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THE GREATNESS AND
DECLINE OF ROME

By GUGLIELMO FERRERO

Authorized Translation

Vol. I.—The Empire Builders

Vol. II.—Julius Cæsar

Vol. III.—The Fall of an Aristocracy

Vol. IV.—Rome and Egypt

Vol. V.—The Republic of Augustus

THE GREATNESS AND
DECLINE OF ROME

THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME

VOL. II.

JULIUS CÆSAR

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NEW YORK
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

1909

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At the end of vol. ii. the reader will find a Bibliography explaining the abbreviations used in the footnotes, and four critical Appendices :

1. On the Corn Trade in Antiquity.
2. On the Chronology of the Campaigns of Lucullus.
3. The Relations of Crassus, Pompey and Cæsar between 70 and 60 B.C.
4. The War against the Helvetii and the Suevi.

CHAPTER I

CÆSAR'S FIRST YEAR IN GAUL

Cæsar's first blunder and first success in Gaul—The negotiations with the Helvetii—the Helvetian trek—Cæsar's first operations—The battle on the banks of the Saône—Dumnorix—The battle of Ivry—The result of the battle—The peace with the Helvetii—Cicero in exile—The tyranny of Clodius—The war against Ariovistus—The panic at Besançon—Cæsar's first victory—The anti-capitalist law of Gabinus.

THE news that the Helvetian emigration was about to take place hastened Cæsar's departure from Rome. In the February of the preceding year the government of the two Gauls had fallen quite unexpectedly to his share. Since then he had had little chance of preparing for his new duties. During his consulship he was so taken up with the struggles and intrigues of home politics that he had no time to inform himself about Gaul. He had neither read books of travel nor consulted the merchants and politicians who were in relations with the *hinterland* through the Narbonese province. Thus he went out to his duties without any definite ideas of policy and with the meagrest knowledge of the country and its inhabitants.* No doubt he had a clear notion of his general line of conduct. He intended, so far as possible, to apply to Gaul the methods of Lucullus and Pompey in Asia, to let slip no real or imaginary pretext for military operations, to acquire the riches and reputation so easily picked up in the provinces, to demonstrate to his fellow-

58 B.C.

Cæsar's
original Gallic
policy.

* This is shown by the whole development of the war as well as by Cæsar's own confessions. He several times informs us that he only learnt the essential features of the situation on his arrival on the spot, when action was imminent. See B. G., ii. 4, 1; ii. 15, 3; iii. 7, 1; iv. 20, 4.

58 B.C. citizens that he was a skilful diplomatist and a brilliant general. But he had as yet no particular ideas as to the possibility of such a policy, nor of the risks and vicissitudes it might be likely to involve. He would make up his mind on the spot, when he was face to face with the situation. His attitude was characteristic of the debasement of Roman statesmanship both at home and abroad. Politics had now become little more than the art of framing happy improvisations. Cæsar in Gaul was but following the common law. He went out at his own risk; and he worked for his own ends. Lucullus had succeeded; Pompey had succeeded; why should not Cæsar succeed also?

The Swiss
peril.

The first of these improvisations was the war against the Helvetii. There is no doubt that, when he left Rome, Cæsar's views about the emigration of the Helvetii were those which had been circulated through the political world at Rome from 62 onwards by the Æduan emissary, Divitiacus. Divitiacus was the spokesman of a political party in Gaul which had its own reasons for opposing the Helvetian movement. Rome had been taught by him to believe that the Helvetii had designs of invading the country and placing themselves at the head of a great coalition of the Gallic peoples. If they were prepared to be satisfied for the moment with the invasion of the province, in order to enter the country by the shortest route, they intended some day to be the nucleus of a great Celtic Empire which would dominate Gaul and menace the independence of Italy.* With his views on the Helvetian movement inspired by Divitiacus, Cæsar naturally left Rome in excitement the moment he heard that the Helvetii were actually on the march. The danger to Roman interests seemed very real: and there was clearly not a moment to be lost.

Surprise of
Cæsar.

The invasion of the Helvetii had been for some time on

* Cic., A., i. 19, 2. "Senatus decrevit . . . legati cum auctoritate mitterentur, qui adirent Galliæ civitates darentque operam, ne eæ se cum Helvetiis jungerent." This fragment of a letter is of capital importance for the history of the conquest of Gaul; it shows us the point of departure of Cæsar's Gallic policy. See Appendix D.

the horizon. Yet Cæsar, in his inexperience, had allowed himself to be surprised with one legion in Narbonese Gaul and the three others at Aquileia, at the farther end of the Cisalpine province. Sending hasty orders to the legions at Aquileia to rejoin him, and travelling day and night, he hurried out to Geneva where he probably expected to find ^(Genava.) hostilities already begun. 58 B.C.

It was between the 5th and 8th of April when he reached Geneva.* Here, to his great surprise, he found, not war but an embassy from the Helvetii. They explained that a part of their nation desired to trek into Gaul † with their women and children, and asked his permission to pass through the Roman province. It was a reasonable request, neither provocative nor menacing. But Cæsar had been taught by his Æduan advisers to regard the Helvetii as a horde of savages impatient to swoop down on the fertile lands of Gaul. Not unnaturally he suspected treachery. He asked for a few days' consideration, giving the deputation to understand that he would eventually consent. ‡ No sooner had they departed than he began, with the legion he had brought with him and some recruits enlisted on the spot, to fortify all the fordable points on the Rhone between the Lake of Geneva and the Jura.§ The object of these precautions is clear enough. They show that Cæsar expected serious hostilities to ensue after the refusal he had decided to give to the Helvetian demands. But once more he had miscalculated. A negative answer was returned to the Helvetii on the 13th, and the apprehended attack did not take place. The Helvetii made

* Rauchenstein, F. C., 50.

† I think Rauchenstein (F. C., 43) has shown the probability that Cæsar is mistaken in saying that the whole nation joined in the trek.

‡ I follow the version of Dion, xxxviii. 31-2, which differs from Cæs., B. G., i. 7, for the reasons given by Rauchenstein, F. C., 51. As regards Dion's sources, I think Micalèlla, in his interesting work on the subject (Lecce, 1896) has definitely proved, against Heller and Rauchenstein, that Dion has not followed Cæsar's *Commentaries*, but another writer whose account differed from Cæsar's on essential points and was often more probable.

§ Napoleon, J. C., ii. 48, judiciously corrects Cæsar's account of this operation in B. G., i. 8. See Dion, xxxviii. 31.

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no attempt to invade the province,* but sent instead to the Sequani to ask permission to cross the mountains at the Pass of the Écluse, which was readily granted them. Then they set out in their full numbers, with men, women, and children, some 150,000 persons in all,† with three months' supplies and the few valuables they possessed stored in their waggons, under the conduct of an old chief called Divico, taking the Jura route.

The scare about the invasion of the Province had passed away as suddenly as it came, and Cæsar had lost his first opportunity for a campaign. But a second scare still remained. There was still the danger that, as the Ædui had so constantly preached, the Helvetii contemplated the foundation of a great Gallic Empire.

Cæsar
pursues the
Helvetii.

Here was Cæsar's chance. It was urgently necessary that he should have some feat to his credit as soon as was conveniently possible. He decided therefore to declare war upon the future Gallic Empire by pursuing the fancied Empire-builders into the heart of the country. A pretext was easily found. He was already in relations with the Æduan government, which thought itself threatened by the Helvetian trek; and the Governor of the Narbonese province had the Senate's instructions to defend the Ædui. First of

* Cæsar, B. G., i. 8, speaks of the attempt made by the Helvetii to force a passage. He is evidently dealing with special incidents of no particular importance and is telling them with the object of showing the Helvetii in the light of aggressors. If the Helvetii had wished to invade the province, which was at that time garrisoned by but a single legion, they could easily have done so, in view of their immense numerical superiority.

† Cæsar endeavours to create the impression, though he never expressly says so (B. G., i. 29), that the emigrants numbered 360,000. Plutarch, Cæs., 18, and Strabo, iv. 3 (193), give almost the same figures. Orosius, vi. 7, 5, says they were 157,000. This figure is by far the most likely. Rauchenstein, F. C., 44, has shown that 360,000 men with provisions for three months would have made a convoy of more than 60 miles, which Cæsar could have attacked at his leisure where and when he desired. Moreover Cæsar himself (B. G., i. 20) says that 110,000 persons returned to Switzerland. Now we shall see that the losses sustained by the Helvetii during the war were very slight, and as only a small number emigrated northwards and another small group remained in the territory of the Ædui, we may suppose them about 150,000 at the moment of departure.

all, however, it was necessary to have sufficient forces for a campaign. Four legions by themselves were hardly enough. Leaving Labienus to defend the Rhone, Cæsar hastily returned into Cisalpine Gaul, and, while awaiting the three legions he had already recalled from winter quarters at Aquilcia, recruited two more. When these five legions were ready, he crossed the Col de Genève, descended on Grenoble, and marched [Cularo.] rapidly northward along the borders of the province. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of the modern Lyons he was joined by Labienus with the legion he had left at Geneva; and it was probably about the beginning of June when, with six legions and their auxiliaries, some 25,000 men in all,* he crossed the frontier of the Roman province and moved into Gallic territory along the left bank of the Saône.† [Arar.]

* Rüstow, H. K. C., 3, reckons 3000 men to one of Cæsar's legions, but his evidence is taken from the last years of the war. At the beginning of the war a legion must have contained more than this. If we take it at 4000, six legions would give 24,000 legionaries, to which we may add about 1000 auxiliaries, and some 4000 Æduan cavalry, who joined him later.

† This is the view of Von Göler, to which Rauchenstein, F. C., 67 ff., makes strategic objections, which are overwhelming on the assumption that the Helvetii were anxious to move southwards into Saintonge. In that case it would be impossible to understand how Cæsar, who was in the south and wished to cut off their route, should move as far north as Mâcon instead of marching north-west. But is this assumption at all certain? Must we not rather admit that the Helvetii were marching northwards? See Appendix D. On this supposition the operations become completely intelligible. Cæsar intended to surprise them at the passage of the Saône. This explains the mystery why the battle against the Tigurini took place on the left bank of the Saône. It seems to me impossible to assign the merit of this victory to Labienus, as is done by Appian, Gall., 30, and Plut., Cæs., 18. Labienus is very kindly treated in Cæsar's *Commentaries*, which were written just before the outbreak of the civil war when Cæsar was anxious to flatter his generals. Why should he have risked offending Labienus by depriving him of the merit of a comparatively unimportant engagement? It is true that the text of the *Commentaries* does not tell us that Cæsar crossed the Rhone at Lyons (B. G., i. 10. *In Segusiavos exercitum ducit*). The Segusiavi apparently occupied the right bank of the Rhone. Napoleon III. has also placed them on the left bank, simply in order to reconcile this passage of the *Commentaries* with the necessity of making Cæsar cross the Rhone at Lyons. Is it not simpler to suppose that Cæsar, who was writing hastily and seven years after the events described,

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The Helvetii
elude him.

His arrival was well timed. During the last two months the Helvetii had slowly traversed the country of the Sequani and had then entered Æduan territory; they had proceeded as far as the Saône with the intention of crossing it, probably at Mâcon. But whether they had really been pillaging the country or whether the party hostile to the trekkers, inspired by Cæsar, had concocted an agitation throughout the country, no sooner had the Proconsul crossed the Roman frontier than numerous Gallic peoples began to send him deputations begging for help. Petitions came from the Allobroges, who lived on the farther side of the Rhone, the Ambarri, the Ædui, and even from the Sequani, who had actually given the Helvetii permission to pass through their territory.* With a legitimate pretext thus ready to his hand, Cæsar used his senatorial decree in favour of the Ædui to demand 4000 horse and the necessary supplies from that nation, and threw himself headlong into the war. His plan was to surprise the Helvetii, who were beginning to cross the Saône, while they were still engaged in that slow and difficult operation. In a series of forced marches he moved upon Mâcon. When he arrived in the neighbourhood he made a last effort, sending three legions in advance at full marching speed. But he had overestimated the delays of the passage. When his three legions arrived, only a small rearguard still remained on the left bank. To cut this to pieces was simple enough; but the success was but of trifling importance for his object.† Cæsar took one day to throw his whole army on to the opposite bank, and started in pursuit of the Helvetii, who had moved off to the north-west across the undulating country of the Charolais.‡

made a mistake as to the name of this people? In this way it will not be necessary to assume with Saulcy, *Guerre des Helvètes*, in the *Revue Archéologique* for 1861, that Cæsar crossed the Rhone at Vienne and then crossed the Saône in the opposite direction, which is surely absurd.

* That is, if Dion, xxxviii. 32, is to be trusted. Cæs., B. G., i. 11, does not mention the Sequani.

† Rauchenstein, F. C., 61, has shown that Cæs., B. G., i. 12, rather exaggerates this engagement. It did not greatly discourage the Helvetii.

‡ Heller in *Phil.*, xix. 559.

Cæsar imagined that he was marching northwards to suppress a widespread and dangerous movement, perhaps the beginnings of a new Cimbric invasion among the Celtic populations. In reality he was merely blundering into a trap which had been skilfully laid him by Ariovistus. The Helvetii had not the least intention of founding a great Gallic Empire. This was a ridiculous popular fairy-tale to which the Romans and Cæsar, in their ignorance of Gallic affairs, had innocently lent credence, and which Ariovistus had done his best to circulate. There were no political designs in their trek at all. The real centre of political interest lay in quite a different direction. At the moment of Cæsar's arrival what really endangered Gaul was not the Swiss peril, personified in the Helvetian trekkers, but the German peril, personified in Ariovistus.

58 B.C.
Ariovistus and
the Helvetii

Divided for centuries past into a large number of unequal and independent republics which were continually fighting one another for supremacy, and distracted too by desperate party conflicts which often led to warfare through outside intervention,* Gaul had been going through a period of particularly acute disturbance during the two decades preceding Cæsar's arrival, owing to a struggle for supremacy between the Ædui and the Sequani. The contest centred round the possession of the valuable toll-rights over the Saône; † but it involved interests that affected, not the two nations only, but the whole of the country. Some years before, in the course of the struggle, the Arverni and the Sequani, having been defeated by the Ædui, had appealed for aid to Ariovistus, King of the Suevi, bribing him with the promise of territory in Gaul. Ariovistus had crossed the Rhone at the head of his Germans, and had duly helped the Sequani and the Arverni to defeat the Ædui.

Ariovistus in-
vited into Gaul.

The consequences of inviting the Germans west of the Rhine had been far more serious than the two Gallic disputants had foreseen. Once settled in Gaul, Ariovistus had

The German
supremacy.

* Cæs., B. G., vi. 11.

† Strabo, iv. 3, 2 (192).

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no intention of remaining satisfied with the territory assigned him. He summoned numbers of his fellow-countrymen from Germany and, with a victorious army at his back, profited by the divisions which paralysed the Gallic states, to establish, within a few years, a German supremacy over the whole of Gaul. The native population chafed bitterly at the invader,* and a coalition of the states had attempted to liberate the country. But Ariovistus had defeated it,† and had gone on, in the flush of his success,‡ to extract tribute from the Ædui,§ and even to oppress his old allies the Sequani, who were responsible for his original intrusion into Gaul. ||

Parties in
Gaul.

Thus for the last fourteen years there had been growing danger of a German supremacy over Gaul with its centre on the Rhine. Nor was this the most alarming feature in the situation. What was more ominous still was that the imminence of this national peril had intensified rather than allayed the struggle between the two dominant Gallic parties, the conservative or aristocratic, and the popular or rather the plutocratic interest. For some generations past the old Gallic nobility, like their Roman compeers at the time of the Gracchi, had been sinking steadily into the slough of debt, while a small knot of aristocrats, more skilful and venturesome than their fellows, had made use of the pecuniary difficulties of the upper classes to gather a great part of the wealth and authority of the country into their own hands. Some accumulated their riches in lands and capital, others monopolised the tolls and taxes and were the creditors of half the community. Between them they had an innumerable train of debtors, dependants, and servants; they controlled the proletariat by the wholesale distribution of largesse, and were trying to turn the old aristocratic republics of Gaul into something very like an ordinary

* Cæs., B. G., i. 31.

† *Id.* Omnes Galliarum civitates ad se (*i.e.* Ariovistum) oppugnandum venisse . . . eas omnes copias uno prælio . . . superatas esse.

‡ The *prælium ad Magetobrigam* of which Divitiacus speaks (B. G., i. 31) is probably that alluded to by Ariovistus above.

§ Cæs., B. G., i. 36.

|| *Id.*, 32.

monarchy.* All over Gaul in almost every state there were millionaire demagogues, the Gallic analogues of Pompey, Crassus, and Cæsar, who were bidding for the support of the proletariat to strengthen their personal influence, and fighting a winning battle against the conservative nobility, which stood for the old institutions and their old prestige. So fierce was the struggle and so absorbed the combatants that, when the German invader suddenly appeared on the field, both sides thought only of how they might use him for their own petty purposes.

Both parties had been quick to realise that the glory of having driven back Ariovistus across the Rhine would be sufficient to ensure them a long spell of power. But as each side desired to win this prestige as a weapon against the other, they were necessarily debarred from pursuing any common policy against the common enemy. They were thus each thrown back upon allies from outside. The conservative nobility, which was most strongly represented among the Ædui, turned naturally to the Romans, and it was with the object of securing Roman help against Ariovistus that the Ædian Conservatives had been intriguing for some time past, through Divitiacus and others, to force the Senate to intervene in the affairs of Gaul. † The popular or plutocratic party, on the other hand, drew its strength from the masses, and the masses would not tolerate foreign intervention against the foreigner. To call in the Romans against Ariovistus would be to exchange one master for another. Its rallying cry therefore was the liberation of Gaul by the united effort of the Gallic peoples. But since the most civilised and influential states in Gaul were not in a position to head the national cause, they looked for allies of a more martial and primitive strain. ‡ It was natural that at this juncture their eyes should turn eastwards, to Switzerland. The Helvetii were just the instrument they needed. It was the chiefs of the popular party then who were responsible for the Helvetian trek. The Helvetii, who

The National-
ists and the
Helvetii.

* See Cæs., B. G., i. 4 ; i. 18 ; vi. 15 ; vii. 32. Strabo, iv. 4, 3 (197) tells us that the majority of the Gauls lived under aristocratic republics.

† See esp. Cæs., B. G., i. 31.

‡ For all this see Appendix D.

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were finding their own territory too small for them, were promised new lands, we do not know in what part of Gaul, and were to be used as allies in the national uprising against the Suevi, whom they had met and conquered of old in their mountain home.

Disorder in
Gaul.

This then was the situation at the moment of Cæsar's arrival. Both parties preferred a prolongation of the existing anarchy and suspense to the possibility of a victory for their opponents; and the power of Ariovistus was being slowly consolidated, while the two factions were disputing as to the best means of overthrowing him. The Roman party had made a great *coup* by securing the senatorial decree in favour of the Ædui; yet, though two years had elapsed, the decree had not yet been put into force. The National party had succeeded in its turn in inducing the Helvetii to take up arms against Ariovistus; but for three years past one difficulty after another, to which the Conservatives, no doubt, contributed their share, had prevented the trek from taking place. In short, neither party was strong enough to secure a dominant position and lead the patriots of Gaul against the national enemy. Deplorable disorder reigned in every part of the country, and the intensity of the conflict, dividing not only nation against nation, and class against class, but even family against family, is well illustrated by the fact that the head of the National party, the Æduan Dumnorix, was the brother of Divitiacus, the chief of the Roman party.

Rome and the
Helvetii.

The simplest way of stifling this insensate party struggle for supremacy would have been the conclusion of an alliance between Rome and the Helvetii against Ariovistus. But the foolish panic which had broken out in Rome, the obstinacy of the Italians in regarding the Helvetii as a horde of new Cimbri and Teutones, the ignorance of even well-informed Romans regarding Gallic affairs, the intrigues of Ariovistus, and the foolhardy mood in which Cæsar entered on his duties, all combined to make any such understanding out of the question. Italian public opinion favoured an alliance with Ariovistus; and Cæsar had gone out to Gaul determined to play the part of a second Marius by crushing the Helvetii.

This led to an exceedingly complicated situation in Gaul. 58 B.C.
 The party which had demanded Roman intervention could not venture to oppose the Proconsul's projects; yet Cæsar's war against the Helvetii was exceedingly unpopular in Gaul; and to support the ally of Ariovistus looked like treachery to the national cause. Still more painful was the dilemma of the Nationalists. They did not dare openly to resist Rome, yet neither could they abandon the Helvetii to their fate. The Nationalist leaders were of course furious with Cæsar, but they soon realised that the only policy was to conceal their embarrassment. They must lie low, employ every artifice to gain time, work upon the ignorance of the Proconsul and the power that their popularity placed in their hands in order to slip in between Cæsar and their opponents and find some indirect means of relieving the Helvetii. The result was that both parties protested their friendship to Rome. Dumnorix came in person to the Roman camp and offered to pay the expenses of the Æduan cavalry on condition that he himself should be placed in command, intending of course to use his position to help his friends on the other side. Cæsar's campaign against the Helvetii was so unpopular in Gaul that the Roman party did not dare to inform him who his strange cavalry commander really was.

Result of
Cæsar's
intervention.

Thus Cæsar had succeeded in entangling himself in a whole network of difficulties of whose existence he was blissfully unaware. He went off in pursuit of the Helvetii, plunging into the depths of a vast and unknown country, without the faintest suspicion that his first campaign would stultify his position in Gaul from the very start by wounding the hopes and susceptibilities of the great mass of the Gallic people, or that a part of his escort, with their Æduan commander, set out on the expedition with the deliberate intention of betraying him.

Cæsar's
blunder.

The campaign so rashly undertaken was as rashly and strangely pursued. The Helvetii were anxious to carry through their trek as speedily as possible and had no desire to provoke the hostility of Rome. As soon as they learnt that the Roman general had crossed the Saône they sent an

Further
negotiations
with the
Helvetii.

58 B.C.

embassy, with Divico in person at its head, to give a reassuring statement and make a reasonable offer. Divico declared that, despite the unwarranted attack that had been made upon them on the banks of the Saône, the Helvetii did not desire war and were prepared to trek to any territory which Cæsar might suggest. To Cæsar, still under the influence of the Æduan intriguers, these declarations sounded too favourable to be sincere. So far from appeasing him, they only increased his apprehensions. Such proposals from the would-be rulers of Gaul could only be intended to hoodwink a foreigner. In his reply to the embassy Cæsar reproached them with their previous wars against Rome, declared that he refused to trust their word, and demanded hostages as the price of his abstention from attack. Divico replied that the Helvetii were more accustomed to receive than to give hostages, and broke off the negotiations.*

Cæsar
follows the
trekkers.

This was an official declaration of war between Rome and the Helvetii. Yet once more there was a lull before hostilities commenced. The Helvetii, still anxious to avoid fighting, continued their march, prepared to defend themselves but resolved not to attack. Cæsar, fully conscious of the danger involved in a defeat, set himself to follow the Helvetii at five or six miles' distance, waiting for a good opportunity for attack, which the Helvetii abstained from giving him.† For fifteen days the two armies followed one another in this manner, with only a few light cavalry skirmishes in which the horsemen of Dumnorix allowed themselves to be easily beaten.‡ The Helvetii were marching northward towards the Côte d'Or, and Cæsar in his pursuit had been forced to move away from the Saône, which had been his line of communications hitherto. Before long the provisions which had been brought up from Mâcon on beasts of burden began to run low, the supplies promised him by the Ædui failed to arrive, and the Æduan nobles found all their volubility required to explain its non-appearance.

* Cæs., B. G., i. 14.

† *Id.*, 15.

‡ See the judicious criticisms of Rauchenstein (F. C., 73) in Cæsar's account of this march in B. G., i. 15.

At last suspicion began to dawn on Cæsar's mind. He grew impatient, and at last ordered an inquiry. Then, from a hint here and a confession there, his eyes began to be opened to the trap into which he had been inveigled. Slowly the whole complicated political situation of Gaul began to take shape in his mind. He discovered that, if the Æduan aristocrats with Divitiacus at their head were friendly to the Romans, a large part of the Æduan nation was bitterly opposed to them, and that the leader of this section, Dumnorix, had only consented to equip and command the Æduan cavalry in order to assist his real allies the Helvetii. Moreover it was Dumnorix who, through his wealth and popularity, controlled the policy of the Æduan Senate and was endangering the success of the campaign by cutting off the supplies.

Viewed in this light the situation was exceedingly alarming. Cæsar dared not take steps against Dumnorix for fear of exasperating the Ædúi, but he saw that to go on pursuing the Helvetii without bringing them to an engagement was to discourage his own troops and to play into the hands of the traitors. Nothing but a speedy and decisive victory could turn the scales in his favour. His luck did not desert him. On the very day on which he discovered the danger of his position the scouts came in with the news that the Helvetii were encamped about seven miles off, at the foot of a mountain which they had as yet failed to occupy and which could be ascended by a different road from that which they had taken. Here was the long-expected opportunity. Cæsar's scheme was to send Labienus in advance with two legions to occupy the mountain at night; he himself would set out a little later with the rest of the army on the same route as the Ædúi, arriving about dawn at their encampment to attack them in their sleep, while Labienus plunged down upon them from above. The plan was ingenious, and it was executed with care. Labienus left in good time; Cæsar first sent a detachment of scouts commanded by Publius Considius, one of his most trusted veterans; then at the hour fixed, in the dead of night, he started in person with the legions. It was an anxious and agitating moment for a general who was making his

58 B.C.

He discovers his blunder.

Attempted surprise of the Helvetii.

58 B.C. first essay in strategy, with his supplies almost exhausted, with a host of traitors in his camp, and with legions whose courage was none too sure. And indeed, as it turned out, one moment of hesitation was enough to spoil the whole elaborate scheme of attack. At dawn, after a difficult night march, Cæsar had just come within sight of the Helvetian camp when Considius arrived at a gallop to say that the mountain was occupied, not by Labienus, but by the Helvetii. What then had taken place during the night? It looked as if Labienus had been overwhelmed and cut to pieces. In his dismay at the news Cæsar hastily withdrew, and, finding a hill in a favourable position, set out his legions in order of battle expecting an attack. It was not till some hours afterwards, when the sun was already high in the heavens and all remained quiet around him, that he sent out scouts to reconnoitre. Soon he heard that Considius' information had been mistaken. Labienus had successfully occupied the mountain and in vain awaited Cæsar's attack. Meanwhile the Helvetii had quietly broken up camp and moved on.*

[Mont Beauvray near Autun.]

The situation was becoming critical. The troops had by this time only supplies for two days. The two armies had now arrived near Bibracte, the wealthy capital of the Ædui, which lay nearly 20 miles to the west of the line of march. Cæsar had no alternative but to fall back upon

* B. G., i. 21, 22. This account has given rise to many criticisms and conjectures; see Lossau, I. K., i. 304; Rauchenstein, F. C., 76; Sumpf., B. O., p. 14. All these critics, particularly R., seem to me oversubtle. Why should it be impossible that the Helvetii had that evening forgotten to occupy the mountain? Such blunders occur in every war. If the surprise had failed because the mountain was guarded, it would have been in no way Cæsar's fault, and it is not probable that he would have altered the whole of the account and risked doing himself an injustice simply, as R. supposes, to discredit Considius. It seems to me more likely that Considius was really mistaken and that the whole incident happened as Cæsar recounts it. Cæsar is careful to insist on the blunder of Considius in order to explain his own mistake in believing the report and losing his presence of mind. This interpretation has the further advantage of confirming a fact of which we have numerous proofs, namely, that during this first campaign Cæsar was not yet master of his nerves.

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Bibracte for supplies. He was just about to make the necessary arrangements when suddenly, on the site of the modern village of Ivry,* the Helvetii threw themselves upon his legions and offered battle. When he learnt that only accident had saved his followers from a disastrous surprise, Divico probably felt unwilling to have the Romans any longer at his heels, and decided to give battle as the lesser evil.† It may be that he was also unable to control the spirit of his men. However this may be, Cæsar had only just time, by dint of using his cavalry against the advancing enemy, to form up his army in order of battle. He arranged his four legions of veterans in three lines half-way up a hill on the right of the road, with the two new legions and auxiliaries above them, with orders to guard the baggage and prepare an encampment. Before long the Helvetii were upon them in full force, assailing the legions front to front with the headstrong bravery of mountaineers. Divico seems to have been one of those skilful and astute tacticians who, growing up among a primitive people exposed to constant guerilla warfare, like the Boers, learn their art by the continual exercise of a natural gift rather than by theoretical study. He was more than a match (and he knew it) for his ingenious but inexperienced Roman opponent, with his academic ideas of tactics picked up in the Greek manuals he had studied as a young man. Cæsar, who was probably much excited about his first big battle, took the frontal attack for the serious part of the engagement; when the ranks of the Helvetii began slowly to

The Battle
of Ivry.

* According to de Saulcy, *Phil.*, xix. 559.

† It seems unlikely that the Helvetii should have attacked Cæsar as is stated in *B. G.*, i. 23, because they heard he wished to fall back upon Bibracte and concluded that the Roman army had lost courage, or because they wished to cut off his retreat. Everything goes to show that the Helvetii were anxious to reach their journey's end with all their forces, without fighting a battle. It is therefore probable that if they had known that the Romans were about to abandon the pursuit they would have let them go in peace. Moreover, if they had intended to cut the Roman army to pieces they would not have continued their route after the battle. As we shall see, they could have renewed the attack on the following day, under conditions exceedingly unfavourable to Cæsar. It is simpler to find the motive for their action in the surprise attempted by Cæsar on the preceding day.

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give way, he ordered his men to advance down the hill and attack the enemy, who were retiring to an opposite height. But the frontal attack and the retreat were only a feint to draw the Romans down the hill.* Scarcely were they well on the level, than Divico drove in an ambush of 15,000 Boii and Tulingii on their right flank, while the retiring columns wheeled round and returned to the attack. The Romans were attacked simultaneously in front and on the flank, and also threatened in the rear; and the change had taken place so rapidly that Cæsar was unable to send to the troops on the top of the hill for help. A desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued. What exactly took place we do not know. It is impossible to make sense out of the confused and contradictory account left us by Cæsar.† What is clear is that he has something to conceal; for it will hardly be admitted that a writer so clear and definite in his descriptions as Cæsar can have left us a confused account of his first great battle out of pure negligence.

It is probable that the two new legions were panic-stricken,

* Rauchenstein, F. C., 83.

† B. G., i. 25, 26. Cæsar describes the first part of the battle with perfect lucidity and in considerable detail. He relates the frontal attack made by the Helvetii, their retreat, the rash pursuit of the Romans, followed by the flank attack of the Boii and Tulingii. But this was only the beginning of the battle. To explain its development and conclusion Cæsar contents himself with five words: *Diu atque acriter pugnatum est*. "It was a long and hard-contested battle." What really happened we do not know. Cæsar does not again mention the two legions placed in reserve at the top of the hill, and he asks us to believe that in the evening, while a part of the enemy were retiring in perfect order on to a hill, the Romans seized their camp, against the desperate resistance by the other part of the army. He does not tell us what happened to the Helvetii who were retiring to the hill, while the Romans were seizing the camp of their comrades. Is it likely that they stayed there without sending help? Cæsar himself gives us to understand that he made no prisoners; he confesses that the enemy were able to continue their journey the same night, while he was forced to remain three days on the field of battle. So there was no pursuit of the enemy. What then becomes of the victory? All this seems to show that Cæsar's pretended success was, if not a real defeat, at least a regrettable incident which he has carefully hushed up. If Divico had left memoirs as well as Cæsar the affair would probably assume a very different complexion.

and, having received no orders, watched the conflict from above without daring to come to Cæsar's help: that Cæsar succeeded after considerable losses in extricating his men from the defile and gaining some strong position where they were able to resist the attack, and that satisfied with this success the Helvetii eventually retired. If so, the confused account in the *Commentaries* is merely a device to mask what was really a defeat. In any case, Cæsar was obliged to allow the enemy to break up their camp during the night and slowly continue their march towards Langres, leaving not a single prisoner in his hands, while he himself, owing to the large number of dead and wounded, and the fatigue and probably also the discouragement of his soldiers, was forced to remain three days on the field of battle.*

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Result of
the battle.[The Lin-
gones.]

Thus the Helvetii had fully attained their object. But after this initial failure Cæsar could not let matters remain as they were. He was just preparing to pursue the enemy afresh and to avenge his rebuff, cost what it might, when, to his great good-fortune, the Helvetii asked for peace. Tired out by their long march, and perhaps somewhat bewildered by what had taken place, they had suddenly conceived a fear lest Rome might make them pay dear for their victory. They determined to make peace with the Proconsul, and declared that they were ready to return to their old country. Delighted at a proposal which rescued him without risk or dishonour from a dangerous war, Cæsar was prepared to be as magnanimous as circumstances required. Not only did he force the Allobroges to make the Helvetii large grants of grain to tide them over the time till their first harvest, but when the Boii flatly refused to return to their homes he made the Ædui grant them land in their own territory. It was Roman magnanimity at the expense of the Gauls.† In his report to the Senate the result

Conclusion
of peace.

* Cæs., B. G., i. 26.

† The conditions of peace which Cæsar (B. G., i. 27) says that he imposed upon the Helvetii are such as to belie his whole account of the war. It is altogether unlikely that the Helvetii surrendered because the Lingones, on Cæsar's orders, refused to grant them supplies. They were clearly in a position to take what was not given them. Moreover, if Cæsar promised them corn from the Allobroges

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of the campaign was of course set down as a victory.* The Helvetii returned home, with the exception of a small band of hotheads who insisted on continuing the trek towards the Rhine, and were easily cut off by the natives before they reached their destination.

Cæsar's
escape.

If the Helvetii had been less frightened, not of Cæsar but of Rome, if they had attacked the tired and dispirited Roman army on the morrow of the battle, they might have saved Gaul from the Roman supremacy for ever. For twenty-four hours Divico had the destinies of Europe in his hands; but satisfied with having checked Cæsar for a moment, the ignorant tribesman continued on his way. Cæsar had therefore emerged not discreditably from the difficulties into which he had been rash enough to plunge. Unfortunately a negative success of this kind was not sufficient for his purpose. He needed some striking victory to revive his prestige in Italy, where his partisans were finding it increasingly difficult to hold their own.

The agitation
for Cicero's
recall.

It was while Cæsar was campaigning against the Helvetii that the first-fruits of the Democratic revolution began to show above the surface. They were as different from the rosy prophecies of Cæsar as from the jeremiads of his opponents. Cæsar had been mistaken in thinking that during his absence from Rome Crassus and Pompey would be able to control the Republic: that they could impose an unquestioned supremacy, amid a submissive and lethargic public, over a leaderless Opposition, a paralysed Senate and a dragooned and disciplined electorate. The habitual indifference of the upper classes, which neither a great internal crisis, nor war, nor the stress of unsolved problems had shaken into action, had been rudely broken at last, soon after his departure, by an injustice done to a single Roman citizen, by the exile of Cicero. It is a curious

and even land from the Ædui, it is evident that the Helvetii negotiated before concluding peace and obtained favourable conditions. If we add to this the fact that, as Rauchenstein (F. C., 97) has observed, we do not hear in the sequel of Cæsar imposing military contingents on the Helvetii, it can be concluded with practical certainty that the Helvetii did not surrender unconditionally, and did not give up their arms. Perhaps they did not even acknowledge the Roman supremacy.

* The account in the *Commentaries* is probably based on this report.

and significant fact. In that troubled epoch iniquities just as crying were committed daily, and excited neither commiseration nor even comment; indeed Clodius had relied upon the moral apathy of the public for the success of his campaign against the popular writer. But for once the old Roman conscience asserted its claims. The first shock of stupefaction gradually passed away; and the public broke out into open discontent, when they saw their favourite driven out of Italy, his house on the Palatine solemnly burnt, his villas pillaged, and his exile decreed without a trial in a *privilegium* by an electoral majority, which assumed the function of a judicial tribunal to persecute one of the greatest of their fellow-citizens, contrary to every principle of law, for a crime which he had never committed. It was more than even the Roman public was prepared to tolerate. Rome would be forever dishonoured if she made no amends. A violent agitation broke out for Cicero's recall, especially among his admirers in the upper classes.

It would be interesting to know why amid a corrupt and tyrannical régime, endured with a cold and cynical indifference, this particular action excited such universal indignation. Was it because the public felt special admiration or even affection for the victim? Or because his enemy was a man detested by every respectable man in Rome? Or because, by a sort of blind instinct, the public seized upon this opportunity to discharge a whole flood of indignation which had been slowly accumulating for months at other acts of injustice, but which it had neither found the courage nor the occasion to reveal? These great phenomena of collective psychology are still dark and mysterious to the historian.

Psychology of
the agitation.

This much only is certain: that while Cicero was mournfully sailing into exile his name began to be held in ever-increasing veneration in his own country among the public of knights and senators. The first manifestation of sympathy in his favour was all the more impressive because it took place in silence. When Clodius held an auction for his possessions not a soul appeared to bid for them.* But this was only a begin-

Demonstration
in Cicero's
honour.

* Cic., Pro Domo, xli. 107-108. Plut., Cic., 33.

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ning. It was followed by demonstrations of all sorts, during which every opportunity was taken to testify to the exile's popularity. Many of the rich citizens placed their fortunes at his disposal; for Cicero was now practically a ruined man and had been reduced to living on the dowry of Terentia.*

Influence and
activity of
Clodius.

Unfortunately while the star of Cicero was thus in the ascendant among the wealthy classes, the light of his persecutor Clodius still monopolised his quarter of the heavens. The youngest recruit in the ranks of the proletariat, who knew neither fear nor scruples, and combined the violence of the demagogue with the self-assurance of the aristocrat, was prepared to assert his claim to dominate the community not so much by his intellect, which was indeed in no way remarkable, but by the one quality in which he outshone all his rivals—his uncontrollable audacity. Against the leaderless Conservatives and the dispirited Senate the Tribune was in his element. Inviolable by the nature of his office, unassailably popular through his recent corn-law, director through his creature Sextus of the free distributions of food, chief of the voters' associations which controlled every election, closely allied to the two consuls, for whom he had secured a five years' governorship, Clodius began systematically to imitate and even to exaggerate the methods of his master. His particular predilection was to exploit the field of foreign policy for pecuniary purposes. He commenced by a stroke of characteristic daring in conniving at the escape of the son of Tigranes whom Pompey had condemned to a sort of honorary imprisonment in the house of a Senator. The Armenian had paid him well for his assistance; but it was a grave insult to Pompey, and every one was wondering what action he would take. Men were already beginning to hope for an open rupture between the Democratic leaders.† But Pompey was in no mood for a fight, and decided to overlook the matter altogether. So the irrepressible Tribune continued uninterrupted on his way, selling kingdoms, privileges, and priesthoods in all parts of the Empire,‡ and rapidly rising to be the real master of the capital.

* Cic., *Post reditum in senatu*, ix. 22.

† *Id.*, *Pro Domo*, xxv. 66. A., iii. 8, 3.

‡ *Id.*, *Pro Sest.*, xxvi. 56; xxx. 65 (much exaggerated).

The demonstrations of Cicero's admirers, with no practical leverage behind them, were not likely to impress a man cast in this mould. Clodius was not the kind of politician to be intimidated by an agitation concerted between the wealthy and middle classes and the more respectable section of the proletariat, nor by decrees (or rather, in the modern phraseology, resolutions) passed by the big syndicates of tax-farmers, or the college of scribes and free officials of the Republic, or the numerous colonies and municipalities all over Italy which were enthusiastic for Cicero's recall.* He would fight long and fiercely before he released his prey. The friends of Cicero had no illusions about their antagonist, and they set themselves patiently to the task of exerting pressure upon the Senate, and upon Pompey, the most naturally Conservative and the most impressionable of the three Democratic chiefs. It was useless to count upon Crassus, who had been stubbornly hostile to Cicero ever since the Catilinarian revelations.

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Cicero's de-
fenders and
Clodius.

Thus it was that an act of injustice to a single individual had gradually stirred up a serious political crisis which was now convulsing the entire community. As no one ventured to buy the site of Cicero's house, Clodius had it purchased by a man of straw, and to make its future restitution more difficult was contemplating the erection of a loggia and a little Temple of Liberty.† The friends of Cicero, on their side, had on the 1st of June brought forward a proposal for his recall in the Senate; when Clodius had induced a Tribune to veto it,‡ they had their revenge by organising a huge popular demonstration to his brother Quintus, on his return from Asia. They had further compelled the Senate to declare that no other public matter should take precedence over the question of Cicero;§ and they were making arrangements to use all their influence at the elections for the success of his partisans.

The return
of Quintus.

Meanwhile the unhappy object of all this excitement and enthusiasm in Italy was pining away his soul at Thessalonica.|| [Saloniki.]

* Cic., Pro Domo, xxviii. 74.

† *Id.*, xxxviii. 102; xliii. 111.

‡ *Id.*, Pro Sest., xxxi. 68.

§ *Id.*, xxxi. 68.

|| *Id.*, A., iii. 15, 1.

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Cicero was thoroughly miserable in exile. All his ordinary tastes seemed for the time to have deserted him. He could neither write nor read (at other times his unfailing resource), nor enjoy the relaxations of travel. He refused to receive the visit either of friends or relations, and spent all his time devising and picking to pieces endless projects for his return, overwhelming his friends with letters sometimes plaintive and reproachful, sometimes buoyant and hopeful, in a continual alternation of confidence and despair.* The times were changed and the part of Rutilius Rufus ill suited his temperament. Meanwhile the Conservatives did their best to keep open the question of his recall, speaking of him as though he were indeed a second Rufus and the victim, not of a personal animosity in a flimsy political disguise, but of the violence and rancour of the entire popular party. If the elections could only be fought upon Cicero, there was some chance of avenging the defeats of the preceding year. The most tempting prospects were thus opened up. Varro and other friends of Cicero, not content with urging Pompey to secure his recall, used the widespread agitation as an argument for the divorce of Julia and Pompey's eventual return to the Conservative side.† In short, the political situation in Italy towards the middle of 58 was such as to cause serious anxiety to the absent triumvir. Unfortunately, soon after the close of the Helvetian campaign he found himself confronted with new troubles even closer at hand.

Meeting of the
General
Assembly of
Gaul.

After the conclusion of peace Cæsar had believed for a moment that his brief campaign against the Helvetii would have far-reaching and favourable results. He had seen assembled around him under his presidency, yet without his own initiative, the *Concilium totius Galliæ* or general assembly of Gaul, almost all the states having spontaneously sent him deputations. Nor had they come merely to offer empty congratulations, but to beg for Roman help against the national enemy, Ariovistus. This was in itself significant. It was no

* See Cic., xiv. 1; xiv. 2; xiv. 4. Ad. Q., i. 3; i. 4; A., iii. 7; iii. 8; iii. 9; iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12; iii. 13; iii. 15; iii. 19; iii. 21.

† Plut., Pomp., 49.

longer, as in the war against the Helvetii, one political party from among a single nation, the Ædui, but the whole of Gaul, without distinction of parties and states, which now declared its willingness to accept the suzerainty of Rome by appealing for her aid in the most important of national questions. It was hardly possible to doubt what this general assembly seemed in itself to prove, that the Helvetian war had done more to increase Roman prestige in Gaul than a generation of negotiations and senatorial debates.

Yet Cæsar was not slow to perceive that the situation was not altogether so favourable as it seemed. It was a solemn and decisive moment in the history of Gaul and of the world when the great Gallic assembly met for the first time under the presidency of the representative of Rome. It was then, very probably, for the first time, that Cæsar had a clear view of the whole political situation of Gaul in its proper perspective, that he was able to see both the real object pursued by the Helvetii in their trek and the essential fact, whose importance had hitherto escaped him, that the true enemy of Roman influence in Gaul was not the old tribesman Divico, but Ariovistus. It was evident that the Roman Proconsul could not obtain the supremacy he desired in Gaul, could not win a position which would enable him on one pretext or another to extract large sums of money from the free Celtic Republics, unless he first disembarassed the country of his German competitor, who had stepped prematurely into his own coveted place. But as he gradually grew better to understand the political situation of the country he realised the full extent of his blunder in attacking the Helvetii, the brave little nation which had itself been prepared to play its part against the German. This campaign had indeed been trebly unfortunate. It had robbed him of an ally who might have been very useful in the coming struggle and thus considerably strengthened his real rivals, the Germans; it had alienated the powerful Nationalist party and the patriotic sentiment of Gaul, which could not forgive either the Roman Proconsul or his Gallic allies; and it had compromised the prestige of Rome in Gaul and lessened his chances in the war against

The Gallic
situation
unveiled.

58 B.C.

Ariovistus—a war which must inevitably be fought out, if the Celtic Republics were ever to be brought within the circle of Roman influence.

The call to arms against the Germans.

It was not out of admiration for Rome that the whole of Gaul sent ambassadors to Cæsar to ask his help against the German intruder. That imposing demonstration of Gallic unity was merely the last despairing effort of the Roman and Conservative party to draw what profit it could out of the situation created by Cæsar's first campaign. The failure of the Helvetian trek, which was the direct result of Æduan intrigue, had excited so much indignation in Gaul that the Conservatives now recognised that their one and only chance was to induce Cæsar to turn his arms without delay against Ariovistus. If Cæsar remained quiet after the conclusion of peace the people would perforce have believed the popular Nationalist agitators, who accused the Ædui and the whole aristocratic party of having betrayed the national cause by calling in the Romans against the Helvetii and thus leaving Gaul in the hands of the Germans. On the other hand, if Cæsar drove the Suevi across the Rhine, the Conservatives would be able to declare that they had done far better service than the so-called Nationalists to the national cause, while at the same time in the victorious Proconsul they would secure a solid support for their future power. The one thing necessary, therefore, was to force Cæsar into the war with all possible speed.

Prospects of the campaign.

Cæsar was not slow to perceive that the pressing and respectful solicitations of the Gallic representatives were practically a summons to arms. Already by the Helvetian war he had alienated the powerful National party and the mass of the people, and now, unless he crushed Ariovistus, the Roman party too would turn against him and he and his small army would be isolated in the midst of a vast and hostile country, with no chance of support from either side. He would have no alternative but an inglorious evacuation. A campaign against Ariovistus was the only means of winning the prestige he had hoped to find in his Helvetian campaign. Unfortunately this indispensable enterprise was not one of those adventures which can be improvised within a few weeks

without serious danger. It involved marching into a strange country with a small army of six legions, with no good base of operations, against an enemy elated by a succession of victories, whose forces were believed to be indefinitely numerous. Cæsar could not depend upon the loyalty of the Gauls, upon whom he relied entirely for supplies; and he would leave behind him a powerful party which was longing for his overthrow. His experience in the Helvetian campaign enlightened him as to the full nature of his difficulties. Finally, and this might be most serious of all, in the case of a reverse, there were technical reasons against the course he was taking. Only a year ago, Ariovistus had been declared friend and ally of the Roman people, and no reasonable pretext of war could be alleged against him.

Cæsar had perhaps never yet been in so awkward a dilemma. He had to stake all that he had gained by a long and painful conflict, and all that he hoped to gain in the future, upon the doubtful result of a very hazardous campaign. A single defeat would mean the end of his whole Gallic adventure, and his fate in Italy was bound up with his fate in Gaul. But, with the lucidity of judgment and quickness of decision that never failed him in an emergency, Cæsar made up his mind that the ordeal must be faced; and he resolved to meet it at once by improvising a campaign to the best of his ability.

The first business was to find a pretext. He began by inviting Ariovistus to meet him because he had certain matters to discuss.* It was insolently phrased, and the chieftain naturally replied that, if Cæsar needed him, he had only to visit him himself to tell him what he wished. Cæsar refused the suggestion, and asked him to make various concessions in favour of the Ædui and Sequani. Ariovistus, now thoroughly out of temper, not unnaturally refused. Cæsar then declared that he had been authorised to make war on him by the well-known decree in favour of the Ædui. Warned, however, by his previous experience, Cæsar was

Cæsar's
dilemma.

Cæsar occupies
Besançon.

* Dion, xxxviii. 34. For the chief differences between Dion's account and Cæsar's, and the reasons for following Dion, see Micaëlla, F. D., 38 f.

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[Vesontio.]

determined to run no risks of starvation or treachery in the course of his march. He occupied Besançon, the largest and richest town of the Sequani, organised a commissariat to be supplied by the Ædui and Sequani, and replaced Dumnorix as cavalry commander by Publius Crassus, son of Marcus.

Panic and
mutiny at
Besançon.

But once on the road a new difficulty confronted him. The courage of his soldiers, already sorely tried by the perils and carnage of the Helvetian campaign, had been broken down by accounts given them about Germany and the Germans through the inhabitants and merchants of Besançon; and at the last moment they refused to march. They were far too few, they declared, to attack so formidable a foe, and would assuredly go astray and starve in the huge forests and deserts of a trackless country. Fear had reminded them too of the obligations of conscience. A war against a king whom the Senate had declared a friend and ally was hardly justifiable, and the gods would surely deny it a favourable issue.* This was just the sort of difficulty Cæsar knew how to face. He called a meeting of officers and men, met their undeniable arguments with appeals to their self-respect, and stirred all their pride as Roman soldiers by dramatically declaring that if all the others refused he would set out alone with his 10th legion, which he knew would not fail him at need.

On the following day the army set out for the valley of the Rhine. After a march of seven days it arrived in the valley of the Thur, and soon afterwards came in sight of the army of Ariovistus. Cæsar, who knew that Ariovistus was expecting reinforcements, at once offered battle; but Ariovistus declined

* Dion (xxxviii. 35) says that the panic broke out among the soldiers. Cæsar, on the other hand (B. G., i. 39), pretends that it first showed itself among the higher officers. Dion's account is the more likely. It is impossible that the officers should have been so lacking in dignity or courage as to allow the soldiers to witness their nervousness. On the other hand, if we admit that the war against the Helvetii was not altogether favourable to the Romans, a panic among the soldiers is very natural. Dion's version is so much more likely than Cæsar's that even Petsch, though generally inclined to accept Cæsar, admits that he has here tampered with the truth. This story illustrates how Cæsar is inclined to exalt the valour of his soldiers and make light of the merit of his higher officers, almost all of whom belonged to the aristocracy.

it for several days, telling his men when they grew impatient that the prophetesses would not let him fight before the new moon.* Meanwhile he contented himself with threatening Cæsar's communications with the Ædui and Sequani and occupying his soldiers in cavalry skirmishes and surprise attacks, without ever venturing upon a general engagement. One day, however, it seems that one of these raids was carried farther than usual, no doubt owing to a mistake on Cæsar's part, and very nearly resulted in the capture of one of the two camps between which, for greater convenience in provisioning, Cæsar had divided his army.† What then ensued is left obscure in our accounts. Perhaps Ariovistus placed too much confidence in his troops, or he may have been unable any longer to restrain their impatience. What is certain is that next morning, when Cæsar brought his troops out of camp, Ario-

* Cæsar (B. G., i. 54) says incidentally that Ariovistus was expecting reinforcements. This is undoubtedly the true reason why he delayed giving battle. The predictions of the women spoken of by Cæsar in ch. 50 were merely the explanation given to the soldiers.

† This mishap to Cæsar is recounted by Dion (xxxviii. 48). I believe it to be correct although, as Petsch observes, Dion's account of this war is very confused. If no event of the sort be admitted it is difficult to explain why Ariovistus changed his tactics. Cæsar's account is itself not free from obscurity. For instance, in ch. 50 he says that one day after keeping his army in the field in the morning, drawn up ready for battle, he led it back into its entrenchments. "Then at last," he adds, "Ariovistus led out a part of his army to attack the small camp and a violent struggle took place till evening. Finally Ariovistus withdrew his troops after great losses on both sides." Clearly what is being here described is a serious engagement; but it is told in a vague and confused manner. How did the soldiers in the small camp behave, and what became of their comrades in the large camp? Did the latter make a sortie to attack the assailants, and did they succeed in drawing out the other troops of Ariovistus? We do not know what sort of a fight it was, nor what troops took part in it. In the next chapter Cæsar tells us that on the following day he led his legions up to the enemy's camp, and that the Gauls were *compelled* to accept battle. What is meant by this? Why should the Germans have been unable to remain behind their entrenchments, as on every other day? Moreover, if Cæsar was so near their camp, how were the Germans able to bring their troops into line? The obscurity here must also conceal something of importance, which is probably connected with the fight on the previous day. Very likely it was more serious than Cæsar wishes us to know, and was indeed what decided Ariovistus to give battle

58 B.C.

Defeat of
Ariovistus.

vistus accepted battle. The right wing of the Roman army broke through the enemy's front, but the left wing could not resist the onset, and was already beginning to give way, before Cæsar, who was on the right, became aware of what was going on. Fortunately Publius Crassus, who was in reserve with his cavalry, realised the peril and ordered the third line of reserves to move up in support. The experience of the Helvetian campaign had proved useful and the Romans emerged victorious. Ariovistus retreated precipitately across the Rhine, renouncing his Gallic ambitions for good. The German rule over Gaul was a thing of the past.

The Protector-
ate of Gaul.

It is this victory over Ariovistus, and not his campaign against the Helvetii, which must be counted as Cæsar's first great political and military success. It was an important success because it transferred to Rome, at least for a time, the Protectorate which Ariovistus had hitherto been exercising over the divided republics of Gaul. So far this Protectorate was in no way comparable to the great Asiatic conquests of Lucullus and Pompey; yet in Cæsar's hands it might become a very useful instrument both for filling his own coffers and for bringing pressure to bear upon Italian politics. But for the moment Cæsar had no time to attend to his new conquests or to drive home his victory. All he could do was to send his legions into winter quarters under Labienus in the territory of the Sequani and immediately return into Cisalpine Gaul. Bad news had come up from Rome.

Clodius and
Cicero's reoall.

No one in Italy suspected the importance of what was taking place in Gaul, and no one therefore displayed the least interest in its details. Attention was exclusively directed upon Cicero, whose cause excited ever-growing enthusiasm as the struggle between his friends and Clodius became increasingly violent. At the elections Cicero's party had won a striking success. The two new Consuls, Publius Cornelius Lentulus and Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, were both favourable to Cicero, besides seven out of the eight Prætors, and eight out of the ten Tribunes.* The public was delighted,

* Cic., *Post red. in sen.*, ix. 22, 23. *Ad. Quir. post red.*, vi. 15.

and hoped that this result would hasten the exile's recall, particularly as Pompey had promised to bring the question before the Senate after the elections.* But Clodius was not easily discouraged. Knowing how easy it was to intimidate Pompey and his Senatorial flatterers, he had begun by attacking him in a series of violent speeches; he had then appeared at the head of his supporters to break up the public meetings of Cicero's partisans; and had ended by posting up on the door of the Senate House the preamble of his law against Cicero, forbidding the Senate hereafter to discuss the question.† Pompey was seriously alarmed. Finding no help from Crassus he had thoughts of appealing to Cæsar. But Clodius, growing daily more violent, actually threatened to burn his house and put him to death,‡ while, encouraged by the apathy of the Consuls, he terrorised the whole city at the head of his bands. The public could protest as much as it liked against the exile of Cicero: the politicians were at the mercy of the irrepresible Tribune. For the time at least all further advance was barred. Pompey retired to his house and refused to show himself in public.§ No one in the Senate dared whisper a proposal. At last a personal friend of Cicero's ventured timidly to raise his voice. To evade the difficulty resulting from the veto posted up by Clodius on the doors of the Senate House, Sestius endeavoured to include Cicero's cause in a general formula which did not mention him by name;|| but nothing came of the suggestion. Clodius made use of the temporary paralysis of his adversaries to inaugurate the little Temple of Liberty on the site of Cicero's house, putting up as an image of the goddess, at least so Cicero tells us, a statue of a courtesan from Tanagra.¶ To increase the popularity of his cause he then began to bribe the public with wholesale donations of corn bought up in all parts of Italy, wasting on this purpose the money brought home by Pompey, which

* Cic., A., iii. 13, 1; A., iii. 14, 1.

† *Id.*, A., iii. 15, 6.

‡ *Id.*, De arusp. resp., xxiii. 49; Pro Domo, xxv. 67.

§ Plut., Pomp., 49. Drümman, G. R., ii. 272 f.

|| Cic., A., iii. 20, 3.

¶ *Id.*, Pro Domo, xliii. 111.

58 B.C.

was to have served for the administration of Cæsar's Land Law.*

Pompey
asserts
himself.

But this was at last too much for Pompey. He decided to put down his foot, and show Rome who was the master of the Republic. With this object he resolved to send Sestius to Cæsar to ask his consent to the recall of Cicero.† He detached the Consul Gabinius from Clodius's side and persuaded him to form a band of supporters to resist the hired ruffians of Clodius.‡ He also induced eight Tribunes of the people to propose, on the 29th of October, a law of recall in favour of Cicero.§ In order not to offend Pompey, the Tribunes consented; but at the same time, to avoid quarrelling with their formidable colleague, they inserted into the law a clause which practically stultified the whole, to the effect that no part of their proposals should repeal or decide any matter with which it had previously been declared illegal to deal.|| So another of these strange legal expedients ended in failure.

Clodius ap-
proaches the
Conservatives.

Amidst all these disorders, no one at Rome found time to pay attention to Cæsar, and the end of the German protectorate fell absolutely flat. Cæsar realised that just at present the Italian public had no ear for victories, and that the recall of Cicero might be far more useful to his cause. He therefore assented to Pompey's request.¶ But a complicated question was not so quickly settled. Determined to use extreme measures to avert what was now seen to be inevitable, Clodius adopted the most unexpected of all his many devices. He turned against his old master, and made advances to the Conservatives, promising to declare Cæsar's laws null and void on the frivolous pretexts already brought forward by Bibulus.**

Clodius' tribunate ran out at last on the 9th of December;

* Cic., Pro Domo, ix. 23; x. 25.

† *Id.*, Pro Sest., xxxiii. 71.

‡ *Id.*, Pro Domo, xxv. 66, 67.

§ *Id.*, A., iii. 23, 1.

|| *Id.*, A. ii. 3.

¶ Dion, xxxix. 10.

** Cic., Pro Domo, xv. 40. Drümman, G. R., ii. 281.

but it had been long enough to send Rome into a condition bordering on frenzy. It left the Democratic party hopelessly divided. Pompey had lost all confidence in Crassus; Crassus detested Pompey; Clodius and Pompey were at open war; there was dissension between the Consuls, Piso remaining friendly to Clodius, while Gabinius had taken sides with Pompey. Public affairs were in a state of absolute chaos. The Senate had ceased to transact business; Crassus held his peace and did nothing; Pompey displayed a feeble and spasmodic activity; Cæsar's Land Law, for which so many battles had been fought a year ago, had not begun to be administered. Gabinius alone showed signs of energy; he had passed an anti-plutocratic measure forbidding Italians to invest money outside Italy, in the hope of forcing capital to remain in the country and of diminishing the rate of interest to the advantage of debtors.*

57 B.C.

Results of
Clodius'
tribunate.

Meanwhile Cicero was still in exile. At the sitting of the 1st of January 57 his recall was at last discussed.† Some of the Senators were bold enough to declare that Clodius' law was illegal, and that it was, consequently, unnecessary to make a new law to annul it. The law being void in itself, it was sufficient to invite Cicero to return. But Pompey, who was more cautious, suggested that it would be better not to enter into a conflict with the electors on a technical point, but to have a new law passed.‡ Since the whole matter was merely a formality, the new law would be approved without difficulty. But he had left Clodius out of his reckoning. When on the 25th of January 57 the law for Cicero's recall was brought before the electors to be discussed, Clodius, though now but an ordinary citizen, appeared at the head of his bands to prevent its approval, and in the riots that took place the Forum was bathed with blood, which it took sponges to wash off again next morning.§

Attempted
legislation for
Cicero's recall.

* Mommsen in *Hermes*, 1899, p. 145 f.

† *Cic.*, *Pro Sest.*, xxxiii. 72. In *Pis.*, xv. 34.

‡ *Id.*, *Pro Domo*, xxvi. 68; *Pro Sest.*, xxxiv. 73.

§ *Id.*, *Pro Sest.*, xxxv. 77; *Plut.*, *Cic.*, 33.

CHAPTER II

THE ANNEXATION OF GAUL *

The expedition against the Belgæ—Their retreat and submission—Disorganisation of the Democratic party—The annexation of Gaul—Cæsar as the instrument of destiny—Ptolemy and the Roman bankers—The Egyptian question—The meeting at Lucca.

57 B.C.

THE situation at Rome was indeed becoming critical; for during the winter of 58–57 famine supervened to intensify the prevalent disorders. Its cause is probably to be found in the enormous purchases made by Clodius in the preceding year and his reckless profusion in their distribution, perhaps also in the general anarchy and uncertainty, which frightened the merchants and paralysed the magistrates. The first explanation was at any rate that which commended itself to the enemies of the ex-tribune, who were anxious to deprive him of his post under the corn-law, and held him personally responsible for the distress.†

Famine at Rome.

The Nationalist plan of campaign.

But in spite of this accumulation of difficulties Cæsar was unable this year to keep in touch with Italian affairs as he would have liked. Disquieting news from Labienus forced him to cross the Alps again almost immediately. The victory over Ariovistus had not been sufficient to wipe out the Helvetian campaign; the consequences of this fatal blunder dogged him at every step. The Nationalists, who detested the Roman intruder, distrusted the assurances he had so readily given that he would respect the liberties of Gaul, and were preparing for a new war. Their plan was the same as that which they had adopted against Ariovistus: to secure the

* The incidents in the Gallic War which are told without references are drawn from Cæsar's *Commentaries*, where the reader will have no difficulty in finding them.

† Cic., *Pro Domo*, x. 25.

alliance of some primitive and warlike people against the national enemy. This time it was to be the Belgæ, a name which includes all the mixed populations of Celts and Germans living between the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Seine, and the Atlantic. 57 B.C.

When Cæsar received the early information of the coming trouble from Labienus, the full scheme of the war had not yet been sketched out. Yet its imminence in the near future was bound to cause him anxiety. It showed him that, unless he consented to withdraw his legions into the Narbonese Province and abandon all thoughts of intervention in Gaul proper, he must make ready for some hard fighting. On the other hand, the poor impression he had made at Rome by his victory over Ariovistus forced him to move on to some more important and sensational enterprise. He had the winter in which to make up his mind. He decided to let Crassus, Pompey, Clodius and Cicero fight it out between them in Italy, while he went back to Gaul to prepare a thrilling adventure recalling the exploits of Lucullus in the East. He proposed to anticipate the attack of the Belgæ by bearding them in their own native strongholds before their arrangements were complete. Their country was a long way off and utterly unknown to the Romans; * and the Belgæ were regarded as an exceedingly formidable enemy, not only because of their valour, which was well known in Southern Gaul, but because of their numbers, upon which information was scanty, but quite sufficiently alarming. In all probability, therefore, it was a question of a long and difficult campaign; but Cæsar was not to be deterred. He was far too eager for some success that would consolidate his influence in Italy to make nice calculations about the risks he was taking.

But once clear as to his policy he did not rush blindly at his goal. The campaign against Ariovistus had warned him of the necessity of cautious and well-considered preparation. Since he could not calculate the enemy's forces with any exactitude he began by increasing his own. He sent agents to Africa, Crete, and the Balearic Islands for archers and

* Cæsar says so himself. B. G., ii. 4.

57 B.C. slingers, and raised two new legions in the Cisalpine province, sending them into Gaul under the command of Quintus Pedius. Shortly afterwards he crossed the Alps in person, and rejoined his army in the Franche Comté. Thence, after making careful arrangements for supplies, he moved rapidly, in a fortnight, into the enemy's territory, and surprised the first nation he invaded, the Remi, into submission. This initial success might be of considerable importance; for the Remi were in a position to give him more exact information as to the enemy's forces. The answer to his inquiries was not reassuring; the Belgæ, it appeared, could put some 350,000 men into the field. Cæsar had no means of testing the truth of this statement, or of judging whether the Remi were sincere in their professions of friendship. In any case, whether the information was correct or not, it was a call for caution. He therefore extracted hostages from the Remi, and persuaded the Ædui to invade the country of the Bellovaci, the most powerful of the Belgian peoples, to detach them from the general coalition, while he himself made a strong bridge-head on the Aisne, where he placed six cohorts under Quintus Titurius Sabinus and established his camp on the right bank with its flank on the river. Here, behind strong entrenchments, he waited with his eight legions for the approach of the Belgæ. When at last they came up, he refused to give battle. He was anxious first to study his new enemy and their method of fighting, and to prepare an elaborate battlefield by digging and fortifying two huge trenches 400 feet long, between which his army could fight sheltered from flank attacks. This was a precaution he had learned from Divico; but on this occasion it proved singularly useless. The enemy were not so naïve as to choose the ground he had prepared for their frontal attack; and though day after day they marched out in battle formation, and ranged up on the farther side of a small marsh, they too, like the Romans, kept stubbornly on the defensive.

[Arona.]

Break-up of
the Belgian
coalition.

In this way some time passed without any decisive action. Suddenly one day Cæsar was informed by Titurius that the Belgæ were attempting to turn his position by fording the river a little below the camp, to cut Cæsar's communications

with the south. Cæsar hastily moved out across the bridge with the cavalry, archers, and slingers, and, arriving at the moment when the enemy were just entering the ford, charged them headlong into the bed of the stream. The engagement was short and sharp, and, after a feeble resistance, the Belgæ retired. Taken aback by this precipitate retreat, which did not seem justified by the losses they had suffered, Cæsar suspected stratagem and had the banks of the river watched all day. But at evening, when all remained quiet and he was just beginning to feel reassured, still more surprising intelligence was brought in. The whole Belgian army was in retreat. It seemed hardly credible after one slight skirmish; and Cæsar dared not move his troops out of camp during the night. It was only next morning, when the news was confirmed, that he threw three legions under Labienus on the heels of the enemy, together with a force of cavalry under Quintus Pedius and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta. Before long he discovered the explanation of a retreat which put a sudden end, after a short advance-guard skirmish, to what had seemed likely to develop into a formidable war. Only a few days before, the Bellovaci had heard of the Æduan invasion into their territory; they were clamouring to return to the defence of their country, but had been induced to stop for the attack on the day before their departure. When this had failed and supplies threatened to run short, they had broken up camp, and the rest of the army had followed them. Thus, after a brief and unsatisfactory campaign, the great Belgian coalition dispersed to the four winds.

Cæsar at once realised that if he acted quickly he could now take each state singly and subdue one after another. He was not the man to miss his chance. Without a day's delay he marched into the country of the Suessiones, surprised their force as they were just disbanding, and quickly persuaded them to submit. He was equally successful with the Ambianes. Then he moved on, with the same promptitude but still greater daring, to deal with the Nervii. The Nervii were the most warlike and barbarous people among the Belgæ. They were still so primitive as to grant no admittance into

The battle
against the
Nervii.

57 B.C.

their cheerless and sparsely populated country to the insidious merchants from Greece and Italy who tried to tempt them with the cajolements of imported wine. And they were crafty as well as brave, as the invading army found out to its cost. Joining hands with their neighbours, the Atrebatæ and Viromandi, they succeeded in surprising the Roman troops in their forests at twilight, just while they were constructing their camp for the night. A terrible hand-to-hand conflict ensued, in which the general himself had to fight like a common soldier. If the Roman troops had not learnt by the experience of the last two years to fight on their own initiative without awaiting orders from their officers, they would very probably have been annihilated. As it was, a hard-won fight ended in the submission of the Nervii. The only people now still remaining in arms was the Aduatuci, who on the news of the defeat of the Nervii burned their villages and took refuge in a fortress on the site of the modern Namur. Cæsar marched up and besieged it, and when, after a few days, proposals for capitulation were offered him he accepted on the usual condition that all arms should be given up. All day long the besieged busily carried out their arms from the fortress or hid them in the trenches; but at nightfall they took them from their concealment and burst out upon the Romans. The attack was repulsed, the town recaptured, and all the besieged, according to Cæsar no less than 53,000 in number, were sold as slaves to the merchants who accompanied the army.*

Effect of these
victories on
Gaul.

By this series of victories over such a number of semi-civilised and warlike peoples Cæsar caused a great sensation in the whole of Gaul and forced even doubters who had jeered at his exploits against the Helvetii to recognise the reality of the Roman supremacy. Most important of all, he had made large captures of prisoners, whom he generally sold on the spot, and of booty. There can be no doubt that in the course of his devastations he must have unearthed great quantities of precious metals, which the Belgæ, like all primitive peoples, were in the habit of hoarding. But the essential

* Cæs., B. G., ii. 33.

question still remained to be answered. Would his victories produce as great an impression in Italy as they had produced in Gaul?

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The news from Rome was indeed far from reassuring, and led Cæsar to anticipate the break-down of the Democratic régime. Cicero had at length returned from exile, welcomed throughout Italy by enthusiastic demonstrations. Yet Clodius' law of banishment had only been repealed by Pompey's discovery, among the Tribunes for 57, of a man capable of standing up against the uncontrollable demagogue. The new Conservative hero was a certain Titus Annius Milo,* a penurious aristocrat who shared the foolhardy ambitions and the unscrupulous methods of his Democratic rival. Sheltered, like Clodius, by the inviolability of his office, and excited by the promise of the consulship for his exertions, Milo had recruited a private band of gladiators and cut-throats.† By this means Pompey had at last been able on the 4th of August, amid scenes of riot and bloodshed, ‡ to vote the law recalling Cicero and ordering full reparation to be made for his sufferings.

Milo and Clodius.

But peace had not yet returned to the Republic. The Conservatives and Pompey had joined hands to make the famine an excuse for depriving Clodius of his superintendence of the corn-supply. Cicero, now once more among his peers, had gone further still. He had persuaded the Senate to approve a law giving Pompey for five years supreme control and inspection of all ports and markets in the Empire and the power of nominating not more than fifteen subordinates to keep Rome supplied with corn.§ This measure once more provoked the tempest which had been lulled for a moment on Cicero's return. Clodius attempted a revenge by raising the people against Pompey, declaring that it was he who had made food dear in order to make himself king of Rome. He had announced his candidature for the ædileship in the following year; he had attempted through his

Pompey's new appointment.

* Cf. Drümman, i. 2, 31. f.

† Dion, xxxix. 8; App., B. C., ii. 16.

‡ Cic., A., iv. 1, 4.

§ *Id.*, A., iv. 1, 6; Plut., Pomp., 49; Dion, xxxix. 9.

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friends among the Tribunes to prevent Cicero from being indemnified for the demolition of his house; * and finally, at the elections for 56, he had placed his bands at the disposal of the Conservatives and had succeeded in carrying into power all their candidates for the consulship and the prætorship.†

Pompey and
Ptolemy.

Thus the alliance between the demagogue and the Conservatives was now formally recognised; and it proved so alarming to Pompey that he arranged with Milo to postpone the election of the ædiles‡ for fear of a fresh success for the new coalition. But now a new cause of difficulty appeared on the scene, as if to add to the confusion. Ptolemy Auletes, who had been driven out of Egypt by a revolution among his subjects, came to Rome to tell his creditors that if they ever desired payment they must help him to recover his kingdom. Pompey, who was anxious to make a success of his new duties, had been relying on the friendship of Ptolemy to secure the granary of the Mediterranean. He received him in his palace and did his best for his cause; but neither the Senate nor the public took much interest in the poor king's fate.§

Demoralisation
of the Demo-
crats.

In short, despite the weakness and incoherence of the Conservatives, the popular party, for all its spasmodic displays of energy, seemed likely before long to have exhausted its strength. With the exception of a few men of note, its ranks were filled with hotheaded and brainless adventurers. Sooner or later the Conservative party, which was not only wealthier but counted far more men of distinction among its supporters, would regain its old power, repeal the Julian laws and pay off its long score of grudges against their author.

Cæsar saw all this clearly enough from his distant vantage post in Gaul. He realised that he must somehow avert the impending disaster. The situation was critical, for the col-

* Lange, R. A., iii. 309-10.

† *Id.*, 308.

‡ *Id.*, 309.

§ Dion, xxxix. 12; Plut., Cat. U., 35; Cic., Pro Rab. Post., ii. 4; Lange, R. A., iii. 311.

lapse of his party might occur at any moment. Amidst the labyrinth of difficulties which hedged him round on every side, Cæsar's far-seeing genius hit on one clear line of escape. It was a way of which no one else but he would have thought, for to traditional Roman ideas it involved what was little short of madness. But, when the danger demanded it, Cæsar had the daring to execute what others in his position would hardly have dared to conceive. What he proposed to do was simple enough on paper—to annex the whole of Gaul as far as the Rhine to the Roman Empire, as Lucullus had annexed Pontus, and Pompey Syria; but it was a far more audacious scheme than either of these, or indeed than anything of the kind that had as yet been done in Roman history. Gaul was a country twice the size of Italy. It contained a number of independent states, with powerful aristocracies, influential priesthoods, and a long and tenacious tradition of national life. It had a population amounting most probably to some four or five million inhabitants,* not debased and vitiated like so many of the peoples of the East, but inured to the experience of organised warfare.

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The Idea of annexation.

To bring a whole medley of nations, from one day to the next, under the authority of Rome, and to remodel the whole structure of their life and government, was a stupendous undertaking. Without sinking to the level of the nervous diplomats who had refused to be embarrassed with the responsibilities of Egypt, serious observers were justified in asking if Rome was not undertaking more than she could possibly perform. But Cæsar could not now draw back. The temptations to attach himself to the new Imperialist school of policy were too great to be resisted. He saw how through the Helvetian war he had so thoroughly earned the hatred of the Nationalists that so long as he remained in Gaul they would never willingly accept the Roman protectorate. Yet, after his recent victories, even the more moderate party in Rome regarded that protectorate as just and necessary; and in any case he himself could not now possibly

The dilemma of the Protectorate.

* Beloch, *die Bevölkerung Galliens zur Zeit Cæsar's*, in *Rheinisches Museum*, LIV., pp. 414 f.

57 B.C.

renounce it. Under these circumstances the Nationalists would be certain to use the semi-independent status under which the Gallic nations were now living to stir up constant difficulties for the Roman overlord. The only methods by which Rome could be rid of the whole trouble were by evacuation or annexation. This after all is a crisis in the history of every protectorate, and sooner or later it had been bound to occur in Gaul, where national feeling was exceptionally strong. This being so, it was surely not unwise to precipitate an inevitable development by making use of the impression produced by his victory over the Belgæ.

The actual
situation in
Gaul.

From the point of view of Italian politics his motives were still more pressing. Cæsar knew that he could never dominate the Italian public or rescue the failing fortunes of his party unless he achieved some amazing and sensational success. The Belgæ had served him just as little as Ariovistus. He needed to make some far more stirring announcement : to proclaim that the age-long and ever-formidable enemies of Rome were now, after two years' hard fighting, at last effectually subdued ; that the conquest of the Celtic lands, the great work undertaken by the first great representative of the Roman Democracy, Caius Flaminius, had been finished a century and a half later by Caius Julius Cæsar ; that the Roman Empire had been enriched by a fertile and populous territory, as vast as the provinces won by Lucullus and Pompey in the East. It is true that this conquest was still in great part imaginary. Aquitania and the other independent districts of Southern Gaul had not as yet seen a single Roman soldier or official ; many of the peoples of Central and Western Gaul had not made their submission, and others had only done so formally ; several, including some of the richest and most powerful, the Sequani, the Ædui and the Lingones, had given the Roman general a friendly reception, but merely in the character of a powerful ally and without displaying the least inclination to accept the Roman overlordship. But at Rome immediate success, whatever the risk of distant danger, was the supreme law of political life. Once involved in a struggle where contending parties played upon the public by alternate violence

and bluff, Cæsar, perhaps the cleverest party leader the world has ever seen, devised what is probably the most skilful recorded exhibition of political charlatanism.

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To give a little colour to his announcement, he sent Publius Crassus with one legion into Western Gaul hastily to receive the formal submission of the small nations between the Seine and the Loire. He despatched Servius Sulpicius Galba with another legion into Valais in the direction of the Great St. Bernard Pass to subdue the mountain tribes, whose toll-dues he regarded as excessive, and thus throw open to Italian merchants the new market that he had won them. He left the other legions in winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes and the Turones, and returned into Cisalpine Gaul, bearing the great news with him. Italy learnt that the Proconsul had finished his part of the work; it remained for the Senate to nominate the ten commissioners required to organise the new conquest into a Roman province. His calculation was that, taken thus by surprise, Gaul would remain quiet at least till the spring, and that during the winter, while the whole of Italy was still ringing with the news of his amazing achievement, he would have time to re-shape the fortunes of his party.

The annexation proclaimed.

Thus it was that the Roman conquest of Gaul was, in the first intention of its author, simply an electioneering manoeuvre to impress the Senate and politicians, the electors and the general public of Italy, in the midst of a confused struggle of cliques and parties, the inevitable, if unpremeditated, outcome of the revolutionary policy which Cæsar had been forced to carry through in his consulship. Yet in those critical days, while he was bent solely on checkmating his Conservative opponents at Rome, Cæsar was in truth the blind instrument of destiny, moulding the whole future course of European history. Little though he guessed it at the time, that fateful proclamation was to be the prelude to a long and sanguinary struggle which would end in the decline or extinction of the old Gallic aristocracy. On the disappearance of their native rulers, who still preserved the old Celtic traditions, the people would easily adopt the Græco-Latin civilisation of their con-

Cæsar as the maker of modern Europe.

57-56 B.C. querors, which thus found its way, unsuspected and unsupported by Gaul's first Proconsul, into the heart of the European continent, to form the basis of our modern society.

Enthusiasm
in Italy.

But Cæsar's only idea at the moment was to regain the ground lost at Rome by the blunders of his supporters. In this he was entirely successful.* Exactly as he had calculated, the conquest of Gaul caused an immense sensation all over Italy. The proletariat, the middle classes, the financiers, the men of letters, the whole of the bourgeoisie which ordinarily stood aloof from political conflicts, in short, the entire nation, felt a glow of patriotic pride at his achievement, and, believing that somehow it would bring forth fruits as abundant as the Eastern wars of the last decade, indulged in one of those short but violent epidemics of enthusiasm which from time to time

* The end of the year 57 is a very important moment in the Gallic War, though its significance has escaped all the historians (including Jullian, *Verc.*, 77); it marks the moment when, after the conclusion of his campaign against the Belgæ, Cæsar announced to Rome the pacification of the whole of Gaul, and then abandoned the hesitating policy he had hitherto pursued and proclaimed its annexation. In other words, at the close of 57 Gaul became a Roman province. This is proved by the great festivals which were given at that time, as contrasted with the indifference displayed by the populace and all public bodies up to the close of 58, as well as by the statements in Dion, xxxix. 5 and 25, Orosius, vi. 8, 6, Cæsar, *B. G.*, ii. 35, and above all, in Cicero's speech, *De Provinciis Consularibus*, a contemporary document of the highest importance, which has been too much neglected by historians. See particularly chapters viii., xiii., xiv.: "Una atque altera ætas" (*i.e.*, 58 and 57, for the speech was made in the spring of 56) "vel metû vel spe, vel pæna vel præmiis, vel armis, vel legibus, potest totam Galliam sempiternis vinculis adstringere" (xiv. 34).

That Cæsar was compelled to proclaim the annexation because of the condition of his party at Rome is a conjecture rendered probable by many analogous cases in history and confirmed by the conference at Lucca and its results. The fact that Cæsar (*B. G.*, ii. 35) disguises in one brief phrase what was the most important moment of his life, so far from refuting this conjecture, only makes it more probable. We shall see that Cæsar wrote his *Commentaries* to clear himself of the accusations of the Conservatives with regard to his administration, and as the annexation was made prematurely, before the land was properly conquered, and provoked a national war lasting several years, for which they held him responsible, it was his object to conceal, so far as possible, the premature annexation which, adopted for temporary political purposes, was the cause of all the subsequent trouble.

stir the depths of a civilised community.* A deputation of Senators was sent by the people of Rome to Cæsar in Cisalpine Gaul to bear him congratulations.† Many politicians who a year ago had passed severe strictures on his policy now returned to his support and hastened to meet him in the Province.‡ The Senate bowed before a unanimous public and decreed a supplication of fifteen days, the longest that had ever been known.§ The unregulated excitement which was at that time regarded as an adequate substitute for common sense and judgment in large matters of policy threw the credulous people of Italy completely off their balance during the whole winter of 57-56. There were very few who suspected that Gaul was not really conquered.

Cæsar was quick to apply the short-lived enthusiasm to the ends for which he had evoked it. During his last two years in Gaul Cæsar had benefited greatly by being continually in the open air, by the constant exercise and the enforced continence of an active military life. He had discovered that his delicate constitution had a far greater reserve of strength than he had ever imagined and that the hardships of campaigning agreed with him far better than the luxury and relaxation of civilian life at Rome.|| It seems that his epilepsy, which had grown worse during his stay in Spain, troubled him a good deal less during these years.¶ At the same time Gaul had revealed to him the possession of another quality which is given to very few, even among superior spirits—that intense and unflagging delight of the mind in the work upon which it is engaged which seems to make the powers of soul and body, of intellect and imagination, ever brighter and more vigorous as fresh prospects of activity are opened out to their labours. Thus it was that after his hard campaign among the Belgæ he crossed over into Cisalpine Gaul, not for repose but to

Cæsar's life
and character
in Gaul.

* Dion, xxxix. 25.

† *Id.*

‡ App., B. C., ii. 17.

§ Cæs., B. G., ii. 35; Plut., Cæs., 21.

|| Plut., Cæs., 17; Suet., Cæs., 57.

¶ So at least Plutarch appears to say in a laconic chapter of the life (chap. xvii.).

57-56 B.C. undertake newer and more burdensome responsibilities. He traversed the province, administering justice and presiding over meetings of notables, travelling night and day to do more in the time; he received deputations, inquired into grievances, determined appeals, accepted invitations to meet the nobility, received the reports of his generals in Gaul, gave orders to Italian merchants for arms, horses and equipment, found recruits for the gaps in his ranks, attended daily to a huge correspondence from the capital, read all the latest books and the accounts of public and private doings at Rome, and entertained the many friends and friends of friends who came to visit him from Rome.* The exaltation that is natural to every man who is conscious of his own greatness, the glory he had won by his striking victory over the Belgæ, the success of his pretended annexation of Gaul, combined with the mere physical pleasure of being restored to good health, spurred him on to the exercise of all his powers.

The Egyptian
Embassy
scandal.

In the midst of all these distractions Cæsar found time to attend to the main object of his journey—the reconstruction of the Triumvirate, which during the latter months of 57 and the early months of 56 seemed to be slowly crumbling to pieces. Perhaps the Egyptian scandal contributed more than anything else to its discredit. Ptolemy's old creditors, in particular the rich banker Caius Rabirius Postumus, had again supplied him with money,† and had managed to arrange, by dint of much intriguing, that the Consul Lentulus should be charged with restoring him to his ungrateful subjects at the head of the army of Cilicia.‡ But the Conservative party, which had always been opposed to Egyptian entanglements, now claimed to have found it laid down in the Sibylline books, no doubt after a considerable search, that if a king of Egypt asked for help, he must indeed be helped, but not with an army. As the majority of Senators did not dare openly to offend against the popular superstition about Sibylline Oracles, the decree charging Lentulus to restore Ptolemy had to be discussed over

* Plut., Cæs., 17.

† Cic., in Rab. Post., iii. 6; *Id.*, F., i. 1, 1.

‡ *Id.*, in Pis., xxi. 50; in Rab. Post., iii. 6; Dion, xxxix. 12.

again. The constant alternations of this everlasting affair were fast degenerating into farce, when it was rudely lifted back again to the region of high tragedy. For some time past it had been understood that an embassy of 100 Alexandrian notables was on its way to Rome to impeach their renegade monarch and to enlighten the Senate as to the real facts of the Egyptian situation; but the weeks passed and no deputation arrived. Various reasons had at first been given to explain the delay; but before long an unpleasant story began to go the round of Rome. Men whispered that Ptolemy had had his troublesome subjects put to death one after the other on the highroads of Italy and that the assassins were receiving their pay in the house of Pompey. The Conservative party was up in arms immediately. Favonius demanded an inquiry and promised to bring up the chief of the embassy, a certain Dio, who had escaped the assassins and was staying in Rome in the house of Lucceius. But before he could do so Dio disappeared in his turn and people did not hesitate to say that he had shared the fate of his fellows.*

Meanwhile other troubles were besetting the popular party. The Treasury was empty; † Cato was shortly expected home with the gold and the slaves of the King of Cyprus; and the old quarrel between Crassus and Pompey was breaking out afresh. Crassus, who was still anxious to be sent to Egypt, was working in secret against Pompey, while Pompey, utterly tired and disgusted with politics, no longer appeared in the Senate and accused Crassus of paying Clodius to procure his assassination.‡ At length after long discussion the Senate decided, early in January 56, that Ptolemy should be restored by a Roman magistrate without an army. But this only provoked new jealousies. Crassus and Lentulus were both eager for the mission, while Pompey, though he said and did nothing openly, had all his friends working to secure it for himself.

So the struggle recommenced with unabated violence. By

* Dion, xxxix. 13-14.

† Cic., ad Q., ii. 5, 1.

‡ *Id.*, iii. 3-4.

Fresh quarrels
between
Crassus and
Pompey.

56 B.C.

The trial of
Milo.

the 15th of January no conclusion had yet been reached and the sittings of the Senate were suspended for the election of the Ædiles, which had been postponed to this date. Clodius was one of the candidates, and with the support of the Conservatives he defeated Vatinius, his most serious competitor. He was scarcely installed in office before he boldly prosecuted Pompey's henchman Milo for assault. The lawsuit that ensued surpassed everything of the sort that had ever been seen even at Rome. Pompey had agreed to defend Milo, but when he rose to speak Clodius' supporters began hissing and shouting, and the whole of his speech was drowned in a flood of irrepressible vituperation. When Pompey at length sat down Clodius rose, but Pompey's supporters played him the same trick; for two hours they deluged him with a shower of elegant invective in verse and prose. The whole scene was one of indescribable disorder. Suddenly, during a lull in the tumult, Clodius stood up and began to cry out with his supporters, "Who is it that is starving you?" to which his band replied in chorus, "Pompey, Pompey." Clodius went on, "Who would like to go to Egypt?" Again they replied, "Pompey, Pompey." "And whom are we going to send?" "Crassus, Crassus."* Finally the suit was suspended and Pompey returned home in a fury. Milo was ultimately acquitted, but Sextus Clodius, the creature of Clodius, whom Milo had accused of assault, was also acquitted in his turn a short time afterwards, because all the Senators in the jury voted in his favour.†

Cæsar's Land
Law in the
Senate.

By this time the Conservatives all openly favoured Clodius against the Triumvirate. So bold had they become that when, a short time afterwards, there was a discussion in the Senate on the forty million sesterces to be voted to Pompey for the purchase of corn several Senators complained in violent terms ("You would have thought," wrote Cicero, "that you were in a public meeting") that Cæsar's Land Law threatened to deprive the State of the revenue of the Campanian land. Fortunately the law had not yet been put into execution, and they asked if it could not be an-

* Cic., ad Q., ii. 3, 2.

† *Id.*, vi. 6.

nulled.* Cicero in fact had actually proposed that the question should be discussed on the 15th of May.† From Cæsar's point of view then there was no time to be lost. Crassus had gone up to meet Cæsar at Ravenna, while Pompey had gone to Sardinia and Africa on his new commission. Cæsar arranged to meet them both at Lucca. He had already thought out a new and daring policy to save the Democrats and the Triumvirate from imminent dissolution, and was anxious to submit it to the judgment of his colleagues.

* Cic., ad Q., ii. 5, 1.

† *Id.*, F., i. 9, 8. This is another proof that the law was not being administered. If the Campanian lands had already been divided the discussion would have been meaningless.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM

The Neo-Pythagoreans—Pompey's theatre—Luxury at Rome—
—Catullus and his yacht—Debtors and creditors in Italy—
Cæsar the great corrupter—The imperialist democracy.

56 B.C.

The transition
in Italian life.

THE annexation of Gaul produced so powerful an impression in Italy because it was proclaimed at a crucial moment of her history. Cæsar had indeed been fortunate in his opportunity. We have seen how in the development of ancient Italy Imperialism plays the part of the industrial movement in the modern world; and it was inevitable that the attitude adopted by the public towards the policy of expansion should vary with every vicissitude in the conflict between the old social order and the new. The annexation of Gaul happened to synchronise with the renewal of the great struggle between the old and honourable traditions of Italy and the æsthetic and intellectual but corrupt and pleasure-loving civilisation of the East.

Old-fashioned
influences.

For the ancient Latin spirit was still by no means extinct. It was yet to be found in those numerous families of the wealthy and well-to-do classes who remained faithful to whatever was best and most healthy in the old simple order, and it continued to fight manfully against the encroaching tendencies of the new era.* It found support not only in the sacred memories of older times but also in some of the philosophies of the East itself. There were many Italian students of Aristotle who were ready to follow their master in his

* See in Cornelius Nepos, *Att.*, 14, the description of the life of Atticus, and in the eulogy of Turia, *C. I. L.*, vi. 1527, the description of a noble family which, without affecting an archaic roughness, preserved the antique gravity and modesty. See also the acute observations of Vaglieri, *Notizie degli scavi*, Oct. 1898, p. 412 f., and also Cic., *Pro Cæl.*, iv. 9, *M. Crassi castissima domus*.

denunciations of excessive luxury and mercantile cupidity as the evils most fatal to republican states.* Varro wrote his learned treatise on civil and religious antiquities in order to reconstruct for his contemporaries all that was most venerable in the life of the past. It was during this generation too that a mystical sect of moralists, founded at the beginning of the century at Alexandria under the name of Neo-Pythagoreans, endeavoured to circulate amongst Italian society certain ethical treatises attributed to the original Pythagoras, preaching all the virtues which were just now disappearing from the life of the upper classes: piety towards the gods, respect for ancestors, gentleness, temperance, justice, and the scrupulous examination every evening of actions accomplished during the day.†

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Varro's
"Antiquitates
rerum
divinarum
humanarum-
umque."
Neo-Pythago-
reans.

But these isolated efforts were powerless against the tendencies of the age. The influence of the East, in all its corruption and all its splendour, came flooding through Italy like a spring torrent swollen by the melting of the snows. The conquests of Pompey, the increase of the State revenues, the abundance of capital, and the prosperity which, after the depressions of the years 66-63, had been the natural result of these conquests, had once more intoxicated the imperial democracy. Italy was no longer the Amazon or the Minerva of the world; she had become a Bacchante. Aphrodite and Dionysus with their train of Mænads had flocked into Rome, leading their wild and stirring processions through the streets day and night, and inviting men and women, patricians and freedmen, slaves and citizens, rich and poor, to join in their festive revels. The banquets of the Workmen's Associations and Electoral Societies were so numerous and magnificent as to be continually raising the price of food stuffs in the metropolis;‡ although the State bought up grain in all parts of the world, there was yet a continual scarcity. The market gardeners in the suburbs,

Demoralisation
of the capital.

* See Ar. Pol., ii. 6, 5; ii. 6, 9; iv. 5, 1.

† Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature grecque* (Paris, 1899), vol. v. p. 408 f.

‡ Varro, R. R., iii. 2, 16; iii. 5, 8.

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the breeders of animals, the innumerable publicans and wine merchants in the city, began to amass incredible wealth. Eurysaces, the biggest baker in Rome, an obscure freedman who had an enormous bakehouse and a great number of slaves, was one of the most successful of these purveyors to the Government and to the great political and popular banquets; he ended by piling up so huge a fortune that he was enabled to leave behind him, as a lasting record of his wealth, that strange tomb in the shape of a baker's oven which is still to be seen, almost in its original form, in the neighbourhood of the Porta Maggiore. All over Italy there was a rage to build palaces, country houses, and farms, to buy slaves, and to increase the expenses of public and private life. Second only to Gaul and the business profits and festivals which its annexation would provide, what the inquisitive public cared most about was the theatre of Pompey, the first great stone theatre Rome had ever seen, which was being constructed by Greek architects on the spot now occupied by the Campo dei Fiori and the adjacent streets. At length there had arisen a man bold enough to revolt against the ridiculous law, imposed centuries ago by the narrow puritanism of the old era, which made the construction of stone theatres at Rome illegal. The building of this theatre was thus in itself symptomatic of the new order. It is true that Pompey had tried to spare the feelings of the old-fashioned party, and to keep himself within the four corners of the law, by constructing a small temple of Venus on the top of the tiers of seats, which could thus be looked upon as a sort of huge staircase leading up to the temple. But Pompey was a man who was always afraid of his own successes, and he had no suspicion that for the great majority of Romans the construction of this theatre meant far more than the conquest of Syria.

The first stone theatre.

The shows of politicians.

In the meantime, while the big stone theatre was being completed, ambitious politicians spent fabulous sums upon giving the populace shows, which sometimes went on for several weeks, in provisional wooden playhouses: in engaging gladiators, musicians, dancers, and actors, and sending to the ends of the earth for lions, panthers, tigers, elephants, monkeys,

crocodiles, and rhinoceroses to be exhibited in public and to fight in the arena.* Every Asiatic and African governor was obliged to become a dealer in wild animals † on behalf of his friends at Rome. In the year 58, in a festival for his ædileship, Scaurus spent almost the whole of the proceeds of his Eastern campaigns in purchasing some 3000 statues, some wonderful pictures from Sicyon, and about 300 columns of beautiful marbles, to decorate a wooden theatre which was to hold 80,000 spectators and was only to remain in use for a month.

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The largest section of the upper classes, both in the aristocracy and the plutocracy, had entered upon a mad career of debauchery and self-indulgence, whether in the fashionable publicity of the metropolis, or in the discreet seclusion of country and seaside resorts.‡ The old aristocracy and the rich bourgeoisie of the equestrian order had at length joined forces, but merely in the pursuit of common sources of enjoyment. The empire was no longer administered by a martial aristocracy and a powerful class of financial magnates; at its head there was now a small clique of depraved and cynical materialists who were prepared to enjoy all the pleasures of the senses, and many of the intellect, provided only that high thinking did not seriously interfere with the paramount business of high living.

The fashionable set.

It was the same with their wives. In this shallow and dissipated society a woman who was not armed with the strongest and most refined of moral instincts soon lost all sense of shame and serious feeling, and became frivolous, fickle and corrupt. Roman ladies ruined their husbands or sold themselves to their lovers to satisfy, not lust but a passion for precious stuffs and dresses, for sumptuous litters or costly furniture, for a well-groomed retinue of foreign slaves, above all for pearls and precious stones, such as they had seen in the treasure of Mithridates, when it was carried in Pompey's

The Roman great ladies.

* Friedländer, D. S. G. R., ii. 392.

† See the curious correspondence between Cicero and Cælius: Cic., F., viii. 6, 5; viii. 9, 3; see also Cic., A., vi. 1, 21.

‡ See Cic., Pro Cæl., xv. 35.

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triumph, and were still able to stare at it any day where Pompey had exhibited it,* in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. Their husbands squabbled between them as to whose cellar was best furnished with the most exquisite and expensive Greek wines, whose larder best stocked with costly victuals, whose country house best decorated, whose library best provided with books, whose gallantries and adventures were most to be envied.

The younger generation.

The younger generation was worst of all; it was wild, scatterbrained and sceptical, emancipated from all family authority, and impatient for the enjoyment of quick and easy profits.† We may typify it as a whole by taking five examples from among the best-known of the promising young men of the time. These five are Marcus Antonius, son of the prætor who had fought so unsuccessfully in 74 against the pirates; Caius Scribonius Curio, son of the well-known Conservative who had been consul in 76 and afterwards commander in Thrace; Caius Sallustius Crispus, son of a rich landowner from Amiternum; Marcus Cælius, son of a well-known banker from Pozzuoli, and lastly Catullus. Antony and Curio were so constantly together that slander called them husband and wife; between them they had run up so many debts and become entangled in so many adventures that Curio's father had forced him to leave Antony, and Antony, pursued by his creditors, had taken refuge in Greece; there he made pretence of leading a sober and studious existence, but when he found this too dull (as he very soon did) he went on to Gabinus in Syria, who made him a cavalry officer.‡ Sallust, who had ability and a real taste for letters, wasted the whole of a considerable fortune upon women, and was considerably given the name of "Fortunate" by his friends because of the great number of his gallantries. Cælius had been an ardent follower of Catiline, chiefly owing to the debts he had already contracted. When he escaped the fate of his accomplices he continued his dissipations; he had

* Pliny, N. H., xxxvii. 1, 11-12.

† See Cic., Pro Cæl., ix. 25; xii. 29; xiii. 42.

‡ Drümman, G. R., i.², 47.

become the lover of Clodia, had then broken with her, and been accused by her of having taken part in the assassination of the ambassadors sent from Alexandria to indict Ptolemy Auletes before the Senate.* Catullus, now out of favour with his family who were sick of his extravagance, burdened with debt, and heart-broken at the betrayal of Clodia and the death of a brother, who had died somewhere in Asia, had gone in the suite of the prætor Caius Memmius to Bithynia to forget his sorrows and to fill his purse. Hardly had he reached Asia than he felt home-sick for Italy,† and he soon began to make congenial preparations for his return and to satisfy a fantastic and prodigal caprice. In one of the sea-coast cities of the Black Sea, perhaps at Amastris, he had bought a dainty little yacht‡ in which he proposed to sail home across the Mediterranean.§ He set sail in his boat with its crew of purchased sailors and took it to a port in the Sea of Marmora, joined it again at Nicæa,|| after an excursion to Troy to visit the deserted tomb of his brother,¶ and then, like a king in his own ship of state, he coasted slowly along the seaboard of Asia Minor, threaded his way through the islands of the Ægean, and along the coast of Greece, and so up the Adriatic to the mouth of the Po, thus eventually, after a strip of land journey, reaching his native lake of Garda. **

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Catullus and his yacht.

Catullus and his companions are only typical members of the thoughtless and thriftless society in which they lived. Elated by a prosperity which every one regarded as permanent, Italy was losing all sense of the distinction between justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, wisdom and folly. She was dashing, blind and undirected, into a dark and stormy future; yet her only object seemed to be to go steadily forward at increasing speed, utterly regardless of the cost entailed.

Exhaustion of the Eastern Provinces.

* See the whole speech of Cicero, *Pro Cælio*.

† Cat., 46.

‡ *Id.*, 4.

§ *Id.*, 46, 1-3.

|| *Id.*, 46, 5.

¶ *Id.*, 101.

** *Id.*, 4.

56 B.C. Yet in sober fact her prosperity was more apparent than real. If expenses were increasing on every side, incomes were by no means increasing in proportion. One of the sources of revenue which had been most lucrative ever since the time of the Gracchi, the financial exploitation of the provinces, was almost exhausted, and Italy was forced back, for her provincial profits, upon the more barbaric methods of political and military bleeding. This is one of the essential factors in the ten years which follow upon Cæsar's consulship; it supplies the key, not only to the popularity which Cæsar's Democratic Imperialism enjoyed at this moment, but also to the terrible crisis which it was one day to bring forth. During the last quarter of a century Asia and Greece, which had already after Sulla's conquests shown symptoms of becoming a less lucrative field for Italian financiers, had been almost worked out. It was now impossible to make a large fortune out of the East by a year or two in business. All the wealth which could be most profitably transported to Italy or exploited on the spot had already fallen into the hands of Italian capitalists, and the new conquests, such as Pontus and Syria, having already been exhausted by long years of war, were not a profitable sphere for western enterprise.

Disappearance
of the financial
magnates.

All this did not pass unnoticed by the money-lending classes in Italy, and capital was gradually withdrawn from all these departments of speculation. The sons, nephews, and grandsons of the knights who had made their millions in the half-century posterior to the death of Caius Gracchus were now comfortably settled at home, like Atticus, enjoying the fortunes they had inherited, and devoting themselves to politics or business, study or pleasure. The last remains of the old wealth of Asia were being scrambled for by a crowd of small money-lenders working with very little capital; and the class of wealthy, educated and influential financiers, who had been the greatest political power in Roman government from the time of the Gracchi to the time of Sulla, had almost entirely disappeared. It had been weakened first of all by the massacres and confiscations of Marius and Sulla; it had become enervated

in the succeeding quarter of a century by the lack of opportunity for great enterprises and by the desire, to which a second business generation is always prone, to enjoy its inherited money; and it had now finally become merged with the old political aristocracy, surrendering its own peculiar advantages to a herd of obscure and ignorant capitalists who were unable to exercise any authority in the State.

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Thus the political influence of the capitalists, which had been a source of so much danger to the Republic in the time of Marius and Sulla, was now scarcely more than a historic memory. The repression of the conspiracy of Catiline had been a desperate and expiring effort. The Catilinarian spirit was by now entirely triumphant; and the victorious democrats were busily infecting Roman society and government with the bitter anti-capitalist prejudices and animosities of the masses, not without certain assistance from the aristocracy which, then as always, had a lurking hatred for usurers. Although the three chiefs of the popular party were not themselves hostile to the capitalists, the executive showed itself more and more opposed to their interests. In Macedonia, for instance, Piso was easily induced for a consideration to lower the interest owed by many of the towns.* In Syria Gabinius always put Italian capitalists in the wrong, interfering with their enterprises in every possible way to persuade them that their capital would be much better invested in Italy than in Syria.† At Rome, after a long period of neglect, the old laws forbidding senators to engage in business began once more to be put into force. Numbers of the upper classes, and politicians in particular, were very chary of investing their capital in enterprises where the risks and difficulties were likely to increase; if any of them did so, he acted shamefacedly and in secret. For instance, Marcus Brutus, son of Servilia, when he went to Cyprus in the suite of Cato, had made the acquaintance of two of those obscure Italian capitalists who infested the East at that time, and had been induced by their mediation to lend money to King Ariobarzanes and to the town of Salamis in Cyprus, at

Anti-capitalist influences.

* Cic., in Pis., 35.

† *Id.*, de Prov. Cons., 5.

56 B.C. the rate of 48 per cent.; but since business of this sort was directly contrary to the law of Gabinius he was secretly intriguing to have his investment authorised by a special vote of the Senate.*

War as a
productive
enterprise.

But if the field of speculation and great financial enterprises was becoming exhausted, what other pecuniary resources remained open to the upper classes, and, above all, to the small ruling oligarchy at Rome? There was only one form of provincial enterprise which was still as lucrative as ever. Italy was driven back inevitably upon war—with its manifold profits in booty and tribute, gifts and ransom. After the huge fortunes amassed by Lucullus and Pompey, and the millions made by their generals, and even by persons in lower positions who had followed their standards, every politician in Rome, and all his friends and relations, looked forward to securing a similar windfall in some part of the world to which the Roman arms had not yet penetrated.

Civilian
Imperialism.

It is easy to imagine how these demands and expectations diffused the passion of Imperialism throughout Roman society. Military plundering had now become the most lucrative industry in Italy. When an army amassed a store of loot there was hardly any one in Italy who did not benefit by it, and it was the peaceable class, the people who risked nothing at all, who benefited the most. It was the merchants, the contractors and the workmen to whom the State, with its treasury heaped with spoils, and the generals, officers and soldiers, with their pockets full of money, provided employment and remuneration. This civil population, devoted though it was to commerce and agriculture, was just as enthusiastic for Imperialism as the world of politics. Perhaps its ardour for the aggrandisement of the empire was all the greater, because, like all stay-at-home classes of society, it was easily moved by the glamour and excitement of military life. The curious platonic affection among civilians for war, a phenomenon common in every advanced society and literature, had by this time become very widespread in Italy, and was a force which partisan interests well knew how to employ in the propagation of their policy

* Cic., A., vi. 1, 4 f.; vi. 2, 7 f.

of Imperialist adventure. If our modern Imperialists look to the great Roman Empire-builders for a model, their heroes went back boldly to the archetype in Alexander. No personage in history was more popular at this time than the mighty Macedonian, and most men seem to have imagined that Rome was about to accomplish very similar exploits.

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But meanwhile, before the empire of Rome became co-extensive with Alexander's, the most immediate and decisive effect of the universal enthusiasm was to impel men to incur the most impossible obligations. Nearly every one was at once both creditor and debtor; men lent one another any little money they possessed, and borrowed again whenever they were in difficulties. Italian society had become an inextricable labyrinth of debit and credit, through the system of *Syngraphæ* or Letters of Credit, which were renewed as soon as they fell due; they were negotiated in the same way as securities and bills of exchange to-day, because the scarcity of capital and the frequent oscillations in prices would have made it ruinous for them to be redeemed too frequently. Those who were in need of money attempted to sell to some financier the claims they had on other persons, and the financier would give cash payment, of course with a proportionate discount according to the prospects of the debt, the needs of the creditor and the condition of the money market.*

The labyrinth of debt.

Paper money.

The new policy which Cæsar proposed to his friends harmonised admirably with the condition of opinion in Italy, and tended at once to stimulate and to satisfy the ruling passions of a commercial and democratic age—its imperial and military pride, its eagerness for quick profits, its infectious mania for luxury, self-indulgence, and ostentation, both in public and private life. Expansion on the frontiers, prodigality at home,

Gold and the sword.

* The attempts of Cicero to sell his credit-interest in Faberius throw a suggestive light upon these operations. Cicero frequently mentions the subject, in A., xii. 5, 40, 47, xiii. 27-33. For the chronology and interpretation of these letters see Schmidt, B. W. C., 291 f.

† Suet. (Cæs., 24) says that the proposals at Lucca were thought out and drawn up by Cæsar and accepted by his colleagues. The statement is almost certainly correct. Cæsar was the most active, and the most endangered, of the three.

56 B.C. gold and the sword : these were the two main points in Cæsar's programme, and the two were inextricably associated. Expansion would furnish the money necessary for prodigality ; the prosperity created by home expenses would generate new energy for expansion.

The Parthian project.

Already in this very winter Cæsar had spent all the money he had made in his Belgian campaign by lending or giving enormous sums to politicians who had come from Rome to pay him court.* But he entertained still vaster designs for the succeeding years. Crassus was to make Pompey's peace with Clodius ; and Crassus and Pompey were to be candidates for the consulship of 55. Once elected they were to induce the people to give them a proconsulship for five years : they were to prolong Cæsar's Gallic command, also for five years, and to vote the sums necessary to pay all the legions which he had recruited since the beginning of the war. Having thus become masters of the Republic for an indefinite time, they were to follow out on a more extended scale the aggressive Imperialism which Lucullus had originated, and to achieve new and romantic feats of conquest. With the money these conquests brought in they were to execute huge public works in Rome and Italy, make profits for contractors and merchants, workmen and soldiers, buy up the Senate and the politicians, and provide the people with amusements on a scale of unparalleled splendour. Among other projects, a big gladiatorial school was to be established at Capua.† As regards the conquests to be made, they had decided upon an enterprise which must appeal to every admirer of Alexander—a scheme too upon which Cæsar had long been bent, the conquest of Parthia. The man and the party who annexed to the Roman East this huge, mysterious and fabulously wealthy empire would win unrivalled glory in the world of his contemporaries and of posterity. Cæsar had indeed to resign himself to the abandon-

* App., B. C., ii. 17.

† It is clear from Cæs., B. G., i. 14, that Cæsar had a gladiatorial school at Capua. Most likely it was founded when his Gallic campaigns were beginning to prove lucrative.

ment of this adventure to one of his friends; for he was himself too much occupied by affairs in Gaul, where his recent conquests still required his presence. As for Egypt, Crassus and Pompey must give up their designs and dissensions, but were to charge Gabinius to restore Ptolemy to his country, without authorisation from the Senate, on condition that he paid each of them a large sum of money. It seems that the amount demanded by Cæsar was about seventeen and a half million sesterces, or more than £160,000.* The man who had attempted as Consul to find a legislative nostrum for the chronic corruption of all civil societies was now himself preparing to corrupt the entire electorate of Italy. 56 B.C.

We do not know what took place in the discussions at Lucca between Cæsar, Pompey and Crassus; but it is probable that Crassus' assent was more easily given than Pompey's. It not uncommonly happens to successful egoists that, wearied by all the abundance of easy satisfactions and greedy for wholly new sources of gratification, they conceive a jealous and obstinate passion for some entirely unattainable object. Crassus had enjoyed both wealth and power, but the popularity of Lucullus, or Pompey, or Cæsar had been denied him, and he had spent a long public life in different efforts to acquire it. He remained quiet for some time after each successive failure, but only to seize the first occasion for repeating the attempt. At this moment of universal elation his old passion flamed up once more. The Imperialist policy of Lucullus was too tempting to be passed by; it had brought glory to its author and to Pompey, and it was already bringing glory to Cæsar. Why should Crassus remain content with being the victor of Spartacus, when it was open to a Roman general to match the exploits of Alexander? His ambition to be the conqueror of Parthia was alone sufficient to win his approval of Cæsar's designs. Crassus at
Lucca.

* It is nowhere stated that Egypt entered into the deliberations of the Lucca conference, but it is more than probable that it did. Crassus, Cæsar and Pompey were not likely to give up an enterprise which involved so little danger and such chances of profit. Plutarch (Cæs., 48) speaks of Ptolemy's enforced promises to Cæsar. The money owing to him in 48 from Ptolemy's heirs can only be what had been guaranteed him for his share in the Restoration.

56 B.C.

Pompey, on the other hand, who was the only one of the three with the least knowledge of Parthia, and had refused the chance of attacking it in 63, was not reluctant to resign it to his colleague. Perhaps he may even have felt inclined to oppose this whole policy of expansion and corruption. It cannot indeed have been at all palatable to his nature; for he was already beginning to be disgusted, and also a little frightened, by the shape which the policy of his party was assuming. Like many wealthy men who have everything that they need, he was strongly in favour of a simple life and an austere and unassuming morality—for other people. But it was impossible for him to break away from Cæsar and Crassus; he was fond of his wife; he felt that his reputation was endangered; and he had numerous enemies in the Senate. Clodius, already quite sufficiently impertinent, would shrink from no violence or stratagem against him when he ceased to be shielded by Cæsar and Crassus. The only way to consolidate his tottering influence was to become consul, and then, after successfully accomplishing his new special mission, to secure some novel and extraordinary command. But for all this he needed allies. So he could not refuse assent to his colleague's proposals.

Pompey at
Lucca.Cæsar and
Caius
Gracchus.

Thus it was that, on the ominous precedent of Caius Gracchus seventy-five years before, Cæsar attempted to infuse fresh life into the Democratic party by becoming in his own single person the nucleus of a huge and powerful coalition of financial interests.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND CONSULSHIP OF CRASSUS AND POMPEY

The first risings in Gaul—Cicero and Cæsar—Cicero and Varro—Gaul declared a Roman province—The war against the Veneti—The condition of Gaul—Cæsar's policy in Gaul—Crassus and Pompey consuls for the second time—Gabinus in Egypt—The Usipetes and Tencteres—The theatre of Pompey—The Conservative agitation against the Parthian campaign.

A SHORT time after the Conference at Lucca Cæsar was 56 B.C. obliged to give up his intention of making a long stay in Cisalpine Gaul and to hasten back across the Alps. Revolts were already breaking out in the province which he claimed to have "pacified." Galba had been attacked by mountain tribes and his army almost cut to pieces; several of the peoples in Armorica who had made their submission in the previous autumn were again in arms; the Veneti, who were heading the movement, had put in chains the Roman officers sent to requisition supplies. Moreover, the announcement of annexation had caused universal discontent among the Gallic people, particularly among the Belgæ and Treveri; and the tribes of Aquitania, who had not yet submitted, fearing that Cæsar intended to include them in the comprehensive terms of his proclamation, prepared to assist the Veneti.*

Risings in the new province.

(Brittany.)

The pacification of Gaul.

At a moment when his friends at Rome were so loudly proclaiming the conquest of Gaul Cæsar could not afford to create the impression that he dared not treat the country like a subject province. He therefore imposed upon Gaul an annual

* Cæs., B. G., iii. 7 and 10.
61

56 B.C.

contribution of forty million sesterces,* prepared ruthlessly to suppress the revolt of the Veneti, and decided to proceed without delay against the peoples which still remained independent. He sent Labienus into the country of the Treveri to impress them and their neighbours, the Remi and the Belgæ, with the Roman power; he sent Quintus Titurius Sabinus with about 10,000 men to ravage the territory of the Vinelli, the Curiosoliti and the Lessobii, who were allies of the Veneti; he ordered Publius Cæsar to march into Aquitania with a small force of cavalry, and about 4000 infantry; and reserved for himself the task of reducing the Veneti.† As the Veneti were provided with a numerous fleet he had ships constructed on the Loire and enrolled all the pilots and rowers he could find. He ordered the Pictones and Santones, who were holding aloof from the revolt but had not yet made their submission, to provide him with ships, thus declaring them tributaries of Rome.‡ For the command of the fleet he selected the young Decimus Brutus, son of the consul of 77 and the well-known Sempronia; and even before the ships were ready he led his land forces into the territory of the Veneti.

Titurius and Publius Crassus were soon successful in their respective operations. Cæsar, however, was not equally fortunate. The Veneti had taken refuge within forts constructed on tongues of land jutting out into the sea, in positions where the great ocean tides defended them far better than any devices of human ingenuity; ebbing and flowing twice daily with a rhythmic force strange to dwellers by the Mediterranean, the high tide repulsed the army which was attempting the siege by land, and the low tide stranded the fleet which

* This seems clear from Suet. (Cæs., 25), who gives the successive incidents of the conquest in chronological order, except that, at the end, he puts the defeat at Gergovia before the massacre of Titurius and Arunculeius.

† Cæs., B. G., iii. 11; Dion, xxxix. 40.

‡ Cæs. (B. G., iii. 11) says: "Ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus." He has not yet spoken of their submission, and has not even previously mentioned the Pictones. It is probable therefore that this demand for reinforcements was one of the numerous rapid devices employed by Cæsar to be able to proceed against the peoples which still remained independent.

was moving to the attack by sea. Cæsar thus spent a large part of the summer in assailing a line of impregnable fortresses which were secured against capture either by land or by sea. 56 B.C.

Meanwhile Pompey, after duly making his peace with Clodius, had again become reconciled with Crassus, and together the two chiefs exercised an undisputed lordship over Rome, Italy and the Empire. The reconstruction of the Triumvirate had reduced the Conservative opposition to a small knot of vain and violent senators, headed by Cato, Favonius and Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had no influence over the majority of their colleagues. Even Cicero had reluctantly submitted. Cæsar had promised his brother Quintus a command in Gaul, and Pompey, who had gone straight from Lucca to Sardinia to requisition corn, had asked Quintus to tell him that his speech in the Senate on Cæsar's Land Law, had given him much displeasure.* Cicero had consented to go into the country on the 15th of May when he should have been present in the Senate to speak on a motion of his own about this very subject.†

Demoralisation
of the Con-
servatives.

He soon yielded still further, and promised actually to speak in Cæsar's favour, when at the beginning of June ‡ a debate took place on the proposed despatch of ten commissioners to organise the administration of Gaul and to vote the funds necessary for the four legions recruited by Cæsar in 58 and 57. In spite of his triumphal return to Italy, the wound inflicted on him by Clodius had left a lasting mark upon his nervous and impressionable temperament. The vague dreams of glory which had turned his brain after the conspiracy of Catiline had by now passed away; his ambition was no longer to be a great statesman. Content with having escaped from the arena with his life, he intended before all things to avoid facing it again; he wished to remain outside as an intelligent onlooker, ready at all times, if necessary, to play a secondary part, provided only that this part involved taking no risks. He was returning to his early passion for literature, to which

Cicero returns
to literature.

* Cic., ad F., i. 9. 9.

† *Id.*, ad Q., ii. 8.

‡ Lange, R. A., iii. 323.

56 B.C.

he had been unfaithful since he laid it by years ago to become one of the leading lawyers in Rome. He was now engaged upon an ambitious work, the dialogue called *De Oratore*, a book written in his very best narrative and philosophical style, full of vivid personal touches and delightful pieces of characterisation. The quiet pleasure which he derived from the composition of his book seemed for the moment far more enviable than the delirious excitements of ambition and the mad intoxication of power. There were private preoccupations too, such as the unsatisfactory state of his finances, which distracted him from devoting too much attention to politics. He had already been in some embarrassment before his exile, through the debts incurred to pay for his new house. Despite the indemnity voted him by the Senate, which, as a matter of fact, was wholly insufficient, and the advances of his friend Atticus, he had serious difficulty in satisfying his creditors and rebuilding his house and country villas.* This was all the more troublesome, because he had allowed himself to be caught in the fashionable whirlpool and was being more and more tempted into a lavish and luxurious style of living.†

The "De Oratore."

Cicero's gratitude to Pompey.

There was yet another reason which deterred him from opposing the Triumvirate. As a man of right feeling he felt that he owed a debt of gratitude towards Pompey for his recall from exile—a debt which was something of the nature of a political obligation. Why, he asked himself, should he offend Pompey to please a small clique of obstinate aristocrats who had abandoned him in his hour of danger and were really not a whit better than their opponents? As for Cæsar, there might be much to be said against him, yet had he not also a good deal to his credit?‡ What was the use of making life a burden by running full tilt against every difficulty that arose? Would it not be wiser to follow the example set by a man like Varro, who, though an aristocrat of wealth and culture, had filled numerous offices, been legate in the war against the pirates and at the end brought home a good million of money for his pains?

* Cic., A., iv. 1, 3; iv. 2, 7; iv. 3, 6.

† *Id.*, ad Q., ii. 6, 3.

‡ For the motives of this interesting conversion see Cic., F., i. 9.

Varro had indeed understood how to preserve entire liberty of action in the midst of all the party struggles and intrigues of his day. Quite recently, after passing some trenchant criticisms upon the policy of his friend Pompey, he had retired from politics to his villa in the country where he occupied himself with improving the cultivation of his estates and helping by his studies and writings to keep alive all that was best in the old Roman traditions, reshaped and revived by the influence of Greece. He did so in the form most popular with a dilettante and bustling age, which made action a fetish and thought a pastime, by writing handbooks, compilations and manuals; his great work in nine books, entitled, *Disciplinæ*, is in fact a sort of encyclopædia. He was also a patron of art, and Archelaus, one of the first sculptors in Rome,* was employed in his service. Cicero was quite ready to follow in the footsteps of his friend Varro. There were now but two objects which he had at heart: to show his gratitude to Pompey, and to take vengeance upon Clodius.†

56 B.C.
Varro as a country gentleman.

His "Disciplinæ."

The public soon learnt of his change of attitude. In spite of his disapproval of the conference of Lucca, he shortly afterwards delivered a striking speech in the Senate, introducing a panegyric, in the fashion of the day, on the conquest and pacification of Gaul, and telling the arm-chair critics, who inquired why funds and reinforcements were still needed for a conquest which was already completed, that, although the larger operations had been triumphantly concluded there was still a sort of war to be carried on against guerillas.‡ The Conservative opposition was easily outvoted. It was decided to send ten commissioners to organise the new territory, and in the spring of 56 Gaul was officially proclaimed a Roman province by the Senate. It was also resolved that Piso should be recalled at the close of the same year, and that Gabinius should leave Syria at the end of 55, to be replaced by one of the newly elected consuls.

The "De Provinciis Consularibus."

Gaul declared a Roman province.

* Overbeck, G. G. P., ii. 482.

† Lange, R. A., iii. 309 ff.

‡ See Cic., de Prov. Cons., xiii. and xv. 32-36.

56 B.C.

Postponement
of the elections.

For July with the elections was now at hand. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus had already announced his candidature for the consulship, and it was generally expected that Pompey and Crassus would follow his example. The days passed : but Pompey and Crassus gave no sign. Either the report which had been circulated about their candidature was erroneous, or they had changed their minds. Soon it was observed that every time it was proposed to fix the day of the election two Tribunes systematically made use of their veto.* The electors soon awoke to the meaning of this manoeuvre. As public opinion was not generally favourable to their candidature † Crassus and Pompey were unwilling that the election should take place under the presidency of the consuls Cnæus Cornelius Lentulus and Lucius Marcius Philippus, both of whom were Conservatives. One of the two would have to preside at the electoral assembly, which meant that it would be his duty to present the list of candidates to the people, and that he would have the right of refusing to inscribe any name of which he did not approve. There was some chance that he might be led on by public opinion to erase the names of Crassus and Pompey. ‡ Fearing a rebuff of this sort from the Conservatives Crassus and Pompey had decided to have the elections postponed by the Tribunes until the following year. From the first of January onwards it would be necessary for the Senate to elect an *interrex* for five days at a time and this *interrex* would preside over the elections in place of the consul. Their plan was thus simply to wait until chance gave them a senator devoted to their own cause.

Indifference of
the public.

The Conservative clique urged the public, who had no taste for these intrigues, to compel Pompey and Crassus to abandon their obstruction, or at least to acknowledge their responsibility for its continuance. Lentulus made several attempts to force a declaration from them in the Senate as to whether they intended to come forward as candidates ; he even summoned a large popular meeting at which, in

* Plut., Crass., 15 ; Pomp., 51 ; Dion, xxxix. 27.

† Plut., Crass., 15 ; Cat. U. 41.

‡ Dion, xxxix. 27.

the presence of all the Conservative senators in mourning costume, he accused Pompey of tyranny.* But it was all in vain. The public grumbled at Crassus and Pompey, but remained on the whole completely indifferent, caring only for amusements and money-making. Among politicians, on the other hand, there was so widespread a fear of the Triumvirate that many were afraid even to enter the Senate House. † The months passed. The elections were still being postponed, and Pompey and Crassus still pretended to be innocent of the obstruction. The Conservatives attempted to retaliate by bringing an action against Lucius Cornelius Balbus, the skilful agent of Cæsar and Pompey, for the wrongful use of the title of citizen; but Pompey begged Cicero to defend him. Cicero made a speech which is still extant and successfully secured his acquittal.

The "Pro Balbo."

Meanwhile the revolt of the Veneti had at last been quelled by the tardy appearance of Decimus Brutus with his fleet. Whether the tribesmen made light of a navy indiscriminately collected from all parts of the coast, or whether, weary of the long siege, they hoped to finish the war at one blow, they had at once taken to their ships and given battle; and Decimus Brutus had achieved so signal a victory that they had immediately sent in their submission. Cæsar, anxious to give a fresh demonstration that Gaul was now a Roman province, condemned all their chief men to death.

Submission of the Veneti.

Then he moved on farther afield. At the end of the summer he undertook an expedition against the Morini and the Menapii who had not yet submitted; but the campaign was unsuccessful. These warlike tribes did not offer a collected resistance against the march of the legions, but dispersed in small bands through the forests and marshes, taking their treasure with them, and carried on an obstinate guerilla warfare by surprising and cutting off small detachments of Romans. Winter was now approaching, and Cæsar saw that it would be foolish to advance farther into a wild and totally unknown country. He therefore made good his

Campaign against the Morini and Menapii.

* Plut., Pomp., 51; Crass., 15; Dion, xxxix. 28; Val., Max., vi. 2, 6.

† Dion, xxxix. 30.

56 B.C. retreat after inflicting some damage on the country, and sent his army into winter quarters in the territory which had revolted in the course of the year.

The third year
in Gaul.

Thus a third year of the war had ended, leaving the Romans with some striking successes and a considerable supply of loot. The suppression of the various risings had given Cæsar abundant pretexts for devastation and pillage, and had enabled him and his officers, notably Memmius and Labienus, and indeed the whole army, to reap a handsome compensation for the hardships they had endured.*

The problem
of government
in Gaul.

But Cæsar had now to meet a far more serious difficulty than the stubborn resistance of a few angry tribes. He had to organise a constitution for the conquered province. It was, of course, entirely beyond his power to destroy at one blow the whole existing framework of Celtic society and to replace it by a brand new form of government. On the other hand it was not at all easy to adapt the old working institutions to the changed situation: to mould to his own extraneous purposes a complicated system of forces and attachments and interests, which still retained much of its vitality under the Roman régime. He was particularly embarrassed by the condition of the two prevailing political parties, the one Nationalist and popular, the other Conservative and aristocratic. Though their activity had been considerably curtailed since the annexation, neither of these parties had been wholly broken up; each still continued to maintain its old position and nurse its old grievances, endeavouring to apply the new conditions to the furtherance of its own particular interests. As Cæsar grew to have a better acquaintance with Gaul he realised that the Nationalists, relying as they did on the support of the masses, were far more powerful than the Conservatives and aristocrats who had invited him into Gaul. He learnt that all through the country the Diets or Assemblies of Notables were feeble and decadent bodies which enjoyed only a nominal authority in face of the growing power of the personage

* Suet. (Cæs. 24) says that the systematic pillage of Gaul began after the Lucca conference.

always known in Cæsar's writings as the king. The king was the chief executive officer of the government, generally nominated for a fixed period by the Diet, and not infrequently selected from among the demagogues at the head of the Nationalist party. Now this party, though it had bowed for the moment beneath the yoke, continued to distrust Cæsar's intentions and to detest the foreigner. This meant, of course, that a large part of the nation refused to accept the new régime with sincerity and loyalty, and would do nothing to bring the old institutions of the country into harmony with Roman demands. 56 B.C. [Rex.]

The difficulty was undoubtedly very serious. But Cæsar, with his fine diplomatic ability and unequalled presence of mind, was not easily daunted. He came to the conclusion that he must alter the whole direction of his Gallic policy by transferring the weight of his influence from the one party to the other: in other words, he made up his mind to abandon the Conservatives upon whose help he had so far relied and to depend upon the popular party, which had been hitherto steadily opposed to him. He began by making advances of all sorts to the powerful capitalists who were engaged in winning a monarchical position in the old Gallic republics. By the exertion of his own personal influence or by usurping the powers of the Diets, he arranged that some of them should be appointed kings in their own country, hoping thus to have the policy of several of the people directed by chiefs devoted to the Roman interest and prepared to bring the masses over to his side. Remorselessly sacrificing the friends who had hitherto stood by him, he summoned the Diets and used all his power to precipitate the revolution which the oligarchy of plutocrats had long been maturing. Amongst the new friends whom he made in this manner were Vercingetorix, the young and powerful chief of the Arverni; * Tasgetus, King of the Carnutes; † Cavarinus, King of the

Cæsar sides with the Nationalists.

* Jullian, Verc., 81. Vercingetorix is certainly a name, not a title. See *id.*, 87.

† B. G., v. 25.

56-55 B.C. Senones,* and Commius, King of the Atrebatés.† It appears that he even intended to make Dumnorix King of the Ædui.‡ He was also thinking of applying the principle of *divide et impera* to help the Ædui and Remi to the supremacy which had been forfeited by their rivals the Senones, the Sequani and the Arverni.§ This was the policy he had devised to consolidate the Roman power in Gaul. ||

The candi-
dature of
Domitius.

But whatever the troubles still in store for him, all went well for the moment both in Gaul and in the metropolis. Crassus and Pompey had succeeded in postponing the elections to the year 55, and in securing the nomination of an *interrex* favourable to their cause. The obstinate Domitius had been induced by his leader Cato to persist in his candidature; and on the morning of the election he left his house at dawn, with an escort of slaves and clients, to make a round of the city soliciting for votes. At the corner of one of the roads he was suddenly assailed by an armed band; the slave who preceded him with a torch was killed, many of the escort wounded, and Domitius himself frightened into an undignified retreat. ¶ Cæsar had given furlough to many of his soldiers to go up to vote, under the escort of Publius Crassus, and Crassus and Pompey were thus eventually elected without difficulty.

Crassus and
Pompey in
office.

They set to work without delay. Their first and most pressing care was to put into execution the scheme agreed upon at Lucca. One of the tribunes of the people, Caius Trebonius, son of a rich business man ** and a recent convert to the party of Cæsar, succeeded, despite the violent opposition of the Conservatives, in passing a law which made Syria and the two Spains the provinces to be assigned to the consuls of the year, each to be held for five years with powers of peace and war. When this was off their hands, the consuls pro-

* B. G., v. 54.

† *Id.*, iv. 21.

‡ *Id.*, v. 6.

§ *Id.*, vi. 12.

|| To Jullian (Verc., 80 f.) is due the credit of being the first to discover this change of policy on Cæsar's part, which Fustel de Coulanges, for instance, overlooked. See G. R., 52-55.

¶ App., B. G., ii. 17; Plut., Pomp., 52; Crass., 15; Cat. U. 41-42; Dion, xxxix. 31.

** Cic., Phil., xiii. 10, 23.

ceeded to renew the government of the three Gauls to Cæsar for another five years. This proposal too was passed without serious disorder, although Cicero, in several friendly interviews, endeavoured to dissuade Pompey from its adoption.* After a short holiday in the country Pompey and Crassus, who returned to Rome in April,† brought forward various measures to put a check to the social disorders of the time. Crassus proposed a bill against corruption and Pompey a bill containing rigorous provisions against parricide and a measure to amend the method of selecting juries for the courts. Pompey was also anxious to pass a law against luxury, which suggests that he was already inclining towards ideas which were utterly opposed to the flaunting Imperialism of Cæsar; Hortensius however persuaded him to withdraw it by an eloquent panegyric in which he described luxury as the natural and fitting ornament of power.‡

But no small reform of this nature could have availed in a society where anarchy and corruption were encroaching day by day. About the beginning of spring a singular rumour began to circulate at Pozzuoli, amongst the numerous Egyptian merchants who used that port in the direct trade between Egypt and Italy. It was whispered that Ptolemy had been brought back to Alexandria by the help of a Roman army.§ Considering that the Senate had as yet come to no decision upon the matter, the news seemed hardly credible. But for all that it was true. Ptolemy, tired of sending money to Rome and receiving nothing in return, || had at length appealed to Ephesus where, shortly after the conference at Lucca, he had been met by Rabirius; they had then gone on together with Pompey's despatches to interview Gabinius in Syria. Gabinius, in obedience to Pompey's orders, at last consented to restore Ptolemy to his kingdom without waiting for the authorisation of the Senate. He was to receive a handsome

Gabinius and
Antony in
Egypt.

* Cic., Phil., ii. 10, 24.

† Drümann, G. R., iv. 93.

‡ Dion, xxxix. 38.

§ Cic., A., vi. 10, 1.

|| Plut., Cat. U. 35.

55 B.C. compensation from Ptolemy, and Rabirius was to become Minister of Finance in the Egyptian kingdom, to watch over the interests of the Italian creditors in that country. Thus, towards the end of the year 56, Gabinius had invaded Egypt and re-established Ptolemy on his throne, with an army in which Antony was an officer.* The howl of indignation from the Conservatives can be imagined.

The Parthian project and Conservative criticism.

£1,240,000.

The impression of this scandal had not yet died away when the public awoke to a still more startling piece of news. It suddenly became manifest that Crassus intended to attempt the conquest of Parthia. The evidence was indeed too plain to be gainsaid. He was now openly making preparations for the campaign, recruiting soldiers, selecting officers, putting his affairs in order and making a detailed inventory of his fortune. He was able to set down in his book, that having been left 300 talents by his father he was now in possession of some 7000.† Yet he was still dissatisfied. The megalomania which was so widespread an ailment at the time, coupled with the vanity of a headstrong and grasping nature, had turned the veteran politician, hitherto, despite all his defects, a serious and sagacious man of business, into a light-hearted swaggerer who was a prey to the strangest and most impossible delusions. He intended to beat the record of Lucullus, who had passed away in the previous year in a state of childish senility, to follow on the track of Alexander into India, and go down as the greatest of all great conquerors.‡ The excitement caused by this news and by the preparations with which it was accompanied proved infectious, and it was not long before enthusiasm was enlisted far and wide for the idea. Many of the younger men attempted to secure positions as officers, amongst them Caius Cassius Longinus, who had married a daughter of Servilia and thus become the brother-in-law of Brutus. But the small Conservative clique persisted in predicting disaster; the country, they declared,

* Dion, xxxix. 55-58; App., Syr., 51; Josephus, A. J., xiv. 6, 2; B. J., i. 8, 7; Cic., Pro Rab. Post., viii. 22.

† Plut., Crass., 2.

‡ *Id.*, 16.

was distant and unknown and the Parthians redoubtable assailants in the field. They even ventured upon the paradox that the war must be unjust because the enemy had supplied no excuse for its declaration.* It was long since any one at Rome had paid serious heed to arguments of this description; and indeed neither party seems to have had any real conception of the difficulties of the enterprise.

Cæsar allowed himself even less breathing space than Crassus and Pompey. In the spring of 55 he had crossed the Alps into Gaul with the intention of spending the summer on a small expedition into Britain, to see if the island offered facilities for the winning of fresh laurels. But his attention had been distracted by an invasion of two German tribes, the Usipetes and the Tencteri, who had perhaps been secretly induced by the Nationalist leaders to cross the Rhine against the Romans. Alarmed at the number of their forces, Cæsar had employed the dishonest stratagem of keeping them busy with negotiations and then attacking them by surprise.† He decided to follow up this success by an expedition across the Rhine, to intimidate the Germans against future interference. He ascended the valley of the Rhine as far as Bonn, threw a bridge over the river within ten days and made a hasty raid into the territory of the Suevi and the Sugcambri. It was only after the conclusion of these operations that his hands were free for the British enterprise. He had only time to make a hasty disembarkation with two legions, reserving a larger expedition till the following year.

In spite of their comparative insignificance the news of these exploits caused great enthusiasm at Rome. Rumour said that Cæsar had conquered 300,000 Germans, and his descent upon

* App., B. C., ii. 18. For evidence of the hostility of the Conservatives to the expedition, compare the unfavourable opinion of Florus, iii. 11, which is certainly derived from Livy, the Conservative historian.

† Plutarch (Cæs., 22) describes Cæsar's conduct on this occasion as treacherous, and this is confirmed by Cato's motion, which would never have been made if Cæsar had not really broken the law of nations. It is clear from B. G., iv. 12, that Cæsar attempts to clear himself by putting the blame on his enemies.

55 B.C.

The theatre
of Pompey.

Britain seemed little short of miraculous. If Cæsar's information about Britain was meagre, people at Rome were utterly in the dark as to conditions of the country, and could therefore say for certain that the wealth concealed in the recesses of that fabulous island would provide an unparalleled opening for profitable enterprise.* But the Roman public had long ceased to employ its reason, and in its appetite for amusements, sensations and holidays it swallowed anything that was offered it with indiscriminate credulity. At the end of the summer the palings round the theatre of Pompey had at last been removed and Rome had been dazzled by its huge masses of glittering marble † and by the superb square colonnade for shelter in rainy weather, which was built behind the stage and decorated with paintings by Polygnotos and statues representing the nations conquered by Pompey. According to one tradition place was found there for the magnificent statue by Apollonius, son of Nestor, part of which has come down to us under the name of the Belvedere Torso. ‡ One part of the colonnade was walled off to form a magnificent room called the Curia of Pompey, which was large enough to hold the entire Senate. § A magnificent festival was held to inaugurate the first building truly worthy of the metropolis of Empire. Amongst other marvels there was a wild-beast hunt in the course of which the wounded elephants began to trumpet, emitting cries so distressing, we are told, as to move the hearts of the public—that same public which used the dagger so freely in its Forum scuffles, and drew an exquisite pleasure from the death-struggle of a gladiator. || Such are the strange caprices of a high-strung and nervous society.

These reports of uninterrupted military success, together with such displays of almost regal munificence and delirious

* Dion, xxxix. 53.

† Pliny, N. H., viii. 7, 20. The text of Aul., Gell., x. 1, 6, seems to indicate that the temple attached to the theatre was consecrated during Pompey's third consulship. See Asconius, in *Pis.*, p. 1.

‡ Loewy (*Zeit. für Bildende Kunst*, xxiii. (1888), p. 74 f.) has shown the tradition to be false.

§ Gilbert, T. R., iii. 323.

|| Cic., F., vii. 1, 3.

popular enthusiasm, must have been profoundly discouraging to the Conservative party. Its ranks grew scantier daily, till they were gradually thinned down to a mere handful of politicians. But these at least made up for lack of numbers by violence; as they saw their forces diminishing they joined more persistently in the combat. They had secured the election of Domitius Ahenobarbus to the Consulship for the year 54 in company with Appius Claudius, the elder brother of Clodius and a friend of Pompey, and had also been successful in winning the prætorship for Cato and Publius Servilius, son of the conqueror of the Isaurians, as the colleagues of Caius Alfius Flavius and Servius Sulpicius Galba, the one a friend and the other an officer of Cæsar's. They now prepared a counterblast to the popular demonstrations in Cæsar's honour. Cato proposed that, in accordance with ancient Roman custom, he should be delivered up to the Usipetes and Tencteri for having violated the law of nations.

55 B.C.

Cato and the law of nations

Nor did this satisfy their meddlesome weakness. Before long they resorted to a still more daring manœuvre. Crassus had been enrolling soldiers in Italy to make up, together with the legions of Gabinus, the army which he thought necessary for his Parthian expedition. Unable to raise a sufficient number of volunteers, he had fallen back at last on compulsory enlistment. This hurried resort to the press-gang wounded the susceptibilities of a public which had long lost all taste for military service. Profiting by the agitation thus provoked, the Conservative party attempted to veto the levy of Crassus by means of two Tribunes, Caius Ateius Capito and Publius Aquilius Gallus.* But the stratagem only intensified the impatience of Crassus, who now arranged to leave Italy already in November. The Tribunes were thus robbed of their victim. But at least they could offer a dignified protest. When Crassus left Rome with his suite and his son Publius, whom Cæsar had sent to accompany him with a troop of Gallic horse, Ateius escorted him to the City boundary, assailing him as he went with evil prophecies and maledictions.

Crassus uses the press-gang.

* Dion, xxxix. 39.

55 B.C. Crassus listened without blenching, but it is likely enough that the young soldiers whom he was carrying off against their will to meet distant and unknown dangers were duly impressed by the incident. The subsequent history of the campaign and the general military decadence of the stay-at-home Italians give us good ground for thinking so.

CHAPTER V

THE "CONQUEST" OF BRITAIN

Cæsar's expenses—His slaves—Cicero and the *De Republica*—The last years of Catullus—The elections for 53—Cæsar's expedition to Britain—Death of Julia—War against Cassivellaunus—Gabinius and Rabirius in Italy—The first great Gallic revolt.

THE elderly banker who was thus buckling on sword and 55 B.C. armour to slake an old thirst for popularity was at least expeditious in his methods. He set off on the conquest of Parthia in the most relentless and peremptory haste, taking the straightest possible line towards his objective, regardless of the impediments in his path. On his arrival at Brindisi he insisted on immediately putting out to sea in the stormy season, and thus lost a number of ships and men in the crossing.* Disembarking at Durazzo, he set out without delay in the depth of winter, taking the Egnatian Road across Albania, Macedonia and Thrace towards the Bosphorus, and ignoring the effect that this disastrous and hurried advance produced upon the spirits of his already dissatisfied recruits.

Meanwhile Cæsar had decided to spend the following year in an attempt on Britain. We have no information as to his object, but it is hardly likely that he expected to effect the conquest of the whole island. Perhaps he intended nothing more than a filibustering expedition on an unusually large scale, to bring home fresh stores of booty, and to give the Romans new material for celebrations and vainglory. He may also have wished to diminish the unrest prevalent throughout Gaul since the peace he had so unexpectedly imposed upon a country where war had for centuries been the normal condition of life. Sudden social changes of this kind never

* Plut., Crass., 17.

55 B.C. fail to produce a crop of unexpected disturbances; and no difficulty perhaps caused Cæsar more trouble in his settlement of Gaul than the unemployed soldiers. There were hundreds of men in the country who were solely dependent upon warfare for power and position. Suddenly cut off by the peace from what had been the whole source of their social importance, and indeed their livelihood, such adventurers inevitably drifted into discontent and sedition. Cæsar was so well aware of this that he attempted to occupy the soldier class by recruiting amongst them a large number of volunteers and to flatter the military vanity of the Gauls by forming a legion, the famous Lark,* composed almost entirely of natives, thus placing the new subjects of Rome on the same footing in the army as the conquerors of the world. It is therefore possible that he thought of Britain as a new field of action to be thrown open under Roman control to the military aspirations of the great Gallic clans, whose chiefs he intended to lead to Britain in the following year.

[A. lauda.]

Cæsar's
buildings at
Rome.

For the moment however, towards the end of the year 55, after having invented a new type of ship and given orders for the construction of a certain number of vessels during the winter,† he crossed the Alps to Italy and thence to Illyria, returning again to Cisalpine Gaul to summon the local assemblies, receive the innumerable petitioners who awaited him from Rome, and practise once more on a grander scale his familiar policy of corruption. Being now in possession of enormous resources, he was able to hand over large sums to Balbus and Oppius, his two agents at Rome, to make advances to needy senators, to build costly villas and to buy up estates, antiques, and works of art of every kind all over Italy,‡ and finally to imitate Pompey in undertaking huge public works at Rome, thus putting money into the pockets of contractors and workmen and satisfying the now almost universal taste for magnificence. His designs were indeed grandiose. He had given orders to Oppius and Cicero to

* Suet., Cæs., 24.

† Cæs., B. G., v. 2.

‡ Suet., Cæs., 47.

enlarge the narrow confines of the Forum and he spent the enormous sum of 60 million sesterces to buy up the blocks of old houses which filled a corner of the Comitium at the foot of the Capitol.* As the people still assembled in the Campus Martius for the Assembly of the tribes, where they were packed into provisional enclosures, surrounded by palisades and divided by ropes into as many sections as there were tribes, Cæsar was anxious to present the electors with a huge marble palace worthy of the sovereign people, to be called the *Sæpta Julia*. The building was to be in the form of a huge rectangle, with a front corresponding to the present line of palaces on the right-hand side of the Corso, looking from the Piazza del Popolo and the Palazzo Sciarra to the Piazza Venezia.† It was to be surrounded by a magnificent colonnade over 300 yards long to which a large public garden was to be attached.‡ This work also was to be superintended by Balbus and Oppius, who were to choose the architects, and contract for and supervise the construction.

Cæsar had now also begun to devote special care to the collection of able and serviceable slaves, whom he either purchased in the open market or chose from among the prisoners of his campaigns.§ He needed an enormous following of accountants, secretaries, couriers, agents, archivists, and ordinary servants, to administer the huge finances of the State and of his private patrimony, to superintend the government of his province, to provide for the armies and public works, and to assist him in the direction of political intrigues. This huge crowd of personal dependants he distributed throughout Rome, Italy, and Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, in the cities, amongst the legions, and along the great roads, wherever, in fact, he thought their presence might be useful to his interests. He had trained it to an unrivalled pitch of efficiency, superintending the whole body down to the humblest slaves and the smallest detail, maintaining the strictest

Cæsar's slave
bureaucracy.

* Cic., A., iv. 16, 14.

† See Lanciani, F. U., tables 15 and 21.

‡ Cic., A., iv. 16, 14.

§ Suet., Cæs., 47.

54 B.C.

discipline by cruel corporal punishments,* and arranging a regular hierarchy of promotion by varying his payments from mere food and clothing up to a salary in money, or liberty, or a gift of land, houses and capital. One of the dependants placed in this way amongst the lowest of his household-servants was a youth captured in a raid across the German frontier; hearing one day by chance that the boy lent out the leavings of his food to his companions at interest and kept a rough account of his debtors, he instantly promoted him to be an official in the financial administration,† thinking no doubt that so decided a gift for figures, if it did not bring him to the cross, would certainly carry him far; and he was not mistaken.

Crassus enters his province.

In the spring of 54 Cæsar returned to Gaul taking with him a number of new officers, amongst them Quintus, brother of Cicero, who joined him in the hope of making his fortune in Britain. Just about the same time Crassus, after passing the Bosphorus, entered Syria from the north, relieving Gabinius of his command and making every preparation to invade Mesopotamia early in the year, without a formal declaration of war.

The Conservative doctrine of Nationality.

Pompey, on the other hand, had sent his subordinates to Spain, but himself remained in the neighbourhood of Rome. His pretext for doing so was the necessity of providing for the food-supply of the capital; but his real reason for staying was that the Triumvirs did not think it safe for all three at once to be at a distance from Rome. The depleted Opposition was now trying to show its hostility to the military policy of the Democrats by posing as the defender of oppressed nationalities. In Conservative drawing-rooms at Rome laments were heard about the unscrupulous rapacity of Cæsar, and the sudden and suspiciously rapid enrichment of his officers, more particularly Mamurra and Labienus.‡ Men asked if the heroes of popular Imperialism had no greater ambition than rapine and robbery, and made stirring appeals to the slumbering moral conscience of the nation. But the nation was not dis-

* Suet., Cæs., 48.

† Schol., in Juven., i. 109.

‡ See Cic., A., vii. 7, 6; Catull., 29.

posed to give ear to them; the enthusiasm of conquest was far too contagious. Most people regarded Britain and Parthia as already subdued and made haste to borrow money on the treasures they concealed. Cæsar, Crassus and Pompey were still the heroes of the hour among a people that had no thought except for riches, victories and festivals. Cæsar, indeed, for the moment, was the most popular of the three: "our only general,"* as his admirers called him, was the man on whom all eyes were directed, about whom all had an opinion, whether good or ill. It seems to be true of all societies, that where pleasure and money are the gods of the multitude, there is a slow but steady weakening in the fibre of character. Men feel unable to remain long in a minority; they have a nervous anxiety to justify their position, and are quick to alter their opinions and likings. Very few at Rome were strong enough not to be carried away by the enthusiasm for the Triumvirs, whose career of success seemed only just to be beginning.

They had a striking and influential example in Cicero. He had at last become reconciled with Crassus, just before his departure for the East.† Pompey too was taking every occasion to testify to his esteem ‡ and Cæsar, always anxious to win over the greatest orator and writer of the Italian democracy, treated his brother Quintus with special consideration, adroitly flattered his literary vanity by praising the writings he sent him, and took pains to be polite to all the persons whom Cicero recommended to his notice.§ Cicero, who had never quite lost his fear of being looked down on by the nobility, or a certain warmth and sincerity in his professions of friendship, was genuinely touched by these exhibitions of flattery. He felt a lively gratitude and devotion towards his three great statesmen friends, and an honest desire to show them his appreciation of their behaviour by acting in their support. Every now and then, it is true,

Cicero and his
statesmen
friends.

* See the "imperator unice" of Catullus, 29, 11; 54 B., 2, an ironical allusion to the extravagant laudation of Cæsar's admirers.

† Cic., F., i. 9, 20.

‡ *Id.*, ad Q., ii. 15 B., 2.

§ *Id.*, F., i. 8, 12-18; F., vii. 5; F., vii. 8, 1.

54 B.C. his feelings were still stirred by some particularly scandalous incident. He had thoughts, for instance, of accusing Gabinius in the Senate for his conduct in Egypt.* But his longing for quiet, the indifference of his colleagues, and a feeling of the futility of anything that he might attempt induced him to abandon the idea and reserve his energies for his work in the courts or in the field of literature.† A distressing personal duty had lately fallen to his share. He had to set into order the great unfinished poem of Lucretius, who had put an end to his life in the previous year in a fit of melancholia, brought on, it seems, by the excessive use of a love potion. ‡

The "De
Republica."

Moreover he had schemes of his own on hand. He meditated composing a poem on Cæsar's achievements in Britain, and was thinking, like many a retired statesman since, of writing a great political treatise, § to expound the ideas which the study of the Greek philosophers, the experience of his career, and discussions with his contemporaries had suggested to his mind. Pure democracy had ended, it seemed, in bringing Rome to a state of irremediable chaos; aristocracy no longer existed, and the idea of monarchy was so generally detested that no one could seriously put it forward as a remedy for present evils. There remained nothing but the Aristotelian harmony of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—the creation of a supreme office to be given for limited periods, and by election, to some eminent citizen of the Republic who would be entrusted with large powers, and enabled to exact a respect for the laws from both the people and the Senate.

Cicero becomes
Cæsar's debtor.

Unfortunately, during the course of these profound political meditations, Cicero was weakly yielding to the fashion of the day, and continuing to swell the large volume of his debts. Although he had not yet finished his payments for the house which had been demolished by Clodius, and although the indemnity granted him by the Senate was insufficient to

* Cic., ad Q., iii. 3, 2.

† Lange, R. A., iii. 339; Cic., ad Q., ii. 16, 1; A., iv. 16, 1.

‡ See Giussani, L. R., 147; Stampini, R. S. A., i. part 4; Cic., ad Q., ii. 11, 4.

§ Cic., ad Q., ii. 14, 1.

rebuild his town residence and his villas, he continued to spend money on his country house at Pompeii, to buy a second at Pozzuoli, to provide additional accommodation at Rome, and to increase the number of his servants.* Cæsar skilfully took advantage of a moment of difficulty and induced him to accept a considerable loan.†

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Catullus, on the other hand, was fast becoming the most violent of aristocrats, hurling his fierce and biting lampoons against the favourites of the popular party. On his return to Rome from the East he had definitely broken with Clodia, and after one last bitter and sorrowful poem of farewell ‡ had changed the subjects, metre and style of his verse. He was now a thorough Conservative in politics and a devotee of the erudite and artificial poetry of the Alexandrian school. It was at this time that he composed his famous Epithalamium on Peleus and Thetis§ and his strange sixty-third song, a description, in the barbaric galliambic metre, of the orgiastic worship of Cybele. He was also writing a series of short and violent political lyrics in which he attacked Cæsar, Pompey and their principal partisans,|| affecting, young provincial though he was, sentiments of the most ultra-aristocratic character and a pious horror for the vulgar democracy which was levelling all the old distinctions between class and class, even in the highest offices of the State, "down to Vatinius who swears he is sure of the consulship. What remains for you, Catullus, except to die?"¶ And indeed his days were running out. Conscious of the near approach of death, he hastily collected the best of his poems into a small volume

Political lyrics
of Catullus.

* Lichtenberger, *de Ciceronis re privata* (Paris, 1895), pp. 9, 14.

† It is clear from Cicero himself (A., v. 4, 3; v. 5, 2; v. 6, 2) that he was Cæsar's debtor. As these letters, which date from 51, deal with the repayment, it is probable that the debt was contracted at this time, when the two men were most befriended and Cæsar most flush with money.

‡ Cat., 11.

§ Guissani, L. R., 167.

|| Cat., 29; 54; 57; 93.

¶ *Id.*, 52. *

54 B.C. and gave expression in a few beautiful verses to the profound sadness of his spirit.

“ Malest, Cornifici, tuo Catullo
Malest me hercule ei et laboriose.”*

The elections
for 53.

Summer was now fast approaching. Crassus had invaded Mesopotamia without formally declaring war and occupied several of the cities. Cæsar was still delaying his invasion of Britain. At Rome the electoral struggle was just commencing; there was a large selection of candidates for all the offices and not less than five for the Consulship. These five were Caius Memmius Gemellus, once an enemy and now the official candidate of Cæsar; Marcus Valerius Messala, a noble of ancient lineage who had the support of the Conservatives; Marcus Æmilius Scaurus; Caius Claudius, another brother of Clodius; and finally Cnæus Domitius Calvinus.† But what gave rise to particular scandal was the wild medley of ambitions which now came to light. Rome had never witnessed anything quite like it. All the magistrates in office demanded money from the candidates as the price of their assistance.‡ The two Consuls concluded a regular treaty with Memmius and Calvinus, promising their support on condition that after their election they should, by an ingenious system of falsification, secure them the provinces they desired, or in case of failure pay them 400,000 sesterces.§ The corruption exceeded anything that had ever been known. One candidate having accused one of his rivals of bribery, all the others followed his example, and soon every one of them was at once accuser and accused. || An astonished public asked what would happen on the day of the elections. As the voting drew nearer accusations, invectives and threats redoubled in violence, and the bribery became more and more outspoken; on the day itself there would inevitably be bloodshed in the Campus, and many looked forward, as a last deliverance, to the nomination of a

* “Your friend Catullus fares ill, oh Cornificius, he fares ill and is full of suffering.”—Cat., 38.

† Lange, R. A., iii. 337.

‡ App., B. C., ii. 19.

§ Drümman, G. R., iii. p. 4; Cic., A., iv. 15, 7; iv. 18.

|| Cic., A., iv. 16, 8.

dictator. But no one thought it his duty to do more than wring his hands. The intrepid Cato, who happened to be Prætor, finally had a million sesterces deposited in his custody by all the candidates for the Tribuneship and threatened to confiscate them if the electors were corrupted.* But Pompey was too irritated and disgusted to interfere. The Senators refused to take any dangerous initiative, and though long and laborious sittings were held no agreement was arrived at.† Soon the summer heats supervened; every one declared "it had never been so hot,"‡ and that they could not put off going into the country. The Senate deferred the consular elections until September, hoping that the electoral fever would calm down while the various prosecutions were being discussed.§

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Cicero too left Rome to enjoy the fresh air of Arpino, and to supervise the construction of a fine villa and other important works ordered by his brother Quintus as a way of spending his Gallic treasure. || For Cicero, who was much attached to his brother, the expedition to Britain was the cause of far more lively anxiety than the situation at Rome.¶ But would the expedition really take place? At the beginning of July Quintus had written to him that Cæsar was on the point of giving up the idea. Information had been received, so he wrote, that the Britons were preparing a vigorous defence and that the conquest would bring in neither precious metals nor slaves of any value.** Perhaps another risk with which Quintus was not acquainted, or which he did not venture to confide to his brother, caused Cæsar to hesitate. It concerned the internal situation in Gaul,†† where his attempts

Cicero and
the British
expedition.

* Plut. (Cat. U. 44 f.) tells this story with some mistakes, as is clear from Cic., A., iv. 15, 7.

† Cic., Q., ii. 16, 2.

‡ *Id.*, iii. 1, 1, 1.

§ *Id.*, ii. 16, 3.

|| *Id.*, iii. 1, 1-2.

¶ *Id.*, ii. 16, 4.

** See Cic., A., iv. 16, 13, and F., vii. 7. Vogel (I. P. P., 153, p. 276 f.) seems to me to have shown that "Britannici belli exitus expectatur" in Cic., A., iv. 16, 13, and "sine Britannia" in F., vii. 7, 2, allude to the idea of abandoning the expedition, and that chaps. 1-7 of B. G., v. confirm this interpretation.

†† See Strabo, iv. 5, 3 (200).

54 B.C. at conciliation with the Nationalists were by no means succeeding. The old institutions were working very badly under Roman control; instead of assuring peace and order they were giving rise to all sorts of unexpected difficulties; and measures inspired by the best intentions were leading to results entirely contrary to what had been awaited.

Cæsar
nominates a
king for the
Treveri.

Thus, shortly after his return to Gaul, Cæsar had had to make a short expedition into the country of the Treveri, where, as often under the old régime, a civil war was imminent over the election of the first magistrate. Cæsar had checked its outbreak by the nomination of Cingetorix, one of the competitors; but his intervention had not been received with gratitude by the people. He had alienated the whole party of the other competitor Indutiomarus, who could not resign himself to giving up the struggle without a contest. Nor was the idea of the British campaign as a bait to the Gallic nobility producing the desired effect. Many of the Gallic nobles were inclined to oppose it, and Dumnorix was persuading them not to set out on the ground that Cæsar was anxious to put an end to their lives during the voyage.*

Cæsar lands
in Britain.

Disquieted by these general manifestations of discontent Cæsar had asked himself for a moment if it would not be more prudent to renounce the whole enterprise. Perhaps he would have made up his mind to do so if the expedition were not being so eagerly awaited in Italy, and if his preparations had not already been too far advanced.† He reduced the enterprise however to the most modest proportions, selecting only five legions and 2000 horse, and taking with him for his personal attendance not more than three slaves; ‡ he left the three remaining legions in Gaul under the command of Labienus, and in short made every disposition for a speedy return and for the protection of Gaul during his absence. After all these precautions, Cæsar led his legions and the Gallic chiefs who were with him to a port which it is difficult to identify on modern maps, and at the first favourable wind

* Cæs., B. G., v. 6.

† B. G., v. 4.

‡ Athenæus, vi. 105 (273).

began the embarkation. But now a serious incident occurred. Dumnorix disappeared with all the Æduan cavalry. Fearing a general mutiny, Cæsar sent all his cavalry in pursuit of the fugitive, who, on being overtaken, killed himself to avoid surrender. The other Gallic chiefs were thus frightened into following Cæsar; and in the last days of August* Cicero heard in a letter from his brother that the army had reached the British coast without further mishaps: probably about the end of July,† for letters at that time took about twenty-eight days to reach Rome from Britain. Cicero was reassured. If Cæsar had been able to disembark, his victory seemed inevitable.‡

54 B.C.

Just at this time, towards the end of August or the beginning of September, occurred the death of Julia, the wife of Pompey, shortly after the death of her grandmother, the venerable mother of Cæsar.§ The young generation was so weakly that premature deaths no longer even excited surprise; in this very same year Catullus too passed away at the age of thirty-three. But the death of Julia produced a very lively impression in Rome because the young wife had, for the last four years, been a bond of union between the two most celebrated men of the day. Every one asked whether her death would not modify the political situation.

Death of Julia
and of Catullus.

But there were soon new scandals to occupy the public mind. The hope that the postponement of the elections would calm the bitterness of parties proved illusory, and all the old intrigues broke out once more, accompanied this time by violence. Memmius, who had broken with Calvinus, one day publicly read out in the Senate the agreement that had been made with the two consuls in office.|| The armed bands

Street fighting
at Rome.

* See Cic., Q., ii. 16, 4. The letter was written about the end of August, as is clear from the passage: "Scauri iudicium statim exerebitur." Asconius tells us that Scaurus' trial was on September 2.

† Vogel (I. P. P., cliii., 275) fixes this date; there are good arguments against the earlier date given by Napoleon III.

‡ Cic., Q., ii. 16, 4.

§ *Id.*, iii. 1, 5, 17; iii. 1, 7, 25; iii. 8, 3. Dion, xxxix. 54; Suet., Cæs., 26.

|| Cic., Q., iii. 1, 5, 16; A., iv. 18, 2.

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of the various candidates engaged in regular street battles, and day after day there were several deaths. The public, disgusted and alarmed, was only too anxious that the struggle should be closed by the holding of the elections without further delay. But when the fixed date arrived, the Tribunes postponed them once more. Memmius, fearing that the scandal would result in his defeat, was anxious to wait until Cæsar returned from Gaul in order to secure his support. He therefore followed the precedent set by Pompey and Crassus in the preceding year.

Cæsar in
Britain.

Unfortunately Cæsar had other anxieties to deal with at the moment. Cicero had received letters from his brother and from Cæsar up to the end of September (the last letter from Cæsar was dated September 1) which gave no special cause for anxiety.* After constructing a camp on the sea-coast Cæsar had advanced into the interior, but within a few days he had left Quintus and the main body of the expedition and returned to the coast to look after his fleet, which had suffered severe injury in a gale.† From that time onwards Cicero had received no further letters either from his brother or from Cæsar: nor was any one else in Rome better informed. Having been without news for at least fifty days, Cicero was beginning to grow anxious ‡ and to ask himself what might be going on in that fabulous island of Britain. Letters eventually arrived to reassure him, and his reply to them is dated the 24th of October.§ Cæsar had again gone into the interior, where King Cassivellaunus, making a feint of retreating, had enticed him far from the sea into the forests and marshes. He had then sent orders to the kings of the territory through which Cæsar had passed to attack him in the rear. His communi-

* Cic., Q., iii. 1, 7, 25.

† *Id.* This passage is in entire agreement with Cæs., B. G., v. 10-11. *Cum ad mare accesserit* in the letter no doubt alludes to the journey mentioned by Cæsar, which took place at the end of August. The letter was written towards the end of September. See Vogel, I. P. P., cliii., p. 281.

‡ Cic., Q., iii. 3, 1 (written about October 20. Vogel, I. P. P., cliii., p. 281).

§ Cic., Q., iii. 4. Note, however, that, as Vogel cleverly conjectures (I. P. P., cliii., p. 281), the opening of the letter is lost.

cations with the sea being thus broken, the legions had been forced to spend their energies in fighting the small and agile bands of British cavalry set on them like wasps by Cassivellaunus, without ever achieving a decisive victory. To destroy these flying columns a strong force of cavalry would be needed, and Cæsar had only with him a very weak contingent composed entirely of Gauls. He was soon obliged to recognise the dangers of a further advance and the risk of being cut off from his base of supplies. Commius the Atrebatian, who was a friend of Cassivellaunus, acted as mediator, and peace was finally concluded.* Cæsar declares that he imposed a tribute upon Britain; † but it is quite certain that, if Cassivellaunus made promises, he made no payments when the Roman army had once re-crossed the sea. Cæsar returned to Gaul in the first fortnight of October, ‡ bringing back no booty beyond a number of slaves. The Conquest of Britain had been a complete fiasco. §

On his disembarkation in Gaul Cæsar heard of the death of Julia. || It was a great blow to him as a father, for he was much attached to his gracious daughter. She had been a link to bind him to one of the tenderest memories, perhaps the tenderest of his life—his romance with Cornelia, daughter of Cinna, whom also death had untimely torn away. It was also a blow to the leader of the Democratic party, for whom Julia had been a guarantee of the friendship of Pompey. But he had no time to give way to grief; there was too much grave business on hand.

Cæsar hears of
Julia's death.

At Rome the situation was becoming dangerously com-

* According to Vogel, *l.c.*, the long silence of which Cicero complains shows that the guerilla operations against Cæsar's communications, spoken of in B. G., v. 22, were more serious than he gives us to understand and were one of the reasons for the rapid conclusion of peace. Everything goes to show that Cæsar, who only set out very reluctantly on the expedition, retired as soon as he could make Rome believe that he had scored a success.

† Cæs., B. G., v. 22.

‡ Vogel, I. P. P., cliii., p. 284.

§ See Strabo, iv. 5, 3 (200).

|| According to Plut., Cæs., 23. Seneca (ad Marc., 14) says that he heard of it in Britain,

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Anarchy at Rome.

plicated. Memmius continued his obstruction, the electors had not yet been convened; there were constant acts of violence; and a frightened public was calling for energetic measures, it cared not what, provided only that order was re-established and the elections took place without a return to the services of an interrex.

The idea of Pompey's dictatorship.

Encouraged by these symptoms of nervousness, the friends and flatterers of Pompey conceived the idea of making him Dictator.* But this only provoked a new struggle. The Conservatives offered the project a desperate opposition, preferring anything to a dictatorship exercised by Pompey. They attempted to make skilful use of the odium which had been attached to that office since the time of Sulla by protesting that it was not Pompey's Dictatorship which they opposed but the Dictatorship in itself.† Pompey, who was anxious to re-establish order at Rome, and was conscious of the need, now that Cæsar and Crassus were on all men's lips, of doing something to enhance his own prestige, had a secret desire to be made Dictator; but he maintained a vacillating attitude, afraid both of the unpopularity of the office and of a possible failure in holding it. So he pursued his usual plan of allowing his friends to work for him without ever revealing his intentions or compromising himself in one direction or the other. "Does he wish it, does he object to it? Who knows," wrote Cicero to his brother.‡ Thus the shadow of Pompey the Dictator began to loom over Rome, sometimes advancing, sometimes receding and almost vanishing, but always to return once more.

Trials of Gabinius and Rabirius.

During the course of this struggle, § Gabinius had quietly returned to Rome, closely followed by Rabirius, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, who had been compelled by a popular rising to fly from the country soon after the departure of Gabinius. The whole story had been an outrageous scandal, and the small clique of Conservatives attempted

* App., B. C., ii. 20.

† Cic., Q., iii. 8, 4. *Rumor dictatoris injucundus bonis; iii. 9, 3. Principes nolunt.*

‡ Cic., Q., iii. 8, 4: *Velit nolit, scire difficile est.*

§ *Id.*, Q., iii. 1, 7, 24.

to make use of it to attack the unscrupulous and bellicose democracy in the persons of Gabinius and Rabirius, since it was powerless and tongue-tied against Cæsar, Crassus and Pompey. Gabinius was accused of high-treason and extortion, Rabirius simply of extortion. But these prosecutions only gave rise to new intrigues.* Pompey in vain attempted to induce Cicero to defend Gabinius.† Gabinius was, however, acquitted on the first charge by a small majority,‡ and now prepared to meet the second. Pompey made new efforts to win Cicero's support and succeeded this time in persuading him. He finally made a speech himself before the people in defence of Gabinius, reading letters from Cæsar in his favour. Nevertheless Gabinius was condemned.§ It seems, however, that Cicero some time afterwards succeeded in securing the acquittal of Rabirius by means of the speech which is still extant.

54 B.C.

The "Pro
Gabinius."The "Pro
Rabirio."

But it was in vain that Memmius awaited Cæsar's return. Cæsar had scarcely landed from Britain when serious trouble broke out in Gaul. Tasgetus, whom Cæsar had made King of the Carnutes, was suddenly assassinated. It looked as if the Nationalists intended to make his assassination the beginning of a movement of reprisals against all the Gallic leaders who had consented to recognise the Roman dominion. Cæsar at any rate was so disquieted by an incident which was rather symptomatic than serious in itself, that he sent a legion into the territory of the Carnutes, as an open menace to the whole of Gaul. He then prepared to return to Italy; but just as he was setting out and had gone as far as Amiens he was met by still more serious news. On his return from Britain, fear of a possible famine had induced him to split up his forces and send them into winter quarters in different parts of the country. Profiting by their dispersion, a small Belgian tribe, the Eburones, had risen in revolt under the leadership of two nobles, Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. They had cleverly enticed from their camp and overwhelmed a

Revolt of the
Eburones.

[Samarobriva.]

* Dion, xxxix. 55.

† Cic., Q., iii. 1, 5, 15.

‡ *Id.*, iii. 4, 1; A., iv. 16, 9; Dion, xxxix. 62.

§ Dion, xxxix. 63.

54 B.C.

legion and five cohorts recently recruited in Cispadane Gaul (probably to make up the numbers of a second legion),* who were wintering in their country under the orders of Titurius and Aurunculeius; and the entire force had been massacred. Then, calling the other tribes to their standard, they had marched against Quintus Cicero, who was wintering in the country of the Nervii, and had besieged him in his camp. This then was Gaul's reply to the murder of Dumnorix, the chief of the Nationalist party. Cæsar was forced to interrupt his voyage and to hasten at once to the help of Quintus. Thus it happened that Cæsar preoccupied by his campaigns, and Pompey by the intrigues necessary to save his friends, the Consuls powerless since the revelations of Memmius, and the Senate in its usual impotence, between them allowed public affairs to drift on as they pleased. The end of the year was reached without a single election having been made. At the beginning of 53 every one of the offices was empty and anarchy reigned supreme.

* CÆS., B. G., v. 24. *Unam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat, et cohortes V., in Eburones . . . misit.* This is the ordinary text; but no doubt we should correct into: *Unam legionem et cohortes V. quas proxime trans Padum conscripserat.* Since Cæsar enumerates his eight legions this *unam legionem*, which is the last to be named, could not have been recruited *proxime*, but at the *earliest* in 58, when he recruited two new legions against the Belgæ. On the other hand, the five cohorts, as apart from the eight legions, appear here for the first time, and it is natural that Cæsar should explain where and when he recruited them.

CHAPTER VI

THE INVASION OF PARTHIA

Social conditions in Gaul—The military decadence of Gaul—Gaul discontented with the Roman power—The first risings in 53—Crassus' plan of campaign—The Parthians march upon Syria—Crassus enters Mesopotamia—The Parthians turn back to meet him—Battle of Carrhæ—The retreat to Carrhæ—Carrhæ evacuated—Death of Crassus—The consuls for 53—Massacre of the Eburones—Anarchy at Rome—Death and funeral of Clodius.

THE disorder at Rome was soon matched by dangers in the provinces. In Gaul, the assassination of Tasgetus had been followed by a revolt against Caverinus, the king whom Cæsar had imposed upon the Senones. When a party of his countrymen, headed by Accon, threatened to put him on his trial, the nominee of the Romans found safety in flight. The revolt of the Eburones also had given rise to other small movements in different parts of the country. After these warnings, Cæsar gave up his intention of spending the winter in Cisalpine Gaul and further increased his army, replacing the fifteen cohorts annihilated by Ambiorix with thirty new cohorts, partly recruited by himself in Cisalpine Gaul, partly supplied him by Pompey, who had himself raised them in the same country.* He was soon to learn that these were no heedless precautions.

53 B.C.
Cæsar's precautions.

Cæsar was now in the full vigour of his powers. The healthy outdoor life of the province and the stimulus of success and popularity had hardened a naturally delicate constitution and restored the elastic energy of his mind. He could take up every morning without effort the urgent and onerous tale of work required for the superintendence of Italy, Gaul and the whole of the Empire. Yet the ceaseless anxieties

Cæsar's activity in Gaul.

* Cæs., B. G., vi. i.

53 B.C.

of the Gallic situation were slowly telling upon his strength and temper. He had not neglected, amid the labours of these years, to devote close and searching study to the social conditions of that country; and his lucid and penetrating intelligence, his unequalled faculty for weaving comprehensive and consistent theories out of a multitude of scattered observations, seemed to grow in quickness and concentration as the area of his experience enlarged. He had now succeeded in forming a mental picture, complete in all the essential details, of the great country whose destinies he controlled—a country still largely covered with forest and marsh-land, but teeming with natural wealth, which already possessed a population roughly equal to that of Australia at the present day.

Gaul at the
time of
Cæsar

Gaul was no longer the same as when she had filled Rome with panic in distant centuries or even half a century ago in the time of Marius. Some relics of those days Cæsar may still have seen among the Belgæ and Helvetii; but over the rest of the country he could watch the old agricultural, aristocratic and military traditions making way, as they had made way in Italy a century before, for a civilisation based on commerce and industry; he could watch the slow and insidious influence of the foreign trader as he initiated the Gauls into the mysteries of Græco-Latin life, from the alphabet and the minting of artistic coins to the temptations of the hot and fiery wines of the south.* Cæsar had indeed been set over the country at a decisive moment in her history. The increase in the cost of living and the individual effort necessary to keep pace with it were slowly gathering to a crisis similar to that which Italy had lived through in the half century following the Gracchi. The old land-holding aristocracy, which had formed the political and military backbone of the country, was gradually succumbing beneath the burden of debt; and the small proprietors were disappearing with them. The whole power and wealth of the country was being concen-

* On the influence of the foreign traders on the ancient Celtic and German life see Cæs., B. G., ii. 15; iv. 2; vi. 24. On the wine-trade between Gaul and Italy see Diod., v. 26; Athen., iv. 36 (152); also Jullian, Verc., 51.

trated into the hands of a small plutocracy that had grown rich on war, usury, and the farming of the public taxes; and it was this plutocracy that Cæsar now resolved to use as the mainstay of his Roman organisation. The national religion, Druidism, was utterly decadent and had lost all hold over the masses. Of the countless multitude whom debt and war and the concentration of land in a few large estates had ruined and cast adrift on the world, many had formed themselves into those bands of brigands—*perditi homines et latrones*—whom Cæsar mentions so frequently, while others were engaged in trade with the different nations of Gaul or with Germans, Britons and Romans,* and others again came to settle in the towns and formed the nucleus of an artisan class. Scattered about among the rude villages which covered the whole of the country were a certain number of large towns, such as Avaricum, Gergovia and Bibracte, which were beginning to attract population and wealth. A flourishing slave-trade was carried on with Italy, and several industries, such as pottery, metal-work, goldsmith's work, weaving and the preparation of ham were making some progress.† As the workers became more numerous in the towns and in the villages, amid a disturbed and still semi-barbarous country, they felt the need both of security and of capital;‡ they thus fell naturally into the clutches of the powerful plutocrats, and gladly accepted their political protection. Gaul was in fact rapidly falling a prey to the disorder and discontent produced in every society by sudden changes in the nature and distribution of wealth and in the timeworn fabric of ideas and customs. Every class in the community was divided and unsettled; and public opinion, capricious and excitable, obeyed neither

53 B.C.

[Bourges.]
[Clermont-
Ferrand.]
[Autun.]

* Fustel de Coulanges, G. R., 33.

† Strabo, iv. 2, 1 (190); iv. 2, 2 (191); iv. 3, 2 (192); iv. 4, 3 (196); iv. 4, 3 (197). This information refers to a slightly later period, but it is probable that the industrial progress which they record dates to Cæsar's time. Jullian, who goes further than Fustel de Coulanges (G. R., 32), remarks that Cæsar's *Commentaries* and the excavations at Mont Beauvray (Bibracte) show that Gaul had both arts and craftsmen at this time.

‡ Fustel de Coulanges, G. R., 35.

53 B.C. guide nor rule. If the old governing class of the nobility was in decadence, the new and active plutocracy, despite its money and ambitions, was equally unable either to administer the old political institutions or to establish new ones in their place.

The Gallic capitalists.

Thus the military and political disorder of Gaul was daily becoming more pronounced. In almost every part of the country the Government had consisted of an assembly of nobles—that is, of rich land-holders—generally distinguished in war, who had also controlled the armies, each of them commanding a small troop formed out of his fellow-citizens and clients. But in proportion as the nobility disappeared and estates fell more and more into the hands of a small plutocracy, the new-comers with their clients forced their way into the army and, by their preponderating influence, disturbed the old equilibrium of Republican liberty. By this time the armies were composed mainly either of the dependants of these plutocrats, men who in return for food and some small remuneration cultivated their lands or acted as their servants in their great riverside mansions in the forests, or of troops of cavalry which they maintained at their own cost to increase their power both in peace and war.

The Gallic armies.

Cæsar had long been aware that the Gallic army was no longer what it had been.* An army cannot avoid passing through the same crises as the society out of which it is formed; and a force composed partly of a town-bred population, almost like that of Italy, partly of the dependants of a few ambitious plutocrats, each of whom was jealous of the others, could scarcely be expected to be efficient. Yet the Romans were hardly justified in regarding their military superiority as a serious guarantee of peace. In spite of continual internecine wars the peoples of Gaul were united by community of language, traditions and religion, and cherished a national sentiment which was far deeper than it seemed, and which had been considerably strengthened by the foreign invasion.

* CÆS., B. G., vi. 24.

This danger in itself was sufficiently serious, but it was still further accentuated by the necessity, in which Cæsar had found himself on several occasions, of offending the interests of different parties or classes. Ruined as it was by continual warfare and threatened by the competition of the classes below it, the aristocracy would perhaps have been ready to accept a Roman protectorate in the hope of re-establishing order and putting an end to a period of distress and agitation. But such a protectorate would never have been accepted with loyalty by the small oligarchy of proprietors and capitalists, whom the possession of riches, the large number of their dependants and the general support which they secured from the people combined to make arrogant in their pretensions and hostile to any settled order. Thus by a policy favourable to the ambitions of the capitalists Cæsar had alienated the sympathies of the republican aristocracy, without securing the loyal attachment of the plutocratic oligarchy.

53 B.C.

Cæsar and the two parties.

The discontent was still further increased by the considerable losses which the foreign dominion entailed. Gaul was compelled to pay a contribution in money, to furnish a large part of the supplies necessary to the Roman army, to provide military contingents for the wars undertaken by Cæsar, which were often unpopular: and she had often to submit to the looting of the soldiery and the expenses necessary to give hospitality to the officers on tours of inspection. In many of the Gallic towns a large number of Italian traders had settled in the wake of the army and these, as may be imagined, were not satisfied with buying up loot, but fell upon the country like birds of prey, to compete with the few large native capitalists.

The drain on the country.

At the beginning of spring disquieting news arrived from all parts. The Nervii, the Aduatuci and the Menapii were taking up arms. The Senones refused to furnish their contingents and were making an understanding with the Carnutes. Ambiorix were endeavouring to stir up a fresh outbreak; and it appears also that advances had been made to Ariovistus to secure his help against the common enemy. Disquieted at this widespread disaffection, Cæsar had not the patience to

The diet at Amiens.

53 B.C.

wait till spring. With the object of striking terror into all the rebels at once he made a sudden foray with four legions into the land of the Nervii and took a huge quantity of cattle and many prisoners, distributing them freely amongst his soldiers.* Then, in March, he convened an assembly of all the Gallic peoples at Amiens; but he found there representatives neither of the Treveri nor of the Senones nor of the Carnutes. In a fit of anger, and in the hope of terrorising the country, he adjourned the assembly forthwith, ordering it to meet at a later date at Lutetia amongst the Parisii, which was on the borders of the country of the Senones; and on the very same day he set out on a series of forced marches into the rebel country. Dismayed at the suddenness of the attack, the Senones promptly sued for peace, which was granted on condition that they gave hostages; and the Carnutes at once followed their example.

(Paris.)

The pursuit
of Ambiorix.

Intending at last to make an end of Ambiorix, Cæsar then sent on to Labienus, who was in winter quarters in the territory of the Treveri, the whole of his baggage and two legions; he then advanced with five legions into the territory of the Menapii, where he suspected the rebel leader to be in hiding; but the Menapii abandoned their villages on his approach and dispersed in small bands through the marshes and forests. Cæsar divided his army into three columns, entrusting one to Caius Fabius, another to Marcus Crassus, son of the millionaire; while at the head of the third he himself began an organised hunt after men and cattle, destroying the villages as he went. The Menapii were soon frightened into suing for peace; but Ambiorix escaped once more.

Continuance
of anarchy
at Rome.

During all this time the disorders in the capital had continued and even increased. Month succeeded month and still no elections took place. Pompey was still hoping that the situation would ultimately make his Dictatorship inevitable, but did not venture to make an open profession of his ambition. Thus the situation remained obscure, and the exasperated Conservatives went so far as to accuse Pompey

* Cæs., B. G., vi. 3.

of giving secret encouragement to the rioters in order to force the hands of the Senate. But all these bickerings and uncertainties were soon to be overshadowed by news from the East. 53 B.C.

In the spring of 53 Crassus at length took the field for the conquest of Parthia. Destiny had chosen him to be the first victim of the megalomania of his countrymen. When he joined the forces that he had brought from Italy with those which he found in Syria he had an army of 5000 horse, 4000 auxiliaries, and nine legions of about 3500 men each, making about 40,000 in all.* He had no sooner reached Syria, at the beginning of 54, than he put into execution what can only be regarded as an excellent plan of campaign. He fortified the bridge over the Euphrates at Zeugma, crossed the river, occupied the Greek cities of Mesopotamia, Apamea, Carrhæ, Icne and Nicephorium, inflicted an easy defeat on a Parthian general who had a small force in that district, and then, leaving 7000 men (probably two legions) and 1000 cavalry behind in the cities, he returned into winter quarters in Syria.† The ancients have severely criticised this retreat, regarding it as a serious mistake, ‡ because the Parthians were thus given time to make preparations; but it is probable that Crassus' aim in taking the Greek cities of Mesopotamia was

Crassus
invades
Mesopotamia.
[54 B.C.]

* Florus (iii. 11) attributes eleven legions to Crassus, but it appears from Plutarch that he had only nine. Plutarch says (Crassus, 20) that Crassus had seven legions with him when he crossed the Euphrates for the second time; to these seven legions must be added (Plut., Crassus, 17) the 7000 men whom he left behind in Mesopotamia, who must have made up two legions of 3500 men, for the Romans avoided as far as possible any division of their legions. We shall thus have a total of nine legions; and the number of soldiers in each of them can be determined by the numbers of the two legions left behind in Mesopotamia. It is possible that there may be a copyist's error in the text and that Florus wrote IX. instead of XI. We need not take into account the exaggeration of Appian (ii. 18), who declares that Crassus' army was 100,000 strong.

† Dion, xl. 12-13. Plut., Crass., 17.

‡ Dion, xl. 13; Plut., Crass., 17. Manfrin, who in his book, *La Cavalleria dei Parti* (Rome, 1893), has made many subtle and judicious observations about this war, was the first to point out that the final failure of the expedition has led to many unjust and foolish criticisms on the part of the historians.

53 B.C.

to draw the enemy out from the interior of Parthia towards the Euphrates and make him give battle at the least possible distance from the Roman province. If he had penetrated deeper into Parthia he would have been committing the same blunder as Napoleon in his advance on Moscow. Crassus was, therefore, well advised in retiring upon Syria in the autumn of 54 to await the spring and the effect of his challenge. He spent the winter in collecting money, laying hands, in the process, on the Treasure of the Temple at Jerusalem. He also made attempts towards an understanding with the King of Armenia and the other independent or semi-independent princes of Mesopotamia, amongst them the Abgar of Edessa, who had been a close friend of Pompey.

Crassus
crosses the
Euphrates

His plan at first seemed to promise success. In the spring of 53 the garrisons that he had left behind in Mesopotamia were attacked by the Parthians. The Parthian king had in fact decided to divide his forces: to invade Armenia with the best of his infantry, while he sent almost the whole of his cavalry into Mesopotamia under the command of the Surena, or commander-in-chief,* with the object of enticing the Romans as far as possible from their base of operations. The two adversaries had thus proposed to themselves identically the same object and were employing identically the same stratagem to effect it. Unfortunately Crassus was too easily deluded into the belief that he had deluded the other side. As soon as he heard that the Parthians were approaching, his only idea was to throw himself impetuously upon them, and his only fear that he might not come up to them in time. Fugitives who had escaped from the towns besieged by the Parthians brought strange news into camp; the enemy had huge numbers of horsemen, all armed in mail, who were amazingly bold and quick, and amazingly strong and skilful in shooting from their enormous bows. Some of the generals were so impressed by this information that they proposed to revise the whole plan of campaign.† Artabaces, the King of Armenia, had just arrived with

* Rawlinson, S. G. O. M., 159 ff.

† Plut., Crass., 18; Dion, xl. 16.

6000 cavalry, and declared himself ready to supply 10,000 more cavalry and 30,000 infantry, if Crassus would only invade the enemy's country through Armenia, where the mountains would prevent the Parthians from making use of their cavalry.* But the obstinate old banker, who was growing more impatient daily, refused to abandon the besieged Romans to their fate. He crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma with seven legions, 4000 cavalry and the auxiliaries, and directed his course across Mesopotamia in the direction of Carrhæ to meet the Parthians.† The seven legions, the cavalry, the auxiliaries, and the 500 beasts of burden carrying the supplies and the tents by which each legion was followed must have formed a procession more than twelve miles long.‡

Scarcely had they set out before scouts began to bring in still more mysterious information. The Parthians had universally abandoned the sieges and retired. The country was clear of them; but everywhere there were traces of numerous horse-hoofs which seemed to indicate a retreating army. This news caused a certain agitation amongst the general staff. What could be the enemy's object? Cassius, the son-in-law of Servilia, who was with Crassus in the capacity of Quæstor and was a young man of ability, advised his general to halt in one of the cities already occupied, and gather more precise information about the enemy's movements, or else, since the towns were no longer threatened, to march upon Seleucia, following the course of the Euphrates along the road of Xenophon's 10,000. This would have the advantage of covering the right flank of the army and would also have simplified the provision of supplies.

The Parthians
evacuate
Mesopotamia.

* Plut., Crass., 19.

† Plutarch (Crass., 20) says that Crassus went along the Euphrates. But in the same chapter he tells us that soon afterwards Cassius tried to persuade Crassus to march to Seleucia along the river and that a council of war was held on the subject. Dion (xl. 20) also mentions this. The army cannot therefore have been by the river. It is evident that Crassus took the inland route towards Mesopotamia, on which the besieged cities were situated, to liberate them and win an immediate victory.

‡ See the calculations of Rüstow (H. K. C., 63 f.) on the space occupied by a legion marching on a high road.

53 B.C. Crassus seemed impressed, and summoned a council of war.*

Crassus
pursues the
Parthians.

Once more the doubters were in the right. The Surena was trying to draw the Roman army away from its base, and to entice it across the Cabur, a stream which forms the boundary of the desert.† Unfortunately, Pompey's friend, the Abgar of Edessa, in whom Crassus had complete confidence, was secretly in agreement with the Parthians, and knew how to play upon the impatience and avarice of the Roman general. He insisted that the Parthians were taking steps to transport their treasures into the mountains, and that the right policy was to pursue the Surena without further delay, and overtake and defeat him before he could join forces with his royal master.‡ In this way he finally persuaded Crassus to commit the mistake which historians reproach him for not having committed in the previous year. His impatience and cupidity, his confidence in his own star, and his repugnance against changing his mind, overwhelmed all the counsels of prudence; and Crassus threw his army upon the track of the Parthians, compelling his soldiers to undertake forced marches during the torrid heats of a Syrian May. But the days passed, the march was continued with increasing hardship, and the enemy was still out of sight. The troops grew weary of pursuing an invisible enemy. Crassus began to grow impatient. He was unwilling to retrace his steps, yet he was also afraid of advancing too far. Rumours of foul play began to circulate. One day ambassadors arrived from the King of Armenia to inform Crassus that no reinforcements could be sent him because the King of Parthia had invaded his kingdom. Crassus was again advised to make Armenia his base of operations. If he rejected that plan it was suggested that he should avoid the desert and the

* Plut., Crass., 20.

† Rawlinson (S. G. O. M., 157 f., 162 f.) and Manfrin (C. P., 73 f.) observe that Crassus has been foolishly criticised for leading his army through a desert. The desert only begins beyond the battle-field. This district of Mesopotamia had towns, streams and a rich vegetation; it was prosperous and populous, as is proved by a variety of passages in ancient literature. Dion's account speaks of trees (xl. 21).

‡ Dion, xl. 20; Plut., Crass., 21.

plain, where the cavalry of the Parthians would have easy play. 53 B.C.

Cassius at once perceived the wisdom of this counsel; but the elderly general with his nerves unstrung by fatigue and anxiety lost his temper at the suggestion that he was in need of advice. He discourteously dismissed the ambassadors, telling them that when the war was over he would punish the King of Armenia as he deserved.* He then continued his march, moving forward without setting eyes on the enemy or hearing news of his whereabouts. At length after long days of weary marching,† about the end of May or the beginning of June, just as they had passed the town of Carrhæ and were approaching the banks of the river Belik, scouts came in breathless with the news that they had met a huge Parthian army a few miles off, advancing rapidly on a surprise attack and that most of the scouts had already been cut off. What induced the Parthians to turn back to attack in this way? Perhaps they had received secret information from the Abgar of Edessa that the Roman army was discouraged and perplexed. It is certain, at any rate, that the tired legions were somewhat troubled by the news, and that many of the officers were in favour of encamping on the bank of the river, there to await the enemy and study his method of fighting before giving battle. But after a moment's hesitation Crassus decided at once to try the fortune of battle, lest the enemy should escape him once more.

He began by giving orders that the seventy cohorts should be disposed in a single line ten files deep. This was what the Roman tacticians advised should be done when an army was attacked by great masses of cavalry. But to draw up on a front nearly eight miles long (for this is the space that seventy cohorts would occupy when placed alongside one another) ‡ an army which in column of march took up some twelve miles is not a manœuvre which can be executed in a few moments.

* Plut., Crass., 22.

† Rawlinson, S. G. O. M., 163.

‡ On the length of a legion drawn up in single line without intervals see Rüstow, H. K. C., 55.

The Parthians
turn back to
the attack.

Tactics of
Crassus.

53 B.C. Crassus lost patience in the middle of the operation and decided to arrange the four first legions in a square, with twelve cohorts, each strengthened by cavalry, on each front, eight cohorts on each flank,* and the beasts and the baggage in the centre. He gave the command of one wing to his son and of the other to Cassius, placed himself in the centre, gave his soldiers time to take a rapid meal in their lines, and then ordered the square, followed by the three legions, to cross the river and throw itself on the enemy.†

The Parthian
tactics.

It was not long before dark groups of horsemen appeared on the horizon, advancing slowly and with caution, little like the wild hordes that had been awaited. But gradually their numbers increased; the plain began to be filled with noise, the air to be dazzled with the glitter of armour; and finally the heavy cavalry forming the head of the army, which the Surena had concealed behind a hill, darted from its ambush and hurled a heavy mass of armoured horsemen against the Roman square. The cohorts stood firm against the shock, meeting charge after charge with the Roman spear. Gradually the assaults grew less frequent, and at last the cavalry slowly withdrew, as though weary of the fight. Fearing that the battle would be over too soon Crassus sent his archers, slingers and light infantry in pursuit of the fugitives; but they were soon overwhelmed by an irresistible hail of arrows from the light cavalry of the Parthians, which was entirely

* Plut., Crass., 23. That the seventy cohorts were not all included in the square appears from Plutarch, who says that the sides consisted of twelve cohorts; this would make them forty-eight. But if we consider that the *Agmen quadratum* was ordinarily a rectangle with the flanks in a proportion of two to three to the front (Rüstow, H. K. C., 56), and take for our base a front of twelve cohorts, we reach a total of forty; that is to say, exactly four legions. We may therefore suppose that four legions only were arranged in a square; and the fact that the Parthians attempted a turning movement which was repulsed by Crassus gives us ground for supposing that the other legions remained in the rear. It was these that the Parthians must have threatened behind the square. It would be a good thing if a tactician were to make a careful study of this interesting battle between infantry and cavalry. Manfrin has cleared up several obscure points, but a good many others still remain.

† Plut., Crass., 23.

composed of archers, and appears to have advanced and deployed from the two sides of the heavy horsemen, in the form of a huge semicircle. The troops sent forward by Crassus were soon forced to retreat in disorder towards the legions. Meanwhile the light cavalry of the Parthians were moving up, and their arrows, passing in a huge parabola* right over their own lines, fell, hissing and whistling, piercing shields and armour, first among the front ranks and then in the centre of the Roman square. Crassus and the officers tried to rally their men; let them only have patience and the arrows must be exhausted; let them show their mettle in a counter-attack. But as soon as the Romans advanced the Parthians retreated, shooting as they went, facing backwards on their horses; and the cohorts were obliged to take refuge once more in the square, upon which the relentless rain of arrows soon descended anew. The Parthian supply of arrows seemed mysteriously inexhaustible, till at length the officers descried a long troop of camels on the horizon towards which a group of horsemen dashed up from time to time—a moving storehouse from which the Parthian quivers were replenished.†

The legions were now fast becoming demoralised under the Parthian archery. Crassus decided to make a supreme effort to break through the moving circle of horsemen which enveloped his army, and ordered his son Publius with 1300 horse, including his 1000 Gauls, 500 archers, and eight cohorts to charge the enemy. The Parthians made show of yielding and disappeared beyond the horizon in clouds of dust. The stinging hail of arrows ceased at last. Crassus used the respite to march his army to a hill and, thinking the battle ended, quietly awaited the return of Publius. But before long the scouts were galloping up to the lines. Publius was begging for reinforcements. The flying Parthians had enticed his small force too far from the main body, and then suddenly turned back and surrounded it. A wild hand-to-hand struggle was in progress and the whole

Death of
Publius
Crassus.

* Plut., Crass., 23; Dion, xli. 22; Manfrin, C. P., 78.

† Plut., Crass., 24, 25.

53 B.C. detachment would be cut to pieces unless reinforcements were promptly sent. Crassus hurriedly took the march with his whole army; but no sooner had he set out than the familiar dust-clouds beat up once more from the horizon, with a glitter of armour in their midst, heralded by a chorus of barbaric cries. The Parthians were returning at full gallop, and a horseman at their head was carrying a black object on his lance. The Romans stopped and waited. When the Parthians came a little nearer keen eyes detected that the black object on the spear point was the head of Publius Crassus. His force had been annihilated. The troops were almost paralysed with horror; but Crassus, who had kept his nerve so far against the whole violence of the onset, did not break down now; he went through the ranks telling his men that it was their general alone that suffered through the death of Publius; that Roman soldiers must do their duty and stand firm against the fresh assault. For by now the enemy had drawn a huge semicircle of archers all round the army while heavy masses of cavalry charged up ceaselessly from its centre against the opposing square. But once more the Roman infantry held their ground; and at length the Parthians, wearied by a succession of furious charges, retired with empty quivers and blunted sabres as the sun sank below the horizon.*

Demoralisation
of the Romans.

It is probable that by this time the Parthians thought victory beyond their grasp. They had hoped to take the Roman army by surprise and cut it in pieces; yet despite the heavy losses they had inflicted, the battle had ended in no definite result. The check would have had no influence upon the issue of the campaign if the army of Crassus had been one of those old and experienced forces which Rome used in old days to send into battle.† But at this moment there was only one trained army in the Empire, and that was in Gaul. In the ranks of Crassus young recruits far outnumbered older soldiers, the officers were almost all drawn from the frivolous gilded youth of Rome and had no real knowledge of the military art, while their chief,

* Plut., Crass., 25-26; Dion, xl. 24.

† Manfrin (C. P., 88) speaks justly of the legions but too severely, I think, of Crassus.

although a man of ability, was too old to be a good general and had been deceived by his successes in the war against Spartacus. None of them had been inured to the hardships of campaigning. They were so demoralised that evening by the heavy losses, the unaccustomed tactics of the enemy, their distance from their base in Syria, and the loss of the detachment of cavalry, that both soldiers and officers took the day's fighting for a defeat. Crassus himself, after commanding during the whole day with remarkable energy, now lost heart. He felt sure that the Parthians would be encouraged by their victory to renew the attack next day on his exhausted forces; and that very night, acting, as it seems, upon the advice of Cassius, he gave orders for a hasty retreat upon Carrhæ.* He was obliged to leave behind him on the field of battle some 4000 wounded, who were killed by the Parthians next morning; and during the night, in the darkness and disorder, four cohorts went astray and suffered a similar fate.†

Nevertheless, once at Carrhæ, the Romans were in a position to rest, reorganise their forces and retire without further danger along the track of their outward march, where the Parthians, through lack of water and forage, would have been unable to keep up the pursuit. This was indeed what the Parthian commander-in-chief anticipated that they would do. ‡ Unfortunately they were so completely demoralised by the hurried retreat, with its abandonment of the wounded, and the massacre of the stragglers, that both soldiers and officers refused to recognise that the crisis was past. They were in such dismay of the Parthians that they dared not move out of the town into the plain. At a council of war it was decided to ask help from the King of Armenia,

They decide
to wait at
Carrhæ.

* This is the most probable explanation of what passed in the night. It is not probable that (as Plut., Crass., 27, declares) Crassus entirely lost his head that night and left Cassius to give orders for retreat. Crassus' energy before and after the battle shows that, though he may have been temporarily overcome by grief, he soon recovered his presence of mind. Moreover, Cassius could not easily have usurped the powers of a general so strict and so much respected as Crassus.

† Plut., Crass., 28; Dion, xl. 25.

‡ Plut., Crass., 28.

53 B.C.

to wait at Carrhæ until these reinforcements arrived, and only then to retreat, probably through Armenia.*

They decide
to abandon
Carrhæ.

When the Parthian commander-in-chief, who had advanced up to the walls of Carrhæ, ascertained the condition of the army, he attempted to win by craft what he had failed to achieve in open battle. He let the Roman soldiers know that he would permit them to return in liberty, if they consented to deliver up Crassus and Cassius. The plot was skilfully devised. If the soldiers mutinied and put their two most capable leaders into his hands, it would be easy to cut the whole army to pieces. But the discipline in the Roman ranks was too strong; the attempts of the Surena would have failed outright, if the Roman officers had kept confidence in their men. But this was just what they were not in the mood to do. As soon as they learnt that the loyalty of their troops was being secretly undermined by emissaries from the Surena, they refused to remain a moment longer at Carrhæ for fear the legions should yield to their tempters. Overcome by the urgent demands of his officers, Crassus changed his mind and gave orders for immediate evacuation without the reinforcements from Armenia, which he was, moreover, by no means sure of receiving.

Cassius
breaks off
from Crassus.

But what road was he to take? Cassius suggested the route by which they had come, but Crassus, perhaps deceived by Andromachus, a noble of Carrhæ, perhaps still afraid to venture with his soldiers into the plain, decided for the mountainous road through Armenia. The Romans set out over the mountains, marching almost always at night and choosing the most difficult paths, very often through marshes, where the Parthian cavalry would be unable to follow them. One last effort and they would be safe. But the hardships of the retreat increased the nervousness of the soldiers and the irritability of the officers. Open dissensions broke out between the chiefs. Crassus lost his temper during the deliberations and sacrificed all his authority over his subordinates. One day he had a violent altercation with Cassius, who criticised all

* The remark of Plutarch (Crass., 29) on "the vain hopes of Armenia" throws light indirectly upon Crassus' plan.

his plans, and ended by telling him, in a fit of spleen, that if he was unwilling to follow him he had only to take an escort and retire by whatever road he thought good. Cassius at once accepted the suggestion, and turned back with 500 horsemen to Carrhæ, where he resumed, in the direction of the Euphrates, the road that the army had taken on its previous march.* 53 B.C.

Thus the force gradually broke up. Yet in spite of all Crassus continued his retreat. As they drew daily nearer to the mountains, the Parthian commander saw his prey on the point of escaping him. At this crisis, unwilling to return to court without a decisive success,† he devised a masterpiece of perfidy. One morning he sent an ambassador into the Roman camp to say that he desired to enter into negotiations with Crassus for the conclusion of peace. Crassus, who suspected treachery and saw the success of his retreat assured, would not listen to the offer. But when the tired soldiers heard that they might hope to retire unmolested, they would listen to no arguments, and threatened to mutiny if Crassus refused to negotiate. Fate had gripped him at last. Neither his years, nor his renown, nor his almost sacred authority as Emperor, nor the immense treasures he had left behind him in Italy, could avail to save him. For all his faults, Crassus was every inch a man, and when death suddenly stared him in the face amid the mountains of Armenia, far from his family and his home, like a criminal given but a few minutes to prepare for his fate, he revealed no sign of weakness. He summoned the officers and told them that he was going out to the Parthians; he knew that there was treachery, but preferred to die by the Parthians rather than by his own soldiers. He set out with an escort and was killed ‡ on the 9th of June. § Death of Crassus by treachery.

* This is the most probable explanation of the mysterious retreat of Cassius. Dion (xl. 25) and Plut. (Crass., 29) only give confused and incomplete accounts of this singular episode. Cassius could only have separated from the army with the general's consent; but why this was given remains one of the dark passages in this strange campaign. See the vague allusions of Dion, xl. 28.

† Plut., Crass., 30; Dion, xl. 26.

‡ Plut., Crass., 30-31; Dion, xl. 27; Polyæn., Strat., vii. 41.

§ Ovid., Fast., vi. 465, who however puts the battle of Carrhæ and the death of Crassus on the same day.

53 B.C.

Break-up of
the army.

Crassus was a man of great gifts—able and active, though self-centred and lacking in generosity. He had conducted this campaign with considerable skill; but his haste, his excess of self-confidence, the carelessness of his preparations, the military slackness of the age, and finally a succession of unfortunate accidents caused him to suffer the fate which Cæsar had only escaped by miracle in his war against the Helvetii. His death was in some sort an expiation for his blunders and the vainglory of his countrymen. His head was cut off and sent to the Parthian court; his body was left unburied. Deprived of its leaders, the army broke up in confusion, many of the soldiers being killed and many others, the small remnant of the great army which had crossed the Euphrates, finally straggling into Syria.*

Reception of
the news at
Rome.

The news of this disaster reached Rome in July 53 † just as the elections for the offices of that year were about to take place after seven months of anarchy. The disorder had been still further increased by disputes as to how best to put an end to it. Some wished to re-establish the *Tribuni militum consulari potestate* of the old days; others proposed to nominate Pompey Dictator. This latter proposal finally appeared the more advisable. But at the last moment Pompey had shrank before the detested memories of Sulla and merely consented to allow his troops to enter the city. This had been sufficient to enable the elections to take place, and Marcus Valerius Messala and Cnæus Domitius Calvinus had been thus eventually elected Consuls.‡ It is easy to imagine the sensation produced in Italy by the news of Crassus' death, coming just at a moment when confidence was reviving after the interminable scandal of the elections. The Conservatives, who had always mistrusted the mad enthusiasm for the expedition, had thus been justified after all.

Meanwhile in Gaul the war was being continued with more favourable results, but with methods of increasing barbarism. Labienus had reduced the Treveri; and Cæsar had crossed

* Drümman, G. R., iv. 109.

† Lange, R. A., iii. 359.

‡ *Id.*, iii. 351 f.

the Rhine a second time and made a raid into the country of the Suevi, where he successfully deterred Ariovistus from interference with his neighbours. He had then returned to Gaul, where he was again confronted with the Eburones, who were adopting guerilla methods, surprising and massacring small and isolated detachments of Romans. Anxious for once to make an example Cæsar published an edict in all the towns of Gaul, giving free permission for robbery and massacre in the territory of the Eburones, and brought together troops of brigands and adventurers from all parts of the country. But he did not mean to leave the whole of the pillaging to others. Leaving behind him at Aduatuca, under the protection of one legion, the baggage of his whole army, he threw nine legions into the country of the Eburones, divided into three columns, one of which was commanded by himself, the second by Trebonius, and the third by Labienus; for several months they burned the villages, stole the cattle, and hunted the natives. But violence, called in as a servant, often exceeds its instructions. A band of Sugcambrian plunderers, who had come to join in the looting at Cæsar's invitation, ascertaining that there was a Roman camp at Aduatuca with all the spoils and baggage of ten legions and the depôts of the merchants who followed the army, attempted to take it and very nearly succeeded. Meanwhile Ambiorix, tracked like a wild beast from lair to lair, still eluded the efforts of his pursuers. At the approach of winter Cæsar once more retired. He convoked the assembly of the Gauls, solemnly tried the Senones and Carnutes for rebellion, condemned Acco to death, and many of the nobles compromised in the revolt, who had fled across the Rhine, to exile and confiscation of their goods. Their property was divided among the nobles who had remained faithful and the higher ranks of the soldiers.* Cæsar then made preparations to return to Italy.

Thus the pacification of Gaul was rapidly degenerating into a war of extermination; the conciliatory diplomacy of the

53 B.C.
Methods of
barbarism
in Gaul.

[Tongres,
just north
of Liège.]

* With regard to the goods confiscated by Cæsar from Gauls and given to other Gauls see Cæs., B. G., iii. 69.

53 B.C. opening period had been replaced by a régime of bloodshed and violence. This is no doubt the history of most conquests; but in this case the temptations to brutality were particularly strong, because these continual revolts unsettled all the labours of the last six years and were gravely affecting Cæsar's credit at Rome. Posterity thinks of the conquest of Gaul as the greatest of Cæsar's achievements; but contemporaries, towards the end of the year 53, looked at the situation in a very different light. The annihilation of the army of Crassus had damped the enthusiasm of the masses for the policy of expansion, and weakened their confidence in its foremost representative. Crassus being safely dead, men could say what they liked about him, and he therefore naturally came off far worse than Cæsar, who was still alive and powerful. He was accused of having directed his campaigns like an amateur, of having committed the most ridiculous mistakes, and of having brought the Roman name into discredit by his miserly persistence. But even against Cæsar disagreeable comparisons were beginning to be made. When Lucullus and Pompey had annexed Pontus and Syria all had been over in quite a short time; in Gaul, on the other hand, he seemed every year to be beginning his work all over again. Surely this must be due, at least in part, to Cæsar's own blunders.

Cæsar's credit
shaken at
Rome.

Gallic riches
in Italy.

[Formiæ.]

[Cingulum.]

Moreover the public had another cause for irritation. The display which certain generals were making of their Gallic plunder was becoming a public scandal. Cicero was constantly superintending buildings ordered by his brother; Mamurra, who was only an obscure knight from Formia, was building a magnificent palace on the Cælian, with all its walls covered with plaques of marble in the Alexandrine fashion, in a style hitherto unknown in Rome; * Labienus, who had bought huge estates in the Marches, was engaged in building a castle at Cingoli which was almost a small fortified town in itself.† A wave of sentimentalism, inevitable in a civilised society and strengthened by the influence of Greek philosophy, was slowly rousing the nation

* Pliny, N. H., xxxvi. 6, 48; Courbaud, B. R. R., p. 352.

† Compare Cæs., B. G., i. 51.

from the narcotics of corruption and vainglory; and it acted with added force when, after a short truce, the elections for the year 52 provoked a renewed outbreak of anarchy. The candidates for the Consulship were Milo, Publius Plautius Hypsæus, and Quintus Cæcilius Metellus Scipio, the adopted son of Metellus Pius. Clodius was a candidate for the Prætorship and Antony, who, after Gabinus' return to Italy, had joined Cæsar in Gaul, for the Quæstorship. Cæsar, who had speedily appreciated his military talents, had allowed him to come home on furlough to stand for this office.*

The elections for 52.

The electoral contest soon became so heated that all the candidates took up arms in the conduct of their campaign. Day after day there was bloodshed between the different bands. Once Cicero was nearly killed on the Sacred Way; † another time Antony only just missed putting an end to Clodius. ‡ The public anxiously asked what madness was coming over men's minds, and what massacres it would cost to restore the state to order. In vain all eyes were turned upon Pompey. Whether through indecision and weakness, or through the desire of making his dictatorship necessary through the very excess of the disorders, Pompey refused to stir. The Consuls made several ineffectual attempts to hold the elections; and the Senate, too weak to do anything more drastic, passed a law against the Egyptian worships of Serapis and Isis, which were adding their share to the moral difficulties of the day; § it also decided to put before the people a proposal that a magistrate should only receive a province five years after the expiration of his office, || which was expected somewhat to appease the competition for all the offices. For the third time in four years the end of this year was reached without a consular election; but this time the Senate was not even able to nominate an interrex, since one of the Tribunes, Titus Munatius Plancus, opposed his veto. Some recognised the hand of Pompey in this stratagem and suspected him of

The elections postponed.

* Lange, R. A., iii. 352.

† Cic., Pro Mil., xiv. 37.

‡ *Id.*, xv. 40; Dion, xlv. 40.

§ Dion, xl. 47.

|| *Id.*, xl. 46.

52 B.C. wishing to hurry on events and so force the Senate to appoint him Dictator.*

Death and
funeral of
Clodius.

In the midst of all these disorders a feat of assassination brought matters suddenly to a climax. On the 18th of January 52 Milo, going out with an armed escort to Lanuvium, happened to fall in on the Appian Way, in the neighbourhood of Bovillæ, with Clodius who, accompanied by a small suite, was returning from his country house to Rome. The two bands came to blows and Clodius was killed.† “At last,” said the Conservatives, heaving a sigh of relief. But even after death the mob leader kept his power of setting Rome in a ferment. The people were stirred to excitement by his clients and cut-throats, by the tribunes of the popular party, and by his wife Fulvia; and they flocked in crowds to see his body when it was laid out for the public view in his house. On all sides there were cries for vengeance, and his funeral was celebrated with a display of almost barbaric pomp. The people accompanied his body to the Curia Hostilia and made display of their hatred of nobles and millionaires by a bonfire of the Senatorial seats, tables and desks. The fire spread to the Curia and the Basilica Portia; and the body of the demagogue was dispersed among the ashes of the two oldest and most venerable public buildings in Rome, while the people shouted for Pompey and Cæsar as Dictators. Plancus was frightened into giving up his opposition to the nomination of an interrex and the Senate selected Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, son of the Consul who had died during the revolution of 78. Lepidus was a young man of great wealth who had married a daughter of Servilia, and was a friend of both Cæsar and Pompey; but as he had very little influence, his nomination only increased the prevailing agitation. At the grand funeral banquet in honour of Clodius wild scenes took place. The crowd attempted to set fire to the house of Milo, and also threatened that of Lepidus, who was suspected of being his friend. A popular demonstration went to offer the

* Asconius, p. 32.

† App., B. C., ii. 21; Dion, xl. 48; Vell., ii. 47; Livy, p. 107; Cic., Pro Mil., x. 28 f.

Consular Insignia to Hypsæus and Scipio ; another proclaimed Pompey both Consul and Dictator. In every quarter of Rome there were processions and street fighting, while bandits and burglars seized their opportunity and on the pretext of searching for the accomplices of Milo made their way into many of the private houses.*

52 B.C.

* App., B. C., ii. 21-22 ; Dion, xl. 49 ; Ascon., p. 34.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC IMPERIALISM—THE REVOLT OF GAUL

Commius and Labienus—Decadence of the Democratic party—Discord between Pompey and Cæsar—New rising in Gaul—Cæsar again contemplating the consulship—The passage of the Cevennes—Cæsar rejoins his legions—His strategy—Vercingetorix—The siege of Bourges—The capture of Bourges and its results—Cæsar's blunder—Gergovia—The insurrection spreads through the whole of Gaul—Critical position of Cæsar—Organised guerilla warfare—Cæsar's retreat—The first pitched battle—Vercingetorix retires to Alesia—The siege of Alesia—Starvation—The attempted relief—Vercingetorix capitulates—The causes of Cæsar's success.

53-52 B.C. **WHILST** this turmoil was raging in the streets of Rome, Cæsar was crossing the Alps on his way back to Cisalpine Gaul. His natural impetuosity, the serious condition of his party, and the sheer impossibility of the task which he had set himself were driving him on to blunder after blunder. Thus, to gain a short respite for interference in Italy he had ventured upon measures of repression in Gaul which had only consolidated and intensified the hatred of the natives;* and he had then left the country without awaiting their effects. Shortly after he had set out, probably while he was still on the road, he heard from Labienus that his old friend and supporter Commius was himself conspiring against him. For once he lost all patience. He gave instructions to Labienus to inveigle the Atrebatian chieftain to his camp and put him to death.†

Cæsar's
treachery to
Commius.

* Jullian, *Verc.*, 114. "His (Cæsar's) attitude during the winter" (53-52) "shows an unusual want of discretion."

† Cæsar says nothing of this barbarous incident; but Hirtius (*B. G.*, viii. 23) is naïve enough to recount it. If the Gauls had left us a history of the Roman conquest we should no doubt hear of many similar incidents which would help us to understand the hatred felt

Labienus obeyed, but Commius, though wounded, succeeded in making his escape; and the only result of the perfidy was to turn Commius into a bitter enemy of Cæsar and of Rome. Cæsar seemed to be involved in a very labour of Sisyphus; no sooner had he finished in one direction than fresh efforts were required in another, where he had thought that all was secure. These brutal and treacherous expedients bear witness to the strain at which he lived. For the moment, however, Commius, who escaped into the forests of Northern Gaul, caused him less anxiety than Italy, where serious events were once more in progress.

The Democratic party was again, as in 57, losing all credit with the public, through its failure to redeem the extravagant promises that it had proclaimed. The Land Law of 59, like so many of its predecessors, had never been put into execution. The hopes which had so confidently been built upon the expedition into Britain had been completely falsified. In Parthia the Roman army had suffered a shameful defeat, while Gaul, though every one had regarded it as subdued in two years by "Rome's only general," now appeared to be still in open revolt. Moreover Crassus was dead, and the once powerful Triumvirate was reduced to a discredited government of two, which was not even strong enough to repress the rioting of the metropolitan crowd. Men had for some time since been chafing at a régime of violence and corruption, which threatened to obliterate all the old landmarks of the State; but since the death of Clodius the situation had become truly intolerable. At first, quite as much out of fear as out of justice, the public had been inclined to pass severe judgment upon Milo, who had had the wounded Clodius put to death by his slaves.* But when the mob began to take to rioting, there was a change in the general feeling. Even in the Conservative camp the party of repression by violence, the party, that is, which approved of the murder of Clodius, gained the upper hand. On the by the Gallic nobility for the invaders. According to Hirtius, Labienus attempted the assassination on his own initiative; but this is impossible. Commius and Cæsar were too closely befriended; Labienus cannot have acted without Cæsar's authorisation.

Cæsar as a
scapegoat
at Rome

* Dion, xl. 48.

52 B.C.

evening of the funeral the Senate decreed a state of siege, and entrusted Pompey and the Tribunes of the people, together with Milo himself, with the execution of the decree.* Emboldened by this sudden change in his favour, Milo at once returned to Rome, and, hoping at one blow to take a pusillanimous public by storm, he had the almost incredible insolence to renew his candidature for the Consulship.† But this was too much for the proletariat, which threatened to break out in open revolt. This then was the situation. The confusion was at its height; the public was beginning to take alarm; and the enemies of Cæsar were plucking up courage. Since Cæsar was the creator of the whole party he was considered responsible for all the troubles that had ensued—for the ruin of Crassus, who had set out for Parthia on his persuasion; for the universal corruption, which he had nursed by his largesse; for the disorders at Rome, which he had openly encouraged; and for the endless war in Gaul, which his repeated blunders had provoked.‡

Cæsar was thus faced with the necessity of once more, for

* Dion, xl. 49.

† *Id.*, xl. 49; App., B. C., ii. 22.

‡ To understand the way in which public opinion veered round as regards Cæsar in 53 and 52 it is sufficient to compare what Cicero writes of Cæsar in 56, 55, and 54 (Cic., F., i. 9; vii. 7; vii. 8; ad Q., ii. 15 B; ii. 16; iii. 1; iii. 5; iii. 8; iii. 9 A; iv. 16; iv. 18), and the whole of the speech *de Provinciis Consularibus*, with what he writes in 51 and 50 (A., vi. 1, 25; vii. 1; vii. 7, 5). See also Cicero, F., ii. 8, 2. This change is not explained by personal reasons, for Cæsar always did what he could to keep in the good graces of Cicero (*cf.* A., vii. 1, 3), but by a change in the opinion of the upper classes caused by the ruin of Crassus, the disorders at Rome, and the rebellion in Gaul. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in Cicero's correspondence we have scarcely any letters of the year 52 and that those which remain to us are notes of no importance. As it is probable that the correspondence was published under Augustus and certain that it was subjected to some sort of censorship, I am inclined to believe that the letters of 52 were almost all suppressed because they revealed too clearly the dismay produced by the revolt of Gaul, and contained severe strictures upon Cæsar's conduct. The moment at which the impartial public, which had been favourable to Cæsar and to the conquest of Gaul, veered round is therefore the year 52. This was the year in which it was first realised that the annexation of 57 had been a mere political trick.

the third time, reconstituting the Democratic party. But this was no easy matter now that not only Crassus and Clodius but also Julia had disappeared. The removal of Clodius, the incomparable agitator, meant the gradual break-up of the electoral colleges, on which Cæsar's party so largely relied; while the death of Crassus, following upon that of Julia, made the relations with Pompey, already strained by the events of the last few years, more and more difficult to maintain. Historians are wrong in attributing the discords which from this moment began to break out between Cæsar and Pompey to the effect of rival ambitions latent for many years and now brought to the surface by the disappearance of Crassus. It was not in the ambitions but in the temperaments of the two men that the discord lay; and it was the force of events rather than the reasoned choice of either of their victims that forced it to break out. The struggle which now begins is not a struggle between two ambitious statesmen; it is the supreme issue between Conservatism and Democracy. After years of desultory conflict the two policies were at last personified in the characters of these two old friends. After all, at the bottom of his nature, Pompey was a Conservative. It was only the bitterness and intrigues of the Conservatives and the difficulty which he had felt in fighting at once against them and against Cæsar, Crassus and Clodius, that had forced him into his strange alliance with Cæsar. A few sharp lessons might be expected to frighten him back into the fold. The defeat of Crassus, the perilous instability of the Republic, and the rioting at Rome supplied the necessary stimulus; they awoke all his instinctive reverence for authority and drove him inevitably towards the ideas of the upper classes.

For earnest and educated opinion had now gradually crystallised round a policy of its own; its programme, so plausible that men forgot how chimerical it still was, proclaimed a harmony between aristocracy and democracy, the repression of public and private corruption, and a return to simpler and purer habits of life. As so often happens to the very rich in times when the whole of society has gone mad over money, Pompey was deeply conscious of the vanity of riches and

52 B.C.

The rivalry
between
Pompey and
Cæsar.

The ideas of
the educated
classes.

52 B.C.

luxury for other people, and was surprised that the competition to secure them should kindle such disorders in the State. It was impossible that things should remain as they were. The Republic had urgent need of peace, order and justice; and if the ordinary magistracies were not sufficient, a new office must be created with paramount and incontestable powers. All these were ideas widely held in the upper classes; Cicero was giving expression to them, perhaps almost unconsciously, in his treatise *De Republica*; while Pompey, whom fortune had deluded into the belief that no difficulty was beyond his powers, was slowly being stirred from the depths of his Conservative temperament to a new ambition—to become the appointed reorganiser and peacemaker in the unhappy divisions of his country.

Cæsar's
overtures to
Pompey.

Cæsar was alive to the danger and wished before all to have Pompey on his side. From Ravenna, where he had gone to pass the winter,* he helped his son-in-law to make a levy with which the Senate had entrusted him in Cisalpine Gaul † and made him a new and double proposal of marriage. Cæsar was to marry the daughter of Pompey, who was at that time pledged to the son of Sulla, while Pompey was to marry the second daughter of one of Cæsar's nieces, Atia, the widow of Caius Octavius, who had died on the eve of his Consulship, and who, besides a son Caius, born in 63 and now eleven years old, had two older daughters.‡ But Pompey, who was already beginning to feel embarrassed at his alliance with Cæsar, refused the offers, to Cæsar's profound mortification.

The question
of Cæsar's
second Consul-
ship.

It now became increasingly necessary for him to take steps beforehand to avert a serious danger with which he was threatened in the future. His proconsular powers would expire on the 1st of March 49, and according to the law of Sulla, which only allowed a re-election after a lapse of ten years, he could not again become Consul until the year 48.

* Florus, iii. 10, 22.

† Cic., *Pro Mil.*, xxiii. 62; xxvi. 70; Asconius, pp. 35, 51; Dion, xl. 49-50; Cæs., *B. G.*, vii. 1.

‡ Suet., *Cæs.*, 27.

There would thus be an interval of ten months during which he would no longer be shielded by the immunity enjoyed by a magistrate, but would be exposed, like any other citizen, to the attacks and prosecutions which formed the ordinary weapons of party warfare at Rome. He knew that he had hosts of private enemies and that, if his party lost influence and he were abandoned by Pompey, there was serious danger of a prosecution; in which case it was as likely as not that the judges might be induced to pronounce a sentence of exile which would abruptly terminate his political career. It was imperative, therefore, that he should keep the government of his province during these ten months. How was this concession to be obtained? Of course it might easily have been managed by securing the postponement of the nomination of his successor until the 1st of January 48 and by remaining in his province as provisional governor until his successor came out. But this would only involve him in a still more serious difficulty, by making it impossible for him to stand as a candidate for the Consulship in 48. Thus if he returned to Rome, he would lose his *imperium* and become a simple citizen, exposed to the attacks of his enemies; if he remained in his province he could not by law pursue his candidature for the Consulship. It was not easy to find a way out of this network of legal and constitutional difficulties; but Cæsar, never at a loss for expedients, soon hit upon a device. Many of his supporters were making the quite unconstitutional demand that he and Pompey should together be elected to the Consulship for that year. Cæsar refused to entertain the suggestion, but asked in return that the ten Tribunes should bring in a law authorising him to stand for the Consulship while absent from Rome.* He could thus at once secure his election as Consul and at the same time, by preventing the nomination of his successor, remain in Gaul till the 1st of January 48. He at once began to make the necessary arrangements at Rome to secure the proposal of this law.

But bad news from Gaul broke in upon these nice calcula-

* App., B. C., ii. 25; Dion, xl. 51.

52 B.C.

New and
unanimous
rising in Gaul.

[Genabum.

tions. Once more Cæsar had been mistaken in thinking that strong measures would give him the respite he needed. Scarcely had he left Gaul than the leading men of several of the nations, provoked by the pillaging and executions of the preceding year, held a conclave in the forests to discuss the situation of the country, and formed an agreement to rouse to action, not only their own personal following, but the poorer classes throughout the country. The Carnutes had already risen afresh under Gutuatrus and Conconetodumnus and had made a massacre of all the Italian merchants at Orleans, amongst them the knight Caius Fufius Cita, who was acting as a supply officer to the Roman army. Meanwhile in Auvergne his young friend Vercingetorix had kindled a revolution of his own, securing the supreme power for himself in order to raise the standard of revolt. His movement had already been joined by the Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the Aulerci, the Lemo-vices, the Andes and all the tribes living on the Atlantic coast; and Vercingetorix had despatched one force under the Cadurcan Lucterius towards the frontier of the Province, while he himself was invading the territory of the Bituriges, who were tributaries of the Ædui.* The surviving forces of both aristocracy and plutocracy were united against the national enemy; Cæsar's opportunist policy of sowing enmity between the rival interests had ended by setting all parties against him; and the revolt had broken out afresh, in a more serious form than ever, unknown and unsuspected by himself or his generals. The Roman army of occupation was dispersed throughout the country in winter quarters, utterly unprepared for rapid action, whilst their general was surprised hundreds of miles away from the scene of action, before he had even set hands to the work of political restoration for which he had so hastily left the country.

The strategic
problem.

Cæsar was indeed in a terrible dilemma. The whole of his work both in Italy and Gaul, the skilful and laborious construction of years, seemed to be crumbling to ruin, threatening to bury him in its fall. But the greatness of the danger

* Cæs., B. G., vii. 1-5.

found response in the energy and buoyancy of his spirit. Unable simultaneously to face the danger in Gaul and Italy, and obliged to make an instant choice between the two, he unhesitatingly left Italy to its destiny, as he had done in 57, and at once set out, probably about the middle of February, for Narbonese Gaul.* As he drew nearer, the news became more and more disquieting. The Ædui, Remi and Lingones, who alone remained faithful in the centre of the country, were surrounded by an immense circle of revolting peoples, broken only in the East, where the Sequani still maintained a wavering allegiance. The strategic problem with which Cæsar had thus to contend seemed almost insoluble. The entire Roman army was stationed on the most northerly point of the circle of revolt. The whole of the rebel country—almost the whole length of Gaul—lay between Cæsar and his legions; he could not take his small force to join them, nor they march South to meet him, without passing straight through the centre of revolt.

In this cruel dilemma, with that rapidity which, as an ancient writer says, was like a lambent flame, Cæsar devised and executed a plan of extraordinary boldness. Within a few days he had arranged for the defence of the Province with part of its garrison, together with the soldiers he had just recruited in Italy. Then, sending a small force of cavalry to Vienne, he set out with what remained of the garrison, forcing a path in mid-winter through the snow-clad Cevennes, and threw his men suddenly upon Auvergne. The Arverni had expected no attack while the snow was still on their mountains; at the appearance of the invader they hastily recalled Vercingetorix to defend his country, which was being overrun, they reported, by a countless army. Vercingetorix, none too secure in his new position, had perforce to comply. This was exactly what Cæsar desired. He abandoned the command to Decimus Brutus with orders to

Cæsar's dash
across Gaul.

* As the death of Clodius took place on the 18th of January, I think this date can be approximately fixed by the passages in Cæsar, vii. 1. I note in passing that in his narrative of this campaign Cæsar has almost entirely neglected all chronological indications, thus greatly increasing the difficulty of giving a connected account of it.

52 B.C. ravage the country. Then, re-crossing the Cevennes with a small escort, he covered the 100 miles which separated him from Vienne in a few days. There he picked up the small troop of cavalry which had been sent on ahead and, riding day and night, crossed Gaul at a gallop unrecognised and unmolested. Before any one had discovered that he was no longer in Auvergne, he had rejoined the two legions who were wintering in the country of the Lingones, and sent orders to the remainder to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Sens. Towards the middle of March * he proceeded there in person with his two legions and found himself at the head of his whole army, eleven legions in all, including the Lark. This gave him about 35,000 men, in addition to the Gallic auxiliaries, whose number is difficult to calculate, and the cavalry, which was very much reduced.† From Vienne to Sens partly on horseback and partly at the head of two legions, Cæsar had covered some 300 miles.

[Agedincum.]

Vercingetorix
besieges
Gorgobina.

Meanwhile, Vercingetorix, discovering that he had been misled, had returned into the territory of the Bituriges and laid siege to Gorgobina; his small army, composed partly of Arverni and partly of contingents contributed by other tribes,

* According to Jullian (Verc., 155) Cæsar rejoined his legions in the middle of February. This seems to me difficult. The journey from Ravenna to Narbonne, the measures which he adopted for the defence of the Province, and the passage of the Cevennes must have taken him at least fifteen days. From Auvergne to Sens by Vienne is at least 400 miles, and though part of the journey was made on horseback, we cannot calculate less than another fifteen days. Thus, if Cæsar rejoined his legions towards the end of February, he must have left Ravenna at the end of January, which is scarcely possible when it is remembered that Clodius was killed on the 18th of January, that Cæsar reached Ravenna after the murder, remained there some time, and made arrangements for standing for the Consulship in his absence; all this could not have been done within a few days. As for the meeting of the legions at Sens, it seems to me to result from what Cæsar says in B. G., vii. 9: *legiones . . . unum in locum cogit*, and vii. 10, *ducibus Agedinci legionibus . . . relictis*.

† The Duke of Aumale (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, p. 75) has remarked that Cæsar's legions cannot have numbered 5000 men, but were most probably nearer 3500 or 4000. Considering that we are approaching the end of the war, this figure should probably be still further reduced, to about 3000.

amounted probably to some 7000 or 8000 horse, and an equal, or perhaps lesser number of infantry,* the greater part of whom must have consisted either of his personal retainers or those of other nobles. 52 B.C.

What course was Cæsar now to adopt? From the political point of view his best policy was to throw himself at once against Vercingetorix, to rescue the Ædui and assure himself of their fidelity, and thus dismay the rebels, finish off the war as quickly as possible and return without further delay to Italy. From the purely military point of view, on the other hand, it would be far wiser to await the good season † when the army would find abundant supplies on its route. But once more military considerations had to be subordinated to politics. The battle
outside
Soissons.

* Jullian (Verc., 159) allows Vercingetorix 6000 or 7000 horse and 100,000 foot, and most historians agree in regarding Vercingetorix' army as very considerable. This seems to me impossible. In the first place where would all his soldiers have come from? There is no doubt that the insurgent peoples sent him contingents; but it must not be forgotten that several among them, and the most important, such as the Senones and Parisii, reserved all their military efforts for their own country, with the result that Cæsar soon afterwards had to send four legions against them. Moreover, if it was difficult under the conditions of ancient warfare to provision an army of 100,000 men (Mithridates, for instance, had several times to accumulate corn for years and years to maintain armies which were not more numerous), it was impossible for an army of such size to conduct a campaign of devastation, such as was conducted by the army of Vercingetorix. A war of this nature can only be successful when the devastating army is either less numerous than its enemy, or has considerably better means of supply; in any other case it would be in far greater danger than its enemy. There is nothing to show that this was the case with Vercingetorix. Moreover, it was the cavalry which performed nearly all the exploits of the war (B. G., vii. 14), the infantry only played a secondary part; and when Cæsar attempted to surprise the camp (vii. 17) it could conceal itself with the baggage in the marshes, and that at very short notice, which would not have been possible if it had been very numerous. Moreover, it is inconceivable that Cæsar would have dared to divide his army and come to Gergovia with only six legions—that is to say, with 20,000 men—if he had had against him an army of 100,000 men, outnumbering him, too, in cavalry. The cavalry can be estimated at 8000, since Vercingetorix had 15,000 at the end of the war (B. G., vii. 64) after receiving the reinforcements from Aquitania and those which he secured after the Conference of Bibracte.

† It must be remembered that the calendar was more than a month ahead of the real time of year.

52 B.C.

Cæsar was more afraid of an Æduan revolt than of any winter campaign, and he desired to revive the reputation of his army by the brilliance and rapidity of his operations. He therefore requested the Ædui to do their utmost to supply him with corn, left two legions and all his baggage at Sens, and within a few days attacked and took Vellaunodunum, burnt Orleans, crossed the Loire, penetrated into the territory of the Bituriges and laid siege to Soissons. The town was about to surrender when Vercingetorix marched up from Gorgobina. It is hardly likely that he wished to engage his small force in open battle with the Roman army, or to make a serious attempt to deliver the town; more probably he was only attempting a feint to give some relief to the besieged and to revive the courage of the Gauls, who were dismayed by Cæsar's quickness, and had already decided upon guerilla warfare as the best method of fighting the national enemy. However this may be, under the walls of Soissons a battle took place, of which Cæsar gives an exaggerated account, resulting in the retirement of Vercingetorix and the surrender of the town. Cæsar then marched upon Bourges, the capital of the Bituriges, one of the richest of the growing and semi-civilised centres in the country.

[Château-Landon.]

[Noviodunum.]

[Avaricum.]

Strategy of Vercingetorix.

Vercingetorix now began methodically to put into execution the design which he must long have had in mind, although Cæsar pretends that it was suggested to him by his recent defeat. His plan was to isolate the invader as he gradually advanced into the country, by making a wilderness all round him—burning the villages and towns, not excepting Bourges, cutting his communications, capturing his convoys, breaking up his foraging parties and allowing him no respite day and night, while drawing his own supplies from a secure base at a distance. These tactics were excellent, particularly as he so outnumbered the Romans in cavalry; but they required one condition for their fulfilment—a nation of iron resolution. At first the Bituriges proved equal to the demand. Cæsar pursued his advance through a deserted and devastated country, daily seeing the smoke going up from burning villages on the horizon, and relentlessly harassed by Vercingetorix who

followed close on his heels refusing all open engagements, camping his small army in the safe shelter of the woods and the marshes, and attempting the capture of Cæsar's convoys.

52 B.C.

If only Bourges itself had been destroyed the Roman army would have gone astray in an aimless and impossible enterprise. But the Bituriges were proud of their prosperous capital, and had not the heart to sacrifice it for the cause; and Vercingetorix had at length yielded to their demands and agreed to spare it. Cæsar was thus able to attack the city, which was stoutly defended by the Bituriges. No sooner had he reached it than, with his habitual activity he set vigorously to work upon the siege, undertaking works of investment on a gigantic scale and keeping his soldiers busy with the spade through the cold and rainy days of early spring, though the attacks of Vercingetorix, which he consistently ignored, sometimes left them without bread for days together. Since the days of Lucullus no Roman army had been in such straits; but Cæsar knew his men far better than Lucullus. In the crisis of the siege, when everything turned upon their labours, he relied rather on comradeship than on discipline to keep them at work, and heaped them with attentions which contrast strangely with the blood-stained records of the campaign. On one occasion he even proposed, if they thought the task above their strength, to withdraw from the siege altogether. He was met, of course, with a unanimous refusal and his men returned to their work in better spirits than ever.* Thus despite cold, hunger and the sallies of the enemy, the siege works were at length completed, and the assaulting towers prepared; towards the end of April † the attack was made and the city taken. Cæsar

The siege of Bourges.

* It must be remarked that Cæsar (B. G., vii. 18), having at this point to describe an attempt to surprise the infantry of Vercingetorix while the cavalry was absent, does not tell us with what forces he marched against the Gallic camp, which would have been an important detail in his account. This cannot be an accidental omission. It is probable that he marched out with a small number of men, because the Gallic infantry itself was not numerous. He has neglected to tell us how many soldiers he took with him, to prevent us from conjecturing the forces of the enemy.

† Jullian (Verc., 183) appears to me to be right in reckoning five weeks from the departure from Sens to the capture of Bourges. This would take us from the middle of March to the second half of April.

52 B.C. decided to make a terrible example, and the town was given over to the soldiers; the entire population was massacred, without Vercingetorix daring to move to the rescue.

Cæsar rests
his troops.

In a little more than a month Cæsar had stamped out four separate flames of revolt, strewn his path with ghastly trophies like the burning of Orleans and the sack of Bourges, replenished his coffers with the treasure of towns, temples and natives, and, above all, revived in his troops the confidence so indispensable to a small army fighting in a huge and unfriendly country. His magnificent vigour and impetuosity had triumphed over every obstacle, over distance and climate and hunger, over numbers and fortifications. He now made a small pause at Bourges, as though to take breath. Imagining that the most difficult part of his work was completed, and that the revolt, if not completely suppressed, was at least well under control, Cæsar proposed to rest his army at Bourges, where he had captured large stores, until the approaching spring. With the arrival of better weather he intended to invade the territory of the Arverni and bring the war to a conclusion by the capture of their capital Gergovia. But now occurred one of those dangerous incidents in Gallic policy which had during the last five years caused so much anxiety to Cæsar. The trouble arose out of the election to the chief magistracy of the Ædui, which had fallen vacant just before. Two parties were in competition for the post, one having nominated Cotys and the other Convictolitavus, and the conflict had very nearly provoked a civil war. One side was now claiming that the election of Cotys was illegal. Cæsar was obliged to suspend military operations, to repair with his army to Decetia, and to solve the difficulty by recognising the validity of the election of Convictolitavus, who was in fact the rightful candidate. This occupied his attention for several weeks, during which the rebel forces might have been expected to be slowly breaking up in the prospect of Cæsar's final campaign against Gergovia.

The Æduan
election.

Once more Cæsar's expectations were falsified. The news which reached him clearly indicated that the insurgents were not nearly so much discouraged by his victories as he had

allowed himself to hope. In the North the Senones and Parisii were still in arms and confident of victory; Commius was recruiting an army of his own, while Vercingetorix had received help from Aquitania and was collecting archers, training his men in the Roman methods of encampment, and bringing pressure to bear upon the nations that remained faithful to Rome, such as the Ædui and Sequani, by sending their chiefs huge quantities of gold from the mines in his own territory. Cæsar, however, was still so certain that the war was almost at an end that he felt strong enough to divide his forces.* We have no further mention of the native legion, the Lark, and Cæsar always speaks of a total of ten legions; of these he tells us that he gave four to Labienus, sending him northwards towards the middle of May against the Parisii and Sequani, while he himself marched southwards with six legions to invade Auvergne by the valley of the Allier, thus forcing [Elaver.] Vercingetorix to accept battle and put an end to the war.

Meanwhile Vercingetorix had reached the banks of the Allier and broken down all the bridges; he now proceeded to march along the left bank of the river following Cæsar's movements on the opposite bank, to prevent him from crossing over into Auvergne. Cæsar was forced to employ a stratagem. He succeeded one morning in concealing twenty cohorts, two from each legion, in a wood near a broken-down bridge; when the rest of the army had disappeared along the river, the cohorts emerged from their hiding-place and rebuilt and occupied the bridge. The legions returned and crossed the Allier; Vercingetorix, unwilling to give battle, allowed them to pass and, adhering to his previous tactics, began once more to retreat before them. Five days later Cæsar arrived in view of Gergovia, which is situated on the top of a steep bluff; and began at once to enter upon the labours of the siege. But six legions were not sufficient to take a city with such strong natural and artificial defences, and the situation of the Roman army soon became critical. Vercingetorix was always encamped a short distance away, keeping himself in the shelter

* On this mistake of Cæsar's see the interesting observations of Barone (I. G. C., p. 64).

52 B.C. of the forests and the marshes, always in evidence and always unassailable. The Æduan nobles, who resented the recent interference of Cæsar in their State, were beginning to yield to the substantial persuasions of Vercingetorix. Cæsar grew anxious, redoubled his energy, and tried every device to shorten the siege with the insufficient forces at his disposal. But still Gergovia held out. One day Cæsar with difficulty prevented a troop of Æduan auxiliaries from deserting to the enemy. Then he saw that he must make a supreme effort to capture the city and strike terror into the Gauls by a direct attack, and sent six legions to a general assault. But it was a forlorn hope; the Romans were repulsed with heavy losses.* Recognising his mistake and fully conscious of the danger of obstinately continuing the siege, Cæsar decided to withdraw and to march off, probably in the second half of June, to join Labienus in the North.

Vercingetorix
the national
hero.

The decision was no doubt wise; none the less so because, in the general ferment of national feeling throughout the country, it was one that brought with it undeniable risks. To many this first open confession of failure on Cæsar's part seemed the beginning of the end. Vercingetorix now became the hero of a real national uprising, winning supporters to his cause from the most unexpected quarters. Already on his way north Cæsar received news of the revolt of his faithful Ædui, who had captured Soissons, with all his treasure and his hostages, his baggage and his horses, massacred the Roman merchants, cut the bridge over the Loire, burning or throwing into the river all the stores they could not carry off, and were now preparing to bar his passage and drive him back, through sheer starvation, into the Roman Province. This was really the most critical moment in the campaign.† The defection of the Ædui, the richest and most powerful nation in Gaul, not only cut him off from Labienus, but deprived him of his best base of supplies, destroyed the entire effect of his preceding victories and lit the flame of rebellion among neutrals and

* See, in Napoleon III., J. C., 281, the remarks on Cæsar's account of this assault in B. G., vii. 45-51.

† See Cæs., B. G., vii. 56.

waverers in every corner of Gaul. His attempted organisation had definitely broken down; the old Gallic institutions which he had tried to use for his own purposes were being used to weld together the whole country against him. Already from one end of Gaul to the other arrangements were being made for the convocation of a great national Diet at Bibracte. 52 B.C.

Once more Cæsar saw himself on the brink of the abyss; but again he displayed neither hesitation nor dismay. He saw that, if he retired alone into the Province, leaving Labienus in the North, the Gauls would make short work of both forces in detail. He therefore decided to rejoin Labienus at all costs at the earliest possible moment. Not wishing to lose time in making a bridge over the Loire, swollen though it was by the melting of the snows, he found a ford by which his soldiers could cross with the water over their armpits, carrying arms and firewood on their heads. He put the cavalry in the van to form a moving dyke against the current and took all his army with him into the river. Then seizing all the corn and cattle he could find, and loading up slaves and mules and the already overburdened legionaries, he advanced northwards by forced marches and finally rejoined Labienus in the territory of the Senones, probably in the neighbourhood of Sens. From Gergovia to Sens Cæsar had covered another 200 miles; if we suppose that this took him some fifteen days, it must have been the beginning of July when once more he found himself with his whole army at his back. Fortunately while he had been unsuccessful at Gergovia, Labienus had won considerable victories over the Senones and Parisii. Cæsar unites his force.

Then supervened a slight lull in the operations. The *Commentaries* do not tell us how long it lasted, but it cannot have been less than a month—a time filled with anxious and feverish preparation on both sides. The defeat at Gergovia seemed to have changed all the probabilities of the war. The example of the Ædui had induced almost all the Gallic nations to join the movement; the only exceptions were the Remi, the Lingones, the Treveri, and a few tribes among the Belgæ. Vercingetorix was at Bibracte, The Diet of Bibracte.

52 B.C. the centre of the insurrection, where representatives from all the states of Gaul were coming together in an improvised Diet to discuss the formation of a national army. Gaul was awake and stirring with enthusiasm from one end to the other; the most sceptical and indifferent were drawn into the national cause.

The Parthian
analogy.

Very different was the outlook and temper of Cæsar. The sudden change in his fortunes, coming as a reaction from the bold self-confidence of a few months before, tended to render him even unduly pessimistic. Isolated with his small army in the depths of a vast and hostile country, with the constant feeling that a new rising might spring up against him from any quarter of the land, he once more restrained his natural tendencies as a strategist and reverted to an almost excessive measure of care and caution. The country itself he gave up for lost; his one thought now was to extricate his army. But this was by no means so easy. New difficulties appeared at every turn to baffle the general who two months before had thought the country reconquered for good. The soldiers were surprised and disheartened by the revolt of the Ædui; * supplies, always scanty, were scarcer than ever since the country-people had turned against them; while the experience of Britain and the disaster of Carrhæ brought home to the army a text on which all Italy was preaching—that in every contest between Roman and barbarian the lack of cavalry was a fatal element of weakness. All through this time Cæsar must have been haunted with the memory of Crassus. If he had hitherto ventured to set his legions boldly on the track of the cavalry of Vercingetorix, he was now far too cautious to march his dispirited infantry with their scanty cavalry supports across the country, exposed, like Crassus, to the constant onslaughts of the enemy's horse.

It was doubtless these considerations which caused him to lead his army in the direction of Germany to a spot which some identify with Vitry-sur-Marne,† and others

* Plut., Cæs., 26.

† The Duke of Aumale was the first to remark that we must conjecture this movement on Cæsar's part, of which the *Commentaries* tell us nothing. According to him Cæsar moved to Vitry-sur-Marne. (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, pp. 76-77.)

with Bar-sur-Aube,* where he recruited a considerable force of German cavalry. The general who had entered Gaul seven years before as the destroyer of the German power was now enrolling Germans against Gauls and paying them with the profits of the pillage of Gaul. He spent the whole of July and perhaps part of August in enrolling a large body of German cavalry and making preparations for his retreat. But his soldiers were still very much discouraged by the reports of the enemy and their own position, while confidence and enthusiasm reigned in the councils of the Gauls.

52 B.C.

Cæsar recruits
German
cavalry.

Both sides had strangely miscalculated the situation. Cæsar was mistaken in exaggerating the danger, as he had been mistaken before in thinking that the war was over. Vercingetorix owed all his success to his guerilla methods of warfare; and no doubt had it been possible to organise a war throughout Gaul under party chieftains like himself, Cæsar would ultimately have been forced, through lack of supplies, to evacuate the country. But Cæsar's defeat under the walls of Gergovia was in reality the salvation of the Roman power. Emboldened by their success, a party among the Gauls desired to transform the guerilla tactics into a regular war—a war in which Gaul, disunited as it was, and in the throes of a dangerous social crisis, could not hope to triumph over the armies of so old and tried a military and political system as that of Rome.

Change in the
Gallic tactics.

The first symptoms of the change were felt at Bibracte, when the question arose of choosing a commander-in-chief and forming a plan of campaign. The Ædui were anxious to elect one of their own countrymen, while another party proposed to confirm Vercingetorix in his command; one party was anxious for war on a large scale, the other voted for the continuance of the present operations. Vercingetorix and his partisans secured the upper hand; but in order that the Ædui might not unduly resent his authority, and in the hope of harmonising two opposing notions of strategy, Vercingetorix, who was certainly a man of real

Vercingetorix
occupies
Alesia.

* *Spectateur Militaire*, April 1863.

52 B.C. ability, proposed the adoption of both tactics simultaneously—one of those unfortunate compromises so frequent in history, because they are fatally imposed even upon the most resolute and intelligent of men by the weakness and folly of their colleagues. The Ædui and Segusiavi were to send 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry under the command of a noble to invade the territory of the Allobroges in the Roman Province; the Gabali and Arverni were to pillage the territory of the Helvii; the Rutheni and the Cadurci that of the Volcæ Arrecomici, thus breaking into the Province at several points and drawing Cæsar down from the North to its defence. Vercingetorix was to transfer his headquarters to Alesia, a small fortified town of the Mandubii,* where all the roads which Cæsar might take in his southward march happened to cross, and which was an excellent post for watching the movements of the enemy. After strengthening the fortifications of Alesia and supplying it abundantly with provisions, Vercingetorix, with a body of 15,000 cavalry and the infantry under his command, was to hamper the march of the enemy, to cut off his supplies and harass him as he passed by on his way to the defence of the Province.

[Alise Sainte Reine.]

Cæsar's retreat to the Province.

It was probably in the first half of August that Cæsar, after organising a large body of German cavalry, put himself at the head of his eleven tired legions to set out on his retreat to the Province,† a disastrous *finale* to the enterprise he had so brilliantly inaugurated. The country on which he had staked the whole of his political fortune had played him false after all; the work on which he had laboured for seven years and which was to make him the equal of Lucullus and Pompey had been shattered at one blow. These 30,000 men, who set out, weary and dispirited, dragging behind them on mules in a long

* The Duke of Aumale (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1858, p. 94) has called attention to the strategic advantages of this spot, and has shown that it must have been Vercingetorix' headquarters. I do not stop to discuss whether Alise-Saint Reine is really the ancient Alesia, for I regard the question as settled.

† Dion (xl. 30) tells us that Cæsar was anxious to protect the Province.

procession the siege-engines, the baggage, the slaves of officers and legionaries, the remains of the booty, the few Italian merchants who had escaped massacre—in short, all that still remained Italian in men or goods in the country which he had for a moment regarded as conquered—seemed to mark the end of the Roman dominion beyond the Alps, and the final ruin of that conquering policy in which Cæsar had thought to imitate, and even excel, his great predecessor Lucullus.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly by what road he travelled. Some authorities trace his route from the neighbourhood of the modern Troyes by Gray and Dijon to Besançon.* Others make him set out from Vitry-sur-Marne to ascend the valley of the Tille, pass aside to Dijon, cross the Saône near St. Jean de Losne and thus make for the Province along the right bank of the Saône.† Others again make him start from Bar-sur-Aube in the direction of Pontaillier-sur-Saône.‡ All that is certain is that on about the fourth day of his march,§ at morning, when he had arrived, according to Von Göler, at Beneuve, between Brevon and the Ource, according to Napoleon III. upon the banks of the Vingeanne, according to the Duke of Aumale in the neighbourhood of Montigny, or according to the anonymous writer of the *French Military Spectator* in the neighbourhood of Allofroy, Cæsar was suddenly attacked by Vercingetorix and forced to engage in a pitched battle.||

52 B.C.

Vercingetorix intercepts his retreat.

What was the reason for this sudden change of tactics? Why had Vercingetorix abandoned his guerilla system to attempt war on a grand scale? As the Gallic general comes down to us, even in Cæsar's account, as a man of intelligence and energy, we must suppose, in the absence of definite evidence, that it must have been the condition of his army which

The army of Vercingetorix.

* Von Göler, *Cæsars gallischer Krieg im Jahre 52* (Karlsruhe, 1859).

† *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, p. 87.

‡ *Spectateur Militaire*, April 1863.

§ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, p. 95.

|| I must make a frank confession. I have studied the maps of France, measured the distances and calculated the marching pace; yet I have not succeeded in satisfying myself as to any of these hypotheses. The problem is perhaps insoluble, in any case it requires greater strategic and topographical knowledge than I myself possess.

52 B.C. obliged him to seek an encounter which exactly fell in with Cæsar's desires. It is possible to conduct guerilla operations with a small army, with few resources, and without great generals; but it is impossible to conduct them without brave, resolute and patient soldiers. While Vercingetorix had been at the head of small bodies of cavalry and infantry composed almost entirely of Arverni who were his clients, his servants, or his friends, he had had sufficient authority to submit them to the fatigues and hardships of guerilla warfare; but now that he was at the head of a heterogeneous army he found that he had at once more soldiers and less authority. It is probable that discord arose between the numerous chiefs of the separate detachments and that national rivalries were spreading through the ranks. In an army which had been formed within a few months at a moment of exaltation and which had never been submitted to any regular discipline, in which the soldiers were, for the most part, dependants of great barons accustomed to small inter-tribal wars of short duration, or young men hastily recruited from all classes of society and devoid of the necessary military training, Vercingetorix may perhaps have feared that patriotic enthusiasm would die out altogether unless it were rekindled and intensified by some signal success. He probably reckoned on the demoralisation of the Romans and hoped to imitate the tactics by which, only a year before, the Parthians had annihilated the legions of Crassus. He therefore threw his cavalry suddenly upon Cæsar's army as it was on the march, keeping his infantry, divided into three corps, out of action in the rear.

Victory of
Cæsar.

Vercingetorix was perhaps unaware that Cæsar had recruited a new cavalry from the other side of the Rhine, and that, instead of the scanty and ineffective Roman squadrons, he was face to face with the vigorous horsemen of Germany. The engagement between the two bodies of horse was violent but short; for Cæsar's Germans, with the help of the legions, soon succeeded in routing the Gauls with considerable loss.

This ended the operations of the actual battle; but its consequences were so momentous that they can only be explained

52 B.C.

Cæsar besieges
Alesia.

by supposing that the Gallic army was totally lacking in organisation and endurance, and that Cæsar had believed it to be far more dangerous than it really was. Immediately after the battle Vercingetorix withdrew his troops to Alesia, and Cæsar, realising at once that retreat into a fortified town implied the demoralisation of the Gallic army, changed his plans once more on the very evening of the battle and, instead of continuing his march towards the Province, resolved to take the offensive, and to strike a final blow. If he succeeded, it would be the end of the war, and the means of recovering his prestige at Rome; if he failed he would perish with his men and meet, in the heart of Gaul itself, the destiny which would certainly await him in the Province if he returned there with a beaten army. On the very next day he set out in pursuit of the Gallic army, arrived in front of Alesia, saw the rock upon which the citadel was perched, and did not hesitate, although in a hostile country and without assured means of supply, to set his 30,000 men to besiege an enemy whose force was greater or at least equal to his own,* to await the attacks of the Gallic armies which were now making for the Province, so soon as they returned to the help of the besieged, indeed to give battle under the walls of Alesia, if need be, to the entire forces of insurgent Gaul. The plan was one of almost desperate rashness. But the man who carried within him the destinies of Europe, the great artist in strategy, over-prudent and foolhardy by turns, was resolved for once to stake all upon his luck. The legionaries took shovel and pickaxe from the backs of their beasts, and once more engaged upon the familiar task of digging trenches and raising terraces round a beleaguered city.

* It is ordinarily stated in reliance upon Cæsar (B. G., vii. 77) that, besides the cavalry, 80,000 soldiers took refuge in Alesia; but it must be observed, firstly, that this figure is put in the mouth of Critognatus in the course of a speech, and secondly, that it is difficult to admit that 80,000 men, in addition to the normal population, could have found room in a small Gallic town and have lived there almost two months; finally, that it is impossible to explain the inactivity of Vercingetorix if he had so many soldiers at his disposal. See further the considerations adduced by the Duke of Aumale in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for May 1, 1858, p. 111.

52 B.C.

The Gallic call
to arms.

Vercingetorix at once attempted to hamper the siege-works of the Romans by constant cavalry skirmishes; but he soon perceived that though he might retard them he could not actually prevent their completion. What then was he to do? To attempt a sally and stake all upon a pitched battle was too dangerous an alternative; yet to allow himself to be shut up was suicidal. At a council of war, after lively discussion, it was decided to send away the cavalry before the investing lines were completed, that they might ask help from the different Celtic peoples and rouse Gaul to make a general levy; the time, place, and numbers of the detachments were settled, and an army of a quarter of a million men was to be collected to be hurled at the Roman trenches. So one evening almost the whole of the Gallic cavalry noiselessly passed the gates, eluded the vigilance of the Roman sentries, crossed the still incomplete siege-works and disappeared in numerous squadrons to the four quarters of the horizon. The first part of the plan had been successful, and great was Cæsar's consternation when he learnt the news. His fate now rested entirely on the reception Gaul gave to the mission. Would the whole country respond to the appeal of the besieged of Alesia, the last surviving defenders of its liberty? Would beacon-fires be lighted on all the roads, to flame across forest and marshland, from village to village, to announce the danger and implore for help? Would the messengers of rebellion penetrate into the most secluded mountain-hamlets to bear news that a common country demanded a supreme and costly sacrifice, and to roll back a great wave of patriots upon the crags of Alesia?

The double
siege of Alesia.

Vain questions, to which Cæsar had no reply! His lot was already cast; retreat was impossible; nor could he, like Lucullus outside Tigranocerta, leave a part of his 30,000 soldiers to continue the siege and march with the rest against the reinforcing army; for his forces were too scanty and a division might entail the annihilation of both parts. He could do nothing but wait, pressing on the siege with all his might till the enemy's reinforcements came up and caught him where he was. Once more his position seemed well-nigh hopeless.

It was this harassing suspense that drove the mind which had for the last seven months been like an impetuous spring, seething and boiling as it bursts its way through too narrow an orifice, to conceive and execute with unheard-of and breathless rapidity one of the most amazing and grandiose ideas in all the record of ancient warfare—the enclosure of his own besieging forces in a huge artificial fortification improvised for the occasion. On the side of the plain he constructed a second circumvallation with bastions and towers, leaving a large space between this circle and that which he had already made on the side of the town; between these two circles his army was to remain in a sort of elongated fortress, moving from one line to the other in the narrow space which remained between, to resist the double assault to be delivered by the besieged of Alesia and the quarter of a million recruits who were expected from Gaul. But would his men have the time to finish the enormous works required—works for which it has been calculated that two million cubic metres of earth needed to be displaced? * Cæsar ran a grave risk of being besieged in his turn by the reinforcing army, like Mithridates under the walls of Cyzicus, and thus being reduced to death by starvation. It is difficult to exaggerate the horror of the situation. Although the enemy was still at a distance and the Remi and Lingones † remained friendly, the provisioning of the troops was already difficult; it would become altogether impossible when a huge horde of armed men occupied the whole country and closed all the roads. Meanwhile from morning to night Cæsar, with the help of Mamurra, Antony, Labienus, Decimus Brutus, Caius Trebonius, Caius Caninius Rebilus, and Caius Antistius Reginus directed the gigantic work and communicated his own enthusiasm to his soldiers. He studied the texts of the manuals of Siege-work; he consulted Mamurra and the eastern slaves most skilled in scientific strategy, and made them sketch him plans which he distributed to the centurions who had become

* *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, p. 113.

† This is a good conjecture by the Duke of Aumale. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 1, 1858, p. 112.

52 B.C.

overseers ; he sent out on all sides to fetch in fuel and iron : while his 9000 soldiers remained ceaselessly at work, breaking up the ground, making trenches far out in the plain, putting in hooks of steel and pointed stone which they covered with faggots and grass, to sow the ground with snares and pitfalls.

Starvation
of the non-
combatants.

Thus the weeks went slowly by. Meanwhile in all the villages throughout Gaul young men were being enrolled for the war, contingents were being fitted, arms furnished, beasts of burden taken out of the stable and loaded with grain. At every cross-road young soldiers and convoys met as they moved towards the spots chosen for the concentration, whence all were to proceed to Bibracte, where the nobles of the chief Gallic states had already come together to deliberate upon the command of the army and the plan of campaign. But round the rock of Alesia brooded a lonely and ill-omened silence. Cæsar received but meagre and uncertain news of the reinforcing army ; and from the topmost towers of Alesia the watchmen of Vercingetorix swept their eyes in vain over the distant horizon. Famine soon crept into the beleaguered city ; and the day arrived when Vercingetorix, after putting the town upon rations, found it necessary to get rid of the useless mouths, and to send the whole non-combatant population outside the walls into the space between them and the inner line of the Romans. He hoped that Cæsar would take them in for sale, and that they would thus at least escape with their lives. But Cæsar had not bread enough for his own soldiers.* It was in vain that the doomed company of old men, women and children, exposed to all the assaults of the climate and of hunger, huddled round the Roman lines begging for bread. Every day the besieged in Alesia and their Roman besiegers could see the crowd of non-combatants chewing the grass outside their lines, could hear their cries and watch their exhaustion. The space between the trench and the hill was transformed into a field of agony, a ghastly cemetery where the suffering were already skeletons before death released them. Yet their cries fell unmoved upon both Gaul and Roman, who had neither the mood nor the means

* Dion, xl. 40 ; Cæs., B. G., iii. 47.

for mercy. The defenders of Alesia were themselves half-starved, while in the Roman trenches the men worked away on empty stomachs. If, instead of recruiting an enormous army all through the land, the Gallic leaders had sent countless guerillas to devastate the surrounding country and capture the convoys of the Lingones and Remi, the army of Vercingetorix and the whole people of the Mandubii might perhaps have succumbed, but they would certainly have involved their Roman besiegers in their fall.

But this was not to be. Once more regular warfare was to come to Cæsar's rescue. A large Gallic army, even if less than the expected quarter of a million, eventually arrived outside Alesia.* It was a rabble of untrained soldiers, hastily recruited from amongst all classes of Gallic society and was commanded by four generals, Commius, Vercassivelaunus, Eporidorix, and Viridomaru, who do not seem to have been in agreement. It has been remarked that two of these generals were Æduans, and that the Ædui, who had only at the last moment entered into the revolutionary movement, seem to have behaved in this final campaign with a slackness which soon enabled them to make terms with the victors. However this may be, there can be no doubt that, if this army had been a regular force under capable commanders, it should have succeeded in annihilating Cæsar, even at the cost of sacrificing Vercingetorix. It should have besieged Cæsar, as Lucullus had besieged Mithridates beneath the walls of Cyzicus, by compelling him either to break out by force, or to die of hunger. Instead of this, the lack of agreement between the leaders and of cohesion in the army, together with the general impatience to rescue Vercingetorix, induced the commanders to make repeated assaults against the Roman trenches, while Vercingetorix attacked them from the opposite side. These assaults lasted seven days; † but the Gauls did not succeed

52 B.C.

Attempted
relief and final
capitulation
of Alesia.

* Cæs. (B. G., vii. 76) puts the total at 250,000 men and 8000 horse. The speed with which the levy was made, and the difficulty of feeding 250,000 men, even for a short time, are sufficient to show that these figures are exaggerated. Nevertheless it must have been a considerable force.

† Jullian, Verc., 286.

52 B.C. in breaking through the great rampart of earth and men which the genius of Cæsar had spent but a month in raising. Under the direction of Cæsar, Antony, Labienus, Trebonius, Antistius, and Caninius vigorously repelled the assaults on all the positions attacked. These useless and costly attempts were wearisome and discouraging to the relieving army, which had reckoned securely on victory and was little used to discipline; and it finally disbanded, leaving numerous prisoners with the Romans, without having succeeded in breaking through the circle of forts which enclosed Alesia. In their discouragement the Gallic chieftains in Alesia turned against Vercingetorix. They seized him, sent him out to Cæsar as a prisoner, and then capitulated. The entire army, all that survived of the Mandubii, and a large number of prisoners, were distributed among the soldiers. In this singular fashion, and to the general amazement, the war was suddenly concluded towards the end of September.

Gaul and
Cæsar's
campaigns.

A barbarous country just lightly touched by the transforming hand of civilisation, Gaul was equally unfitted either for the obstinate and unsystematic fighting of savage tribes, or the skilful and methodical warfare of civilised nations. She attempted to do both by turns. Cæsar's campaigns reveal all the social and moral incoherence which was at that time prevalent in Gallic society, and which alone is adequate to explain how so vast a country could be effectually subdued by a small army of 30,000 men. Vercingetorix was at once the hero and the victim of this transformation in the character and institutions of his countrymen, which could only be completed after immense sacrifice and suffering. Yet the scales, after all, were very evenly balanced. The awful tension of the crisis from which Cæsar and his legions so triumphantly emerged by the capture of Alesia, might easily have been relieved in very different fashion. If the general had been cast in a softer mould, or had displayed less signal qualities of daring and resource, if the soldiers had failed either in training or in toughness, or in loyalty to their incomparable leader, they could never have achieved what they did. Certainly, had they been of the quality of the troops of Crassus, they

could never have endured the stress of the campaign—alone in the heart of a huge and hostile territory, constantly exposed to attack on all sides, with no base of operations in the country, with their communications with Italy irretrievably cut off. In such a situation as this, even the most inconsequent and unscientific methods of warfare should have brought victory to the native. Cæsar might have fallen on the road to the Province as Crassus fell on the road to Armenia, and the whole history of Europe would have taken another course.

What would have happened had Carrhæ been repeated, Cæsar's work in Gaul. within a year, against a western enemy? The speculation is interesting. It was a critical moment in the development of Italy; and the shock of a second catastrophe, removing Cæsar so soon after his less gifted colleague, would have made a deep, perhaps an indelible, impression. It is tempting to ask whether it would not have converted Italy for good from the gospel of adventure, and prevented her from pressing further into the interior of the continent. The siege of Alesia reads like a hideous nightmare; but it decided the character of the civilisation of Europe. Cæsar's enemies were fond of reproaching him with the slowness of his conquests and the smallness of his achievements. But his work was greater than it seemed. In his seven years of campaigning he had created an army, small in numbers, but finer in quality than any force Rome had had at her command for generations; and, at the decisive moment in the history of Europe, he and his men had drawn events into a course which their successors would for centuries be unable to deflect.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DISORDERS AND THE PROGRESS OF ITALY

The laws of Pompey—The terror during his Dictatorship—The progress of vine and olive cultivation—Great and moderate landlords—Industrial advance of the Italian country towns—The new influences in Literature—The young men—The Conservatives and the revolutionary intellectuals—The problem of debt.

52 B.C. **WHILST** Democratic Imperialism was passing through this supreme ordeal in Gaul, an important change had taken place in the metropolis. Pompey at last made his peace with the Conservatives. Soon after the departure of Cæsar the rioting had become so serious and energetic measures of repression so urgently necessary that the whole of Rome, even his most violent opponents, had been driven in dismay to acquiesce in the Dictatorship of Pompey. Cato had indeed insisted that Pompey's official title should be not Dictator but sole Consul, in order that he might still be held responsible at the expiration of his term.* But this was a mere constitutional subtlety. The fact remained. Pompey had been raised alone to a supreme position in the State, with the duty of re-establishing order at all costs, thereby adding to his long list of extraordinary honours the altogether unprecedented privilege of being at once consul and proconsul.

Pompey
becomes
Dictator.

Pompey's laws. He had bent himself to his task with an energy which Rome had ceased to expect from one who generally exercised authority with such an air of detachment. He had, it is true, made one last concession to the Democrats by securing the approval of the bill which allowed Cæsar to stand for the

* App., B. C., ii. 23; Dion, xl. 50; Plut., Pomp., 54; Cat. U. 47.

Consulship without returning to Rome.* But all the rest of his measures were unaffectedly Conservative.† He carefully revised the list of citizens from whom the 100 judges of political cases were chosen by lot, reducing them to 950, Senators, knights and plebeians, and admitting only men whom he was in a position to influence.‡ He proposed a *lex Pompeia de ambitu* and a *lex Pompeia de vi* which simplified lawsuits, increased the penalties for all acts of political corruption committed since 70 (that is, during the years when Cæsar's gold had been most lavishly scattered throughout Italy) and introduced a new and more vigorous procedure against crimes of violence.§ He also brought forward a *lex Pompeia de Provinciis* to legalise a Senatorial decree of the previous year, according to which no one could be a Governor of a province less than five years after ceasing to be Prætor or Consul; || and finally a *lex Pompeia de jure magistratum* which contained, amongst other provisions which have not come down to us, a simple and straightforward confirmation of the old rule against standing for the Consulship without coming to Rome.

These were all measures for which Conservatives had been clamouring for years. Their exultation may therefore easily be imagined. Even the most inveterate of Pompey's critics began to take a more lenient view of his character. Cæsar's supporters, of course, were by no means so delighted; but as Pompey was still regarded as being on friendly terms with Cæsar they did not attempt to oppose any of his measures, confining themselves to the criticism that the *lex de jure magistratum* seemed on the face of it to annul the very privilege expressly granted so recently to the proconsul of Gaul. Thus, thanks to his own personal authority and to the support of the Conservatives, the upper classes, and an alarmed and disgusted public, Pompey succeeded in passing all his bills without a struggle and with a minimum of delay. One small concession he made to the friends of Cæsar, by inserting in the *lex de*

Attitude of the
two parties
towards
Pompey.

* Suet., Cæs., 26; Dion, xl. 51; Cic., A., vii. 1, 4; A., vii. 3, 4.

† Cic., A., viii. 16, 2; Vell., ii. 76.

‡ Cic., A., viii. 16, 2; Vell., ii. 76.

§ Lange, R. A., iii. 361-362.

|| Dion, xl. 56.

52 B.C. *jure magistratum* a clause the exact terms of which we do not know but which was so drawn up that Cæsar's enemies were able later on to dispute its legality.

Pompey
wakes up.

These laws were excellent. But Cæsar's laws had been equally excellent and they had been in force now for several years. Yet they were entirely useless, simply because, in the excitement and intrigues of the party struggle and the universal debasement of Roman public life, no magistrate was able to put them into execution. What was there to prevent the same from taking place now? All depended upon the action of the Dictator. To the astonishment of Rome, Pompey rose to the occasion. From the moment of his election he seemed to become a changed man. The vacillating, indolent and sceptical aristocrat suddenly displayed an almost brutal energy in the administration of his own laws. For a time it was almost as if Sulla had come to life again. Something like a reign of terror prevailed in the law courts. Cases were hurried forward with peremptory haste; the most garrulous of advocates were sternly silenced; and all the authority of the Dictator was used to secure a condemnation. Within a few weeks a large number of the friends of Clodius and Cæsar who had been compromised in the scandals of the preceding years had been summarily tried and sent into exile. Some of the less respectable of the Conservatives, amongst others Milo, went to share their fate.

The vagaries
of influence.

All this tended to enhance Pompey's popularity and intensify the feeling against the recent disorders. It put all who were desirous of seeing order re-established in the mood to approve severe measures, without inquiring too closely into their literal legality. It was no time for lawyers' scruples. Rome needed something more thorough than rose-water surgery. Such was the talk of the day. Yet, as always will happen when society has grown rich and self-indulgent and is split up into hostile and self-satisfied cliques, these copy-book maxims were somewhat restricted in their application. When it came to a question of his own friends or relations the most relentless of censors showed an unexpected tenderness. Pompey might harden his heart against the low rioters of

the streets; he might display something like ferocity against individuals out of the upper classes, as when he told Memmius, who came to ask his help in a lawsuit and found him going from his bath to his dinner, "If you detain me, you will give me a cold dinner: that is all"; yet even he would intervene to save his own friends. He had lately found a new wife in the young and charming Cornelia, a daughter of Scipio and widow of the ill-fated young Publius Crassus. When Scipio was on his trial Pompey not only secured his acquittal but had even made him his colleague in the Consulship.

Pompey's justice was thus not exactly even-handed. But it was effective; and the elections had passed off without disorder. The results were highly satisfactory to the Conservatives. It is true that Cato, who had refused to spend a sesterce upon his candidature, was unsuccessful for the Consulship. But both the elected consuls were members of his party. One was Marcus Claudius Marcellus, member of an ancient Roman family and an outspoken enemy of Cæsar: the other, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the lawyer who had stood against Catiline twelve years before, but whom age and experience had taught the wisdom of opportunism. Clearly the tide of feeling against the extravagance and corruption of Cæsar's régime was still steadily rising. Cicero, of course, had not escaped its contact. As he neared the end of his great treatise on the Republic, summoning all the eloquence of his pen to expound in sonorous Latin the high wisdom of the political thinkers of Greece, he shook off the palsy of scepticism which had weighed down his spirit during the last ten years. His old enthusiasm for Pompey was reawakened; he began to hope once more; and, with a scrupulousness which is very characteristic of the man, he prepared to repay the debt he had contracted with Cæsar, whose conduct he now judged with increasing severity.

Amidst the suspense and excitements of this anxious year there was one small change which almost escaped the notice of contemporary observers. It was the first year in which oil prepared in Italy was exported for sale in the provinces.*

* Pliny, N. H., xv. 1, 3.

52 B.C.

Cicero's
admiration
for Pompey.

The export
of oil.

52 B.C.

Hitherto Greece and Asia had supplied the markets of the Mediterranean, and even of Italy. But the field of cultivation in Italy had been slowly extended and improved; the increase in the supply had steadily diminished the cost of production; and Italy was now at last prepared, not only to satisfy her own increasing demands but to compete with success in oversea markets. This small item of information, accidentally preserved for us by one of the most careful students of ancient times, reminds us how, amidst wars and the rumours of wars, the despised slave immigrants from the East, under the guidance of their Italian masters, persevered in their appointed task. Behind the small knot of warriors and statesmen who crowd with such self-importance before the footlights of history we catch this one fleeting glimpse of the great multitude of workers who, unknown and unregarded, were spending their powers, each in his own way, to transform Italy into an industrial and capitalist nation. In every country town in Italy there were freedmen and sons of freedmen and immigrants from the East, small peasant proprietors and well-to-do landlords, retired legionaries and centurions come home from distant parts, or settled with some comrade in a piece of country they had learnt to know during their service, all busily increasing their resources, laying by savings, buying land sold off by noble families in difficulties, buying slaves, improving methods of cultivation, setting up in business, introducing new arts and processes or opening workshops for manufactures.

The new
land-owning
middle class.

The progress in the cultivation of the olive which is revealed to us by this little notice of Pliny, and the progress which was being made simultaneously in the cultivation of the vine, would not have been possible but for one all-important change in the whole structure of society. This was the emergence, between the great landlords and the few surviving members of the old peasant proprietor population, of a new middle class of landowners who were prepared, with the small capital and few skilled slaves at their command, to attempt the scientific and intensive cultivation of the East. The old peasant proprietors would never have acquired the knowledge

to do this for themselves; while the large absentee landlords had not at their disposal, or were not inclined to stake, the vast capital required to stock huge tracks of land with olives, vines, fruit-trees and the necessary buildings. Moreover, they could hardly ever devote to their estates the personal attention so indispensable to agricultural success. Occasionally some unusually well informed man of business, some wealthy financier on the look-out for new opportunities of investment, some large landowner who lived upon his property, some man of letters or retired politician or general might be tempted, perhaps only as an amusing distraction, to turn his hand to the new-fangled processes of cultivation.* But ordinarily, unless their estates happened to be in the immediate neighbourhood of a town or of the capital, they found it more convenient to rely upon pasturage, conducted however with greater care and knowledge than in the old primitive days. In the great forests and prairies of the Po valley, and in South Italy, where the devastations of Hannibal had never been effaced, there were huge herds out at pasture under the slaves of Roman nobles.† Most of the strength that still resided in the extreme Conservative party came from a small knot of old aristocrats like Domitius Ahenobarbus, who were cattle-breeders on an immense scale. But such cases were gradually growing to be altogether exceptional. The steady progress which was being made, more especially in North and Central Italy, by the introduction of intensive cultivation and the growing of vine and olive, was due almost entirely to middle-class proprietors who no longer lived, like the old-fashioned middle class, in the open country and made a precarious living by setting their whole family to work on the soil. The new landed middle class spent a good part of each year in the neighbouring town, leaving the whole of the manual work to their slaves and labourers, over whom they maintained the

* For instance: C. Fundanius, P. Agrasius, a tax-farmer; C. Agrius, a knight (Varro, R. R., i. 2, 1); Libo Martius, a chief of engineers (Varro, R. R., i. 2, 7); M. Seius (Varro, R. R., iii. 2, 7); Gaberius, a knight who laid out his money in goats (Varro, R. R., iii. 3. 10).

† Blümner, G. T. A., p. 98. See the whole second book of Varro, R. R.

52 B.C. strictest control, often remained bachelors or had very small families, and devoted a large part of their attention to increasing to a maximum the profit drawn from their estates.

The develop-
ment of
industry.

These large changes in the whole economy of agriculture could not help causing a corresponding development in the sphere of industry. It is to these days that we are surely justified in assigning the first impetus of that great advance in arts and manufactures which was in the next half century to penetrate from one end of the peninsula to the other. The agricultural improvements recorded by Pliny were indeed only the natural effects of a general progress in material civilisation which necessarily entailed a greater division of labour in every department of society, and not least, therefore, in industry. In primitive Italy the landowner had made everything for himself: his clothes, his furniture, his implements of toil; he was his own workman, and was at pains that his family should wholly satisfy its own needs. But the modern landlord was more intelligent and cultivated, more refined in his taste than his humbler predecessor. He demanded finer clothes, more perfect implements, less precarious profits; and he realised that he could not ask his slaves to be equally accomplished in every department. He saw that it would pay him to reach perfection in one branch, and apply in the open market for many articles which had previously been manufactured at home. In this way commerce and industry advanced hand in hand with agriculture, and Oriental slaves could be bought or hired for industrial uses not only at Rome but in all the smaller towns of Italy. The freedmen, immigrants, and vagabonds who were tramping up and down the country for a livelihood, often found employment in a Latin colony or a *municipium*, or in one of these federated towns which from the height of their Cyclopean walls still seemed to threaten death to the stranger who ventured to draw near without first making sure of a kindly welcome.

New Italian
industries.

We may therefore confidently fix this period as marking the first appearance of the class of prosperous merchants and artisans which we shall find flourishing fifty years later in all the smaller cities of Italy. It was this generation that, all

over North Italy, from Vercelli in the North down to Milan, 52 B.C. Modena and Rimini, first began manufacturing the lamps and bowls and pottery that were afterwards so famous ; * that saw the skilled workmen and merchants of Padua and Verona produce and export the carpets and coverlets which were soon to be known and appreciated in all parts of Italy ; † that tempted the poor workers of Parma and Modena to make a living by home labour out of the wool of the great flocks at pasture on the big absentee estates outside the town, thus inaugurating the Italian woollen trade ; ‡ that planted flax in the low land round Faenza and encouraged the city to spin and to weave it ; § that made Genoa, at the foot of her savage mountains, a great centre for the timber and hides, the cattle and the honey, brought down by the Ligurian natives from the lonely valleys to which they had slowly been driven back ; || that revived the old Etruscan pottery works at Arezzo, through the cheapness of skilled slave labour, encouraging the proprietors to buy workers who were clever at designing, and would help to make the red ware which afterwards became so familiar under the Empire ; ¶ that worked the iron mines of Elba and developed the resources of Pozzuoli as a great centre for the iron trade, where rich merchants imported the raw material from Elba and turned it into swords and helmets, nails and screws, to find a market in all parts of Italy ; ** that made Naples the city of perfumes and perfumers, and Ancona the seat of a great purple dye industry. †† All over Italy too there was an increase in the labouring population employed in satisfying local needs : dyers, fullers, cobblers, tailors, military outfitters, porters and waggoners. ‡‡

The cities of Italy, which had declined so sadly in the last

* Forcella, I. C. M., p. 12 f., p. 25.

† Blümner, G. T. A., 102.

‡ *Id.*, 100.

§ Pliny, N. H., xix. 1, 9.

|| Strabo, iv. 6, 2 (202).

¶ Fabroni, *Storia degli antichi vasi fittili aretini*, 1841, p. 55.

** Diod., v. 13.

†† Blümner, G. T. A., 117-119.

‡‡ Forcella, I. C. M., 45 f.

52 B.C.

The new local
aristocracy.

fifty years of social unrest, during the gradual break-up of the territorial aristocracy and the old peasant class, once more recovered their prosperity, widening their borders to welcome the new bourgeoisie of proprietors and merchants, who had no taste for country life and desired to spend on town pleasures the money they had made by wise ventures in business or agriculture, through the labours of well-trained and well-selected slaves. This new bourgeoisie was the heir of the ancient local institutions of Italy; in the colonies and *municipia* it took over the old arrangements made by Rome in her aristocratic period; in the allied cities it had to administer venerable survivals which had served to govern the cities in their days of sovereign independence and had now, after the concession of Roman citizenship and all the transformation and reconstruction of the last fifty years, to sink to a position of purely municipal usefulness. This rising class, or its wealthier and more eligible members, formed a new upper caste in the towns, called the order of *decuriones*, and it was from amongst its ranks, with varying procedure, that the small governing Senate and the magistrates were chosen.*

Its exclusion
from politics.

On the whole this new class kept strictly aloof from politics. This was not merely because most of its members lived at a distance from Rome, only going up on chance occasions for an election, and making practically no use of their political rights. It was due principally to the fact that, in the democracy that had been provisionally erected on the ruins of the illustrious aristocracy of ancient Rome, it was not possible to obtain power or office or to take an active part in public life without possessing either a great name or immense wealth or supreme ability. Not unnaturally men turned their energies into other channels; they made money, and, if families were small, took all the more pains over the education of their sons, regarding riches and culture as a fair substitute for personal advancement and political influence.

Thus from end to end Italy was conscious of a process of social and intellectual rebirth, which was at once the cause and effect of the policy of imperialism; it was felt in the rising

* This is the class alluded to by Cæsar in B. G., i. 13 and i. 23.

standard of luxury and consumption, in the effort of all classes towards increased riches and influence and improved culture and education. The tide of emigration from Italy into the provinces, wherever profits were easy and abundant, showed no sign of slackening. Cæsar welcomed to his legions young recruits from all parts of Italy who desired to earn wealth or distinction in business or warfare. Strange indeed were some of the contrasts to be observed in his camp. Here were descendants of the oldest house of Rome jostling the sons of well-to-do middle class families from Piacenza or Pozzuoli or Capua,* or ex-dealers in mules like Ventidius Bassus. Ventidius' career may be taken as typical of the vicissitudes of that adventurous time. A native of the Marches, he had been taken prisoner, while still a boy, in the Social War; after his release he had entered business as a contractor for military transport, but, growing tired of hiring out slaves and mules, he had gone off to join Cæsar in Gaul.† The position of *Præfectus Fabrum*, or chief engineer officer, in an army provided contractors who had experience of building with an easy stepping-stone from business to politics.‡

Next to war and politics, education was the most powerful factor in this wholesale process of democratic levelling. Schools were now almost universal, even in the small country towns. They were maintained by private enterprise, principally by freedmen, to whom the pupils made a fixed payment. And all schools were common schools. Distinctions of rank were entirely ignored. The son of a poor freedman sat on the bench next the son of a senator § or a free peasant or a knight. Rome was becoming the meeting-place of a company of young men from all parts of Italy, of the most varied rank and breeding, all ambitious to win fame and fortune. From Etruria there had probably already arrived in the capital a certain Caius Cilnius Mæcenas, a young man then perhaps twenty years of age, descended from one of the

52 B.C.

The career open to talent.

Placentia

The young literary aspirants at Rome.

* Cæs., B. G., iii. 71.

† Gell., xv. 4.

‡ See, besides the case of Mamurra, that of the grandfather of Velleius Paterculus, Vell., ii. 76.

§ Hor., Sat., vi. 71 ff.

52 B.C. old royal families of Etruria, which had lately descended to commerce and contracting; from Cisalpine Gaul came Cornelius Gallus, a youth of eighteen, born of humble parentage; the Abruzzi contributed Asinius Pollio, now aged twenty-three, sprung from a noble house which is believed to have supplied the insurgents with a general during the civil war. Then there was Quintilius Varus from Cremona, Emilius Macer from Verona, and a certain Publius Vergilius Maro from Mantua. Virgil was at this time eighteen years old. He was the son—at least so it appears—of a potter in a small village near Mantua, who had taken up bee-keeping and a timber business and made sufficient money to send his son to study, first at Cremona, then at Milan, and finally, in 53, at Rome.*

The new school
of literature.

Amongst this group of young Italians, who had been brought together in the schools of rhetoric and philosophy and were already united by the deep and lasting friendship which has lent an added lustre to all their names, the new spirit in literature, which had found a bold but solitary champion in Catullus a few years earlier, was preached as the great revolutionary movement of the coming generation, which was to bear down, like a resistless torrent, upon all the old monuments of Latin thought—the old-fashioned statuesque epics of Ennius and Pacuvius, the wearisome dramas of the classical period, the clumsy horseplay of Plautine humour, the uncouth sallies of Lucilian wit, the ponderous didactic compositions in the slow-footed monotonous old hexameter verse. Valerius Cato, the literary model of all the cultured youth of Italy,† and a few Greeks, amongst others Parthenius—an Oriental captured by Lucullus at Nicæa, sold into Italy and then set free, who settled at Naples to write poetry, teach Greek literature and make friends with the young literary aspirants of the day—had been the first to diffuse the taste for a livelier and more delicate style; Catullus, with the wild burst of his passion, had brought it suddenly and unexpectedly to the surface; and on his death his spirit survived among his own friends and the small band of enthusiasts for

* Donatus, p. 54, 10.

† Schanz, G. R. L., i. 143.

the new poetry. Caius Helvius Cinna, probably from Cisalpine Gaul, and Caius Licinius Calvus, Caius Memmius, and Quintus Cornificius, all members of noble Roman families, were its most prominent representatives. They were all of them *Young Italians*, as Cicero, who did not like them, somewhere νεώτερος. calls them, revolutionaries dissatisfied with the present condition of literature—they all desired to have done with the old national fustian: to fill Italy with a new poetry, written in new metres, bursts of heartfelt lyric or moving elegy, delicate studies in all the moods and experiences of passion, adventures in the strange and elusive bypaths of psychology or in the bewildering labyrinth of Alexandrian mythology.* Rare exceptions, like Asinius Pollio, remained faithful, or at least respectful, to the old classical writers; but the majority were carried away by the enthusiasm of the moment and reserved all their admiration for the models of the new literature.

Virgil succumbed like the rest. He had come up from his school at Milan full of old-fashioned ideas, with the naïve intention of composing a great national poem, on the model of Ennius, upon the Kings of Alba,† and had begun to study eloquence with the celebrated Epidius, the favourite master of the young aristocrats of the day. But he soon grew ashamed of his crude ambitions, and gave up the idea. Disheartened at his excessive nervousness and at the difficulty of self-expression, he had abandoned rhetoric for philosophy and passed on to the school of Siro, an Epicurean and a friend of Cicero, to devote himself with enthusiasm to the investigation of the great Mystery of the Universe. The passion to read deep and widely, to fill the mind with great generalisations and all-embracing theories, to fathom the very depths of Being, was becoming an enthusiasm common among the younger generation; but they combined it with an impatient delight in novelty for its own sake, and an insistent craving for fineness of execution and perfection of detail which had been entirely foreign to their elders.

* Schanz, G. R. L., i. 141.

† Donatus, p. 58, 21; Serv., ad Ecl., vi. 3.

Virgil reads philosophy.

52 B.C.

Old-fashioned
regrets.

Men of riper years and Conservative inclinations like Cicero were fond of passing strictures on this contempt of the rising generation for the whole venerable past of Rome.* They saw in it simply one more manifestation of the revolutionary spirit which was tossing Italy to and fro and allowing her no peace. This clique of young firebrands who professed to think Ennius and Plautus mere vulgar scribblers, were they not animated by just that same spirit of consuming restlessness which drove Cæsar and his party to trample the old constitution under foot? If their example proved infectious, what would remain of the Rome of older days? While the old Republican constitution had been transformed into a giddy alternation of revolutionary Dictatorships, the old manners, if they still survived in many departments of life, were contemptuously dismissed by the younger generation. There was many a town whose citizens felt less cramped within the towering walls which remained to remind them of the old era of warfare than by the obdurate rigidity of their ancient local institutions. To imitate the Greeks became the all-absorbing fashion of the day, and the spread of revolutionary ideas threatened to overwhelm Italy and the Empire as the flame of the pyre of Clodius had seized and destroyed the Curia.

The burden
of debt.

It is not surprising that even the more enlightened among the Conservatives, always a sickly and pessimist tribe, began to join the reactionaries in asking if the era of expiation had not already begun. What had Rome to show for the bellicose democratic demonstrations of the last few years? A serious war in the East, a serious war in Gaul, and the irksome burden of debts so confidently assumed during the years when a gullible public had been induced to stake money with both hands on the fancied security of the treasures of Persia and Britain. The great imperial nation that held the world beneath its sway seemed unable to shake itself free from the load of its obligations; the slight relief brought by the influx of capital through Pompey's army was soon exhausted, and Cæsar's assiduous contributions from the spoils

* See Cic., A., vii. 2, 1; Tusc., iii. xix. 44; De Orat., xlvi. 161.

of Gaul were not enough to meet new needs. Many of the improvements in agriculture and industry had been brought about by money lent out at high rates of interest; to the mass of old debts still unpaid new and greater obligations were being steadily added; and the whole structure of the new society seemed to rest on the flimsy foundations of credit.

Even the upper classes, outside a small group of prominent capitalists, were in similar difficulties—not least the noble families, many of them conspicuous in the arena of politics, which had inherited huge estates in the country and house property in Rome, with but little capital to keep them up. Their land-agents robbed them without mercy so soon as their masters were safely plunged into politics; their tenants constantly delayed payment; the slaves whom they found it necessary to keep at Rome, for household duties, or to help at elections, or for mere idle ostentation, were a heavy expense, especially in a city like Rome, where living was dear.* The enterprises they embarked on for relief, without the time or the desire to supervise the slaves who were to carry them through, often ended in added disaster. It was not every one who could manage his dependants like Cæsar. Not infrequently senators who had inherited large fortunes and won personal distinction could not raise the small sum required for a daughter's dowry without borrowing at ruinous rates of interest; or an illustrious statesman like Cicero rose to speak in the sovereign assembly of the empire with the paralysing sense of his immense liabilities, and of the constant and importunate demands for the largesse which was expected from those who had provinces at their disposal. Friendly loans to influential politicians and a cheerful readiness to make allowances for temporary difficulties were obligatory upon rich financiers who desired to have friends at court; and the politicians, of course, were delighted to accept them. Both parties seemed thus enabled to assist one another with impartial generosity; but in reality it was the needy politicians who succumbed to the influence of their wealthier allies. One of the most powerful members of this class was Atticus, to whom many Roman politicians—

52 B.C.

The pecuniary obligations of the upper classes.

* Cic., F., xiv. 7, 3.

52 B.C. for instance, Cato, Cicero and his brother Quintus, Hortensius and Aulus Torquatus—had entrusted the administration of their complicated affairs, using him not only as a banker and paymaster in times of embarrassment, but as an intimate adviser in all matters of public or private interest.* Yet these widespread difficulties themselves tended to arouse an increasing aversion for money-lenders and capitalists. Even among the upper classes Catiline was making converts, and it was by no means unusual to hear great nobles like Domitius Ahenobarbus raising their voices in the Senate even louder than the men of the popular party against the exactions of tax-farmers and financiers.†

* Corn. Nep., Att., 15.

† Cic., ad Q., ii. 13, 2. On the question of *latifundia* under the Empire, which will be dealt with in detail in a later volume, see the excellent study by Salvioli: *On the Distribution of Landed Property in Italy at the Time of the Roman Empire* (Modena, 1899), esp. p. 33 f. See also *le capitalisme dans le monde antique* (Paris, 1906), by the same writer.

CHAPTER IX

THE "DE BELLO GALLICO" AND THE "DE REPUBLICA," 51 B.C.

Reaction against Cæsar in Italy—The *Commentaries*—The Gallic revolt of 51—Cicero's Proconsulship in Cilicia—Cæsar's cruelty in Gaul—M. Claudius Marcellus—The question of the Comacines—Cicero's outward voyage—The first political skirmishes against Cæsar—The publication of the *De Republica*—The sitting of Sept. 30, 51—Cicero in Cilicia and the Parthians—Cicero as *Imperator*.

CÆsar had emerged from the war against Vercingetorix 52 B.C. victorious but discredited. His reputation as the conqueror of Gaul and Rome's one and only general had been seriously imperilled. During the seven long and eventful months of the war against Vercingetorix, in the vicissitudes and excitements of the first revolt and its extinction, of the failure before Gergovia and the last desperate struggle at Alesia, Italy had at length realised that the conquest of Gaul, which Cæsar had so boldly proclaimed in 57 and the Senate ratified in 56, was still far from accomplished; relapsing from a mood of blind confidence to a still blinder pessimism, the public began to think that Cæsar would now take years to carry through the enterprise he had so rashly undertaken.* In a capitalist democracy where the general public is composed of nobles and landed proprietors, merchants and professional men, all supremely ignorant of military affairs, success is

Cæsar and the
home public.

* The damage done to Cæsar's military reputation by the events of 53-52 is not merely a conjecture from the many parallel cases in history; it is proved by the easy credence given at Rome to rumours of defeats sustained by Cæsar (see Cic., F., viii. 1, 4) and by the widespread belief that discontent was prevalent in his army (see Plut., Pomp., 57; Cæs., 29).

52 B.C. the sole standard by which a war can be judged. A victorious general is a hero and a genius, while failure becomes the stamp of weakness and incapacity. This is the explanation why armies operating in distant countries are so often distracted by the excited prognostications of the home public. The present juncture was a case in point. Italians had seen Syria and Pontus securely annexed to the Roman dominion after the campaigns of Lucullus and Pompey; they now saw Gaul invaded and annexed, yet still stirring and simmering with constant rebellions. They concluded that the Gallic war was being so indefinitely prolonged because Cæsar had not the skill to bring it to a conclusion. They did not stop to reflect that, unlike Pompey and Lucullus, Cæsar was engaged in combating, not settled kingdoms with regular armies, but the entire strength of a people in whom the sentiment of nationality and the love of independence were still ruling passions. They did not know that ordinary warfare against great armies is mere child's play compared with a struggle against a nation, however insignificant in numbers, which has made up its mind, in whole or in part, to give no quarter to the invader. The conquest of Gaul, which posterity was to reckon as Cæsar's greatest achievement, seemed to observers at the time little better than an inglorious failure, discreditable to its author and proportionately encouraging to his enemies. So the public willingly lent ear to the familiar Conservative comminations. Fiascos such as they had seen in Parthia and Gaul were the inevitable consequence of the corruption and injustice, the aggression and illegality, of the Democratic leaders.

Pompey
cajoled by the
Conservatives.

There was another change in the situation at Rome still more menacing to Cæsar. It was becoming obvious that Pompey had now no further need of his services. While the credit of Cæsar was being steadily lowered owing to the difficulties of his campaigns, Pompey, thanks to the success of his drastic measures of repression, had become the dominant figure in Roman politics. He had now all parties on his side. The Democrats still continued to re-

gard him as one of their leaders, while the Conservatives, who flattered him to the top of his bent, only asked him to continue unflinchingly in the new path which he had marked out. He had thus succeeded in obtaining, from the people, without a contest, as the proconsular command attached to his new Consulship, the Governorship of Spain for five additional years, with two extra legions; while the Senate had granted him without discussion the sum of 1000 talents for the maintenance of his troops during the following year.* In short, Pompey's independent position was now so powerful that Cæsar could no longer reckon upon exercising any considerable influence on his policy. Moreover, the Conservatives were already looking forward to the prospect of an open rupture between the two allies, and a complete change of policy on the part of Pompey.

52 B.C.

All this must have caused Cæsar much anxious reflection. It was imperative to find means to refute the insinuations of the Conservatives, to repair his reputation and fortify his position as Proconsul. What else indeed had he to set against Pompey? It was with this object that he set hands to what is, second only to money, the greatest instrument of power in a democracy—the pen. In the last months of 52,† in spite of innumerable distractions and anxieties, he found time to write his *De Bello Gallico*, a popular work written with consummate art, and intended to demonstrate to the general public of Italy that Cæsar was a capable and courageous general, and his Gallic policy neither so violent nor so rapacious as his opponents pretended. With a studied modesty he drew a veil over his own personality and achievements, as a reply to those Conservatives who described him as a charlatan, and posed as an emissary of

The “*De Bello Gallico*.”

* Dion, xl. 44; xl. 56; App., B. C., ii. 24; Plut., Pomp., 55; Cæs., 28.

† Scholars are now agreed in recognising that the *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* were published in 51. I think, with Nipperdey and Schneider, that the book was already finished at the beginning of 51 and was therefore written in the last months of 52, after the war against Vercingetorix and before the beginning of the fresh campaign. Indeed if it had been written in 51 and after the war of that year it could not have avoided giving an account of it.

52 B.C.

civilisation, who had come into Gaul with four legions full of good intentions towards the natives, but was driven by their base ingratitude and provocation, contrary to his own real wishes, to conduct war against them. He concealed his losses and exaggerated his successes, but so skilfully, with such trifling alterations of significant detail, as to avoid incurring any charge of deliberate falsehood, whilst easily misleading the careless reader. Thus he desired to create the impression that he had exterminated in battle huge multitudes of the enemy, yet was careful to disclaim any responsibility for improbable figures. When figures are introduced they are never his own; they come from lists found in the camp of the enemy,* or they had been given him by informers,† or they are put into the mouth of one of the enemy in a speech.‡ He appears to be impartially recording the exaggerations of others, without letting us see who it is that is imposing them upon the reader. He makes no mention of plunder, except as regards the sale of slaves, which he knew would never be brought up against him. Nor does he waste time over detailed descriptions of strategic movements which the reader, ignorant of the geography of the country, would have been unable to follow. On the other hand he gives minute and coloured descriptions of battles and sieges, to please the peaceful burgher in Italy, who enjoyed, as men in a settled and peaceful society always will enjoy, letting his imagination roam at leisure over scenes of fighting and adventure, as he lazily turned over the pages in the comfortable seclusion of his frescoed veranda. In short, the book was intended to be a military and political essay for the benefit of outsiders, and all the seductions of its style, the lucidity and quickness of the narrative, the simplicity of the diction, were only devised to delude a credulous public.

The book was written with a rapidity which struck Cæsar's friends with amazement,§ probably in less than two months. It was perhaps intended to prepare the ground

* *E.g.*, B. G., i. 29.† *Id.*, vii. 77.† *E.g.*, B. G., ii. 4.

§ Hirt., B. G., viii. pref.

for a letter which he meant to address to the Senate at the beginning of the next year to demand the prolongation of his Governorship into 48, at least in the Transalpine portion of his province. But the narrative, which is quiet enough in the earlier books, becomes hurried and excited as it approaches the close. The writer had to finish his story of the war against Vercingetorix in time to be ready for a new campaign. The Gallic nobles who had escaped in the preceding year were once more fanning the flame of revolt, and an outbreak was imminent in the North and West. The war seemed likely to go on indefinitely. Once more Cæsar angrily refused to await the coming of spring, and in full winter despatched his troops into the country of the Bituriges not to fight, but to burn and to pillage and to massacre. From the Bituriges he turned to the Carnutes, who had also arisen again under the command of Gutuatrus, where he repeated the same barbarous operations.

51 B.C.

The revolt of 51.

At Rome on the other hand the year had begun under quite unusually peaceable conditions. Pompey's measures had successfully exorcised the violence with which Rome had been so troubled during the preceding year. The partisans of Clodius kept well in the background: party factions and agitators were forgotten for the moment, and the public settled down, after its momentary access of severity, into the habitual mood of complacent indifference. Appeals began to be made for the recall of the exiles, and Cicero made arrangements with the friends of Milo to attempt at least the rescue of his fortune which had been put up to auction. It was agreed that his property should be bought for a nominal sum by Philotimus, a freedman of Cicero's wife, who was to take it over on Milo's behalf.*

Cassius and the Parthians.

* The detractors of Cicero have endeavoured to find in this business an intrigue for which there are no grounds. The passages in Cicero (A., v. 8, 2; F., viii. 3, 2) seem to be quite clear. They are concerned with a fictitious purchase of the goods of Milo made by Philotimus, in agreement with Milo and his friends, in order to save them from dispersion. Milo in consequence bought his property back for an insignificant sum, thanks to the disinterested aid of Cicero. The real

51 B.C. Altogether the times were becoming abnormally quiet. In March the Senate met to arrange about the provinces. Cilicia and Syria called for particular attention, owing to a Parthian incursion into Syria in 52 to avenge the invasion of Crassus. They had easily been repulsed by Cassius, who was only a Quæstor in temporary command as Proconsul; but a new invasion was expected in 51, and it was necessary to send out officers with higher powers. Now according to the law passed in the preceding year only Senators who had been Consuls and Prætors at least five years before were eligible for a proconsulship or pro-prætorship; and it therefore became necessary to collect the names of all ex-magistrates who had not held a province at the expiration of their Consulship or Prætorship and draw lots between them for commands. By a caprice of fortune Syria fell to Bibulus, Cæsar's old colleague in the Consulship, and Cilicia to Cicero.*

Cicero accepts
his Proconsul-
ship.

Cicero was exceedingly vexed.† He had just finished his *De Republica*, he had other literary projects on foot, and he had almost entirely given up politics to devote himself to letters. His ambitions were now centred solely upon writing; and now suddenly, by the merest and blindest accident, he who was so obviously a man of the pen rather than of the sword, born rather for the library than for the battlefield, was to be turned out of his beloved Rome and his comfortable villas in the hills and by the seaside, and sent to the other end of the Empire to meet the enemy who had destroyed one of Rome's greatest armies. But after his fierce denunciations in the *De Republica* of the decay of patriotism and the increasing reluctance to undertake civic responsibilities, he could hardly venture in his own person to provide a striking example of the very qualities he condemned, by refusing the first charge that was

intrigue began later, when, during Cicero's absence in Cilicia, Philotimus attempted to pass as the real owner of a part of the goods at the expense of Milo. Hence Cicero's anxiety, since he feared the suspicion of having been lacking in *bona fides* through being an accomplice of his freedman.

* Plut., Cic., 36.

† Cic., F., iii. 2, 1; A., v. 2, 3.

laid upon him, particularly under circumstances that involved a certain risk. He dared not face the incongruity. There were other less ideal motives to facilitate his acceptance. In spite of bequests which had come to him in this and the preceding year from two friends who had remembered him in their wills,* his pecuniary outlook was far from satisfactory. He had been unable to shake himself free from debt. If an unscrupulous man could come home from his province a millionaire, an honest man might perhaps make a modest fortune. Cicero decided to go. 51 B.C.

He asked his brother Quintus, who had come home from Gaul, and his friend Caius Pomptinus, both of whom knew more about military matters than himself, to keep him company. He then selected out of his slaves and freedmen those whom he thought would be most useful in the government of the province: secretaries, amongst them a freedman who bore his own name, Marcus Tullius † and a young slave, Tiro; couriers, who were to convey his letters to Rome and bring back answers; litter-carriers for the journey; servants for his own attendance and to precede him by stages on the road to prepare lodgings for himself and his suite in the towns where he stopped. He then made arrangements with one of the regular contractors who hired out the animals necessary for the transport of a governor's baggage: ‡ loaded up his belongings and those of his suite, including the jars full of gold pieces, containing the sum which the Treasury allowed him for the administration of his province: § engaged the slaves required to guard his treasures on the journey, made Cælius promise to send him detailed information of all that went on at home during his absence, and finally set out on the road taking with him Quintus and his young son, || and leaving his wife in Italy. Quintus felt no wrench at parting from his wife Pomponia, sister of Atticus, a hysterical and cantankerous

He sets out for Cilicia.

* Lichtenberger, p. 48.

† Cic., F., v. 20-1.

‡ Aul. Gell., xv. 4.

§ Aul. Gell., xv. 12, tells us that money was often conveyed in this way.

|| Cic., A., v. 1, 3; Schmidt, B. W. C., 73.

51 B.C. woman who was continually making scenes.* In Roman high society fashionable ladies were quite used to being left temporarily widowed when their husbands went off on distant governorships or campaigns, and it is probable that they generally suffered their loss with resignation. The Roman family had now become rather a conventional tie than a connection based either on sentiment or duty.

Cæsar's
brutality
in Gaul.

Just before his departure, in April, Cicero witnessed the first skirmishes in the new contest between Cæsar and the Conservatives. Pompey cannot be held responsible for their outbreak. Although his relations with the Conservatives became daily more cordial, he had retired into the background after his Consulship, and was at present in South Italy. No one knew what he thought of the political situation, and Cicero, who was certain to see him on his way out, had actually been requested to sound his views.† But the enemies of Cæsar did not now even require Pompey's support. The war in Gaul, which still dragged on, in spite of pillage and devastation, was sufficient to encourage them. Ambiorix, Commius, and Lucterius had again taken up arms; the Bellovaci, the Atrebates, the Cadurci, the Vellocasses, the Aulerci and the Senones were all in open revolt; and Cæsar, compelled to dash in desperation from one end of Gaul to the other, tired of the endless fighting, uneasy as to the panic which these new risings, coming so soon after Vercingetorix, might arouse in Italy, lost the little serenity that he still retained and broke out into unworthy and barbarous reprisals. Having secured Gutuatrus the chief of the Carnutes in his grasp, he had him flogged to death in the presence of the legions. When he had captured the city of Uxellodunum, where the surviving rebels of the Cadurci had taken refuge, he cut off the hands of all the prisoners.

These final struggles must have been cruelly exhausting to Gaul; but they were not reassuring to the public at home, and the old confidence in Cæsar was badly shaken. Alarming rumours were continually reaching Rome from the seat

* There is a capital account of one of these scenes in Cic., *A.*, v. 1.

† Cic., *F.*, viii. 1, 3.

of war : and Cæsar’s enemies, of course, knew how to make the most of them. On one occasion, for instance, it was reported that Cæsar had lost a legion and all his cavalry ; on another, that he was surrounded by the Bellovaci and in a critical situation.* Moreover, Cæsar was just now making a serious mistake in lavishly showering upon Italy and the Empire the plunder which he had collected in Gaul that year and during the revolt of Vercingetorix.† As he felt himself falling in popular esteem he tried to consolidate his influence by unheard-of prodigality ; he lent largely to young Society spendthrifts and to hosts of Senators who were in debt ; he doubled the pay of his soldiers, and even went so far as to make presents to the slaves and freedmen of important personages at Rome in order to have friends or spies in their households. He gave an enormous banquet to the people in memory of his daughter Julia, thus putting large sums into the pockets of the butchers and caterers ; he made presents to the towns of Greece, sent thousands of Gallic prisoners as gifts to Oriental sovereigns ; used and abused the prerogatives of the *lex Vatinia* to make citizens of freedmen from every country and to increase the number of electors who would be favourable to his cause.‡

51 B.C.
Cæsar's largesse in Italy.

Cæsar thoroughly realised that his prestige was on the wane. But the daring with which he applied himself to his policy of corruption only served to increase the discontent against him.§ Above all, men were indignant at his wholesale conferment of the title of Roman citizen. Thus, when in April there was a discussion in the Senate on his demand to be maintained in the Governorship of Transalpine Gaul till the 1st of January 48, one of the Consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, did not shrink from meeting it with open opposition, though his colleague, Servius, a politician of more cautious temper, did his best to restrain him. Marcellus was a noble

Marcellus and the Comacines.

* Cic., F., viii. 1, 4.

† See Dion, xl. 43. He is not alluding to the regular tribute imposed by Cæsar on Gaul (which is mentioned in Suet., Cæs., 25), but to extraordinary contributions exacted after the war.

‡ Suet., Cæs., 26, 28.

§ *Id.*, 28.

51 B.C. of ancient lineage endowed with all the qualities and all the defects characteristic of an aristocrat who has lived to witness the rising tide of democracy and has the desire, but not the capacity, to control its advance. Carefully educated and very fairly intelligent, he displayed that curious mixture of arrogant self-assertion with weakness of character which takes on different forms by contrast with the encroachments of democracy in politics, manners and ideas. Such a man will at one moment display a lordly and contemptuous indifference to any object too burdensome to attain, any obstacle too difficult to encounter; at another, when his pride happens to be touched to the quick, he will respond with admirable courage and an unexpected tenacity, or sometimes with a sullen and invincible anger. Hitherto Marcellus, though like all the reactionaries he had for some time past railed at the popularity of Cæsar, had not joined vigorously in the struggle against him, nor indeed played any very prominent part in politics, rising by the ordinary stages, slowly and inconspicuously, by the influence of his name, his friends and his connections rather than by any ambitious efforts of his own. But on this particular occasion, being Consul in a year when the fighting spirit of his party had once more been awakened, free from the vulgar ambitions which imposed prudence upon so many of his senatorial colleagues, and feeling the joy of a true aristocrat in stirring the fury of the democrats and the mob, he could not refrain from making a public display of his hostility to Cæsar when his proposals came to be discussed before the Senate. He therefore proposed, not only to reject Cæsar's request for Transalpine Gaul, but also to annul the privilege of Roman citizenship bestowed by him on the people of Como.*

* The order of the discussions which lead up to the great conflict cannot be established from the confused accounts of Appian (B. C., ii. 25, 26) and Suetonius (Cæs., 28); but fortunately we have also Cicero's correspondence. In a letter to Atticus (A., v. 2, 3) he says that on the 8th of May he did not know what Cæsar had said to an *auctoritas præscripta* from the Senate on the subject of the Transpadanes. It is probable that Cicero is here alluding to the proposal that Suetonius tells us was made by Marcellus (Cæs., 28: "ut colonis, quos

The Tribunes interposed; and the proposal was not approved, but simply registered in the records of the Senate.* But the enemies of Cæsar had no reason to be displeased. They had succeeded, without causing a disturbance, in making proposals against Cæsar which a few years before would almost have provoked a revolution. The Conservatives lauded Marcellus up to the skies. But a serious report began to circulate shortly afterwards. It was said that Cæsar intended to take his revenge by granting citizen rights to all the Gauls in the Cisalpine province. But the rumour was not confirmed,† and Marcellus was so carried away by his success that he prepared a decisive answer to the tribunician veto. Towards the end of May he had one of the Comacines whom Cæsar had enfranchised flogged with rods, a punishment which it was illegal to inflict upon a Roman citizen. If he could not annul the honour Cæsar had conferred, he could at least show how little he esteemed it. Reasonable men thought the act uncalled for;‡ but reasonable opinion counts for little in times of crisis; and the boldness of one party increased as that of its opponents declined. After the Comacine incident Marcellus was so intoxicated by his achievements that he intended, with the encouragement of his friends, to go further still and at

51 B.C.
Marcellus flogs one of Cæsar's citizens.

rogatione Vatinia Novum comm deduxisset, civitas adimeretur”). Appian, on the other hand, says nothing of this proposal and confines himself to describing the violence with which Marcellus opposed the Comacines. His violence must clearly have been a consequence of the struggle provoked by this proposal. The sitting must therefore have taken place in April, and it seems to me probable that it was that at which Cicero (F., iv. 3, 1) says he was present and at which he heard Servius counsel moderation. Appian, on the other hand (ch. 25), precedes the Comacine incident with a sitting of the Senate in which Cæsar's request for a prolongation of his command was rejected. Suetonius does not mention this request, but from the order which Appian follows in his account I am inclined to think that this discussion took place before the Comacine incident and therefore probably at the same time as the initial discussion about them. The two discussions were thus simply occasions for attacking Cæsar. This makes it easier to understand the moderate attitude of Servius.

* Lange, R. A., iii. 372; Cic., A., v. 2, 3.

† Cic., A., v. 2, 3; F., viii. 1, 2.

‡ App., B. C., ii. 26; Plut., Cæs., 29; Cic., A., v. 11, 2.

51 B.C. the sitting of the 1st of June to make the startling proposal that Cæsar should at once be recalled, and his successor nominated. The moment was opportune; the public had been thoroughly frightened by Pompey and refused to stir; the Democratic party was discredited and disorganised. Pompey, if not exactly favourable, proved at any rate by his absence that he had no strong feelings against it.

Pompey dis-
appoints the
Conservatives.

But at this moment the fair prospect became suddenly overclouded. The Conservatives were not mistaken in supposing that Pompey's behaviour in the preceding year indicated a reaction in their favour, and that Sulla's old lieutenant was anxious to re-enter the ranks of the party to which he had served his first apprenticeship. Indeed when Cicero interrupted his journey to see him at Taranto and spent three days discussing politics, Pompey had used language almost as frank and outspoken as Cato himself.* Yet for all this he was too prudent a man to adopt Marcellus' crude and precipitate methods of provocation, and at the session of the Senate which was held on the 1st of June or one of the following days he, either directly or indirectly, indicated his dissent from the proposal. Marcellus made a great harangue in which he declared that, since they had Cæsar's own guarantee that Gaul was pacified, they were justified in disbanding the army and recalling the Proconsul. He added that the privilege of standing for the Consulship while absent from Rome, which the people had granted to Cæsar, was valueless, since it had been abolished by the law of Pompey. But Pompey, or some Senator who had been authorised to speak in his name, observed that by the *Lex Licinia Pompeia* of the year 55 it was illegal to discuss the question of Cæsar's successor before the 1st of March 50.† From the consti-

* Cic., F., ii. 8, 2; A., v. 7.

† Cicero is of great help in determining the date of the debate. He tells us (F., viii. 1, 2) that Marcellus "in Kalendas Junias distulit relationem provinciarum Galliarum." It is clear that this is the debate alluded to by Suet., Cæs., 28, "M. Claudius Marcellus . . . retulit ad senatum ut ei succederetur ante tempus." This is also the proposal to which Pompey made the opposition recorded, not in Suetonius at all, but in App., B. C., ii. 26. There is one objection

tutional point of view this argument was difficult to refute, and Marcellus and his friends were not so blind as light-heartedly to engage in a quarrel with Pompey. Marcellus wisely refrained from pressing his point.

Public opinion was soon diverted to the elections for 50, which took place in June or July. Cæsar sent home a large number of his soldiers to vote, but his candidate for the Consulship, Marcus Calpidius, was not elected. The successful candidates were Caius Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of Marcus and a bitter enemy of Cæsar, though related to him through his wife Octavia, whom Cæsar had offered to Pompey: and Lucius Æmilius Paulus, who professed himself a Conservative but was not to be relied upon, because Cæsar had given him some profitable contracts for building at Rome. The other elections had been more favourable to Cæsar, and amongst the Tribunes there was only one, Caius Furnius, who was a supporter of the Conservative party. The Conservatives, however, immediately brought an action for corruption against Servius Pola, one of the elected Tribunes, and succeeded in getting him condemned and finding a successor in Curio, one of Cæsar's most inveterate opponents.* The Prætorian elections had been postponed altogether.

The electoral excitement was scarcely at an end before the enemies of Cæsar renewed their attacks. Their tactics were now to force Pompey to make a clear statement of his views, to say what he thought of Cæsar and his policy, and the demands and pretensions in which he indulged. On the 22nd of July, during a discussion in the Senate about the payment of the legions of Pompey, who was anxious to go to Spain, † he was asked to account for the legion which he had lent to Cæsar. Pompey declared that he meant to claim it

to this. According to Cic., A., v. 7, Pompey was at Taranto on May 20. Could he be in the Senate by June 1? It was not impossible, by quick travelling, to go from Taranto to Rome in ten or eleven days. But if this be thought too fast, it can be supposed that the sitting did not take place on June 1, as Marcellus intended, but a few days later, or that Pompey was represented by one of his friends.

* Lange, R. A., iii. 377.

† Cic., A., v. 11, 3.

51 B.C. back, but not immediately, in order to avoid putting the enemies of his friend in the right. He was asked again what he thought of Cæsar's recall, and he replied in vague terms that it was the duty of all citizens to be obedient to the Senate. He deferred all further action until his return from a trip to Rimini, where he was expected to superintend the recruiting which was to be made on his behalf in the valley of the Po.*

The Senate and
the problem of
debt.

Every one thought that the matter would be discussed in the sitting of the 13th of August; but the sitting was put off till a later date owing to a discussion on a charge of corruption brought against one of the Consuls designate; and when the Senate next met, on the 1st of September, it was found that there was not a quorum.† The Debating Society of business men and dilettantes began to grow uneasy. What was the meaning of all these manœuvres and counter-manœuvres? Despite his drastic behaviour in the preceding year Pompey continued to give himself out as a friend of Cæsar. Those who were leading the movement against Cæsar, despite their illustrious names, were after all men of little mark, who enjoyed the sport of baiting the Proconsul, but whose influence could not be set in the scales against that of his bold, powerful and wealthy ally. However, in spite of an empty house, the enemies of Cæsar succeeded in gaining a step. Pompey gave it to be understood that he did not approve of Cæsar's standing for the Consulship in his absence; and Scipio proposed that on the 1st of March the only question discussed should be that of the Gallic province, a suggestion which caused great concern to Cæsar's agent Cornelius Balbus,‡ as showing that Pompey's conversion to Conservatism was still in progress. Meanwhile at the remaining elections Favonius, one of the Conservative candidates for the Prætorship, had been defeated, but Marcus Cælius Rufus and Marcus Octavius had been elected Curule Ædiles, and Curio Tribune of the people, all three enemies of Cæsar.§ Finally,

* Cic., F., viii. 4, 4.

† *Id.*, F., viii. 9, 2.

‡ *Id.*, F., viii. 9, 5.

§ Lange, R. A., iii. 378.

at about the same time, the Senate adopted a serious measure to deal with the great increase of indebtedness and the scarcity of money which were the inevitable consequence of the mad gambling of the years 55 and 54. It enacted that the maximum of legal interest should be 12 per cent., and that unpaid interest should be added to the capital, but should not itself bear interest.*

51 B.C.

It was a strange decision; for it looked as if the Senate, within ten years of the Conspiracy, were inclined to adopt, in however attenuated a form, the old policy of Catiline. The financiers clamoured loudly against it. If the Senate lent all the weight and sanctity of its example to deprive existing laws of their force and undermine the inviolability of contract, the popular party would surely be justified in renewing their demand for the burning of all *syngraphæ*.† There are certain things which it is difficult to do by halves, where to make terms is to yield all. Yet this indulgence on the part of the Senate was as symptomatic in its own way as the great success of Cicero's new political study, the *De Republica*, published just at the moment of his impending departure. The book was sought after and read with avidity all through the educated classes;‡ it was copied and re-copied by the slaves and freedmen who worked as copyists and librarians for men like Atticus, who was a bookseller on a considerable scale. With the continuous advance in prosperity and refinement the educated public was more and more disposed to allay political and economic antagonisms by methods of conciliation and compromise rather than to press for a final solution through a decisive conflict. There was no class or party which retained the energy and courage, or the toughness of fibre, to venture into a death-struggle against its rivals. The days of Marius and Sulla seemed dim and distant. There was a general desire to put an end to all difficulties between creditors and debtors, but without injustice or inconvenience to any

The “De Republica.”

* Cic., A., v. 21, 13.

† *Id.*

‡ *Id.*, F., viii. 1, 4. Schmidt (B. W. C., 12) was not the first to point out the importance of the book from the standpoint of contemporary politics.

51 B.C. one concerned, by settling the question in a manner agreeable to all parties. So too there was a general desire to reorganise the State, but without a revolution, through a government such as Cicero proposed in his book, which was to be a harmonious blend of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy.

Further proposals against Cæsar.

The spirit of conciliation might be in the air, but the enemies of Cæsar were still irreconcilable. On the 30th of September Marcellus, in the presence of Pompey, proposed a decree in the Senate that on the 1st of March in the following year the Consuls should bring up the question of the Gallic command; that the Senate should meet daily until it was decided; and that even those Senators who were acting as judges should be obliged to be present. This proposal was approved; but when Marcellus proposed further that any veto which a Tribune might oppose against these proceedings should be considered null and void, and that all Tribunes who objected to this measure should be considered as public enemies, and when he went on to ask that all requests for furlough made by Cæsar's soldiers should be taken into consideration, as though to invite them to desert their general, several of the Tribunes, amongst them Caius Cælius and Caius Vibius Pansa, made use of their veto.

Pompey takes sides against Cæsar.

But all this was of relatively minor importance compared with Pompey's attitude on this same occasion. Not only did he declare that, though it was impossible before next March to enter into discussion of the provinces then in Cæsar's occupation, these matters could and ought to be discussed from the 1st of March onwards; but he added that in his opinion, if Cæsar was instrumental in inducing a Tribune to oppose his veto, he should be considered as a rebel. Under the influence of this declaration, one of the Senators asked him what he would do if Cæsar wished all the same to remain at the head of his army; to which Pompey replied, "What should I do if my son gave me a box on the ear?"* This was by far the

* For the whole of this sitting see the very important letter of Cicero, F., viii. 8.

clearest announcement he had yet made of his separation from Cæsar. Pompey's conversion to Conservatism was proceeding apace, and the great success of the *De Republica*, which was the literary event of the year, was no doubt a contributory factor. Since the book was being read with such universal enthusiasm it seemed clear that Italy was ready for a saviour, who should be at once illustrious, intelligent and aristocratic. Who else but the man who had saved the State from anarchy the year before could be the hero foretold by Cicero, and desired by all his fellow-citizens?

Cæsar was still engaged on his final campaign in Gaul; The Parthian scare. but Rome was soon disquieted by bad news from the East. Despatches arrived from Cassius and Deiotarus announcing that the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates in considerable force. Malicious wiseacres in the Conservative party at first refused to believe them, declaring that Cassius had invented the invasion in order to attribute to the Parthians ravages he had made himself; but a letter from Deiotarus soon removed all doubt.* As usual the public began to grow excited and clamoured at once for energetic measures; some proposed to send Pompey and others Cæsar to the East. Both Consuls were greatly alarmed lest the Senate, to avoid choosing either Cæsar or Pompey, should entrust the campaign to one of themselves, an honour which neither Marcellus nor the old law-dog Servius were at all inclined to accept; for since the death of Crassus the Parthians were a source of considerable dismay to imperialists at home. The Consuls therefore began to postpone the sittings of the Senate and prevent all discussion, at a moment when it was generally believed that the Empire was threatened with a serious war.† The friends of Cicero were especially anxious; they asked what would happen to the great writer, who was left with but a small force to support him in the Governorship of a province exposed to so formidable a foe.

And indeed Cicero had found the opening months of this year distinctly disagreeable. In the course of his voyage out,

* Cic., F., viii. 10, 2.

† *Id.*, viii. 10, 3.

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Cicero's out-
ward journey.

as he was passing by Samos, a deputation of Italian tax-farmers resident in the province had come to bring him their congratulations and beg him to maintain in his edict certain dispositions which had been made by his predecessor.* Once disembarked in his province he had stopped some time at Laodicea to arrange for the exchange into the native currency of the sums which he had brought with him from Italy, and to see that it was fairly carried out.† But while engaged in these routine duties he was dismayed by the disorder prevalent in his troops. The army which was considered sufficient to defend the province against the Parthians had been broken up by his predecessor into small detachments at the service of the Italian usurers, who infested the country and used the soldiers to extract money by main force from their recalcitrant debtors. In the course of these operations three cohorts had gone astray and no one knew what had become of them.‡ It can be imagined therefore how he felt when news arrived in August that the enemy had crossed the Euphrates in considerable force. He had originally hoped that his Syrian colleague would be able to repulse the Parthians; but when he learnt that Bibulus had not yet arrived in his province he wrote a pressing despatch to the Senate asking for help. The provinces and their revenues were in serious danger; it was urgently necessary to send him soldiers from Italy, for the Asiatic recruits were valueless and it was imprudent to trust the allies, who were sick of Roman maladministration.§

Cicero as
Imperator.

In spite of this piteous appeal, it is a tribute to his genuine patriotism as well as to his skill and adaptability that he did his best to collect his small forces and set out with them to defend the road through Cappadocia, in case the Parthians attempted to invade the province of Asia. He calculated that the frontier of Cilicia on the side of Syria was easily defended with a small body of troops. But ascertaining soon afterwards that the Parthians had invaded Syria and were advancing towards Antioch, he hastened back and arrived at

* Cic., F., iii. 8, 4.

† *Id.*, F., ii. 17, 7; iii. 5, 4.‡ *Id.*, F., iii. 6, 5.§ *Id.*, F., xv. 1.

Tarsus on the 5th of October, whence he proceeded at once to the mountains of Amanus. But about the 10th of October, hearing that Cassius had routed the Parthians below Antioch and that the enemy were in full retreat, his thoughts turned towards more lucrative fields of adventure, and he undertook an expedition against the wild tribes who lived by brigandage in the range of Amanus. Guided by the experience of his brother and Pomptinus, he fought a small engagement, laid siege to the town of Pindenissus and received from his soldiers the title of Emperor; he captured a large supply of slaves and horses, selling the slaves on the spot and distributing the proceeds to his soldiers. Then he returned to his province delighted with his short excursion into generalship.*

The despatch of Cicero begging for reinforcements and that of Cassius announcing his victory arrived simultaneously at Rome and were read at the Senate at the same sitting towards the end of October.† The one effaced the impression caused by the other; it was believed that the invaders had been successfully routed, and the Roman public once more dismissed the subject from their minds.

Satisfaction
of the home
public.

* Cic., A., v. 20.

† *Id.*, A., v. 21, 2, where it seems necessary to read with Hoffmann: “*Literæ in Senatu recitatæ sunt, datæ*” (instead of *id est*) “*Nonis.*” See Schmidt, B. W. C., 82. The letter of Cælius (Cic., F., viii. 10, 2), written on Nov. 18, proves that Cicero’s despatch was read after (not, as Schmidt declares, before) that date.

CHAPTER X

THE CAMPAIGN OF CURIO, AND THE TROUBLES OF A ROMAN GOVERNOR

Growing unpopularity of Cæsar—Cæsar's Conservatism—Cæsar and the educated classes—Curio—His manœuvres for Cæsar—Public opinion unanimous for peace—Curio begins to oppose Pompey—Pompey and Curio's opposition—Cicero in his province—Cilicia—The sufferings and anarchy of a Roman province—The troubles of an honest governor—Cicero's administration—Cicero and the traffic in guarantees—The imbroglio of Valerius and Volusius—Historic importance of Cicero's proconsulship—The marriage of Tullia.

51 B.C.

Cæsar's
discredited
position.

MEANWHILE troublous times seemed in store for Cæsar. His efforts to secure the favour of the great impartial public, which had been successful for a short while in 56 and 55, had now definitely failed. Since the death of Julia everything seemed to have gone awry. The ruin of Crassus, the disappearance of Clodius, the revolt of Vercingetorix, the doubtful attitude of Pompey, the new war which had broken out in Gaul in 51, had all gravely compromised his reputation. Whereas, but a few years before, every success gained by the Republic had been put down to his credit, most people now inclined to hold him responsible for every conceivable difficulty: for the dangers which seemed to threaten in the East, for the interminable operations in Gaul, for the increasing corruption at home and the imminent break-up of the whole fabric of the State. And now, to crown all, Pompey's open declaration at the sitting of the 30th of September had put in the clearest light the growing likelihood of a rupture between him and his ally. To speak abusively or contemptuously of Cæsar was now the fashion of the day, impartially imposed, with all the tyranny of a social convention, upon landlords and capitalists and all the gilded youth of the Capital. Cato did not mind saying

openly that he would like to bring him into court and condemn him to exile as soon as his command came to an end.* Many who had been his admirers in the preceding years now turned against him, and even Atticus, always on the safe side, demanded the repayment of the fifty talents which he had lent Cæsar before his Consulship.† It was little enough that he could set against these manifold influences—the precarious support of the small contractors‡ to whom he had given, and was still giving, so much employment, and the admiring devotion of the poorer classes, the artisans and freedmen, who could not forgive the Conservatives the death of their old patron Clodius.

Though far away from the turmoil of the capital—perhaps all the more for that reason—Cæsar was conscious of this great change in public feeling and of its causes. If his native excitability sometimes tended to carry him, in the fever of the times, into unreasonable extremes, yet Cæsar was not the man to yield at fifty—for he had already reached fifty—to the insatiable megalomania which Napoleon found irresistible at thirty-five. Not only had the Roman a more balanced judgment, and a finer and more penetrating intellect, but he had had to wait far longer for his success. All that he had won so far, riches, reputation, and power, he owed to twenty-five years of hard and uninterrupted labour, and at fifty he was still the best hated and most despised man of his class. He had had to adapt himself to the most various and uncertain moods of public opinion—to the respectable and conciliatory Liberalism of the years 70 to 65, to the subversive and revolutionary Radicalism of 65 to 60, to the bold, grasping and spendthrift Imperialism of 58 to 55. Yet throughout these Protean changes, with all his marvellous adaptability to shifting circumstances, he had remained the same simple and powerful personality—a man with the depth and insight of a scientific truth-seeker, who valued riches not, like Crassus, as an end in themselves, but as a means to his own purpose, who

Simplicity and
moderation
of Cæsar's
character.

* Lange, R. A., iii. 381.

† Cic., A., vi. 1, 25.

‡ *Id.*, A., vii. 7, 5.

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was full-blooded and passionate by nature, yet sober and abstemious in his personal habits; who had built and rebuilt villas and palaces in Italy to make employment, yet continued all the while to live without luxury in the wilds of Gaul; who loved glory, yet despised the servile flattery and the boastful exaggerations of the mob; who had laboured on with the one instinctive and overruling desire to exercise the powers that were in him. Too acute and clear-sighted to be blinded by pride, he was all the more conscious of his own mistakes because it was necessity rather than inclination which had driven him to commit them; he realised the advisability of meeting public opinion at least half way, and, with not the least startling of his miracles of versatility, turned away from the barbarities of his last campaign to baffle his Italian antagonists by appearing in a new and unexpected character—that of the moderate and exemplary citizen, disposed to every reasonable concession and solely desirous of the public good.

Cæsar and
the educated
public.

Cæsar was indeed, both by temperament and necessity, far more Conservative than his policy since the Catilinarian conspiracy had enabled him to reveal. He was a Conservative by temperament because, like nearly all men of ability sprung from the educated classes, he could not bear to cut himself off for ever from the sympathy of his equals; he was a Conservative by necessity because, though he had learnt by repeated triumphs the political inertia of the upper classes, he knew only too well that the cosmopolitan city mob, which would be all that was left of his party on Pompey's desertion, could never be made into a really trustworthy instrument of government. At the head of the artisan population of Rome he had been able to seize, almost by a surprise attack, a foremost place in the State—but he would not occupy it for long unless, like Lucullus or Pompey or Cicero, he enjoyed the confidence and respect of the upper and middle classes, the educated and well-to-do bourgeoisie, which, despite its indifference to politics, possessed the two most powerful means of domination in a mercantile democracy—riches and knowledge. The consent of these classes was indispensable to any government; and it was Cæsar's anxiety to secure their favour which is the master-

key to his actions since the conspiracy of Catiline; it explains his hasty annexation and hard-won conquest of Gaul; it explains his sudden and striking reversion now to a policy of skilful moderation. He was not at this time hoping—he would have been a madman if he had hoped—for the possession of the supreme power.* His sole object was to become Consul in 48 without giving up his command. To come to Rome for his candidature would be to place himself entirely at the mercy of Pompey who, since the reforms of 52, had all the judges under his control, and of whom Cæsar had now, of course, a profound distrust.† How was he to secure his object? To attempt violent methods would have been to court defeat. Weak and weather-beaten as the old Republican constitution appeared, it still stood solid enough against any overt revolution. It was not mere hypocrisy but a real respect for the old machinery of government which induced all would-be usurpers, however they might offend against the spirit of the constitution, to pose as scrupulous observers of it in the letter. There was no way out, then, but by intrigue; and Cæsar set to work, with characteristic patience and subtlety, in the midst of his last and not least bloody campaign in Gaul, to extricate himself unhurt, by a series of ingenious and unexpected contortions, from the network of constitutional difficulties in which he had allowed himself gradually to become enmeshed.

There can be no doubt that from the purely constitutional and legal point of view his position was indefensible. He could maintain that the privilege of absence granted him by the people implied approval of the prolongation of his command to the year 48: for otherwise the privilege itself would have been valueless. But the sophistry of this plea was evident; and his adversaries could easily retort that the privilege had only been granted him in case his presence should be

Cæsar's
constitutional
position.

* See the ingenious arguments of Schmidt in *Rh. Museum*, xlvii. p. 261. It is necessary to admit that Cæsar was unwilling to provoke a civil war, and regarded its outbreak as impossible, in order satisfactorily to explain most of what he did in the course of the year 50.

† See Cic., F., viii. 14. 2.

50 B.C. necessary in Gaul during the whole of 49. Now he was obliged to reassure the public, whose patience had been exhausted by the length of the war, by declaring that the conquest of Gaul was already concluded—from which the Conservatives of course drew the rigorously logical conclusion that it was no longer necessary to prolong Cæsar's command, and that consequently there was no more reason for the privilege. Cæsar realised that his best policy was to gain time, to secure the postponement of the nomination of his successor, which should have taken place on the 1st of March 50, but to employ no methods, either violent or scandalous, which might have caused indignation among the general public—even to refrain from the time-honoured expedient of the tribunician veto, which, after Pompey's last declaration, would indeed not have been without danger. Once more therefore it was necessary to surprise his enemies by some bold and unexpected stratagem. He needed a successor to Clodius, whose loss he must often have lamented in these years. He found one, where he was least looked for by the public, in Curio.

The bargain
with Curio.

Curio was a young man of good education and great abilities, a striking speaker and writer, but thoroughly debauched and hopelessly in debt, ambitious, cynical, and unscrupulous, anxious only to make a name, a true "scoundrel of genius,"* as one of the ancients defined him, a Clodius, only with more subtlety and a stronger head: in short, a typical representative of the dying brilliance of the old Roman nobility. By proposing to pay his debts and make him a rich man besides, Oppius attracted him to the party of Cæsar. An arrangement was made, in the strictest secrecy, that Curio, pretending all the time to be hostile to Cæsar, should complicate matters in such a way as to make it impossible that a vote should be taken on the 1st of March on the question of the Gallic command.† Once more, as in 59, when he formed the Triumvirate, Cæsar concealed his tactics, partly

* Vell., ii. 48, 3.

† Dion, xl. 60; App., B. C., ii. 27; Plut., Cæs., 29; Vell., ii. 48, 4; Suet., Cæs., 29; Serv., ad Æn., vi. 621.

in order to avoid frightening the public, partly, of course, to take his enemies off their guard. At first Curio was to stand up by himself, as Cæsar had stood up for Crassus in 65, to conduct the dangerous intrigues necessary for the attainment of his object. It was not a very difficult secret to keep. The public could hardly suspect that two men whose enmity was of such long standing could be working together towards a common end. 50 B.C.

Scarcely had he entered on his office when Curio caused universal surprise by proposing various laws, some of them displeasing to the Conservatives, and others to the Democrats. Numerous pretexts were thus naturally found for postponing their discussion till the two first months of the year; that is, almost till the beginning of March.* Curio made no objection; but as March approached he proposed, in his character of *pontifex*, to interpolate between the 23rd and 24th of February the month of Mercedonius, which, according to an old usage, should have been added every second year in order to make the Calendar agree with the course of the sun. There would thus, he said, be time to discuss his proposals before the month of March, which was to be given up to the discussion upon the provinces. Mercedonius of course failed to secure recognition; and Curio, with a show of violent indignation against the Conservatives, forthwith proposed two popular laws, one on the subject of roads, and the other on the price of corn.† The necessity of discussing these laws afforded a good pretext for the Consul Lucius Æmilius Paulus, who was that month presiding over the Senate and was a friend of Cæsar, for the postponement of the provincial discussion till later.‡ Cæsar thus attained his object, thanks, it seemed, to the mysterious interposition of one of his enemies. It appeared impossible to reproach him for what had occurred. The Odd Month trick.

Pompey accepted the postponement, in spite of the declaration he had made in the preceding year, without expressing

* Lange, R. A., iii. 382; Dion, xl. 61.

† Dion, xl. 62; Cic., F., viii. 6, 5.

‡ Nissen, H. Z., xlvi. p. 66; Cic., F., viii. 11, 1; A., vi. 3, 4.

50 B.C. his opinion upon it in public; but he let it be known that, in his view, it was possible to bring Cæsar's pretensions into harmony with the strict observance of the constitution by maintaining him in his command until the 15th of November, by which time the elections would already be over.* Pompey was no more anxious than Cæsar to precipitate events; he was at that time fifty-six years old and continually in bad health; † and he was beginning to feel the effects of the hard campaigning of his youth and the nervous strain of a long succession of political intrigues. He enjoyed the respect of the popular party, which still remained faithful to him, as well as that of the Conservatives, who had now returned to him. In short, he was the most prominent and powerful man in the Empire. Why should he endanger this privileged position by driving the friends of Cæsar to desperation? Some pessimists were indeed already declaring that a civil war between Cæsar and Pompey was inevitable ‡ because both men were too ambitious to remain together at the head of the Republic, and the ominous expression "civil war," words awaking so many sombre memories, were once more whispered abroad. But there were few who believed in its possibility, and still fewer who desired it; it acted rather as a check than as a stimulus upon the parties and their chiefs.

Public opinion and civil war. The Senate, after all, consisted mainly of a crowd of politicians, individually of small account, who had managed to secure election to office and win wealth and influence by steering skilfully between the two recognised parties, inclining to Conservatives and Democrats, to Cato and Cæsar, Pompey and Cicero, as opportunity offered, without ever openly taking sides with either. These men had no desire to imperil their fortunes in dangerous adventures and were restrained, just as Cæsar was restrained, by the all-powerful, if invisible, authority of public opinion. They realised that if Italy thought ill of the turbulent methods of Cæsar, she would

* Cic., F., viii. 11, 3.

† *Id.*, A., viii. 2, 3.

‡ See Cic., F., viii. 14, 4.

think still worse of a policy of deliberate civil war, provoked by the hotheads in the reactionary camp. Italy, that is the public of landlords, merchants, capitalists, wealthy freedmen, schoolmasters, men of letters and leisure, who viewed these personal conflicts from an impartial standpoint, was unanimous for peace. The public drew its picture of a future civil war from the memories of the last, which, to a generation that, despite many symptoms of debasement, was distinctly more settled and humanitarian than its predecessors, seemed too horrible to contemplate. It meant the re-emergence at Rome of some monster of violence like Sulla, the abomination upon whom all parties now looked back with impartial detestation. It meant the burning of workshops, the sacking of houses, the robbing of temples, which the ordinary citizen used for banks; it meant the suspension of credit, now become almost a necessary of life in all classes; above all, it meant the undermining of the foundation on which the whole of that mercantile and bourgeois society reposed—the fidelity of the slaves. Like all societies where there is a slave class, Italy, so proud of her world-wide power, so confident in her future, was yet for ever tormented by a ceaseless unrest. What would happen, in case of civil war, to the vast multitude of slaves now to be found in almost every house in the land—a multitude composed of every variety of humankind and held in subjection, in the anarchy of the times, by the hatreds and jealousies that divided them in their servitude, by differences of race and language, and by the personal exertions of their masters? Groaning beneath her vast burden of debt, distrustful of all parties and politicians, weary of the unmeasured corruption of public life, exhausted by the great effort of the last ten years, Italy was unanimous against war. No statesman and party dared openly to act counter to this universal sentiment.

But when the times are ripe for great political changes neither parties nor statesmen can alter the stern logic of facts; Rome was on the eve of a conflict which by the force of circumstances, and in spite both of Cæsar and Pompey, was bound to draw slowly to a climax. No sooner had he won

Curio worries
Pompey.

50 B.C.

his first success, the postponement of the nomination of his successor, than Cæsar moved on to a more daring stroke. It had for some time been evident that the issue of the struggle between the reactionary Conservatives and Cæsar depended in a large measure upon Pompey. With the large army under his control, with his host of relations and dependants and all the influence at his command, Pompey could turn the scale in whichever direction he wished. The Conservatives had long ago grasped this, and they pressed round him with a constant chorus of homage and adulation. It thus naturally became Cæsar's object to loosen the hold which his opponents had gained over his old ally. But how was he to do so? By flattery or by menace? After the refusal of his proposals in March, and the last declaration of Pompey against him, Cæsar could place little reliance upon flattery. Pompey stood too high, and was in too little need of patronage and support from others. Yet the alternative method of threatening him, if it were openly adopted, might very possibly so exasperate Pompey as to drive him altogether into the Conservative camp, with the additional disadvantage of making Cæsar appear to be the aggressor. Here again Cæsar conceived the idea of making use of Curio. Calculating on the sensitive and impressionable character of Pompey, he instructed Curio to continue throwing difficulties and vexations in his path till he was practically worried into withdrawing his underhand opposition to Cæsar's demands. Curio, who was a politician of quite exceptional adroitness, accomplished this difficult task with consummate skill. Turning suddenly upon the man whom every one in Rome regarded as the model of constitutional propriety, he attacked Pompey in a series of violent speeches, posing, not as a partisan of Cæsar, but as a disinterested supporter of justice and common sense. Why did Pompey affect to be so scrupulously and pedantically correct when it was he himself who, by the laws of 55, had created the present situation? * How could he pose as the defender of the constitution after violating nearly all its provisions, after having been simultaneously Consul and Proconsul? This was shrewd

* Cic., F., viii. 11, 3.

and careful hitting: and it left its mark.* The public did not know whether to be more surprised that no one should have made these criticisms before or that some one should have been found brave enough to make them now.

50 B.C.

Pompey himself was so much concerned that he once more entered the arena to attempt a reply; † but soon finding the exertion too great for his strength, he left Rome for Naples, where shortly after his arrival he fell seriously ill. ‡ He was thus absent from Rome when, in April, § the Consul Marcellus, who was presiding over the Senate, raised the whole issue afresh, by inviting a discussion on the vote of the sums necessary to Pompey's army for the new year and on the unsettled question of the Gallic command. Encouraged by Pompey's absence, Curio declared that Marcellus' proposal to vote money to Pompey was fair enough, but that there was no reason why Cæsar should abandon his command if Pompey kept his. Put in this way the question seemed to resolve itself into a petty personal quarrel between contending commanders. The only means of solving it to the advantage of the Republic was to return to the ground of strict constitutional principle by putting an end to exceptional powers of every kind. Curio therefore proposed to recall both Cæsar and Pompey and put his veto upon all the proposals of Marcellus. ||

Curio proposes simultaneous recall.

These means were very skilfully chosen. The Conservatives reproached Cæsar for being in an illegal position. Why should they tolerate in Pompey privileges and illegalities of a still more flagrant character, which they now even propose to increase? ¶ The impartial public, with the possibility of a civil war before its eyes, thought Curio's proposal excellent. Here at last was a chance of the definite solution of this complicated business. To have done with all

Curio's bid for popularity.

* App., B. C., ii. 27.

† Suet., De clar. rhet., 1.

‡ Plut., Pomp., 57; Cic., F., viii. 3, 2.

§ Lange, R. A., iii. 386, 1.

|| Nissen, H. Z., xlvi. p. 66.

¶ App., B. C., ii. 27.

50 B.C. exceptional powers, and to return to the constitution which made them illegal, became the rallying cry of all good citizens. The result was that the Senate rejected the proposal of Marcellus to enforce the decision of the previous year which deprived the tribunician veto of its validity;* and Curio became in a moment one of the most popular men in Rome.† Only a few clear-sighted politicians suspected the hand of Cæsar behind the whole intrigue.

Pompey's
popularity in
Italy.

But Cæsar had counted too securely upon Pompey's timidity. Curio's proposal, however momentarily successful, failed in its principal object, which was to make Pompey more amenable to compromise with Cæsar. The proposals of Curio were too direct an attack upon his prestige and his interests; and so far from drawing him nearer to Cæsar they cemented his alliance with the reactionary Conservatives.‡ The change was not immediately apparent; Pompey even wrote to the Senate from Naples during his convalescence declaring himself ready to renounce his command;§ but the offer was not made in sincerity. The law had given him the command of the Spanish army for five years, and he had no intention of renouncing his rights to please Curio. If Cæsar, whom he suspected of being concealed behind Curio, was anxious to inflict this humiliation upon him, he would not endure it at any price. As for the notion that the constitution allowed no exceptional powers, it was the merest fiction. If the metropolitan mob had cast flowers upon Curio's path as he left the Senate House, the towns of Campania were now celebrating huge festivals in honour of Pompey's recovery; the man whom Curio was trying to drive back into private life, or to some minor magistracy, was being openly invoked as the mainstay of great fabric of Empire.||

* Cic., *F.*, viii. 13, 2; Nissen, *H. Z.*, xlvi. 66.

† App., *B. C.*, ii. 27; Vell., ii. 48.

‡ The sequence of events proves that Curio's propaganda was the immediate cause of the rupture between Cæsar and Pompey; and this is expressly confirmed by Dion, xl. 63.

§ App., *B. C.*, ii. 28.

|| Plut., *Pomp.*, 57.

After his return to Rome Pompey declared once more that he was ready to accept the compromise proposed by Curio ; but his offer was received with such universal scepticism that Curio immediately renewed his attacks, and declared, in a number of speeches, that he could not take Pompey's words at their face value. He added that words were not enough, that he needed actions ; and to put the matter to the test he completed his preceding proposal by adding that whichever of the two refused to obey should be declared a public enemy and that troops should be prepared to make war against him.* Deeply hurt by this insulting suggestion,† Pompey felt more and more inclined to throw in his lot with the extreme Conservatives ; and when, in May or June,‡ the Senate decided that Pompey and Cæsar should both detach a legion from their army and send it to Syria against the Parthians, he seized the opportunity to ask back from Cæsar the legions which he had lent him in 53.§ He was beginning to count up his forces against Cæsar's. He had seven legions in Spain, Cæsar had eleven. After repaying him his legions Cæsar still retained nine. If war were really to break out this would be an appreciable advantage. All discussion was then broken off on the approach of the elections, which were awaited in great excitement by all parties.

50 B.C.

Pompey asks
back his
legions.

During all this time Cæsar in Gaul was slowly repairing the ravages of the last years of war and consolidating the Roman dominion, while Cicero was sincerely but not very successfully endeavouring to effect reforms in the administration of his province. In the course of his voyage he had had reason to see how familiar a figure he had become throughout the whole of the Empire, even in the Hellenic countries. This world-wide admiration, and, above all, the great success of the *De Republica*, of which Cælius kept him informed, revived in him the illusion, which he had lost almost entirely in the ten years since his Consulship—that it was his mission

Cicero's good
intentions.

* App., B. C., ii. 28.

† *Id.*, ii. 29.

‡ Nissen, H. Z., xlv. p. 69 ; Lange, R. A., iii. 388.

§ Hirt., B. G., viii. 54 ; App., B. C., ii. 29 ; Dion, xl. 65 (wrong date) ; Plut., Pomp., 56 ; Cæs., 29.

50 B.C.

to be a great statesman and ruler of men. He was anxious to act up to the level of his professions and to give his contemporaries the example of a just and wise provincial administration.* But the task was more difficult than he had imagined. The provincial governors had become the agents of the political and financial oligarchy of Rome, the representatives of a whole system of powerful and wealthy interests. How could the man who was to be the instrument of the oppressor be at the same time the defender of the oppressed? Yet it was impossible to be blind to the urgent necessity of good government. On his first arrival, in the imminent fear of a Parthian invasion, Cicero had been chiefly struck with the want of discipline and efficiency among his troops. But when the Parthians retired and he was able to consider the condition of the country more at leisure, he realised the full nature of the duties he had undertaken—the government of a vast province which, from one end of his horizon to the other, over leagues and leagues of country, bore witness to the havoc of Italian speculation.

The municipal oligarchies.

The population of Cilicia consisted partly of native Asiatics, partly of Greek immigrants. The Greeks lived almost entirely in the towns, and were traders, skilled labourers, professional men and proprietors; while the natives were for the most part peasants, shepherds, humble artisans, or brigands in the mountains. The province was divided into a certain number of districts each of which had some important town for its capital and was governed by a senate or council. This council was chosen from amongst the richer section of the population, which was almost exclusively Greek and governed the town according to the existing legal code, under the supreme control of the Roman Governor and Senate.† This municipal organisation was excellently devised, and the Romans had turned to study it with some interest as a contrast to the complexity and unwieldiness of the old arrangements still in force in Italy. But a period of warfare and anarchy, prolonged

* Cic., A., vi. 1, 8; vi. 2, 9.

† Mommsen, P. R., i. 307 f.

through more than a century, had gradually reduced these local councils to monstrous instruments of tyranny and spoliation. Everywhere the councillors banded together to make profits out of the revenues of the municipality, which were generally derived from taxes and town property. They would decree public works, festivals, special missions and every kind of useless expense in order to share in the profits of the contractors; or make ruinous loans with Italian financiers and tax-farmers, or join with them in exploiting the municipal domains, or in pocketing the proceeds of an exorbitant taxation.* Soon after his arrival Cicero found the municipalities busily engaged in sending off special missions to Rome to eulogise the virtues of his predecessor before the Senate, and decreeing monuments and temples in his honour throughout the country, according to the degrading custom which survived from the days of the Hellenistic monarchs.†

But the extortions and extravagance of these native oligarchies was but the least of the evils which afflicted the unhappy province. Far more terrible was the last expiring effort of the Italian plutocracy to wring blood from an exhausted prey. What financial Imperialism had meant during the last twenty years, as the provinces had gradually less and less to offer to the invader, the accuser of Verres could now judge for himself. The system was only maintained by a systematic application of violence. In every part of the province money was being wrung out of wretched and helpless debtors by the help of the military; and acts of cruelty and violence occurred daily. Finally, to crown all, every year there would arrive in the province a whole shipload of bankrupt Roman politicians—the governor with all his friends and the officers of the legions, who squeezed money out of cities and private individuals, ‡ lived in luxury at the expense of the province, and sold every sort of favour at exorbitant prices. Exemptions from giving quarters to the military were especially lucrative—a curious sidelight on

Financial
Imperialism
at work.

† Cic., A., vi. 2, 4; see Mommsen, P. R., i. 328.

‡ Cic., F., iii. 7, 2; iii. 8, 2; see Cic., A., v. 21, 7.

* *Id.*, A., v. 21, 7.

50 B.C. the reputation of the Roman army. Meanwhile the poorer classes, the small shop-keepers and artisans, the peasant proprietors and free labourers in the country districts, were being slowly reduced to desperation, and forced to part with all that they held dearest—their land, their houses, the savings of generations, and often their own children.*

Cicero and his friends at Rome.

These depredations shocked Cicero as they had shocked Rutilius Rufus and Lucullus before him; but he was unwilling to follow Rufus and Lucullus in declaring open war against the Italian financiers. Here as elsewhere he preferred, by a characteristic compromise, to typify the curious and contradictory emotions of his age. So far as his own personal integrity permitted it, he was as obliging a governor as most. He treated with the hunters of panthers to satisfy his friend Cælius, who needed wild animals for the games of his ædileship.† He settled a business negotiation for Atticus at Ephesus,‡ and secured him some valuable vases.§ He welcomed the friends and relatives of friends who came to him with letters of introduction. He asked to dinner the son of Hortensius, who was supposed to be studying but preferred to waste his money in riotous living.|| He also showed kindness to a young man called Marcus Feridius, a member of a well-to-do Italian family, who had come to Cilicia as the agent of a company which was farming the affairs of a town.¶ He performed all the ordinary duties of a governor—the liquidation of inheritances, the ransom of Italians kidnapped by pirates, the recovery of the interest of sums lent by Italians in Asia.

Cicero refuses to collect debts

Yet at the same time he did his best to bring some relief to the unfortunate native population. He refused the celebrations and gifts of cities; he lived, and forced his escort to live, with extreme simplicity, in order to save the province from excessive expense, and showed himself markedly attentive to the principal citizens. He went out into the streets every morning while

* Cic., A., v. 16, 2.

† *Id.*, F., ii. 11, 2.

‡ *Id.*, A., v. 13, 2.

§ *Id.*, vi. 1, 13.

|| *Id.*, vi. 3, 9.

¶ *Id.*, F., viii. 9, 4.

he was residing at Laodicea, to enable the humblest provincials to approach him if they wished : * and he did all he could to expedite the working of the law-courts. On several occasions he refused absolutely, in spite of the most pressing demands, to put his soldiers at the disposition of the money-lenders for the recovery of their debts.† To beg, to solicit, to write letters he was not unwilling ; but he would not stoop to use his army to recover the debts of his friends. This led to some serious difficulties, not the least of which related to the loans made by his friend Brutus to Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia. Long since drained dry by Italian usurers, the old king was spending the little money which remained to him in paying the interest he owed to Pompey, which now amounted in all, probably through the accumulation of arrears, to thirty-three talents a month.‡ Almost every month Pompey's agents in Asia sent off to the coast on mules escorted by armed slaves a sum amounting to some £4800 of our money. Meanwhile the other creditors remained unsatisfied. In vain did Cicero write letter upon letter to the king § on their behalf. It was believed throughout Asia that Pompey would shortly be sent into the East with a great army to make war against the Parthians ; and Ariobarzanes could think of nothing but the settlement of his accounts with Pompey.||

But Cicero went further still. He declared in his edict that, whatever might be the private arrangements of individuals, he would not recognise as governor any annual interest higher than 10 per cent., and would refuse to enforce any claims for arrears of interest, thus reducing interest all round in the same way as the Senate had done at Rome.¶ At the same time he carefully revised the budgets of all the towns for the last ten years, remorselessly cancelling all superfluous expenses, and ruinous or unjust impositions. He forced numerous financiers

He reduces interest to 10 per cent.

* Cic., vi. 2, 5 ; Plut., Cic., 36.

† Cic., A., v. 21, 10 ; vi. 1, 6.

‡ *Id.*, vi. 1, 3.

§ *Id.*, vi. 2, 7.

|| *Id.*, vi. 1, 3.

¶ *Id.*, A., v. 21, 11.

50 B.C.

to restore to the towns what they had taken, and took care that the reduced interest on loans made to the towns was punctually paid.* In this way he hoped to satisfy both parties, his Cilician subjects as well as the Italian tax-farmers, by an arrangement made at the expense of the municipal oligarchies.†

Brutus'
business in
Cyprus.

But it was not easy for him to be virtuous in such an environment. The suppression of all the decrees voted in honour of Appius Claudius brought Cicero insolent letters from that personage; and the reduction of interest to 10 per cent. was the occasion of a serious disagreement with Brutus. Two business men named Scaptius and Matinius, who figured as creditors of the people of Salamis, had presented themselves before him to demand the payment of the modest interest of 48 per cent. which had been arranged; and on failing to receive it they had acquainted him with the fact that the real creditor was Brutus. This revelation caused great surprise to Cicero, who had always regarded Brutus as a pattern of virtue: but he refused to alter his decision and remained obdurate even after the receipt of insulting letters from Brutus. Encouraged by his clemency, the unfortunate debtors asked permission to deposit in a temple the 10 per cent. interest which Scaptius and Matinius refused to accept and to declare them freed from every obligation. But at this point Cicero lost courage. Not daring to defy Brutus so openly, he left the matter in suspense. This was exactly what Scaptius and Matinius had now been hoping. They knew that Cicero's successor would not be equally obstinate, and would compel the Salaminians to pay according to the original bargain.‡

The guarantee
candal.

But how could a Roman governor administer real justice when every one round him was a party to transactions of this nature? Cicero did his best to set a good example. He refused to touch a sesterce of the sums that fell to him as booty or of those which were assigned to him by the Senate for the

* Cic., A., v. 21, 7; vi. 1, 20; vi. 2, 5; F., xv. 4, 2; Plut., Cic., 36.

† Cic., A., vi. 1, 16.

‡ All the details of this business are to be found in Cic., A., v. 21; vi. 1; vi. 2.

government of his province, leaving the former to the prefects and the latter to the Quæstors.* But all his escort were busy making their pile. His Quæstor was the brother of a rich merchant living at Elis † whom he had asked to join him as adviser; ‡ and one of his staff officers and Lepta his chief engineer were so compromised in an intrigue that he could only extricate them by consenting to an entirely exceptional indulgence. It was the practice of the Roman government never to give out a contract unless the contracting party presented a certain number of guarantors, who engaged to pay a fixed fine in case the contract were not executed. As contracts increased in number and importance, acceptable guarantors were naturally sought after for their wealth or political influence, as eagerly as letters of exchange from endorsers who enjoy a good credit with banks are in demand nowadays. All possible methods were employed to secure them: friendship or political association or the promise of a large profit. It is probable that many politicians at Rome made arrangements to make money with these guarantees. They arranged the guarantee in return for the promise of an indemnity with the contractor; then if it turned out that the contractor did not keep his engagement with the State and the State proceeded against him, they exerted all their influence to avoid payment. Thus it happened that one of Cicero's agents and his chief engineer Lepta had stood security for a certain Valerius, who had undertaken a contract for some public work; but Valerius had not been able to keep his engagements and had passed on his contract (probably for a very small sum) to a usurer named Volusius. Volusius in his turn was probably in agreement with the Quæstor Rufus, and had engaged to execute the contract but not to pay the fine to which Valerius and, in his default, his guarantors were exposed. Valerius and his guarantors were of course in despair and appealed to the Proconsul, who took pity on them. Finding a legal flaw which entitled him to cancel the concession from Valerius to Volusius, Cicero broke

* Cic., F., ii. 17, 4.

† *Id.*, F., xiii. 26.

‡ *Id.*, F., v. 20, 2.

50 B.C.

off the agreement, paid into the Treasury the sum which still remained to be paid to the contractor, and freed the guarantors from their engagements, to the great annoyance of Volusius, who thus lost both his money and the profits of the agreement.* So common were extortion and fraud in a society where financial interest was now the only tie between man and man! Cicero's utmost efforts towards honest administration were doomed to failure; for instance, he was continually receiving letters from his friends asking for loans and suggesting that after the booty of his war he must necessarily be flush with money. Cicero was forced to send polite replies to the effect that this booty belonged not to him but to the Republic and that he could not make advances upon it to any one.†

Significance
of Cicero's
Proconsulship.

Cicero's administration of Cilicia is a title to glory of which the unimaginative and pettifogging criticism of modern historians has in vain attempted to deprive him.‡ It is true that succeeding years swept away the results of his labours as the waves sweep over the drawings made by a child in the sand. But Cicero after all was only human. He could not be expected, single-handed, to cure the malady from which a whole generation was suffering. It is not for its results that his work is significant, but for the emotions and intentions with which it was inspired—for his anxious solicitude for the victims of a chronic misrule, and for the spirit of justice and pity and common humanity that endeavoured to transmute philosophic contemplation into active beneficence. At early dawn in the Alps, a few sentinel rocks on the summits catch the first rays of sunshine and proclaim the coming day, while the folds of the mountains, and the sleeping valley beneath, are still wrapped in gloom. Just so did the conscience of this timid man of letters, and a few solitary thinkers like him, tell a world still deep in the night of unrelieved depravity of the sure approach of a happier age.

* This seems to me the best interpretation of an obscure passage. Cic., F., v. 20, 3.

† Cic., F., ii. 17, 4.

‡ See, on the subject of Cicero's administration, the just answer of Schmidt to the criticisms of Drümman and Tyrell and Purser.

But Cicero little guessed what he was doing; and the manifold duties of his office, almost all of them disagreeable, vexed him beyond all belief. That the Empire could not last for long, under the conditions in which it was at this time, without involving something like a total collapse of civilisation, is proved, not only by the maladministration of the other provinces, but best of all by the utter weariness which overcame one of the few men who attempted to govern uprightly, after a short year at his task. The Proconsulship of Cicero shows that the encyclopædic diversity of functions by which the same man had successively to act as general, orator, judge, administrator, and architect was an obsolete heritage from a simpler epoch, and could not continue indefinitely in an age of increasing specialisation. At last there was a governor who was both honest and conscientious, and he was impatient to be rid of his harassing responsibilities. He begged all his friends to oppose the prolongation of his command * and seemed to have but one desire, to escape as quickly as possible from his pile of *syngraphæ*, securities, contracts and official business and to return to Italy.

50 B.C.

Break-down of
the provincial
system.

There were many public and private reasons to call him home. His daughter, his dearly loved Tullia, who had already been twice married and twice divorced, was being courted by a number of great personages in the expectation of her father's return from Cilicia and the prospect of a handsome dowry. Her mother, the adroit Terentia, had given the preference to Cnæus Cornelius Dolabella, a young man of noble family, but dissolute character. Cicero was not ignorant of his future son-in-law's moral and pecuniary reputation, † but his ambition to be allied with a genuinely aristocratic family overbore even considerations of paternal affection. He had always dreamed of intimacy with the great and noble as the supreme recompense for his labours. For in spite of the progress of the democracy and their own impoverishment and degeneration, the surviving aristocratic families still enjoyed great consideration; they maintained the privilege of fairly easy access to office,

The third
marriage
of Tullia.

* Cic., F., ii. 7, 4; ii. 11, 1; A., vi. 3, 2.

† *Id.*, F., ii. 16, 5.

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Cicero's
homesickness.

since the abler men of the middle class, like Atticus, preferred money-making to the hazards of politics ; and, through constant intermarriage* they had come to form a small and exclusive caste, whose acquaintance was much sought after by social aspirants. His daughter's marriage with Dolabella was almost a charter of nobility for the parvenu from Arpino. The serious aspect of public affairs, too, inclined him to hasten his return to the capital. He had asked Cælius to keep him abreast of the news ; and Cælius had paid a certain Crestus, a professional journalist, to send him out a political and social chronicle of all the gossip of Rome.† His couriers too, who were generally on the move between Cilicia and Rome, brought him constant news, and he received further information from the couriers of the tax-farming companies, who often came with letters from distinguished friends at home. Yet despite all, the distance was too great to be bridged ; news arrived long after it had occurred, and often in the wrong order. Cicero was longing to be home again.

* See the interesting details collected by Ciccotti, *D. P.*, 27, 28.

† *Cic.*, *F.*, ii. 8, 1 ; *F.*, viii. 1, 1.

CHAPTER XI

INITIUM TUMULTUS, 50 B.C.

The elections for 49—Cæsar in Cisalpine Gaul—Cicero returns to Italy—The Censorship of Appius—Cæsar's hopes of peace—The sitting of December 1, 50—The three contradictory Senatorial votes—Pompey joins the Conservatives—The intrigues of December 1-10, 50—The *coup d'état* of Marcellus and Pompey—Cæsar and Pompey—Last efforts of Cæsar to avert war—The last days of December—Pompey's luck and Cæsar's misfortunes—Cæsar and the Civil War—The sitting of January 1, 49—Last hopes and efforts for peace—The War Party gains the upper hand.

THE elections were now at hand and the contest for the 50 B.C. Consulship promised to be exceptionally keen. As the question of the Gallic command was at last to be settled in the course of the year, both parties were more than usually anxious to secure the supreme magistracy. Cæsar, who was still in a moderate mood and would have been satisfied to have one of the Consuls on his side, sent soldiers on furlough to Rome* to support his old general, Servius Sulpicius Galba. But the Conservatives put up two candidates against him, Lucius Cornelius Lentulus and Caius Claudius Marcellus; the latter was cousin of the Consul then in office and brother of the Consul of the preceding year, and as ill-disposed as his namesakes to the cause of Cæsar. The reaction against the Democrats was bringing the old aristocratic families back into prominence. There was a desperate conflict, and Cæsar was defeated. His friend and supporter Antony was elected to the Tribuneship, but Galba failed to secure the Consulship. The most important of the offices thus fell into the hands of the Conservatives.

The result of the elections left Cæsar's enemies in a state

* Plut., Pomp., 58.

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Caesar and
Antony.

of wild jubilation.* They believed they had dealt a final blow to the influence and power of Cæsar. It was indeed a serious check, though not so much in itself as for the impression it made upon the timid and vacillating public, which began to be persuaded that the current rumours about his precarious position in Gaul must be well founded. Cæsar, who was just now preparing to take his troops into winter quarters † for the enjoyment of a little well-earned repose, was so much disturbed by his defeat at the elections and the intrigues of his enemies that he decided to cross over in person in September ‡ to Cisalpine Gaul to help Antony in his candidature for the Augurship against Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus.

e demon
strations in
Cisalpine Gaul.

He was already half-way on his journey when he heard that Antony had been elected; § but, instead of turning back, he decided to make use of the opportunity to execute a project which he had long carried in his mind, that of organising a demonstration in his favour in Cisalpine Gaul. He was already extremely popular in that province. It was well known that he was in favour of granting it full citizen rights; many of his soldiers came from the villages which were springing up amid the forests and fens of that prospering region; and moreover the inhabitants of the Po valley

* Hirtius, B. G., viii. 1.

† As Nissen remarks (H. Z., xlvi. p. 67, n. 1), the words used by Hirtius, *hibernis peractis* (B. G., viii. 50), do not mean that the winter quarters of 52-51 were concluded, but that those for 51-50 had been prepared. As a matter of fact during the winter of 52-51 nearly every one of the legions was engaged in fighting.

‡ Nissen (H. Z., xlvi. p. 68, n. 1) seems to me to have proved that the election of the Augur and consequently Cæsar's journey into Cisalpine Gaul was after the other elections, not before, as used to be believed, and that it actually took place in September. Proof of this is to be found in Cicero (F., viii. 12, 3), who alludes to the *Ludi Circenses*, which took place in September, and in Plutarch (Ant., 5), who says that Antony was first elected Tribune and then Augur. Moreover, it would be impossible to understand why Cæsar should have made so long a journey solely for the election of an Augur if he had not been driven to it by the defeat of Sulpicius. Although the reasons are somewhat confusedly given, they may be detected also in Hirtius (B. G., viii. 50).

§ Hirt., B. G., viii. 50.

had been quick to understand that the conquest of Transalpine Gaul would tend to increase the wealth of their province by transforming it from a frontier territory into the main thoroughfare to a large and populous *hinterland*. Skilful agents were sent in advance and found no difficulty in persuading the notables of the Cisalpine province to prepare great demonstrations in honour of the conqueror of Gaul. The enthusiasm became infectious, as it generally does, and Cæsar was able to make a regular triumphal progress through his province. Deputations came to meet him outside every village; the municipalities and colonies invited him to festivals; and the country people, who had given him so many soldiers and knew of his exploits from the tales they had brought home, came in crowds to greet him on the road.*

These demonstrations were not intended simply to gratify a soldier's vanity. They were to show Italians who were grumbling at the conquest of Gaul what enthusiasm it excited amongst a population which knew and dreaded its northern neighbours. Cæsar was still so inclined to conciliation that, somewhere about this time, he sent back to Italy the legion demanded from him for the war against the Parthians, returned to Pompey the other legion he had borrowed from him,† and instructed Curio to abandon his tactics against Pompey and to cancel his veto upon the supplies for the Spanish legions.‡ After causing Pompey all these vexations, Cæsar now judged the moment opportune for agreement, and held out the olive branch. He was so convinced that his enemies would not provoke a civil war upon so futile a pretext that, towards the end of September, he set out on his return journey and once more crossed the Alps to make final arrangements for installing his troops in their winter quarters.

Meanwhile Cicero's year of government, or rather of exile, had at length run out, and he had started post-haste on his homeward journey, without even stopping to draw up the accounts of his administration. He had begged his Quæstor to

Cæsar holds out the olive branch.

Cicero on his homeward journey.

* Hirtius, B. G., viii. 51.

† Nissen, H. Z., xlv. p. 69.

‡ Cic., F., viii. 14, 2.

50 B.C.

come at once to Laodicea to settle this with him ;* but his Quæstor could not be found and he had been too impatient to wait for him. He begged his scribe to collaborate with the Quæstor in drawing up the accounts, and to expose them, in accordance with the *Lex Julia* of 59, in two public places, at Laodicea and Apamea, for the scrutiny of the public. He had then set out † on his homeward journey, taking none of the income of the province with him. Part of it he left to his Quæstor, who remained behind as provisional governor, in the hope that it might prevent him from pillaging the country ; the rest, amounting to about a million sesterces, he deposited in the provincial treasury, to the great indignation of his friends and officers, who failed to understand why he should show more consideration for Phrygians and Cilicians than for themselves. ‡ His action was indeed without precedent. Yet even with these deductions Cicero could, *salvis legibus*, as he said, bring back to Italy money enough to pay for the triumph which he hoped would be decreed for his victories and to pay in some 2,200,000 sesterces § to the tax-farmers at Ephesus, probably his private share in the booty of his little war. Even the honestest of Proconsuls were sufficiently well paid for their year of government. On his way home he received a letter from his Quæstor protesting that his secretary had put into the treasury some 100,000 sesterces which should have come to him ; || and he wrote him a consoling answer to say that he was ready to indemnify him personally. He travelled by slow stages, to show his son and his nephew the sights of Asia and Greece, stopping some time at Athens, ¶ where he learnt that his friend Pretius had died and left him heir to his property. ** At Patras, Tiro, a young slave, whom he loved as his own child, fell seriously ill, †† and the journey was again interrupted. As it proved to be a lengthy illness,

* Cic., A., vi. 7, 2.

† *Id.*, F., v. 20, 1-2. This is, I think, the best way of harmonising this passage with A., vi. 7, 2 (cited above).

‡ Cic., A., vii. 1, 6.

§ *Id.*, F., v. 20, 9.|| *Id.*, F., v. 20, 8.¶ *Id.*, A., vi. 7, 2.** *Id.*, F., xiv. 5, 2.†† *Id.*, A., vii. 2, 3.[About
£40,000.]

Cicero was forced, to his great regret, to leave Tiro behind ; 50 B.C.
but he did not set out before making all the arrangements necessary for his comfort, quite regardless of expense. Manius Curius, a rich Italian merchant at Patras with whom he was acquainted, and who was intimate with Atticus, was asked to place at Tiro's disposal any money that he might need from Cicero's account.* Finally, on the 24th of November, he landed at Brindisi.†

Meanwhile in Italy the excitement had calmed down The Censorship of Appius. somewhat after the elections ; but political and educated society had been considerably taken aback by the sudden appearance at Rome of a censor of quite perverse and old-fashioned severity, a true rival of the older Cato. It was a strange enough circumstance in itself, but what made it still stranger was the personality of the man who had suddenly taken it upon himself to pose as the incarnation of the austerity of a bygone age. It was Appius Claudius, brother of Clodius and the ex-Governor of Cilicia who had caused Cicero so much trouble in repairing the wrongs committed or sanctioned by him during his administration. He had since been accused of extortion by Publius Cornelius Dolabella, the *fiancé* of Tullia, but since one of his daughters was married to Brutus and another to a son of Pompey, Brutus and Pompey had not only had him acquitted but even raised him to the Censorship.‡ Once safely in office, Appius had displayed a severity almost amounting to barbarism. He had expelled numerous Senators from that august body, brought forward several awkward prosecutions, harassed the proprietors of too extensive estates and all who were deeply in debt, and had even interfered with extravagance in pictures and statues.§ Amongst his victims was Sallust, who lost his seat in the Senate, and Cælius and Curio, who, however, both eventually evaded his clutches. In short, Appius was doing his best to mimic Pompey's behaviour during his sole

* Cic., F., 16, 14, 2. This Curius is certainly the Manius Curius of F., xiii. 17.

† *Id.*, F., xvi. 9, 2.

‡ Lange, R. A., iii. 389.

§ Cic., F., viii. 14, 4 ; Dion, xl. 63.

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Consulship. Yet his Censorship was a mere caricature, too ridiculous to excite more than passing amusement and annoyance. The fashions of one year are the absurdities of the next, and the high moral tone so loudly professed by the Conservatives, which two years before Pompey seemed to have re-established as a rule of government, had already become rather a stale and unedifying farce.

Disposition
of Cæsar's
legions.

However nobody was seriously concerned about Appius, for Italy was for the moment in absolute quiet. Pompey was once more in Naples,* while Cæsar, having concluded his arrangements in Transalpine Gaul, was returning into the Cisalpine province to winter there and prepare for his candidature in the following year. So far was he from believing in the possibility of a civil war that he only brought into Italy a single legion to garrison the Cisalpine province, in place of the legion which he had detached for the Parthian war. The remaining eight he left behind him in Gaul, four under Caius Fabius in the country of the Ædui, and four under Trebonius among the Belgæ, at the furthest possible distance from Italy.† Pompey might perhaps no longer be his friend; but he was a man of prudence and discretion; his other enemies were almost all of them, with the exception of Cato, men of good family but devoid of real influence, who could not possibly do violence to the unanimous opinion of Italy in favour of peace. He refused therefore to entertain the slightest doubt about arriving at some sort of an agreement with Pompey and the Senate.

Marcellus
forces the
issue.

These were wise and careful calculations. That is why they were wrong. In a period of social transition, when the balance of parties and classes is precarious and unstable, the light-headed petulance of a group of amateur politicians, whether on the reactionary or revolutionary side, may be sufficient, against the desire of an overwhelming majority of the nation, to bring latent antagonisms to the surface

* This is clear from the fact that Cicero's interviews with Pompey in December probably took place at Naples. See Schmidt, B. W. C., 94.

† Hirtius, B. G., viii. 54.

and precipitate developments of far-reaching significance. It is this that sometimes gives historic importance to the petty tempers and ambitions of men like Marcellus. Marcellus was furious with the unbroken success of Curio, and could not bear to see his year expire without obtaining his revenge. Nor were Cæsar's other enemies inclined to give up their designs; and their determination was strengthened by a new source of encouragement. If it was soon to be demonstrated by the most unimpeachable logic that the fidelity of Cæsar's soldiers was proof against every test, it seems that amongst his officers, particularly amongst those who belonged to noble families, there prevailed a certain amount of dissatisfaction; perhaps they were affected, as it was impossible that the common soldiers should be, by the impression of Cæsar's growing unpopularity among the upper classes. Labienus himself was taking the lead in the movement. Now Rome was just in the mood to mistake the disaffection of a few officers for a feeling of mutiny throughout the whole army, and it was widely believed that Cæsar's troops, worn out with years of continuous warfare, were clamouring to be disbanded. Thus Cæsar's enemies were now confidently reckoning upon the support of his legionaries. Marcellus decided to make a supreme effort in the sitting of the 1st of December—to force a decision that Cæsar's powers should expire on the 1st of March and to defeat an analogous proposal with regard to Pompey. If he succeeded he would attain a double object; he would both humiliate Curio and, by doing Pompey a service, force him openly to join the Conservatives and become their leader.

On the 1st of December the Senate met; there was almost a full attendance, about 400 members being present.* But the greatest indecision was found to prevail; hardly any one seemed to have come with his mind made up. Whilst they were afraid of displeasing Cæsar, they were equally afraid

The sitting of
December 1.

* App., B. C., ii. 30; Nissen (H. Z., xlvi. p. 71, n. 1) has, I think, proved that the sitting was held on December 1.

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of offending Pompey. The majority appeared to have but two desires, to avoid compromising themselves, and to avoid provoking a civil war. Marcellus and Curio alone knew what they wanted. At the beginning of the sitting Marcellus rose, and put the definite question whether Cæsar was to return to Rome as a private citizen. It was generally expected that, as on the 1st of March, Curio would make use of his veto, and that the Senate would thus be saved from entering upon so serious and dangerous a discussion. But to the universal amazement Curio remained silent and motionless on his seat. Marcellus' proposal could thus be put to the vote and was approved by a large majority. Without giving Curio a chance to intervene, Marcellus rose again and proposed to submit to the Senate the other question which had been raised, whether Pompey should resign his command. Thus formulated, the proposal seemed to be aimed definitely at Pompey and so to violate a law specifically approved by the people. Marcellus had couched it in this form on purpose to anticipate any proposal by Curio. In its fear of offending Pompey the Senate of course rejected the proposal. Thus the surprise had been completely successful. Curio and Cæsar had again been defeated and nothing remained but to adjourn the assembly. But Marcellus had not reckoned with Curio. With great presence of mind he rose and begged leave to put another proposal before the Senate—that Cæsar and Pompey should both simultaneously abandon their commands. Expressed in these terms and supported by the skilful pleading of the Tribune, the proposal lost its character of personal hostility against Pompey and seemed simply a measure conceived in the interests of equity and concord, which only a bad citizen could oppose. Marcellus put it to the vote in the full belief that the Senate, being already bound by its preceding decision, would reject it decisively and so complete Curio's discomfiture. But deliberative assemblies are not always guided by strictly logical considerations. Curio's proposal corresponded, as the Senators knew, with the general feeling of Italy, and when it was put to the vote there were 370 against 22 in its

favour.* Curio was thus once more successful, and the defeat was the more disastrous for Cæsar's enemies because it showed that they could place absolute reliance upon only 22 votes in the Senate. Marcellus adjourned the Senate in disgust, with the ejaculation that they had voted in favour of the tyranny of Cæsar.

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If it had not given its vote in favour of tyranny the Senate had unconsciously, and in its desire to maintain the peace, given a vote for war. This vote was the direct cause of the outbreak of the civil war. Marcellus and the small group of Cæsar's enemies were furious at the turn affairs had taken. But they realised at once that one vital advantage had been gained. The vote was as great a blow to Pompey as it was to themselves, and it might achieve what they had been vainly trying to do since 58—it might bring Pompey over to the Conservative side. Marcellus decided to suggest to Pompey the adoption of a supreme expedient—he would propose in the Senate to declare Cæsar a public enemy, and, if the Tribunes intervened or the Senate did not approve, he would on his own authority declare a state of siege and entrust Pompey with the charge of public affairs and the command of the two legions of Cæsar which were to go to Parthia and were still at Lucera.† The success of such a *coup d'état* could [Luceria.]

Marcellus' calculations.

* App., B. C., ii. 30; Plut., Pomp., 58. By comparing the passage in Appian with Plutarch it will be seen that Plutarch puts into a single sitting occurrences which, according to Appian, took place in two sittings and at some interval. Appian's version is most certainly the right one. It alone enables us to explain the *coup d'état* of Marcellus, of which we shall speak later, and the attitude of Pompey. Pompey had hitherto maintained great reserve. Although he was on bad terms with Cæsar, some very serious motive was needed to make him put himself at the head of the Revolutionary Conservative party and accept the command of the Italian legions at Naples. The event which explains this behaviour is this vote, and for the reasons given in the text. But the *coup d'état* must have been arranged between the Conservative chiefs and Pompey; and as Pompey was still at Naples this must have taken some time.

† We have no information as to this plot; but it appears to me necessary to assume it: for it is absolutely impossible that Marcellus should have attempted his *coup d'état* without being in agreement with Pompey. He would only have been exposing himself to

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not surely be doubtful. With the two legions to be given him by the Consul the army of Pompey would amount to nine legions, which was as much as the total force at Cæsar's disposal. With Pompey in command of equal forces and in a position to offer him serious resistance, was it likely that Cæsar and his friends would continue their opposition at the risk of provoking a war which would be disastrous to themselves? If so, the majority of the Senate would certainly succumb to the greater fear and vote all that the enemies of Cæsar desired. It is true that an impartial observer might have objected that the military position was hardly so favourable to Pompey as it appeared. For while his nine legions were scattered, two being in Italy and seven in Spain, Cæsar had his nine legions under his own hand in Gaul. But there was general confidence in the prestige and skill of Pompey, and it was also believed that Cæsar would not run the risk of a new outbreak in Gaul by withdrawing his army from the province.*

Pompey agrees
to the coup
d'état.

Letters and messages soon began to pass to and fro, in all secrecy, between Rome and Naples. Marcellus and his friends had calculated rightly. Pompey, who had never had any serious intention of giving up his Proconsular command, was more decided than ever after the vote in the Senate not to yield to the suggestions of Curio, who was evidently acting on Cæsar's behalf. He did not mean to resign a right which had been legally conferred upon him or to recognise a surprise vote snatched from the Senate by an intriguing Tribune and inconsistent with a decision made a few minutes before. He would perhaps have been ready to cancel his rights of his own accord, if that would have helped to keep the peace so much desired by the whole of Italy. But it was impossible for him to capitulate before the menaces of a low-class Tribune like Curio. He could not forget that he had been elected Consul without the exercise of any previous magistracy; that

disastrous defeat. Is it not possible that in the sinister words addressed by Pompey to Cicero on the 10th of December (A., vii. 4, 2) he is alluding to the *coup d'état* which he knew to be imminent at Rome?

* See Cic., F., xvi. 12, 4.

he had a long record of distinguished service to his credit; that he was the destroyer of the pirates, the conqueror of Mithridates, the invader of Syria; that he had doubled the State revenues and re-established order in the capital. If Cæsar was short of money and unable to fulfil the delusive promises that he had made, and if he therefore desired to throw Italy into confusion by deliberately provoking a civil war, he must expect no mercy from Pompey.* He counted securely upon his own prestige and upon Cæsar's mutinous officers; with some of these he was personally related and they seem to have inspired him with dangerous illusions. With Labienus he was already in communication and the officer escorting the two Parthian legions had told him that Cæsar's troops would never take up arms against him.† Pompey in short felt himself complete master of the situation. At the first whisper of hostilities Italy would rise and give him all the legions he wanted. Civil war was an impossibility; he had **only to threaten and Cæsar would give way.**

Pompey therefore accepted the proposals of Marcellus; and the public soon noticed that the situation was becoming threatening without in the least understanding the reason. Cicero, who was travelling to Rome by the Appian Way, stopped at Naples and visited Pompey on the 10th of December. He was disagreeably surprised to find him in an irritable and pessimistic temper and to hear him say that war was inevitable, that it was now impossible to come to an understanding with Cæsar.‡ Cicero, who had no knowledge of the intrigues which were going on between Rome and Naples, failed **entirely to understand why this should be.** At

Anxiety of
Balbus.

* Suet., Cæs., 30.

† Plut., Pomp., 57.

‡ Cicero, A., vii. 4, 2. As regards the date and the place of this interview see Schmidt, B. W. C., 94. This unexpected change can only be explained, short of lunacy on Pompey's part, by some change in the situation; and I can see no other than the vote of the 1st of December. We have here a new proof that two important sittings took place. As a matter of fact when Cicero wrote this letter the *coup d'État* in which one of these sittings ended had not yet been made.

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Rome Cæsar's friends, particularly Cornelius Balbus, were exceedingly anxious. Scenting danger in the air, they kept close watch over the minority of the 1st of December and waited impatiently for Cæsar's arrival. Cæsar was at this time quietly travelling through Cisalpine Gaul without any suspicion of his danger, and was actually under the impression that on his arrival he would find an agreement with the Senate already concluded. On the 8th of December Hirtius, one of Cæsar's officers, arrived at Rome, bringing letters for Pompey, and stayed in the house of Balbus. Balbus dissuaded him from continuing his journey to Naples, begged him to leave his message with Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, and made Hirtius set out the same evening post-haste to rejoin Cæsar, to inform him more fully than could be done by correspondence of the sudden and ominous change in the situation.

The coup
d'état.

But the suspense did not last long. So soon as Pompey's consent was received, probably on the 9th of December,* Marcellus convened the Senate and made a violent speech in which he attacked Cæsar as a brigand and proposed to declare him a public enemy, at the same time ordering Pompey to take command of the legions which were at

* Nissen (H. Z., xlv. p. 72) puts this sitting on the 4th of December. Schmidt (B. W. C., 97) on the 10th. Both these dates seem to me impossible, the former because there would have been no time to communicate with Pompey, who was not, as Nissen supposes, at the gates of Rome but at Naples, or at any rate somewhere three or four days' distance from Rome, as is clear from Cicero (A., vii. 4, 2). Moreover, if the *coup d'état* had been made at that time it must have formed the chief subject of the interview which took place on the 10th of December between Cicero and Pompey and of which Cicero speaks (A., vii. 4); but Cicero only mentions the *coup d'état*, of which, moreover, he disapproved, in A., vii. 5, 4. The second date is equally impossible; for on the 10th Curio was no longer Tribune. App., B. C., ii. 31; Dion, xl. 66; Plut., Pomp., 58, agree in saying that the veto was put by Curio, and it cannot be supposed that they have all written Curio in mistake for Antony. Schmidt's supposition that Marcellus would have waited for the new Tribune to enter into office is futile. From the moment that the *coup d'état* was decided upon the agreement or non-agreement of the Tribunes was of no importance. I think therefore that the sitting took place on the 8th or 9th, as soon as Pompey's consent arrived.

Lucera waiting to be embarked for Syria. Curio declared that the proposal could not be seriously meant and opposed his veto. Then Marcellus brought up his big battalions. He declared that, since he was hindered by factious interference from defending the Republic, he would have recourse to other than the ordinary constitutional means. He left the Senate and set out from Rome on the same day with a band of enthusiastic aristocrats, travelling in all haste to Naples to join Pompey, whom he reached on the 13th of December.*

His sudden departure must have caused consternation among the public, which was ignorant of the intrigues of which it was the outcome. Would Pompey accept the rash offer that was being made him? On the 10th of December Curio became once more a private citizen and he decided that, whatever happened, it would be wiser for him to be away from Rome. He set out to rejoin Cæsar who was marching his legions along the Æmilian Road † on his way from Piacenza to Ravenna, where he intended to spend the winter. ‡ Cæsar clearly still believed in the maintenance of peace. But towards the 18th or 19th of December terrible news reached Rome, § whence it penetrated three or four days later to Ravenna. In a speech of studied moderation Pompey had accepted the proposal of Marcellus and had started for Lucera, Pompey sets out for Lucera

* Schmidt, B. W. C., 97, 98. I accept his rectification of the date.

† See Schmidt, Rh. Museum, xlvii. p. 248.

‡ It does not seem to me necessary to modify, as Schmidt (B. W. C., 99) wishes, the consistent account of Appian, B. C., ii. 32. Appian says that it was only the return journey which Curio made; it is probable that Curio left on the 10th or 11th of December, at unusual speed; that he joined Cæsar at Piacenza, or somewhere in the neighbourhood, and went with him to Ravenna, and that when the news of the *coup d'état* arrived he hastily conveyed Cæsar's ultimatum to the capital. In any case it seems to me certain that Curio left for Rome from Ravenna, which is about 260 miles from Rome, and not from Piacenza or from Milan, which is more than 400; it was indeed impossible for a man to cover 400 miles in three days. We must therefore accept the correction proposed by Mendelssohn and read *δισχιλίοις* for *τρισχιλίοις*.

§ Schmidt, B. W. C., 98.

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where he would shortly arrive to take over the command of the legions. The panic and indignation this news evoked among the public were indescribable. Impartial men, particularly the rich financiers, shared Cicero's disapproval of Pompey's behaviour in precipitating a war : * while the chiefs of the Cæsarian party gave full rein to their anger. Antony summoned a mass meeting and delivered a violent address, recalling, amongst other things, the great number of citizens whom Pompey was already responsible for sending into exile. † The extreme Conservative clique were of course openly exultant.

Cæsar's
dilemma.

But nobody was more disconcerted than Cæsar when the news reached him at Ravenna, immediately after his arrival on the 24th or 25th of December. ‡ He saw all his hopes of a peaceful settlement dashed at one blow. It was impossible to entertain any illusions. Pompey's sudden resolution would at once drive into the Conservative camp a number of Senators who, under the impression that Pompey was inclined to be conciliatory, had voted on the 1st of December for the simultaneous retirement of the two generals. With Pompey openly arrayed against him, the last remnants of his popularity with the upper classes were taken from him, and their personal quarrel would gradually assume the form of a conflict between rich and poor, between the *elite* and the proletariat, in which respectability in a body would take Pompey's side. § There would be few found bold enough to brave the anger of Pompey, still less that taint of vulgarity which was attached, as in all struggles between rich and poor, to the chiefs of the popular party. If Pompey persisted in his demand that he should abandon his command on the 1st of next March, there was no alternative but open resistance. To return to Rome and face the prosecution threatened him by the Conservatives was no longer possible : for since the revision of the lists of judges,

* Cic., A., vii. 5, 4. For the date see Schmidt, B. W. C., 101. *Iter Pompeii* means his journey to Lucera.

† Cic., A., vii. 8, 5 ; Schmidt, B. W. C., 98.

‡ Schmidt, B. W. C., 99.

§ See Cic., A., vii. 3, 5 ; and the picturesque and interesting passage, A., vii. 7, 7.

Pompey was master of the law-courts, and his condemnation would be assured. 50 B.C.

Cæsar at once summoned his friends to a council of war. Curio proposed to summon the Gallic army and march at once upon Rome. If war was inevitable, better face it at once. But Cæsar was unwilling. He knew that, though Pompey might carry the whole world of politics against him, the public opinion of Italy was still on the side of peace ;* and he still hoped to set a united and peaceful Italy between himself and his enemies. Sulla was a distant memory, and the bitter antagonisms between class and class which had provoked the outbreak of the last civil war now existed no longer. Italy would not lightly forgive if the petty squabbles of politicians provoked another. Yet Cæsar could not remain inactive. He recalled two legions, the 12th and the 8th, to Italy, and ordered Caius Fabius to proceed with three legions from Bibracte to Narbonne, to intercept a possible movement on the part of Pompey's legions in Spain.† Meanwhile he would make one more effort at conciliation. It was now the 25th or 26th of December. The Senate would meet on the 1st of January. If a courier could reach Rome before that day there would still be time to parry the blow that his enemies certainly intended to deliver in that sitting. Curio declared his readiness to accomplish this miracle of quickness. Cæsar wrote a letter to the Senate and another to the people, and Curio left Ravenna at early dawn on the 27th.‡ In his letter to the Senate Cæsar declared his readiness to abandon his command if Pompey acted likewise ; otherwise he would take steps to defend his rights. In his letter to the people he said that he was ready to re-enter private life and to give an account of all he had done, and invited Pompey to do the same.§

The last days of the year were a busy and anxious time for

* Cic., A., vii. 6, 2.

† Nissen, H. Z., xlvi. p. 75.

‡ Schmidt, B. W. C., p. 99.

§ This letter can be pieced together out of App., B. C., ii. 32 ; Dion, xli. 1 ; Cæs., B. C., i. 9 ; Suet., Cæs., 29 ; Plut., Pomp., 59 ; Plut., Cæs., 30 ; Cic., F., xvi. 11, 2.

Cæsar's last efforts for peace.

49 B.C.

Attitude of
Pompey and
Cicero.

all parties. Pompey's declaration had indeed converted, albeit reluctantly, a good number of the Senators and the wealthy classes to his side; for they had not the courage to take an open line against a man in his position; and Cæsar's declared supporters were treated with coldness and almost boycotted. This movement of opinion was of course a further encouragement to Pompey. In a fit of irritation at the violent speeches of Antony he told Cicero on the 25th, in the neighbourhood of Formia, that he would absolutely oppose Cæsar's ever becoming Consul either in 48 or at any other time; a second Consulship of Cæsar would be fatal to the Republic. If he was foolish enough to go to war let him do his worst; he, Pompey, was not afraid.* Only the proletariat, which had supported and admired Catiline, was now united in its attachment to Cæsar. But every one in either camp was in a state of feverish anxiety. What would happen at the sitting of the 1st of January? Cicero was especially unhappy, and almost regretted having left his province. He felt more indebted to Pompey than to Cæsar, and now that the rupture was imminent he was sorry that he had not quite paid off his debts to the Proconsul of Gaul. But above all he was anxious for peace and still hoped for some agreement to stave off the fatal and almost ludicrous expedient of civil war. For unlike many of his contemporaries he was under no illusions as to Cæsar's strength.†

* Cicero, A., vii. 8, 4. This letter, which gives an account of an interview with Pompey, is of great importance, because it shows us that on the 25th of December Pompey himself thought that Cæsar did not wish to provoke civil war out of ambition, but accepted it simply in order to defend his political position. Cicero, for instance, says that Pompey *putat eum, cum audierit contra se diligenter parari, consulatum hoc anno neglecturum ac potius exercitum provinciamque retenturum*. Cicero adds further that Pompey was not anxious for peace: *pacificationis ne voluntas quidem*. If these words be compared with those of Hirtius (B. G., viii. 52 (Cæsar), *judicabat . . . liberis sentiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri*), it will be seen that two very important authorities affirm, directly or indirectly, that Cæsar was not anxious for war. Adding the weight of this evidence to the actual conduct of Cæsar, which is inexplicable except on the assumption that he believed in peace, are we not justified in concluding absolutely that it was not Cæsar but Pompey and the Conservatives who were responsible for the rupture?

† Cic., A., vii. 7, 6.

Moreover, if a war broke out, what would become of his triumph? 50 B.C.

But it is Cæsar in the little town of Ravenna, which seems predestined to be the refuge of great Italians in the stormy hours of their career, who must have suffered most during these terrible days of suspense. We cannot tell whether the fatalism to which, after so many years of conflict and corruption and intrigue, he had schooled his spirit, helped him to meet even this supreme trial with quiet indifference. Certainly he had every reason to give way to a blind indignation against mankind and his destiny. All that had gone so well for Pompey had gone ill for him. Together they had courted the crowd, inflamed the passions of the democracy, corrupted the nation, opposed the Senate, tilted against the old republican institutions, all to win glory, riches and power. But Pompey had not been forced painfully by slow degrees to mount the ladder of office. He had been three times Consul: he had celebrated numerous triumphs: his victories over Mithridates and his conquest of Syria had made him the greatest general of his day: he had amassed an immense fortune and enjoyed it at his leisure at Rome, amid the admiration of the people and the nobles. He had become the representative of the great without losing the respect of the humble. All his life he had been moving from success to success. He thought of himself. What had all his labours brought him? With endless intrigue and difficulty and danger he had climbed into office; and when, at the age of forty, he had at length obtained a province which was to bring him in glory and riches, fortune had again played him false. He had received a country poor in comparison with the East and very difficult to conquer, where he had fought for nine years against almost continuous insurrections. And at the end of it all what had he to show? Had it brought him glory? He was the most despised and best hated man among the upper classes, and every Italian who had read a line of Xenophon was in a position to improve upon the strategy of his campaigns. Had it brought him wealth? He came out of that gigantic struggle almost as poor as he went

Cæsar at
Ravenna.

50 B.C.

in, having used nearly all that his Gallic ravaging had brought him to corrupt Roman politicians, without even winning the gratitude to which his generosity had entitled him. Italy was united in reproaching him for a policy of pillage of which she alone had reaped the fruits. When Cæsar turned back to the past to inquire into the reason for the strange divergence of their two careers, he could not help seeing that, if Pompey had been the favourite of fortune, he owed it to the part he had taken in the massacres of Sulla. It was then that he had acquired his great influence with the rich classes, which had enabled him later to join the Democrats without forfeiting the respect of the Conservatives. Safely entrenched behind an unassailable popularity, he had been able to secure all that he desired, offices and provinces, extraordinary commands and grandiose triumphs, all with but the smallest concessions to the popular party, until he had become universally recognised as indispensable to every undertaking. He himself on the other hand had excited the hatred of the Cabal during the régime of the reaction, and it was this hatred that had dogged him all through his career. His slow and laborious rise, the enormous debts he had contracted in order to make a name at all, his early conflicts with the Conservatives, the revolutionary action which was practically forced upon him during his Consulship, the ultra-Imperialist policy by which he had endeavoured to sustain it, the fatal alliance with the demagogues from which he had never been able to withdraw and which threatened now to drag him to his ruin, all these were but the necessary outcome of his connection with the conqueror of the Cimbri and of the chivalrous behaviour of his earliest days—of his loyalty in the reign of terror to the daughter and to the memory of Cinna, of his haughty defiance of Sulla, of his horror of massacre and fratricide. If he had only consented then to betray the conquered side, his career would have been swift and easy, and he would have risen like Pompey to fortune and power.

In the misfortunes which had befallen Cæsar there was thus a real element of injustice ; men and circumstances alike had

played him false. That his sense of this injustice did not embitter his nature, or drive him, at this climax of his career, to acts of cruelty and violence, is at once a proof of the serenity of his intellect and one of his most lasting titles to glory. The history of the civil war up to the battle of Pharsalia is perhaps the finest episode in Cæsar's life. He displays a clear-sightedness and moderation which go far to make up for the indiscretions and barbarism of his Gallic campaign. Even at this very moment, while Curio was galloping breathless upon the Flaminian Road, Cæsar was still confident of peace. He fully expected that his letter, couched as it was in terms at once vigorous and conciliatory, would awaken the reactionaries to wiser counsels. All seemed to depend upon whether it could reach Rome in time.

49 B.C.

Cæsar's
moderation.

Once more Curio justified the confidence reposed in him. When the Senate met on the 1st of January the letter was already in the hands of Antony. The Consuls were so afraid of the effect it might produce that they endeavoured to prevent it from being read. Antony and the friends of Cæsar were naturally all the more anxious to read it, in the hope of producing another of those revulsions of feeling which had been so frequent in the last few months. It was only after a long and violent discussion that it was finally read.* The result was disastrous for the partisans of Cæsar. Whether out of genuine indignation, or out of fear of Pompey, who was now known to be entirely opposed to Cæsar, or simply out of an instinctive desire to find a vent for the ill-humour with which they had all of them come together, the Senators punctuated the reading of the letter with a running chorus of protest, and denounced it as insolent, dictatorial, and unworthy.† Before his supporters realised what had happened, Cæsar had lost his last chance in the Senate. Antony was too much disconcerted to speak, and the Conservatives, forgetting that they had tried to prevent the letter from being read, broke out into cries of exultation. Lentulus and Scipio made violent speeches, saying that it was time to have done

Cæsar's letter
to the Senate.

* Cæs., B. C., i. 1 ; Dion, xli. 1.

† Not Cæsar, but Appian (B. C., ii. 32) tells us this.

49 B.C.

with palaver; the defenders of Cæsar could not make themselves heard amid the general hubbub, and even Marcellus, the Consul of 51, was hissed into silence because he dared to ask whether it would not be better, before inviting a war, to examine the state of their resources.* Had not Pompey repeatedly reassured anxious inquirers by the assertion that everything was ready? In the midst of this confusion approval was given to a proposal by which Cæsar was declared an enemy of his country if he did not abandon his command before the 1st of July.† Thanks to the intervention of Antony and Quintus Cassius the vote was not to take effect at once; ‡ but this was almost a matter of indifference to the Conservatives; they were certain of being able to vote a state of siege, which would annul the Tribunician veto, as soon as they wished it.

Then followed ten days of breathless activity. Out came all the figures familiar on the eve of a great conflict—the peacemakers and the mischiefmakers, the inopportune opportunists, and the inconsolable pessimists—all anxious to add their quota to the opinions of the moment. On the evening of the 1st of January Pompey summoned numerous Senators to his house, addressed them words of praise and encouragement and invited them to be present in the Senate on the following day. At the same time a levy was begun, and the veterans were recalled to Rome. § Nevertheless there seems to have been a slight reaction among the Senators during the night. On the next day, the Consuls did not venture to dispute the Tribunician veto; the father-in-law of Cæsar and the prætor Roscius demanded a suspension of six days to attempt conciliation, while others suggested that ambassadors should be sent to him. || It so happened that the Senate held no sitting on the 3rd and 4th and that on the 4th Cicero arrived in the neighbourhood of Rome, heartily welcomed by the more reasonable party among the Senators, which was anxious for

* Cæs., B. C., i. 2.

† This is a likely conjecture of Nissen, H. Z., xlv. 80, n. 1.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 2.

§ *Id.*, i. 3

|| *Id.*

The first
ten days of
January 49.

peace and hoped that Cicero might be able to intervene.* Cicero at once undertook the task. He negotiated with the party leaders and proposed that Cæsar should be authorised to stand for the Consulship in his absence, and that Pompey should go to Spain † during Cæsar's Consulship. Meanwhile Curio had received still more moderate proposals from Cæsar. He was prepared to be satisfied with Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions.‡ For one moment it was believed that these two proposals might settle the difficulty. Pompey, who seems to have awoken for a moment to realities, gave secret instructions to Lucius Cæsar, a young man whose father was a general in Cæsar's army, to treat for peace. Lucius Roscius, to whom Pompey had declared that he was inclined to accept the last conditions proposed by Curio, also left on a mission of his own to Cæsar.§ But Lentulus, Cato and Scipio came to the rescue, and strengthened Pompey's failing resolution. Cæsar was but plotting as usual. Would he allow himself to fall into the trap? || Pompey's vacillation had been reflected in the Senate which had held its hand on the 5th and 6th of January, discussing the question without arriving at a decision. But by the evening of the 6th Pompey had been reconverted by the extreme Conservatives. On the 7th the state of siege was declared, ¶ and Antony and Quintus Cassius fled the city. Cæsar's enemies heaved a sigh

* Cic., F., xvi. 11, 2.

† *Id.*, vi. 6, 5.

‡ Nissen (*H. Z.*, xlvi. p. 84, n. 1) has shown the error in App., B. C., ii. 32, and made clear the right date of this proposal.

§ I do not believe, with Schmidt (*B. W. C.*, 123) that Roscius and Cæsar were sent after the news of the capture of Rimini, and as official representatives of the Senate. Cic., A., vii. 13, 13, and Cæs., B. C., i. 8, prove that each of them went on his own account and as emissaries of Pompey. Lange (*R. A.*, iii. 401) appears to me nearer the truth; only I do not think that they went after the news of the capture of Rimini, which arrived on January the 14th. They could not have been at Minturnæ on the 23rd; they would only have had time, according to Schmidt (*B. W. C.*, 123) to reach Fano; and as Cæsar declares that the interview took place at Rimini I see no reason to doubt it. They must have been sent at the moment when fresh hopes of peace were entertained.

|| Cic., F., vi. 6, 6; Vell., ii. 49; Suet., Cæs., 29; Plut., Pomp., 59; Cæs., 31.

¶ Cæs., B. C., i. 5.

49 B.C. of relief. After a year and a half of plots and counterplots the foe was at last at their mercy. If he wished to become Consul, he must pay the price of a civil war. Let him do so if he dared. With Pompey on their side Cæsar's enemies were now masters of the State. They disposed of the Treasury, the provinces, the allies, and the armies; the most celebrated of Roman generals, the most illustrious of Roman citizens was devoted to their cause. Cæsar had but nine legions, worn out by a long war, and a small province, only recently subdued and still bitterly hostile. The common opinion was that he would never dare to leave Gaul behind him and break into Italy, but would prefer to remain on the defensive in the valley of the Po.* On the following days the Senate held several sittings under the presidency of Pompey, who gave a reassuring account of the military situation; various measures directed against Cæsar were approved without difficulty. The State treasury and the municipal and private funds were placed at Pompey's disposal; he was authorised to make forced loans,† and the important provinces were distributed amongst the favourites of the Conservative party. Scipio received Syria, Domitius Transalpine Gaul, and Considius Nonianus Cisalpine Gaul.‡ Finally it was decided to make a general levy. Italy was divided into divisions in each of which a Senator of influence, who possessed estates in the districts, was selected for the chief command. Cicero received Capua,§ Domitius the territory of the Marsi, Scribonius Libo Etruria, and Lentulus Spinther Picenum. The Conservative government seemed already re-established.

Cæsar in Italy. When the Romans awoke on the morning of the 14th of January || they found that a thunderbolt had burst upon the city. Cæsar had crossed the Rubicon and occupied Rimini in considerable strength; the first fugitives of the invader were already in the capital. The chief of the demagogues, the patron of bankrupts and adventurers, was marching upon Rome at the head of his legions and the Gallic cavalry.

* Cic., F., xvi. 12, 4.

† App., B. C., ii. 34.

§ Cic., F., xvi. 11, 3.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 6; Cic., xvi. 12, 3.

|| Schmidt, B. W. C., 106.

CHAPTER XII

BELLUM CIVILE

Cæsar and his army—Cæsar's last hesitations—The die is cast—Panic at Rome—Pompey in dismay—Evacuation of Rome—Departure of the Consuls and Cicero—New efforts for peace—Cæsar seizes all Picenum—Weakness of the Conservative party—Cæsar on the road to Corfinium—Pompey and the vacillation of Domitius Ahenobarbus—The siege of Corfinium—Pompey's retreat—Cæsar follows him up—Pompey sets sail for Greece.

WHAT had really happened was not so alarming as report 49 B.C. suggested. Cæsar had not the intention so naïvely attributed to him in many quarters of remaining quietly on the defensive in the valley of the Po; but neither was he inclined to march straight upon the capital. By the 4th of January he had probably heard of the reception given by the Senate to his last proposals and he had now to make up his mind how to face the situation. What course should he pursue? To wait quietly in his province, plying the Senate with futile recriminations till his command expired on the 1st of July was hardly practicable; it would have given his enemies just what they needed—time to collect their forces, and opportunities of sowing discord amongst his soldiers; for he had already for some time past been aware that Labienus was untrustworthy.* Somehow or other he must find means to stiffen his verbal protests; the Senate needed the vigorous tonic of an open defiance. But defiance was difficult, for it involved the risk of provoking a civil war. Moreover, it was impossible to predict what impression it might produce upon his own soldiers. It was the attitude of the legionaries in the approaching crisis which really formed the pivot of the Cæsar's dilemma.

* Hirtius, B. G., viii. 52.

49 B.C.

situation and swayed the calculations of the two opposing parties. They had already been through a lengthy series of exhausting campaigns. Could he ask them now to follow him through the odium and vicissitudes of a civil war?

His relations
with his
soldiers.

During the last ten years Cæsar had always taken the greatest pains to win the devotion of his soldiers. True, when on active service he had demanded the most rigorous discipline and almost unexampled exertions; he had constantly appeared at unexpected moments to make sure that all was in order and had never failed to punish most severely any dereliction of duty. But he had provided them on the other hand with the amplest compensation for their loyalty. He had heaped them with gold and prize-money; he had shown the greatest solicitude for their material well-being; he had multiplied the number of centurions by increasing the quantity and diminishing the fighting force of the legions; he had encouraged them in a taste for luxury and a liking for fine arms and helmets and cuirasses; and he had employed all the arts of cajolery generally so successful with simple and ignorant persons, trying to know all their names and the details of their lives, and speaking with high appreciation of their services in his public reports. The soldiers, who were most of them poor peasants from the valley of the Po, had listened with pride as their patrician general harangued them not as "soldiers" but as "my comrades,"* and he had certainly succeeded in securing their enthusiastic fidelity. Yet, elaborate fiction though it was, the old Republican government was still capable of inspiring unbounded veneration. The Senate, the magistrates, and the whole immemorial structure of the Roman state were still looked up to with respect by the mass of the Italian people. One moment of hesitation or distrust or fear at the beginning of the war and the attachment of his soldiers might have vanished before an age-long sentiment, and the Gallic army that he had so laboriously welded together would have dispersed in a few weeks.

Perhaps Cæsar never lived through so perplexing a time as the five or six days which followed.† But the news that

* Suet., Cæs., lxxv. 70.

† Plut., Cæs., 32.

the state of siege had been proclaimed at Rome on the 7th of January, and that the Tribunes had fled the city, put an end to all his doubts. Quite suddenly, probably on the morning of the 10th, he made up his mind. He determined to make a sudden dash upon Rimini, the first Italian city across the Rubicon frontier, making it his base for the seizure of other important towns: thus making it clear to the Senate and to Pompey that he was not afraid of a civil war, and that if it was to be a fight to the death he would defend himself with the courage of despair. He would then once more attempt to treat with his enemies, whom fear if not reason might by this time have brought into a more conciliatory mood. He set to work at once with the quickness which was his second nature. He communicated the plan to several friends and officers who were to go with him, of whom Asinius Pollio was one, and concerted skilful arrangements to prevent any report of his intention from reaching Rimini. Each of them was to leave the city alone at nightfall by a different route; they were to form a junction during the night with the cohorts whom Cæsar had already sent forward under the command of Hortensius; and together before dawn they were to occupy Rimini. Meanwhile Cæsar was to do his best to distract the attention of the public. He showed himself all day in the streets of Ravenna; he went to the baths, appeared at a public spectacle, examined the plans for a gladiatorial school; in the evening he even gave a great dinner at which he displayed the most complete self-control. And yet the plan was in itself exceedingly hazardous. If his intentions had become known and Rimini had closed its gates, he and his 1500 men could never have taken it; while a violation of the Italian frontier, however little he achieved, was a definite provocation of civil war. In the middle of dinner he apologised for having to leave his guests for a short time upon urgent and unexpected business, mounted a tradesman's cart, and left Ravenna by a road going in the opposite direction from Rimini. After driving a little distance he turned back, joined the cohorts and his friends, aroused the soldiers and ordered them to set out on the march with no other arms

49 B.C.

He seizes
Rimini.

49 B.C.

than their swords. On the morning of the 11th of January, when the burghers of Rimini awoke, Cæsar with his 1500 legionaries was already in their town.*

New efforts
for peace.

At Rimini he found Antony, fresh from the capital. The soldiers were introduced to their ex-general the Tribune in the slave costume in which he had fled the city. Cæsar delivered a vigorous speech promising large rewards and declaring that it was his object to defend the liberties of the people against the tyranny of faction. In the excitement of the moment the soldiers eagerly pledged themselves to remain loyal.† Cæsar then sent Antony to fetch the five other cohorts who were on the Æmilian Way, probably in the neighbourhood of the modern Forlimpopoli,‡ ordering him to cross the Apennines and seize Arezzo. With the five cohorts under his own command he spent the following days in occupying the principal towns along the coast, Pesaro, Fano and Ancona.§ He did not do this with the object of beginning a campaign. How could he, with little more than 3000 soldiers at his disposal?|| He was merely trying to secure an asset which would enable him to treat for peace on more favourable conditions, and to prove to his enemies that, under

* Plut., Cæs., 32; Suet., Cæs., 31.

† According to Suet. (Cæs., 33) and Dion (xli. 4) this *pronunciamento* took place at Rimini; according to Cæsar (B. C., i. 7) at Ravenna. See in Schmidt (B. W. C., 105, n. 1) and Nissen (N. Z., xlv. p. 97) the reasons for disbelieving Cæsar. He has probably tried to conceal the fact that he took his soldiers more or less by surprise and only revealed them his plan when it was already half executed.

‡ Nissen, H. Z., xlv. p. 96.

§ Nissen (H. Z., xlv. p. 96) and Schmidt (B. W. C., 114 f.) have shown that the passages in Cicero (A., vii. 11, 1, and F., xvi. 12, 2) prove that it was already known at Rome on the 17th of January that Ancona and Arezzo had been occupied; these towns must therefore have been occupied at the latest on the 14th. Some points in Cæsar's narrative are thus made inadmissible; for instance, it is impossible that he should have occupied Pesaro, Fano and Ancona after hearing of the failure of the peace negotiations upon which Roscius and Lucius Cæsar were engaged; in other words, Cæsar makes alterations in the first episodes of the war with the intention of showing that he was taken entirely by surprise by the violent decision of the Senate.

|| See Schmidt (Rh. Mus., xlvii. p. 261; B. W. C., 123), who seems to have demonstrated the true nature of Cæsar's intentions.

[Pisaurum.]
[Fano
Fortunæ.]

provocation, he could answer violence with violence. Thus when, towards the 19th of January,* Roscius and Lucius Cæsar reached him in one of the towns on the Adriatic coast, he was ready with his conditions. Pompey was to return to Spain; all the troops recruited in Italy were to be dismissed; the electors were to meet at Rome in the absence of the military; if this were done he was prepared to renounce his province and to go to Rome to stand for the Consulship in person.†

Cæsar, like the other side, had been engaged in bluffing; and his tactics met with a very common, though always unexpected result. They failed, not because they did not succeed in frightening his enemies, but because they frightened them too much. When on the 14th, 15th and 16th of January the news of the successive occupations along the Adriatic coast reached Rome: when it was reported that Pesaro and Fano had followed Rimini and that Libo was hurriedly abandoning Etruria and retiring upon Rome ‡ a panic broke out among the politicians at Rome which it was far beyond Pompey's powers to allay. Cæsar had certainly never imagined that it was so easy to disconcert, indeed to paralyse his opponents. Every one was convinced that he was preparing a surprise attack upon the capital; that he was on his way to Rome with a host of Gallic cavalry and legionaries who were thirsting for plunder; that he was already well-nigh at the gates; § that all Italy lay helpless at his feet, since Pompey had nothing to set against him but two untrustworthy legions which had actually been returned him by Cæsar. All day long a train of terror-stricken Senators and officials crowded round Pompey's mansion feverishly asking for news or comfort, and proffering futile prognostications or equally futile advice. So great was the confusion that the freedmen and slaves were unable to keep watch over the door; every one entered as he wished, and burdened the unfortunate Pompey

Panic at
Rome.

* See Schmidt, B. W. C., p. 123, n. 1.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 9; Cic., F., xvi. 12, 3.

‡ Florus, iv. 2; Lucan., ii. 462.

§ Plut., Pomp., 60; App. B. C., ii. 35.

49 B.C.

with the outpourings of their hearts. The majority of the Senators, who had never been whole-hearted in their acceptance of the war, now suddenly turned against the small Conservative majority, and especially against Pompey; they accused him of miscalculation and impetuosity, they regretted not having accepted Cæsar's proposals,* and several even used language which on other occasions they would have been the first to call insulting.†

Dismay and
resentment
of Pompey.

This general panic was highly disconcerting to the Consul and the small knot of politicians who were responsible for the rupture. The preparations which were being hurried on on the 12th ‡ were as suddenly interrupted; the Senate was not convened either on the 14th, the 15th, or the 16th, obviously because the Consuls were afraid lest the Senators should vote for unconditional submission. The chiefs of the Conservative clique spent the days in deep debate; but they were unable to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.§ Pompey himself seems to have been in a most pitiable state of mind. He had never possessed the amazing quickness and elasticity which carried Cæsar all over his obstacles, and he had for some time past been in feeble health. The dizzy succession of rumours and recriminations crowding in from all sides now threw him utterly off his balance. Just when he should have been a tower of strength amid the universal confusion he seems for a time to have been almost paralysed. He did not even succeed in ascertaining, amid the various conflicting reports, what number of troops Cæsar had at his command, || and whether he was really in a position to make a dash upon Rome. He was genuinely frightened, and as he was afraid to reveal it he preferred to remain inactive and to make no plans. His aristocratic *hauteur* gave him the strength to contain his feelings, but beneath a calm and almost nonchalant exterior there lurked a blind fury against the party which had egged him on to war and now, at the first stroke,

* App., B. C., ii. 36.

† Plut., Pomp., 60; Cæs., 33.

‡ Cic., F., xvi. 11, 3.

§ App., B. C., ii. 36.

|| Cic., A., vii. 16, 2, shows that it was not till February, after Labienus arrived, that Pompey realised the weakness of Cæsar's forces.

was threatening to desert him: while he was laying up a store of lasting resentment against Cæsar as the cause of this open and unexpected humiliation. Three whole days he spent in debate with the Consuls and chief persons in Rome without being able to make up his mind. He felt that it was his duty to leave Rome at once to take over the command of the legions which were awaiting him, to hurry on the recruiting and to organise the defence of the country; for, like every one else, he believed that Cæsar would take the offensive at once. But how could he leave behind him at Rome the government of the State in the hands of a terror-stricken Senate, whom Cæsar could easily intimidate into submission? A short-lived panic would be sufficient to cause the Senate to disavow him, thus placing him in a painful and almost impossible situation. The other alternative was to persuade the Senate and the magistrates to leave Rome in his company, thus taking with him the whole of the constitutional government, and withdrawing it from the actions or threats of Cæsar. But this was a highly serious and complicated undertaking, and at present Pompey did not venture either to propose or to approve it.

But on the 17th* came the news that not only Ancona but Arezzo also had been occupied by the enemy. Cæsar seemed full on his march towards Rome. The panic had been bad enough before: it now became insupportable. Pompey at last awoke out of his lethargy,† and came to a definite understanding with Cato, the Consuls and the more important

The "tumultus" decreed.

* Schmidt, B. W. C., 115.

† Cic., F., xvi. 12, 2, and A., ix. 10, 2, prove that a sitting of the Senate *plenus formidinis* after the capture of Ancona and Arezzo decided on the evacuation of Rome. I believe this was the sitting at which Pompey made the declarations spoken of in Cic., A., vii. 11, 1; Plut., Pomp., 60; Cæs., B. C., i. 32, 8; and App., B. C., ii. 36; at which Cato (Plut., Cat. U. 52; Pomp., 60) proposed to make Pompey Dictator and at which the *decretum tumultus* was passed. With regard to this last, I believe with Schmidt (B. W. C., 106 f.) that it took place after Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, but not on January the 14th; since, according to all indications, there was no sitting till the 17th. The general uncertainty probably prevented the holding of another. We should certainly know of it had there been one.

49 B.C.

persons at Rome. All of them realised that speedy decision was now essential. After due consultation he decided to convene the Senate. The sitting was stormy and confused, lasting many hours and revealing many contradictions. Several Senators reproached Pompey with miscalculation.* Volcatius Tullus and Cicero proposed to send ambassadors to Cæsar to treat for peace.† Cato, on the other hand, wished to entrust Pompey with full powers for the conduct of the war.‡ Pompey listened with disdainful indifference to everything that was said against him. He refused to disguise the realities of the situation and quietly declared that he would look to the defence of Italy.§ But he opposed the proposal of Tullus which was equivalent in his mind to a confession of weakness.|| This resolute attitude caused the war party to prevail; Cato's proposal was approved and the *tumultus* decreed.¶ Pompey then revealed his plan. The Consuls and the Senate were to abandon Rome and to retire to Capua, taking the State treasury with them; Pompey was to take vengeance on the towns which opened their gates to Cæsar and consider as enemies all Senators who did not leave Rome in his company.** It can be imagined with what stupefaction this decision was received. Rome was to be abandoned to the enemy. Here was a *coup d'état* on which Sulla himself would never have ventured.

* Plut., Pomp., 60; Cæs., 33; App., B. C., ii. 37.

† Plut., Pomp., 60; App., B. C., ii. 36.

‡ Plut., Pomp., 60; Cat. U. 52.

§ See Cic., A., vii. 11, 1 (the words of Pompey).

|| Cæs., B. C., i. 32, 8.

¶ Nissen (N. Z., xlvi. p. 100) relying upon the vague expressions of Plutarch (Pompey, 60, and Cat. U. 52), and upon the weakness of Pompey during the war, believes that Cato's proposal was not approved. Schmidt (B. W. C., 135) seems to share this opinion. But Velleius (ii. 49) says *Consules senatusque Pompeio summam imperii detulerunt*. It appears to me that Velleius is right. There is no other way of explaining Pompey's order for the evacuation of Rome and the retreat to Greece, undertaken not only by the army but by the whole of the Senate. Moreover, during the campaign in Italy he directed the whole operations from Lucera. If his chief command was not successful, the reason does not lie in his want of the necessary powers but in his own and his party's weakness.

** Cic., A., ix. 10, 2; App., B. C., ii. 37; Dion, xli. 6.

It seems that Pompey set out for Capua as soon as he left the Senate House. It was already late in the evening* and the numerous Senators who had not brought slaves with torches to escort them home and did not wish to venture alone into the unlighted streets of Rome, spent the night in the Curia. It would be interesting to know their feelings during those slow-moving hours. The difficulty and inconvenience of so hurried a departure were of course innumerable. Pompey, the rich aristocrat, with his slaves and his secretaries, his friends and his clients, had not stopped to reflect that the majority of the Senate was not equally well circumstanced. What was to be done with the slaves that every one had in his household? Could they be left behind at Rome during a civil war, with the price of provisions going up and a spirit of revolt in the air? † And where to send the women and children? ‡ Besides it meant a total stoppage of business. Many of the Senators had not even the money necessary for the journey and not the least idea where to turn for it. Their own friends were themselves in need, dealing in bills was practically suspended, and borrowing was very difficult in face of an imminent civil war. §

Difficulties of the evacuation.

49 B.C.

Nevertheless, now that Pompey knew his mind, he rapidly regained his ascendancy. As people recovered from their first surprise they began to consider what was truly to their interest. Cæsar's victory must surely involve a political revolution in which the rich would be despoiled of their possessions. There was no disputing the cogency of this argument; and thus, although Pompey's conduct caused a good deal of bad temper, the greater number of the Senators decided to set out in his company. Even Caius Cassius, once Quæstor of Crassus, came over to Pompey's side, together with his brother-in-law Brutus, whom Cæsar had almost treated as his son and whose own father had been treacherously put to death by Pompey in the operations against Lepidus at Modena. Brutus had hitherto refused to have relations with Pompey, but at a moment like this he was unable to resist. Cæsar's

Pompey regains his ascendancy.

* Appian, B. C., ii. 37.

† Cic., A., vii. 13, A. 3.

‡ Cic., F., xiv. 7, 3.

§ *Id.*, A., vii. 18, 4.

49 B.C. supporters formed a contemptible handful—Sallust and Cælius, still smarting under the persecution of Appius Claudius, Dolabella, the young libertine who had become the son-in-law of Cicero, and Asinius Pollio, a personal friend of old standing.

Renewed panic
at Rome.

Next morning, amid general confusion, preparations began for departure, though many still hoped that some unexpected incident would make it possible for them to remain. To procure money enough for their journey many of the Senators applied to Atticus, who placed at the disposal of his friends the huge sums he had stored in the cellars of his house or deposited in the temples at Rome.* Yet many had great difficulty in setting out, and not a few would have still further prolonged their preparations, if, fortunately for Pompey, a false rumour had not been spread on the 18th that Cæsar was already marching on Rome at the head of his Gallic cavalry.† This suddenly revived the panic. The Consuls went off at once without even emptying the Treasury; those who found most difficulty in their preparations finished them off without further ado, and before evening on that day the Appian Way was blocked with a long train of litters and slaves, waggons and beasts of burden. Crowds of knights, freedmen, and well-to-do plebeians—in short, the whole of the wealthy and educated classes ‡—were evacuating Rome, and, with a strange but not altogether unparalleled inconsequence at a time of revolution, were leaving behind them their women, children and slaves in a city on which Cæsar was hourly expected to pounce with his barbarian cavalry.

Cicero had left before the panic, on the morning of the 18th,§ in as bad a temper as many of his friends and thoroughly disgusted with Pompey. He did not think it wise to abandon

* Corn. Nep., Att., 7.

† It appears to me that this may be a right correction, suggested by Dion, xli. 16, of the account given by Cæsar, B. C., i. 14, which seems exaggerated but true in the main. Cæsar, however, is wrong in saying that it was the news of the capture of Osimo which caused the panic; indeed he tells us himself that the panic took place on the 18th of January, the day following the departure of Pompey, at a time, that is, when Osimo had not yet been taken.

‡ Dion, xli. 7.

§ Cic., A., vii. 10; A., 9, 10, 4.

the capital in this hurried fashion.* Nor did he believe that Pompey could succeed so rapidly as he expected in collecting a large army in Italy.† He was therefore very uneasy. It seemed to him that Pompey had been at once too violent and too weak in face of the resolute attitude of Cæsar. He had no reason to pin his faith on Cæsar, yet he was on the whole more disposed to believe in his success than in Pompey's. Events were confirming the sinister presentiment which he had felt at the beginning of the struggle. He repented of having accepted the mission at Capua, now that Capua was becoming the advance position of Pompey's army, and was anxious to exchange it for a post of general supervision over the plain and coast of Latium.‡ Amidst all these anxieties he was by no means sorry to see his son-in-law Dolabella taking sides with Cæsar. It was no doubt a disgrace to the family, yet if Cæsar were to win, it might turn out a blessing. A son-in-law might serve as a useful intermediary.§

49 B.C.
Cicero's son-in-law on Cæsar's side.

Meanwhile Cæsar of course did not in the least intend to march upon Rome. After occupying Ancona and Arezzo he had already, on the 19th of January, sent Curio to seize Gubbio which had been evacuated by the Prætor Thermus with five cohorts; || and he had then paused to await reinforcements. With his 3000 men he could venture no farther. But soon the events which he had set in motion carried him far beyond his wildest calculations. He was much vexed to hear that Pompey, the Consuls and part of the Senate had evacuated Rome, and concluded that Pompey wished to deprive him of the means of negotiating an equitable peace with the Senate and to force him to a regular civil war in any or every part of the Empire, which was just what he least desired. He had immediately written, and persuaded his friends to write, to a large number of the departed Senators, amongst others to Cicero, to induce them to stay at Rome.¶

Cæsar seizes Gubbio.

[Iguvium.]

* Cic., A., vii, 11, 3.

† *Id.*, A., vii, 12, 2.

‡ See the interesting comments of Schmidt (B. W. C., 117) on Cic., A., vii, 11, 5; viii, 11, B. 3; A., viii, 11, D. 6; F., xvi, 11, 3.

§ Cic., A., vii, 13, A. 3.

|| Schmidt, B. W. C., 122; Rh. Mus., xlvii, p. 261.

¶ Cic., A., vii, 17, 3; A., vii, 21, 3.

49 B.C.

Meanwhile a far more serious danger threatened him from Osimo, where Atius Varus was hastily arming a number of cohorts, and seemed inclined to make a move forward against Cæsar's small force of 3000 men, now dispersed in a great triangle between Arezzo, Ancona and Rimini. Cæsar, who had only his small Gallic army to fall back upon, realised that he must at all costs prevent the enemy from further recruiting. He therefore reunited his legions on the Adriatic coast, perhaps at Ancona, and gave orders to Curio and Antony to evacuate Gubbio and Arezzo,* thus clearly revealing that the occupation of Arezzo had been merely a piece of bluff.

Cæsar reunites
his forces.

[Auximum.]

The Senatorial
proposals.

It was at this moment, towards the end of January, that he received the answer to the conditions of peace which he had proposed. On his return from his interview with Cæsar, Pompey's ambassador had met the Consuls and several Senators at Teano on the road to Capua.† Most of them were so much put out by their sudden departure from Rome on a dangerous adventure of which it was impossible to predict the outcome, that they were disposed in Pompey's absence to accept the proposals of Cæsar. Cæsar desired peace and the Senate desired peace. Why should it be impossible to attain it? But events had passed beyond the control of human wisdom or human management. The Senators who met at Teano had added to Cæsar's proposals the condition that he should retire into his province in order that the Senate might have full independence for deliberation.‡ It was a natural demand on their part; they needed some pledge of Cæsar's sincerity. Unfortunately it was a demand that Cæsar could not possibly accept. He knew how easy it would be for his enemies to find a pretext for war the moment they felt themselves strong enough to declare it. All this while, indeed, Atius Varus was continuing to arm his soldiers, and it was imperative for Cæsar at all costs to prevent his adversaries from obtaining further recruits. Thus as soon as the whole of his army was

* Cæs., B. C., i. 12. On this concentration of troops see Schmidt, B. W. C., 125.

† Cic., A., vii. 14, 1; vii. 15, 2. For the dates see Schmidt, B. W. C., 124.

‡ *Id.*, A., vii. 14, 1.

under his command, probably on the 1st of February, he marched upon Osimo, took the city after a brief skirmish, and attached to his side, by the promise of high pay, a large number of Varus' soldiers.* He then seized Cingoli and the whole of Picenum.† A few days later, perhaps on the 3rd of February, ‡ having now been joined by the 12th Legion,§ he advanced in the direction of Fermo|| with the intention of marching upon Ascoli, which was held by Lentulus Spinther with ten cohorts.

49 B.C.

[Cingulum.]

[Firmum.]

[Asculum.]

These operations, which were forced upon Cæsar to prevent the recruiting of his adversaries, put an end to all attempts at conciliation just at the moment when they seemed about to succeed. Fate was dragging both sides remorselessly into civil war. Day by day the forces of Cæsar seemed to swell and those of his enemies to dwindle. The daring of his first operations, the confusion which he had unexpectedly introduced into the enemy's camp, the flight of Pompey, his occupation of a whole district of Italy, prepared the mind of the army for a civil war, and for the revolution which was its inevitable outcome. A report was current that Cæsar would make knights of all the soldiers who followed him; and the hope of this reward had still further excited the enthusiasm of his Gallic troops for their Emperor.¶

Loyalty of Cæsar's soldiers.

Pompey, on the other hand, though armed with the fullest authority that the State could offer him, found it impossible to carry on the war with efficiency. He had succeeded in inducing the magistrates and the greater part of the Senate to evacuate Rome; but he was unable to make use of them for his own purposes. How could he make his way through the country, stopping at the little towns and villages on the way, dogged

Confusion of the Conservatives.

* Cic., B. C., i. 13.

† *Id.*, 15.

‡ Schmidt, B. W. C., 127, n. 1.

§ Cæs., B. C., i. 15.

|| Schmidt seems to me to be right in translating Cæs., B. C., i. 15, *Asculum Picenum proficiscitur*, "he set out in the direction of Ascoli." *Recepto Firmo* (i. 16) can be similarly explained. We need not suppose that Cæsar first took Ascoli and then turned back upon Fermo; nor need we change the text.

¶ Suet., Cæs., 33.

49 B.C.

by a long and melancholy procession of Senators, who knew nothing that they could do to help him and spent their time quarrelling with him and one another and with the miserable accommodation the country places provided? It is not surprising that, before many days passed, he left the Senators to themselves and set out for Lucera, where he intended to take command of his two legions and concentrate all the troops that were being recruited on the Adriatic coast.* Thus left to themselves, the Senators gradually dispersed all through Campania; the Consuls were in one place, the Tribunes in another, while the majority of the Senate retired alone to their homes in solitary villas on the deserted and wintry country-side. The couriers did not know where or to whom to deliver their letters; Pompey and the Consuls were sometimes left in ignorance of the most important intelligence; † orders arrived too late or could not possibly be carried out owing to distance. Altogether the Conservatives were by now in a condition of utter confusion; every one was complaining but few were acting, and those few took no pains to obey the instructions of Pompey, who was only nominally their chief. ‡ Levies were carried out remissly, and there was little enthusiasm. Pompey sent the Tribune Caius Cassius from Lucera to Capua to tell the Consuls to return to Rome for the treasure; but the Consuls refused on the pretext that the roads were not safe.§ Not only the capital, but the treasure was thus abandoned to the enemy. Already thoroughly discouraged by the opening events of the war and by the losses entailed by the confusion of their departure, the Senators became still more depressed in the solitude of their country homes, where news which arrived days after it had happened seemed but the distant echo of a far-away world. The hurried departure from the capital, evacuated for the first time in its history, had filled them with something like superstitious terror. How were men in this temper to be infused with the energy or the enthusiasm of battle?

* Cic., A., vii. 15, 3.

† *E.g.* the news of the loss of Picenum. Cic., A., vii. 21, 2.

‡ Cic., A., vii. 21, 1.

§ *Id.*, vii. 21, 2.

It was a grain of comfort at this juncture to learn that Labienus had at last actually crossed over to Pompey's side. We do not know the exact reasons for his treachery. It appears that there had for some time past been friction between Cæsar and his subordinate, and that after the war against Vercingetorix, during which the only real victories had been those gained by Labienus over the Senones and Parisii, the obscure plebeian whose friendship with Cæsar had made him a rich and prominent personage imagined he was actually Cæsar's superior in generalship. In any case his defection did something to relieve the despondency of Pompey's partisans, though it was far from removing their dissatisfaction. Cicero was going and coming constantly between Formia and Capua, impatient for news and a prey to constant and contradictory emotions. At one moment he would wax furious at the audacity of Cæsar, at another at the unpardonable inertia of Pompey, then he would hark back once more to his favourite project for intervention and peace. On the 10th of February a meeting was arranged on his estate at Formia between various friends and influential members of Pompey's party, Caius Cassius, Marcus Lepidus and Lucius Torquatus. They discussed the situation at length, and arrived unanimously at the conclusion that if a pitched battle was inevitable there must be one and no more. All serious and patriotic politicians would then unite in inducing the defeated party to renounce his pretensions and force him to the conclusion of peace.*

49 B.C.
Treachery of Labienus.

The council at Formia.

While his adversaries were organising the defence with such slackness and want of spirit, Cæsar was moving rapidly and resolutely forward. On his arrival at Fermo he heard that Ascoli had been evacuated and that Lentulus, dismayed by the speed and strength of his advance, had surrendered his command during the retreat to Vibullius Rufus† and had retired to Corfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus was concentrating a large and formidable army. Lucilius Hirrus, who had abandoned Camerino, was also retiring upon Corfinium with a considerable force. Corfinium was thus becoming the

Cæsar's new plan of campaign.

[Camerinum.]

* Cic., A., vii. 22, 1; F., xv. 15, 1.

† See Schmidt, B. W. C., 131.

49 B.C. rallying point of his opponents; and Cæsar was compelled to continue his advance if for no other reason than that his enemies were flying before him. Realising that it was now impossible to secure terms without first fighting a pitched battle, which would overcome the obstinacy of some and the hesitation of others, he formed a new plan of campaign at Fermo, which he immediately put into execution. He would fight a short and sharp campaign in Italy, break up the army concentrated at Corfinium, force Pompey and the Consuls to conclude a reasonable peace, and thus, within a few weeks, restore peace to Italy. He stopped one day at Fermo, collecting supplies, and sending numerous couriers with a reassuring manifesto to the chief cities of Italy to set forth his peaceable intentions. Then with his habitual rapidity he set out once more, on the 8th of February, by forced marches along the coast * in the direction of Corfinium.

At Corfinium, and at Sulmona and Alba in the neighbourhood, was a force of thirty-one cohorts in all, a little more than 10,000 men.† Pompey wisely desired to concentrate his troops farther south, at Lucera, and if his plans had been carried out Cæsar would have found the country of the Marsi deserted. But Pompey could not yet shake off the uncertainty and slackness which ruined all his best projects. He had unlimited powers, but he hesitated to use them against an influential aristocrat like Domitius Ahenobarbus. He had advised rather than ordered him to fall back on Lucera ‡ and had been gratified to hear, on the 10th of February, that Domitius expected to set out on the 9th.§ Since then he had

* The fact that Cæsar moved along the coast is proved by Cic., A., viii. 12, B. i. See Schmidt, B. W. C., 129.

† Cæsar (B. C., i. 15) estimates the cohorts in this district at thirty-three, of which twenty were with Domitius. Cic., A., viii. 11, A and A., viii. 12, A. i., says that according to Pompey there were thirty-one—fourteen under Vitellius, five under Hirrhus, twelve (or eleven according to some editors) with Domitius. Pompey's information was safer and directer than Cæsar's. The garrisons at Sulmona (seven cohorts, according to Cæs., B. C., i. 18) and Alba were included in the thirty-one; so that there were only eighteen at Corfinium. See Cic., A., viii. 12, A. i.; Schmidt, B. W. C., 133.

‡ Cic., A., viii. 12, A. i.

§ *Id.*, A., viii. 11, A.

Pompey and
Domitius.
[Sulmo.]
[Alba
Fucentia.]

heard no more from Domitius. It was only some days later that he ascertained indirectly that he had changed his mind and was now anxious to oppose a bold front to Cæsar's advance. Pompey, who knew the weaknesses of the Italian upper classes, concluded that some of the great landowners in the neighbourhood of Corfinium must have joined Domitius and were insisting that the country should be saved from pillage.* Himself a large landowner and indulgent towards the foibles of his class, and not vigorous enough to impose his will upon others, Pompey then took a step unworthy of a general. On the 12th of February he begged Domitius to send him nineteen cohorts and to keep the rest for his defence.† But on the 13th or 14th of February,‡ having now lost all hopes of seeing Domitius conform to his advice, and persuaded that he was on the point of being surprised by Cæsar, he fell back upon the scheme of retiring to Greece. If it was no longer possible to defend himself in Italy he must leave the peninsula, move eastwards to collect an army, and renew the war later on with a more serious fighting force. But even after coming to this momentous decision Pompey showed a lack of the necessary energy. On the 13th§ he despatched Decimus Lælius to the Consuls with a despatch in which he begged them, if the advice appeared "opportune," the one to go to Sicily, with the troops recruited in the neighbourhood of Capua and with twelve of the cohorts of Domitius, to protect the corn supply, and the other to proceed with the rest of the troops to Brindisi to embark.¶ He also invited Cicero to meet him at Brindisi.¶ Un fortunately the fears that he had entertained on the subject of Domitius were but too well founded. On the 14th of February Domitius allowed himself to be surprised and besieged in Corfinium with eighteen cohorts. This news was of course received with great consternation through-

* Cic., A., viii. 12, B. ii.

† *Id.*, A., viii., 12, B. ii. For the date of this letter see Schmidt, B. W. C., 136. See Cic., A., viii. 12, A. i.

‡ Cic., A., viii. 12, A. iii. For the date, which may be fixed by reference to A., viii. 11, D. i., see Schmidt, B. W. C., 136.

§ For the date of this order see Schmidt, B. W. C., 136.

¶ A., viii. 12, A. iii.

¶ *Id.*, viii. 11, D. i.

49 B.C. out the peninsula, but it was believed that Pompey would march at once to the relief of the besieged.

Capture of
Corfinium.

The news of the siege and impending disaster at Corfinium at last woke Pompey out of his lethargy; from this time onwards he seems to recover much of his old energy. At the risk of precipitating the Republic into anarchy and of perishing with his party in a gigantic struggle, he decided to have his revenge upon Cæsar. Calculating that the two legions which he had at Lucera were not sufficient to relieve Domitius and that a check would be disastrous to his prestige, he resisted the unanimous entreaties of his fashionable friends, who were impatient to stake all upon the relief of Domitius, and showed sufficient strength of mind to come to the most difficult of all decisions—to confess himself temporarily beaten. He counted as lost all the recruits that had been made on the coast of the Adriatic, abandoned Domitius to his fate, and took the decisive step of retiring to Greece. In view of the insufficiency of his forces he even renounced his idea of securing a hold over Sicily, and sent the Consuls the laconic order to concentrate at Brindisi with all the recruits that they had collected at Capua and all the arms which they could bring together.* His calculations were justified. After a seven days' siege Domitius capitulated, while Pompey retired to Brindisi, where the fleet which was to carry him to Greece was already being collected. The surrender of Corfinium was followed by that of Sulmona. During the course of the operations another legion, the 8th, reached Cæsar from Gaul, together with twenty-two cohorts of new recruits and 300 horse sent by the King of Noricum.†

Cæsar's
moderation.

The news of the fall of Corfinium caused stupefaction among the Italian upper classes. The terrible demagogue had captured five hostile Senators and a large number of knights and young nobles! But Cæsar promptly set them at liberty, restored them all the money they had on them and treated them with every indulgence. As events carried him gradually forward into a war which he had never desired, Cæsar showed an in-

* Cic., A., viii. 12, A. iv. ; Schmidt, B. W. C., 139.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 18.

creasing desire to bring the struggle to a rapid conclusion ; he hoped to force Pompey to an honourable agreement satisfactory to a public which desired and indeed clamoured for peace and was ready to adore the man who was in a position to secure it. A civil war, even on the present limited scale, was injurious to innumerable private interests. Credit had become so difficult that debtors were obliged to sell their possessions to pay their interest, thus bringing about a general reduction of prices. There was a dearth of employment and a great increase in distress, particularly at Rome with so many of the wealthy away. Cæsar was anxious at all costs to arrive at an agreement with Pompey, if possibly in Italy and within a few weeks, and to conclude it in such a manner as to receive the credit for peace in the eyes of Italy. With his usual fertility of resource he wrote to Cicero to say he was ready to re-enter private life and to leave Pompey his place in the Republic, provided he was allowed 'to live in security.* He sent the nephew of Balbus to the Consul Lentulus to beg him to return to Rome and use his efforts in favour of peace.† He wrote to Oppius in Rome asking him to give out that he was not setting up to be the Sulla of the democracy, but was only anxious for a reconciliation with Pompey and his generous permission to a triumph.‡ Finally on the 21st of February, the very day of his capture of the town, he left Corfinium, taking six legions with him, three of which formed part of the army of Gaul, the remaining three having been formed on the spot out of new recruits and the soldiers of Domitius. On his way south he set at liberty any officers and supporters of Pompey with whom he fell in along the route. On the 9th of March, after a series of forced marches, he arrived beneath the walls of Brindisi.

But Pompey had already decided for war and had made his arrangements. Recollecting at last that he had an army in Spain he had sent Vibullius Rufus to take command of it. He had also sent Domitius to Marseilles to retain that town in its allegiance ;§ and he had despatched a part of the army with the Consuls to Epirus and was only waiting the return of their

Pompey and
Cæsar at
Brindisi.

* Cic., A., viii. 9, 4.

† *Id.*, ix., 7, C. i.

‡ *Id.*, viii. 9, 4 ; viii. 11, 5.

§ Cæs., B. C., i. 34.

49 B.C. transports to cross over to join them. In the light of these preparations was peace still possible? Cæsar seems to have entertained a last glimmer of hope on the arrival of Magius with proposals from Pompey.* It is possible indeed that, at this supreme moment, if Cicero had happened to be at Brindisi he might still have made efforts towards the conciliation for which he had all along been working. Unhappily the veteran writer had not responded to Pompey's invitation, on the pretext that the roads were unsafe, but in reality because he was unwilling to take part in a civil war which was as odious to him as to all sensible Italians. At the time when he should have been acting and travelling he remained on his estate at Formia in dreamy inaction, brooding over the hopes and fears of the situation. He had been deeply impressed by the clemency Cæsar had displayed at Corfinium; and he had also, most unfortunately, been flattered by the letters of Cæsar and Balbus. Though he pretended to conceal his satisfaction under a veil of distrust, he would discuss Cæsar's proposals frequently with his friends and enjoyed listening to their assurances that Cæsar was quite sincere in reckoning upon his help for the conclusion of peace.

Pompey sets
sail for Greece.

Meanwhile the last opportunity was slipping through his fingers, if indeed it can be said that peace was still possible. Cæsar waited for some days for the return of Magius,† and sent Titus Caninius Rebilus into the town with equal ill success to confer with Scribonius Libo, an intimate friend of Pompey's. Libo's response was that Pompey could not possibly discuss the question of peace in the absence of the Consuls.‡ The despatch of Magius had been a device to gain time.§ Pompey was anxious for war and desired it on a great and decisive scale. After the surrender of Corfinium Italy would be certain to consider him as having been conquered by Cæsar, if he consented to make peace without taking his revenge. The horror of a civil war, and the infinite distress it was

* This is a way of harmonising Cæs., B. C., i. 26, with Cic., A., ix. 13. A. Schmidt, B. W. C., 152, takes the despatch of Magius as a feint; and I agree with him.

† This is, I think, the right interpretation of Cæs., B. C., i. 26.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 26.

§ Schmidt, B. W. C., 152.

certain to involve, all this now counted as nothing to a man intoxicated by the greatness of his position and swayed by a blind and brutal access of egoism. The extraordinary fortune which he had hitherto enjoyed was leading him to his ruin. Cæsar was unable to prevent Pompey from setting sail with all his fleet on the 17th of March.* The small quarrel that had broken out between two factions at Rome had swollen to gigantic size. The real civil war had broken out.

* Cic., A., ix. 15, A. i.

49 B.C.

CHAPTER XIII

THE WAR IN SPAIN, 49 B.C.

Italy and the Civil War—Cæsar after the flight of Pompey—Cæsar on his way to Rome—Interview between Cæsar and Cicero—Cæsar at Rome—Cæsar's violence against Metellus—Pompey's army in Spain—Marseilles—Cæsar's policy in Gaul—Antony—The siege of Marseilles and the Spanish War—Critical position of Cæsar outside Lerida—Cicero leaves Italy—Cæsar saved by Decimus Brutus—Cæsar made Dictator.

49 B.C.

Cæsar's
chances in
a civil war.

CÆSAR stopped only one day at Brindisi and then left hastily for Rome in a violent temper, telling his friends that since Pompey and his Senators asked for war to the death he would take them at their word and move at once to the attack of their stronghold in Spain.* Curio and Cælius, who had been filled with admiration at his moderate behaviour hitherto, were dumbfounded to hear him talk in this fashion.† But Cæsar had only too much reason for irritation. The effects of what had taken place during the last two months were so far-reaching that Italians had as yet been unable to collect their impressions; the result was a situation so obscure, so unprecedented and so utterly unforeseen that, despite his astonishing momentary success, Cæsar could not bring himself to face it

* Cic., A., ix. 15, A.

† Cicero, A., x. 4, 8; x. 9, A. i. This evidence from Curio and Cælius, who at that time saw Cæsar daily, is exceedingly important as showing us his state of mind at Pompey's departure. It can hardly be doubted that it is correct. Cælius indeed had no motive, in writing to Cicero, for crediting Cæsar with violent ideas, and Curio, who was doing his best to attract Cicero to the party of his chief, would rather have exaggerated his moderation than his excitement. We are thus face to face with revelations of absolute sincerity and great psychological value. There is no contradiction, however, between this violent mood of Cæsar and his previous moderation. The situation had changed so greatly and become so dangerous that he might well be carried beyond himself.

with any degree of assurance. The Italian upper classes had now long been used to thinking of the Republic as on the eve of dissolution, but the truth had proved far worse than their gloomiest predictions. They had seen the Senate and the magistracies, the whole venerable edifice of the old Republican government, crumble to pieces within two months, under the blows of a few legions of trained soldiers, and its *débris* swept from the soil of Italy. It was indeed just the very suddenness and completeness of his success which filled Cæsar with dismay. He was in the perilous position of a usurper who has won one striking success over the legitimate government, thereby only provoking it to renewed exertions; he realised that after their hasty and humiliating flight Pompey and the Senate would never consent to return to Italy before they had crushed their exulting rival. No human force could now avert a civil war; and in a civil war his enemies, despite their initial failure, had far greater forces at their disposal than himself. Practically the whole of the Empire was at their command. They had supreme control of the sea; they had a large army in Spain: while they could recruit another and still more formidable force in the East. He himself on the other hand had but fourteen legions, little money and no fleet; worst of all, he had to be on his guard against the smouldering disaffection of his province. If he recalled his legions from Gaul for the civil war he would be risking the outbreak of a new Gallic rising, a dilemma upon which his adversaries placed great reliance.

Cæsar had realised from the first that his only chance of safety lay in an extreme rapidity of action, and calmer investigation only confirmed this idea. With Pompey now escaped from his clutches, his policy must be to attack the forces of his opponents, collectively so formidable, while they were still dispersed; and he would naturally begin with the army in Spain, which was threatening Gaul at close quarters. It was upon the Spanish legions that Pompey's friends based most of their hopes, and a report was even current that Pompey would shortly take command there himself to lead his troops to the re-conquest of Italy.* It seems that with characteristic

Cæsar's new
plan of
campaign.

* Cic., F., xvi. 12, 4; A., vii. 26, 1; viii. 2, 3; viii. 3, 7.

49 B.C.

energy Cæsar thought out a large and elaborate scheme on the road between Brindisi and Rome, which he at once began to put into execution, endeavouring through detailed instructions to make his will felt in a hundred different places at once. He placed garrisons in the principal centres of South Italy; * he ordered all the coast towns to send a quota of ships to Brindisi, and to set to work upon the construction of others; all this was to be left to Hortensius and Dolabella.† He at once took steps too to secure command over the corn-supplying countries nearest to Italy, ordering Quintus Valerius to proceed with one legion to Sardinia, and Curio to occupy Sicily with two legions, crossing over thence into Africa,‡ while Dolabella was to go to Illyria.§ He also intended immediately on his arrival at Rome to convoke the few Senators and magistrates who remained there and restore a semblance of legitimate government. This was indeed a matter of urgent necessity both for himself and for Italy. The condition of Italy, in the anarchy in which Pompey had left it, was indeed at this moment one of his greatest embarrassments.|| If in a short two months he and his soldiers had been able to break down the government of the Republic, he could not build it up again with the troops that he needed for his campaign, nor yet could he leave it without any government at all. Moreover, as the weaker party, it was greatly to his interest to secure some sort of legal justification for all that he had done or intended to do: more particularly, to be authorised to carry the war into Spain, and to take the sums which he needed from the State Treasury.

Like all Cæsar's creations this plan was coherent and well thought out; but almost superhuman efforts were needed if he, with his friends and soldiers, was to carry it into

* Cæs., B. C., i. 32; App., B. C., ii. 40; Cic., A., ix. 15, 1.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 30; App., B. C., ii. 41.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 30; Dion, xli. 18; App., B. C., ii. 40-41. (He is wrong in saying that Asinius Pollio was sent to Sicily.)

§ From Oros., vi. 15, 8, and Dion, xli. 40, it seems clear (contrary to App., B. C., ii. 41) that Dolabella (and not C. Antonius) was sent to Illyria. Caius seems to have gone later to reinforce Dolabella; perhaps he was sent by his brother Marcus.

|| See Cic., A., vii. 13, A. i.; vii. 9, 3.

execution. The difficulties it involved, social, military and political, were stupendous. Moreover, the state of public opinion, which still seemed dazed by the rapidity of events, must have appeared very alarming. It is true that circumstances had modified it slightly in his favour. On the course of his journey some of the towns which had given Pompey a brilliant reception in the preceding year now turned out to welcome Cæsar; * numerous Senators whom Pompey had persuaded to leave Rome were preparing to return with the conqueror † and many observers now seemed disposed to grant that Cæsar, and not Pompey, was in the right, that Cæsar had in no way provoked the conflict, and had in fact displayed a conciliatory temper all through. People were even sometimes heard exaggerating his merits and the power which he controlled, saying, for instance, that he could, if he wished, collect innumerable recruits from Gaul and had immense treasures at his command. ‡ Yet, at bottom, for Cæsar as for Pompey and all the other leaders in a struggle that they hated, Italians felt little else than distrust and indignation. The reception which was given him by the towns on his journey, friendly though it seemed, was very different from that which had been given forty years before to his uncle on his return from Africa. After all, Italy was no longer the Italy of Marius. The sons and grandsons of the nobles and landlords and downtrodden peasants who, half a century before, had been unconscious victims for the future of their country now owned slave-worked estates in the country and houses in the towns; they had turned traders, or brokers, or opportunist politicians, or advocates and solicitors with friends in great houses, or hard-working small proprietors whose smartly dressed children were taken to school by a slave with the sons of the best families. Taken in the mass, they made up a public opinion which was selfish, exacting and incompetent, which had no understanding of the inevitability of the present situation and lived in mortal terror of a civil war. They imagined

49 B.C.

Italy and
Cæsar.

* Cic., A., viii. 16, 1-2.

† *Id.*, viii. 1, 3; viii. 11, 7; viii. 16, 1; ix. 1, 2; ix. 8, 1.‡ *Id.*, ix. 13, 4; x. 8, 6.

49 B.C. that peace was an easy matter and depended solely on the will of Cæsar and Pompey. No one understood that Cæsar had really no alternative now but to go forward; and the feeble reaction in his favour was in part determined by the hope that he would put an end to hostilities.* In short, whether favourable or unfavourable, public opinion with its naïve and contradictory pretensions could not but cause him serious embarrassment.

Cæsar's inter-
view with
Cicero.

Cæsar was able to take stock of this difficulty in an interview which he had with Cicero. Formia was on his road to Rome, and wishing at this critical moment to assure himself of the friendship of the most powerful writer of the time he paid him a visit, probably on the morning of the 28th of March.† But a meeting which, had it taken place a month earlier, might have been a turning-point in the world's history was now but a futile and conventional ceremony. Cæsar made himself as agreeable as he could and invited Cicero to come to Rome to negotiate for peace. When Cicero asked if he would be free to employ any means he liked, Cæsar replied that he would never venture to impose conditions on a man of his distinction. Cicero then informed him that he was prepared to stand up in the Senate and oppose the contemplated campaign in Spain and Greece. Cæsar was obliged to tell him that this advice was useless, since he lay under the absolute necessity of conducting these campaigns with the least possible delay. "I knew it," replied Cicero, "but I could not possibly say less." The conversation was then continued in a cold and trivial strain, and after various subjects had been raised Cæsar broke it off by begging Cicero to think over his suggestion. Cicero of course promised to do so, and Cæsar set out for Rome.‡ Still more unfavourable was the impression left on his mind by Cæsar's escort, which was composed, he told Atticus, of a crew of criminals, adventurers and bankrupts. After the interview he finally made up his mind that Cæsar and his supporters were engaged in a delibe-

* Dion, xli. 16. See App., B. C., ii. 41.

† Cic., A., ix. 18, 1. See Schmidt, B. W. C., 161.

‡ Cic., A., ix. 18, 1.

rate conspiracy for the ruin of Pompey, the confiscation of the goods of the rich and the exploitation of the State. Under these circumstances he could not think of going to the sitting of the Senate: far better make up his mind to rejoin his old friend in Greece.*

49 B.C.

On the 29th of March 48† Cæsar arrived in Rome. It was Cæsar at Rome. nine years since he had left it at the commencement of his Proconsulship. He might have paused to reflect on all that had happened during those eventful years, how the city itself had been changed and beautified. But he had no time now to admire the embellishments of the capital. He found the whole population, from the few Senators who had returned down to the common people, aghast at the idea that the war was to go on, at the armies which were encamping in all parts of Italy and at the revival of the memories of Marius and Sulla. He was in a serious dilemma. He was very unwilling to exasperate the upper classes in Italy and the public in general; yet he needed to set out for Spain at the earliest possible moment and to lay hands on the treasure that Pompey had so foolishly left behind. Antony and Quintus Cassius collected the few remaining Senators outside the city boundary. Cæsar pretended to be in the presence of a legitimate meeting of the Senate and delivered a moderate speech justifying his actions. He denied that he had used violence against any one and declared that he would allow all who wished to go off to join Pompey. He proposed that ambassadors should be sent to Greece to negotiate for peace. He then delivered a similar speech to the people, gave orders for the distribution of corn and promised 300 sesterces to every citizen.‡ All this was intended to reconcile public opinion to the Spanish campaign; but in the prevailing mood of suspicion and uncertainty it only served to intensify the discontent. It was observed that his proposal to negotiate for peace could not possibly be regarded as serious, if he did

* Cic., A., ix. 18, 2.

† Groebe, App. to Drümman, 1², p. 402.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 32; Dion, xli. 15-16; App., B. C., ii. 41; Plut., Cæs., 35.

49 B.C.

not suspend his preparations for war until the arrival of a reply.* The attempt to find an ambassador proved fruitless, in face of the threats of Pompey; and the proposal was thus made to look even more insincere than it was in reality.†

æsar and
the treasure.

Nevertheless in the early days of April the Senate and Cæsar worked together with fair success to create some sort of a Government out of the magistrates who had remained at Rome. It was found that Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, son of the Consul who had died in the revolution of 78 and son-in-law of Servilia, a friend of Cæsar's boyhood and now holding the Prætorship, had stayed behind at Rome owing to his relationship with Servilia and his old intimacy with Cæsar. Here was a fairly trustworthy agent, and the Senate was induced to decide that he should be acting Consul.‡ By another senatorial decree Antony was placed at the head of the troops stationed in Italy, and further decrees ratified Cæsar's selection of Quintus Valerius for Sardinia, Curio for Sicily and Africa, Marcus Licinius Crassus for Transalpine Gaul and Dolabella for Illyricum.§ Thus for a time all went well. But when Cæsar went on to ask the Senate to authorise his use of the Treasury funds, the trouble broke out. Though Cæsar refused to make an open statement, every one understood that the treasure was needed for the Spanish war. Whatever the decision of the Senate || the idea that public money was to be used by one of the rivals for the prolongation of a wicked and calamitous war was highly unpopular and Lucullus Cæcilius Metellus, one of the Tribunes, went so far as to oppose his sacrosanct person against the blacksmiths and soldiers whom Cæsar sent to break the cellar-doors in the Temple of Saturn, where the money was deposited; for the keys had been taken off by the Consuls in their flight. At this Cæsar lost patience; he

* Cic., A., x. 1, 3; Schmidt, B. W. C., 166.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 33; Plut., Cæs., 35.

‡ App., B. C., ii. 41. He is wrong in attributing this to Cæsar. The constitution gave the Prætors the power of replacing absent consuls.

§ App., B. C., ii. 41. I think it probable that all these decisions were ratified by the Senate. See Zumpt, S. R., 203, who takes a contrary view.

|| In the absence of evidence, either may be supposed.

appeared in person at the head of his soldiers and threatened to put the Tribune to death unless he instantly gave way.* 49 B.C.

Fortunately for Cæsar, Metellus had no intention of dying in defence of the law and his sacred rights. Cæsar was able to carry off 15,000 pounds in gold bullion, 35,000 pounds in silver bullion and about forty million sesterces in coin † without shedding the blood of an inviolable magistrate. But the general public was profoundly moved by this exercise of violence against the most popular and the most sacred of the Republican officers. Men saw in it the first symptoms of a new Sullan tyranny. How could the old chief of the popular party now declare that he had taken up arms in defence of the rights of the Tribunes? Confiscation and pillage would soon reveal his true temper! Cæsar was so much disturbed by this change of feeling that he decided upon a speedy departure, without even waiting for a legal authorisation of his campaign. All the rest that he intended to do he put off till his victorious return from Spain. He even gave up the idea of making a great speech before the people, although he had already prepared it.‡ But one reform he still found time to carry through. In order to show the public that he had no intention of becoming a second Sulla, he made Antony propose before the Assembly the abolition of the monstrous and antiquated provision of Sulla excluding the descendants of the proscribed from the privilege of holding office.§ Then he left the city, six or seven days after his arrival, probably on the 6th of April,|| with a small escort of friends.¶

Cæsar hastily
leaves Rome.

* Dion, xli. 17; App., B. C., ii. 41; Plut., Cæs., 35. See Cæs., B. C., i. 33. Note the terms he uses to conceal the seriousness of the action.

† These are the figures of Pliny, N. H., xxxvii. 17. Oros., vi. 15, 5, gives less likely figures.

‡ We have a safe witness of Cæsar's anxiety at the indignation evoked among the common people by his insult to a tribune; the witness is Curio in Cic., A., x. 4, 8. See also Cic., A., x. 8, 6.

§ Dion, xli. 18. Plut., Cæs., 37, puts this reform after his return from Spain.

|| Cic., A., x. 8, 6. See Groebe, App. to Drümman, G. R., 1², p. 402.

¶ Of the six legions Cæsar had at Corfinium, three, certainly the new arrivals, were sent to garrison Brindisi, Sipontum, and Taranto

49 B.C.

Pompey's
forces in Spain.

His short stay at Rome had in fact been rather injurious than useful to his cause. During those few days he lost in public esteem all that he had gained in the four preceding months. Many impartial observers, upon whom his moderation in January and February had made a favourable impression, now felt once more attracted towards the party of Pompey. The sincerity of Cæsar's talk of peace began to be suspected by those who actually witnessed his violence towards a Tribune and set eyes on the wretched band of adventurers by whom he was accompanied.* It seemed absurd to entertain any further illusions. Most probably he and his precious confederates would not be heard of after another six months; but if by any chance he came out conqueror the old ally of Catiline would surely justify the hopes placed in him by the worst section of the Roman population. Cæsar was therefore all the more anxious for some signal success in Spain. Pompey had two legions in Lusitania under the command of his legate Marcus Petreius; he had three more in Nearer Spain under Lucius Afranius and two in Farther Spain under Varro, making a total of seven legions. True, they were only accustomed to guerilla warfare in the mountains and against barbarians.† Yet they were seasoned troops and commanded by trusty and skilful generals. Pompey had sent them orders to remain upon the defensive, hoping to retain part of Cæsar's army in Gaul by threatening the passes of the Pyrenees or to compel Cæsar to the dangerous exploit of an invasion of Spain; and the three generals had formed a common plan of defence. Varro was to remain in Farther Spain with his two legions to hold down the tribes who were as yet but half subdued,‡

(Cic., A., ix. 15, 1); one was given to Q. Valerius, and two to Curio. The Spanish war and the siege of Marsilles were thus conducted with the eight legions left in Gaul.

* See the important letter, Cic., A., x. 8, especially § 6 and 7.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 44.

‡ This appears, judging by Cæsar's own words in B. C., i. 38, to be the true reason why Varro remained in Farther Spain. The motive given in B. C., ii. 17, is a false one. That passage, which bears marks of ill-will and even of calumny, must be erroneous and written in a moment of ill-humour against Varro. It is not only in contradiction with Cæsar's own narrative in B. C., i. 38, but with the char-

while Afranius and Petreius with their united five legions were to advance as far as Lerida, a fortified town in a strong situation near the Pyrenees frontier, to await the enemy if he ventured upon an invasion. Pompey had also induced the nobles of Marseilles to refrain from assisting Cæsar. Without the aid of Marseilles, as Pompey knew very well from his war against Sertorius, it would be difficult to maintain an army in Spain, where the population would certainly be hostile to Cæsar.* The conqueror of Sertorius would be fresh in their memories while the name of Cæsar was almost unknown.† If the Spanish legions had not done all the service that the ingenuous strategists at Rome expected they were none the less, in conjunction with Marseilles, a formidable barrier upon Cæsar's road. 49 B.C.
[Lerida.]
[Massilia.]

Cæsar was indeed soon brought to a halt on his march. When probably on the 19th of April ‡ he arrived under the walls of Marseilles, he found the city gates shut and the Senate steadfastly hostile on the pretext of neutrality. As the occupation of Marseilles was necessary to carry on a vigorous campaign in Spain, Cæsar resolved at once to take it by force, and sent for three legions from Gaul. But before his soldiers came up Domitius arrived by sea, threw himself into the town and began to organise the defence. With Domitius against him the siege of Marseilles became a much longer and more difficult undertaking. Yet it was imperative for Cæsar to come to blows with the Spanish army with the least possible delay. Vexed by this unexpected rebuff and resolved to stake all upon a rapid and signal success, Cæsar suddenly decided upon two exceedingly rash enterprises. He resolved to withdraw all his troops from Gaul and to push on operations simultaneously under the walls of Marseilles and in Spain. No sooner had Cæsar at
Marseilles.

acter of Varro. Varro may have been cold and reserved; but he was certainly also upright and honourable.

* It is impossible to understand this campaign unless it is realised that the military operations in Spain and the siege of Marseilles were intimately connected. Cicero knew this well, but it has escaped the notice of many modern historians. See Cicero, *A.*, x. 12, 6.

† Cæs., *B. C.*, i. 61.

‡ Schmidt, *B. W. C.*, p. 176.

49 B.C.

his three legions arrived than he commenced the siege, giving orders at the same time to the three legions which were already in the Narbonese Province under the orders of Caius Fabius and to the two last legions which remained in Gaul to proceed to Spain.* Fabius was to attempt to detach the native inhabitants of the country from Pompey, while Cæsar himself continued the siege of Marseilles. With that city once in his possession, he would advance into a country already partially conquered and complete the destruction of the armies of Pompey.

Cæsar's new
Gallic policy.

So far as concerned Gaul the venture was entirely successful. Thanks to the measures that Cæsar had taken and to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances, no rising resulted in that country. With his habitual quickness and adaptability Cæsar had prepared for his action by once more exchanging his policy of violence for conciliation. Not only had he done his best to repair the damage caused by the last wars, but he had endeavoured to make peace with the surviving chiefs of the insurrectionary movement. He seems, for instance, to have succeeded in coming to a complete understanding with Commius.† But he had achieved yet more. The Gallic nobles were for the most part men of the sword. A large number of the horsemen and foot-soldiers who were in the pay of the rich now found themselves without employment and many of the impoverished nobles were only awaiting an opportunity for winning riches and renown. With the money from the Treasury and sums which he had borrowed from military Tribunes and Centurions, at once a useful contribution and a pledge of their fidelity, Cæsar had enrolled a force of cavalry and infantry in Gaul and taken many of the nobles into his service on the promise of restoring their confiscated possessions. He was thus able to send into Spain, in addition to his five legions, no less than 3000 volunteers and 6000 cavalry raised from Gaul itself.‡ In short, he had

* Cæs., B. C., i. 37.

† This is the best interpretation of the obscure passage, Dion, xl. 43.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 39.

actually succeeded in securing substantial support from the country which according to his adversaries should have been the greatest of his embarrassments. 49 B.C.

On the other hand his efforts to bring the war to a rapid conclusion led at first to disappointing results. While he was actively continuing his siege works in Marseilles and constructing a small flotilla, Fabius had crossed the Pyrenees; but he was so easily driven back by the troops of Afranius and Petreius that one is inclined to ask whether the retreat was not a feint to tempt the enemy onwards. Fabius encamped on the banks of the Sègre a few miles from Lerida (Sicoris.) and began to scatter large sums of money through the town and the neighbouring country to detach the population from Pompey's cause. Although the two legions had now already joined him,* he remained on the defensive awaiting the fall of Marseilles. Fabius outside
Lerida.

But the whole of May passed, and Marseilles still held out. This unexpected delay very nearly led to a catastrophe in Italy. The reaction in favour of Pompey, which had begun after Cæsar's departure, was steadily gathering force. The resistance of Marseilles had at first been regarded by Pompey's party merely as a poor compensation for the loss of Sicily, which had been abandoned by Cato and successfully occupied by Curio.† But as the weeks went on it began to be thought that Cæsar's simultaneous operations before Marseilles and in Spain could not possibly succeed.‡ The strangest rumours Rumours
in Italy.

* The text of Cæs., B. C., i. 39, which enumerates the forces sent into Spain, is corrupt. But there must have been more than four and not more than five legions. More than four, because in the battle spoken of in Cæs., B. C., i. 40, Fabius sends four legions out of camp against the four of the enemy, and he must have kept one back to guard the camp. Not more than five, because Cæsar had at that time fourteen legions in all; three were protecting the sea-coast towns of Italy (Cic., A., ix. 15, 1); one was in Sardinia, two in Sicily, three before Marseilles (Cæs., B. C., i. 36). There is still a difficulty. With what forces did Dolabella conduct his campaign in Illyria, and whence came the fifteen cohorts sent to his help under C. Antonius (Oros., vi. 15, 9)? They must have come from the seaport garrisons; which is all the more likely as they would do the journey by sea.

† Plut., Cat. U. 53; Cæs., B. C., i. 30; Dion, xli. 41.

‡ Cic., A., x. 12, 6.

49 B.C.

were in circulation; it was said that Pompey had marched across through Illyria and Germany to encounter Cæsar in Gaul.* There were other reasons too why the public should be dissatisfied, not least the extraordinary behaviour of Antony.

Antony.

Antony was the last descendant of one of the noblest families in Rome; yet in some ways he seems more of a typical plebeian than an aristocrat. A regular barbarian, of great physical vigour and powers of enjoyment, a great eater and drinker, jovial, courageous and bloodthirsty, brought up in a primitive independence, removed from all family and social traditions, first among the lowest haunts in Rome and then in the camp, and thus utterly indifferent to the opinions of others, he was gifted by nature with a fair intelligence, a good measure of astuteness and a considerable insight into the more elementary passions of human nature; he could plot and counterplot like the rest and use the ordinary weapons of flattery and intimidation; but he was utterly innocent of any general ideas and had no notion of using his abilities for any other object than the satisfaction of his personal passions. Left by Cæsar the practical master of Italy, he had scandalised even his hardened contemporaries by the shameless licence of his manner of life, keeping a harem of both sexes at Rome, and travelling through the country with Citheris, a Greek courtesan, in his litter.† It is true that such scandals had been seen before in Italy; but Antony's conduct produced an exceptional effect at this moment, when public opinion was particularly impressionable. Several Senators left Rome in disgust; and a rumour was trumpeted abroad, not without reason, that Cicero was anxious to follow their example. Antony was seriously annoyed, and he could think of no better remedy than to bring pressure upon Cicero, at first in a politely worded letter ‡ and then in more outspoken terms,§ to remain in Italy.

Unfortunately towards the end of May the war took a still

* Cic., A., x. 9, 1.

† *Id.*, x. 10, 5.‡ *Id.*, x. 8, A.§ *Id.*, x. 10, 2.

more unfavourable turn for Cæsar. Marseilles was still holding out and Fabius was unsuccessful in his solicitations. The people of Spain remained obstinately faithful to Pompey, partly owing to his reputation in that country, partly to the five legions of Afranius and Petreius, and partly also to the rumours that were skilfully set in circulation. One story was that Pompey was on the point of landing in Africa with a large army.* Fabius was soon in great straits for the supplies and began to be afraid that he would be obliged to retreat. Some striking victory was necessary to win Cæsar the support of the Spanish tribes and to induce them to bring in food to his troops, rather than to those of Pompey.

49 B.C.

Loyalty of the Spaniards to Pompey.

Cæsar therefore decided to take an extreme step—to leave Decimus Brutus and Trebonius at Marseilles and take command of the Spanish army in person to bring about an engagement. Towards the middle of June † he left the besieged city with an escort of 900 cavalry, crossed the Pyrenees, rejoined his army, and at once advanced to Lerida, where Afranius was encamped on a hill, and offered him battle. But Afranius, who was aware of the critical position of his adversary, refused to fight.‡ Cæsar was compelled to force the enemy to an engagement. He discovered a small height situated between Lerida and the hill where Afranius was encamped and commanding Afranius' communications with the town and the stone bridge over the Sègre. One day he suddenly detached three legions to make an assault upon this position. But Afranius and Petreius were on their guard. They sent out their cohorts, and after a sanguinary hand-to-hand struggle Cæsar's legionaries were repulsed at the foot of the rise. The check must have been a serious one,§ for Cæsar, although previously so anxious for an engagement, no longer attempted to take the offensive. Its consequences were soon apparent. The Spanish country towns which Fabius

Cæsar's peril in Spain.

* Cæs., B. C., i. 39.

† This date is clear from Cæs., B. C., ii. 32, where he says that his operations against Afranius and Petreius took forty days, and from C. I. L., i. p. 398, according to which the surrender was on August 2.

‡ Cæs., B. C., i. 41.

§ See Dion, xli. 20.

49 B.C. had won over to Cæsar ceased to send in supplies, and provisioning became a matter of difficulty. Cæsar's embarrassments were increased by a sudden flood of the rivers between which he was encamped, carrying away the bridges. The army was soon reduced to the condition in which it had been under the walls of Alesia, in the clutches of the invisible enemy, famine.* Within a few days the situation had become almost desperate.

Pompey in
the East

The news of the great danger in which Cæsar was placed spread very rapidly through the whole Roman world and reached Rome, of course, in considerably exaggerated form.† At the same time favourable reports of Pompey arrived from Thessalonica. He was making active preparations for war, and was collecting a numerous fleet, provided by the allied states in the East, which he had put under the command of Bibulus. He had recalled one legion from Cilicia to attach

* Cæsar's account in B. C., i. 41-56, should be examined with care and compared with Dion, xli. 20 ff. Cæsar describes (chaps. 43-48) the attack upon the hill as an incident of small importance which had no decisive effect on the subsequent events of the war. On the other hand, in chapters 48-56, he gives the rising of the rivers as the cause of the critical situation in which he was suddenly placed. But in this account there is one fact which is not explained. Cæsar was so anxious for a battle that he had left the siege of Marseilles to bring one about; why then did he make no further attempt towards a serious conflict after this first encounter, which according to him was of uncertain result? Moreover, it is strange that the rising of the rivers was sufficient in itself to bring about so serious a famine. It is probable that the famine resulted rather from the hostile attitude of the Spanish population, which would have been intensified after the semi-defeat sustained by Cæsar. This view is confirmed by an important and illuminating observation of Dion's (xli. 21). He says that the first reverses of Cæsar occasioned a famine and that plenty was restored to the camp of Cæsar, not after the subsidence of the flood, but when the news of the victory of Decimus Brutus at Marseilles restored to Cæsar the friendship of the natives in the surrounding country. To sum up, it appears to me that the necessity of bringing the war to a rapid conclusion impelled Cæsar to the error of attempting at once to besiege Marseilles and to fight in Spain, that this blunder and the comparative failure of his first battle exposed him to great dangers, and that he afterwards endeavoured to conceal his mistake as best he could by alleging that the floods were the cause of the whole difficulty.

† Cæs., B. C., i. 53.

it to the five legions he had brought over from Italy; he was recruiting another from amongst the Roman soldiers who had settled in Greece or Macedonia, and two more were being raised in Asia by Lentulus. He had instructed Scipio to send him two from Syria, and by holding out offers of pay he was enrolling cavalry, slingers and archers from amongst Gauls, Germans, Galatians, Cappadocians, Dardanians and Bessi; he was imposing a tribute or the obligation of furnishing military contingents upon the towns of Asia and Syria, the kings and chiefs of the East, and the great Italian trading companies which did business in the East.* He would shortly be master of the sea, commander of a formidable army, and at the head of a coalition of all the Eastern states under the protectorate of Rome. This news did not fail to influence the public, which already inclined to Pompey's side, and many of the Senators left for Greece, without Antony being able to interfere with their departure. Cicero had already set sail from Formia on the 7th of June,† his fears and hesitations at length subdued. He was angry at the domineering tone adopted towards him by Antony and felt remorse at having allowed Pompey to go off alone on his adventure. He had little confidence in a victory and he realised the full risks of the enterprise; but, when he felt certain that Cæsar was deliberately provoking a war against his friend and benefactor, the writer of the *De Republica* could not display cowardice and ingratitude. It was in vain that his wife begged him at least to wait for the conclusion of the Spanish War.‡

49 B.C.

Cicero leaves Italy.

Cæsar was thus once more in an extremely perilous situation. But fortune again came to his rescue. Towards the middle of July, Decimus Brutus gained a considerable victory over the fleet of Marseilles, and the news of this success, which seemed to make the fall of the city inevitable,

Capitulation of the Pompeians.

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 4; App., B. C., ii. 49.

† Cic., F., xiv. 7. Duruy (H. R., iii. 305) is therefore unjust in reproaching Cicero for flying to Pompey when Cæsar seemed to be on the point of defeat in Spain. On June 7 Cæsar was still at Marseilles.

‡ Cic., A., x. 9, 2. See Cic., A., x. 8, 7.

49 B.C. was exaggerated by the emissaries of Cæsar and caused some dismay among the natives of Spain, particularly those who lived between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. They expected that the legions which were besieging Marseilles would shortly be crossing the Pyrenees, and that a victory for Cæsar was now assured. Many of them therefore abandoned the cause of Pompey and began to send into Cæsar's camp the supplies which they had been furnishing to Afranius and Petreius. The famine crossed over from one camp to the other and Cæsar was thus almost miraculously saved.* The lack of supplies soon forced Afranius and Petreius to prepare to break up their camp and retire across the mountainous district towards Octogesa, then crossing the Ebro and taking refuge among the friendly tribes of Celtiberia. When he heard of their intention Cæsar at once made arrangements for pursuit. Calculating that it would be a slow business to take his army over the weak wooden bridges which crossed the Sègre, he conceived the idea of reducing the size of the river by constructing basins and canals by its banks, thus forming an artificial ford which his soldiers could cross on foot. The troops took pick and shovel and set cheerfully to work; but their labours were still only half completed when the enemy got wind of them and hastily began their retreat. The river was still flowing deep and strong and Afranius and Petreius were in full flight. Cæsar hesitated a moment; then he had all work suspended, drove his army into the ford and crossed the river without losing a man. Once out of the dangerous island he might have attacked Afranius and Petreius on their march, but fearing that the Spanish legions might fight with the courage of despair, he preferred to work for a bloodless capitulation. Throwing his legions, unimpeded by baggage, across the hills and the valleys by a long irregular route and by forced marches, he forged ahead of the enemy's army as it con-

* Cæs. (B. C., i. 59-60) scarcely alludes to this change in the attitude of the Spaniards, and does not let it appear that this was the real cause of the *commutatio rerum*. On the other hand the true course of events is well described by Dion, xli. 21—another proof that Dion is following the text of an author who had studied Cæsar's wars with discernment and was not blindly dependent upon the *Commentaries*.

tinued its retreat on the high road to Octogesa. Arriving before them at a gorge in the hills through which the road passed, he forced the enemy to retrace their steps in the direction of Lerida; and as soon as they were on the march he advanced on their heels, harassing the stragglers and cutting off supplies. Afranius and Petreius used all their efforts to save the army; but their soldiers rose against them and they were forced to surrender on the 2nd of August.*

Cæsar was magnanimous in his conditions. He allowed them all both their life and their money; the soldiers were free to go where they wished, either to retreat to Pompey or to take service under Cæsar's standard, or to re-enter private life. Some time afterwards Varro, who had remained with two legions in Farther Spain, capitulated without a battle. His two legions joined the standard of Cæsar † and the whole of Spain was thus in the power of the Proconsul of Gaul. Cæsar held a sort of Diet at Cordova, made a great number of Spaniards Roman citizens, and imposed a considerable money tribute; then he passed on to Cadiz, which he gave the rights of a Roman city, ‡ and thence by sea to Tarragona, leaving Quintus Cassius with four legions to administer the country. He left Spain by land for Marseilles, where he arrived towards the end of September. Here he learned that about the middle of August Marcus Lepidus had made use of the impression produced by his success in Spain to nominate him Dictator. He had done so by passing a law through the Assembly authorising him to act with the powers of a Consul §—an arrangement which had probably been agreed upon beforehand between Lepidus and Cæsar. Cæsar distrusted the Senators who remained behind at Rome and did not wish that the elections for 48 should be presided over in the absence of the Consuls by an interrex nominated by them. As Dictator he would, of course, preside over them himself.

* C. I. L., i. p. 398. This part of the war is narrated in Cæs., B. C., i. 61-87.

† Oros., vi. 15, 7.

‡ Dion, xli. 24.

§ Cæs., B. C., ii. 21; Dion, xli. 36. See Zumpt, S. R., 205 f.

Cæsar
nominated
Dictator.

[Corduba.]

[Gades.]

[Tarraco.]

CHAPTER XIV

PHARSALIA, 48 B.C.

Distress in Italy—Death of Curio in Africa—Cæsar after the Spanish victories—He returns to Rome—His first Dictatorship—Cæsar and the question of debt—He sets sail from Brindisi—Cæsar and Pompey on the Apsus—Renewed efforts for peace—Pompey's camp—Arrival of Cæsar's reinforcements—Rashness of Cæsar and caution of Pompey—Cæsar's defeat at Durazzo—Critical position of Cæsar—Pharsalia.

49 B.C. FOR Lepidus and the remnant of the Senate which remained at Rome Cæsar's Dictatorship perhaps provided a welcome

Financial crisis
in Italy.

means of withdrawing from the alarming responsibilities which were crowding in upon them. Since Cæsar's departure Italy had passed through a time of frightful distress. The suspension of public payments, which had been decreed by the Senate simultaneously with the *tumultus*, the exhaustion of the Treasury, which Cæsar had emptied and from which Pompey was cutting off the tribute of Asia, the interruption of public works, the sudden departure from Italy of a large number of the wealthier citizens, the requisition of all the ships necessary for the transport of troops and supplies, the enormous forced loans that Pompey had raised from the temples of Italy, the recruiting of a large part of the youth of the country, the interruption of normal electoral and political activity, all these had combined to provoke an economic crisis of the gravest character. Trade, in all its branches, was almost at a standstill; the middle class missed the profits it drew from its trained slaves and freedmen, while at Rome especially a large number of artisans and small traders felt the lack of employment. Corn was scarce; bankers and capitalists refused to give loans, for fear of a revolution which might end in the abolition of debts: and

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money was therefore almost unobtainable.* Debtors who had hitherto paid their debts or their interest at fixed seasons, by contracting new debts to pay them, found it impossible to borrow; fathers were no longer in a position to pay the dowries they had promised to their daughters, nor divorced husbands to pay them back as the law required. At Rome and throughout Italy landlords of houses were unable to collect their rents, debtors and creditors were at one another's throats, and many were obliged to sell all that they had if they were lucky enough to find a buyer. But there were many offers and few to take them. Prices fell to an unprecedented level, whether for gold or silver ware, or jewels or stuffs or furniture or land or houses. The decree of the Senate in 51, reducing the rate of interest, afforded little alleviation; for most people were in such straits that they continued to pile up debts on any conditions imposed upon them by the capitalists, and took no notice of a decree which seems universally to have been regarded as a dead letter. Thus the great question of debt became more and more urgent.† Lepidus, the acting Consul, was a man of forty-one, of no great capacity or influence in the State, who had only been prominent in politics hitherto during the unfortunate interregnum which followed on the death of Clodius, and he gladly threw off the whole responsibility of his position upon Cæsar.

Unfortunately Cæsar, who was now returning in all haste to Italy, was hardly in a position to face new difficulties with equanimity. In spite of his remarkable success in Spain his prospects were still very precarious. It is true that, when all hopes of reinforcements from Spain had disappeared, Marseilles had finally capitulated and consented to pay a large indemnity.‡ But in Africa and Illyria Cæsar's party had suffered two serious reverses. Curio, who had ventured into Africa with only two legions, although Cæsar

Illyria and
Africa lost
to Cæsar.

* See Cic., A., ix. 9, 4, *propter nummorum caritatem*.

† Dion, xli. 37; Appian, B. C., ii. 48. The measures which were later taken by Cæsar and those proposed by Cælius and Dolabella show that this was the real trouble from which Italy was then suffering.

‡ Dion, xli. 25

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had sent him two more,* had paid dear for his rashness. He had at first easily defeated Atius Varus, Cæsar's victim in Picenum, who had fled into Africa to recruit a small army; but he had then been entrapped into an ambush by Pompey's ally Juba, King of Numidia, where he had been surrounded and killed. Only a few stragglers from his little army had found their way back to Italy.† Meanwhile Dolabella, who had proceeded with a part of the fleet to attempt the conquest of Illyria, had been severely defeated at sea by Marcus Octavius and Lucius Scribonius Libo. He had then appealed to Antony for reinforcements. Antony sent him the fleet under Hortensius and the three legions which were garrisoning the coast towns under the command of Sallust, Basilius, and his brother Caius; but these reinforcements had been repulsed and Caius himself made prisoner with fifteen cohorts.‡ Illyria and Africa thus remained in the power of the enemy. The advantage that Cæsar had secured from the two legions of Varro and the recruits who had come over from Afranius and Petreius was cancelled by losses of greater importance; and, what was more serious still, a part of the fleet had been destroyed just at the moment when Cæsar most needed it for carrying the war into the East; for the land route to Macedonia was cut off by the defeat in Illyria.

But the difficulties of transport, whether by land or sea, were perhaps the least of those which the new campaign presented. Pompey had collected a force of some 50,000 men, against which Cæsar had only twelve legions, and those so weary after their hardships that the six which returned from Spain by forced marches dropped invalids at every stage § and their total after all losses was hardly above 25,000. || It would really

* Cæs., B. C., ii. 23. There is a difficulty here. Which were these two legions? Perhaps the one which had been sent to Sardinia and one of those which had been detached for the protection of the coast towns of Italy.

† Cæs., B. C., ii. 24-44; App., B. C., ii. 44-46; Dion, xli. 41-42.

‡ Oros., vi. 15, 8; App., B. C., ñ. 47; Dion, xli. 40; Florus, iv. 2; Cæs., B. C., iii. 10.

§ Cæs., B. C., iii. 2.

|| From Cæs., B. C., iii. 2 and iii. 6 it is clear that the seven legions embarked at Brindisi amounted to 15,000 men.

have been advisable, from the military point of view, to close up the ranks by reducing the number of the legions; but this would have involved cutting off some of the posts for officers, *tribuni militum* and centurions, which Cæsar had always endeavoured to maintain as an avenue of promotion for the best of the common soldiers. Moreover Albania, Macedonia and Greece were poor countries where an army, however small, could not subsist for long unless supported by supplies from oversea—from Egypt or Sardinia or Sicily or the Chersonese. Pompey's command of the sea would enable him to capture the corn ships, and might reduce Cæsar to the same straits as Sulla during his Mithridatic campaign. Worst of all, Cæsar was short of money, and the war promised to be enormously costly. Almost the whole of the money from the Treasury and from Gaul had been expended in Spain in gifts to the natives. Under these circumstances he could not help asking himself whether his soldiers, hitherto so faithful, would continue to follow him upon this last and most hazardous adventure. One legion had just mutinied at Piacenza and refused to advance unless it received the rewards promised at Brindisi. Cæsar had been so much disquieted by this revolt that he had threatened the rebellious legion with decimation, though he had afterwards yielded to the appeals of his officers and had only punished twelve soldiers whom he pretended to select by lot; in reality, at least so it was believed at the time, he had arranged things in such a way as to select those whom the centurions pointed out as the ringleaders.*

Immediately on Cæsar's arrival at Rome his father-in-law and the most influential members of his party begged him to send ambassadors to Pompey.† Cæsar would gladly have consented, if he had entertained the slightest hope of their success. He was aware of the difficulties of an eastern campaign, and the danger of the indefinite continuance of civil war. But he knew that Pompey would listen to no terms, and that his only chance lay in a speedy and vigorous

Cæsar's new
plan of
campaign.

* App., B. C., ii. 47; Dion, xli. 26-35.

† Plut., Cæs., 37.

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prosecution of the campaign. Thus it was that, partly out of anxiety to put an end to a time of dangerous suspense, partly out of a confidence in sudden and unexpected action confirmed by recent events, he prepared perhaps the most daring of all the surprises of his career. His scheme was to be nominated Consul for 48, and then, at the opening of the year, when he could enter upon his province as the legitimate representative of the Republic, to embark all his troops, without slaves and with the least possible encumbrance, so as to be able to land them at any creek on the coast, without using a harbour; to leave a small garrison of Gallic and Spanish horse to defend Italy, to venture across the sea in midwinter when he would be least expected, and then to face the enemy blindly trusting to fortune and the valour of his men. Before Pompey had recovered from the surprise of his sudden appearance in Epirus, he would offer him terms of peace as legitimate Consul; there was no knowing if he would not accept them. While still on his way to Rome, without divulging his plan even to his intimates,* he sent on to Brindisi his twelve legions and all the ships that he could requisition from Italian harbours; and he began to collect war stores as though he were preparing a campaign at leisure in the spring.

The eleven
days in Rome.

But Cæsar could not go on straight to Brindisi without stopping for a few days in Rome, to assume the Dictatorship and to make the most necessary provisions for the ordinary administration. He entered Rome towards the end of November,† and stayed there eleven days,‡ perhaps the most crowded even in his crowded life. He presided over the elections, which of course resulted favourably to his party; he was elected Consul with Publius Servilius Vatia, son of the Isauricus under whom Cæsar had fought as a boy, while the new Prætors were Cælius, Trebonius, Quintus Pedius, son of one of his nieces, and perhaps Caius Vibius Pansa.§

* App., B. C., ii. 52, proves that the departure from Brindisi took place unexpectedly, and earlier than had been awaited.

† Mommsen, C. I. L., i², p. 40.

‡ Cæs., B. C., iii. 1.

§ Lange, R. A., iii. 411.

He presided over the Latin holidays; he caused various magistrates to propose to the people the recall of many of those condemned by Pompey's laws in 52 and earlier, amongst others Gabinius, but not Milo;* he passed a law granting citizen rights to the whole of Cisalpine Gaul;† and he attempted also to deal in some way with the question of debt.

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His action in this last question is one of the most important episodes in Cæsar's life, both in itself and for the consequences to which it led. The desperate competition for wealth in which all Italy was engaged had ended, as it seems that such competition always will end, in a gigantic accumulation of vested interests, which it needed nothing less than a revolution, a cataclysm, to break down. Enormous loans had been contracted at exorbitant rates of interest for the improvement of agriculture and industry or the promotion of a high standard of comfort and culture. These debts were steadily accumulating, and it was impossible for Italy to shake them off. Not even the spoils of a second Gaul or Asia would have sufficed. Yet the age of expansion seemed definitely closed; before long there would be no more unexpected importations of gold and silver captured in war; debtors could place little hope in legislative assistance, and would soon be forced to meet their claims by their own efforts. When this point was reached the liquidation of this immense mass of debt would automatically follow. Yet the injury such a liquidation would entail to the whole structure of Italian life was appalling to contemplate. There were many upper class families who might still manage to keep afloat by playing off their creditors against their debtors and reducing their scale of living. Not so the middle class. The houses they had built and the slaves they had bought and trained with so much care during the last twenty years would pass into the hands of a small group of capitalist creditors, and with them would disappear the industrious and intelligent bourgeoisie which had been slowly formed

The question of debt.

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 1, rectifies Dion, xli. 36; App., B. C., ii. 48, and Plut., Cæs., 37. See Lange, R. A., iii. 411.

† Dion, xli. 36.

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during the last half century. The progress of this class is really the central feature in the history of Cæsar's time. On its prosperity the future of Italy depended, and its ruin would have meant the stifling of all her nascent energies. The fate of this class depended entirely upon the solution of the problem of debt; and this solution could only be achieved by one of those revolutionary strokes which recur periodically in the history of nations. There was no other way out. This is proved by what happened seven years later, when under far less favourable conditions, entailing much greater hardship and suffering, the abolition of debt was finally adopted, like a surgical operation which is the more dangerous and painful the longer it has been delayed.*

It is often said that in a great historical crisis a man of genius can divine the future course of events and drive the reluctant multitude along it, thus saving a whole nation by his own single-handed exertions. If this were true, Cæsar, who was indisputably a man of genius, would have done so now. He had not shrunk from the most revolutionary action when his own life was endangered. He would not have shrunk from any measures, however high-handed, that were necessary, had he only known it, to save, not himself, but the combined labour of a whole generation, the civilisation of his people, the spiritual future of Europe. But Cæsar could see no farther than the other men of his day; and he acted, like all politicians, according to the impressions and the needs of the moment. In his ambition to win the place and authority of Pompey, as the controlling personality at Rome, it was to his interest to appear rigidly law-abiding, to avoid vexing or frightening the upper classes, the rich knights and capitalists, the landholding aristocracy and the wealthy members of the middle class. Ever since he crossed the Rubicon the moneyed classes had accused him of meditating *novæ tabulæ*, the Abolition of debt.† They remembered the pillaging of forty years ago, in the great

* We shall see in vol. iii. (*Da Cesare a Augusto*: Milan, 1904, chapter xi.) that the proscriptions arranged in 43-42 by Antony, Lepidus and Octavian were not dictated by political revenge, but by the desire to get rid of the richest men in Italy and confiscate their capital and their credit.

† Cic., A., vii. 7, 7; A., x. 8, 2.

Cæsar and
the abolition
of debt.

democratic upheaval, and they lived in dread of a wholesale spoliation. They found allies, curiously enough, among those in their own station of life who were themselves most deeply in debt. These timid Epigoni of Catiline shrank from the far-reaching disturbance that Abolition would entail. They hated the popular party on whose banner it stood inscribed; they were many of them at the mercy of capitalists who had lent them money; they shared the strange respect, almost amounting to adoration, which the rich seem destined to inspire; they feared that the abolition of debt would be merely a prelude to the confiscation of lands; and they clung to that abstract sentiment of justice which is often so lively in educated persons and makes them so ill-disposed to anything savouring of revolution.* All these various apprehensions had been confirmed by Cæsar's nomination to the Dictatorship, with its memories of Sulla's spoliation at the close of the last civil war. Cæsar therefore desired to show the rich that he intended before all to respect the rights of property. Following the precedent set under similar conditions in the cities of Greece,† and imitated by Cicero in Cilicia, he adopted an ingenious if unpractical device which many modern admirers of Cæsar, in their contempt for Cicero, have denounced as ridiculous. Debtors were to hand over their goods not at the existing prices but at what they would have fetched before the civil war; if creditors and debtors failed to arrive at an agreement about the price arbitrators were to be called in to settle it; the interest already paid was to be subtracted from the capital.‡ It seems that to avoid unpleasant discussions in the Assembly Cæsar sanctioned this arrangement by his own authority as Dictator.§ He also attempted to bring capital forcibly into

* Cf. Cic., *De Off.*, ii. xxiv. 84.

† Compare Cæsar's measures with those taken at Ephesus during the Mithridatic war; they are detailed in the great inscription published by Dareste, *N. R. H. D.*, 1877, p. 161 f.

‡ Cæs., *B. C.*, iii. 1; Suet., *Cæs.*, 42; Dion, xli. 37 is confused; though he gives exact details as to the arbitrators, App., *B. C.*, ii. 48; Plut., *Cæs.*, 37, barely allude to the whole subject.

§ This seems clear from Cæs., *B. C.*, iii. 1, and from the care which he takes to inform us that the recall of the exiles was decided by a law of the people.

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circulation by putting an old and long-forgotten law into operation, forbidding persons to keep more than 60,000 sesterces in gold or silver in their houses;* and he made a last concession to public opinion by abdicating his Dictatorship at the end of the eleven days, since it was useless to him after the elections. Then he left Rome amidst the plaudits of the people, who seized the opportunity of his departure to make demonstrations in favour of peace.† It was still generally hoped that a settlement was in sight.

Cæsar slips
across the
Adriatic.

Cæsar on the other hand was firm in his resolve to precipitate an issue. The ships he had collected were only enough to carry a little more than half his troops, and to make a second journey was perilous. But he refused to wait. He appeared at Brindisi unexpectedly in December, called together his soldiers, told them his plan, made them new and more tempting promises. He then embarked 15,000 men, without corn or slaves or beasts of burden and with only the light baggage that a legionary can carry at the end of his spear. The rest of the troops he left with Gabinius, Fufius Calenus and Antony, with orders to embark them as soon as the ships returned. On the 4th of January 48 ‡ he put out to sea, taking with him the young Asinius Pollio and his subordinates Cnæus Domitius Calvinus, Publius Vatinius, Publius Sulla, the unfortunate Consul of 65, Lucius Cassius and Caius Calvisius Sabinus. His calculations proved correct. The enemy had not expected him to embark before spring. Bibulus was caught napping. His ships lay rocking on the grey Adriatic in the cold and threatening winter weather, while his sailors sat chattering round the tavern fires in port. When he learnt that the enemy had put out from Brindisi, Cæsar and his army had already landed in a lonely creek near Oricum.

Renewed
efforts for
peace.

Once safely on shore Cæsar entered upon a twofold policy of conciliation and aggression. He at once sent an ambassador to propose peace once more to Pompey, § who was at this

* Dion, xli. 38. † App., B. C., ii. 48. ‡ Cæs., B. C., iii. 6.

§ Cæsar, B. C., iii. 10. I see no reason to doubt that these proposals were made seriously and not to gain time, as Dion suggests (xli. 47), or to throw the responsibility for the war upon his opponent,

moment taking his troops from Macedonia to Durazzo into winter quarters. At the same time he endeavoured to seize the whole coast up to Durazzo, the most important port in that region. His object was to keep open every possible chance of peace, and at the same time to take possession of a huge tract of country, including several towns, from which he could draw not merely corn, but also beasts of burden, leather, wood, iron and necessary implements. He had no difficulty in seizing Oricum and Apollonia, where the small garrisons of Italians were discouraged by the attitude of the natives, who favoured the invader, not because his name was Cæsar but because he was legitimate Consul;* but he failed to take Durazzo. Learning on his way that Cæsar had landed and divining his intentions, Pompey advanced his army by forced marches and threw himself into the city before him. Cæsar then encamped on the banks of the Apsus, a small stream to the south of Durazzo, to await the effect of his sudden appearance and the reply to his advances. Pompey and his army were on the opposite bank of the river.

The two rivals were at last face to face, but, as Cæsar had feared, peace was as far off as ever. As soon as Pompey's camp had recovered from the inconvenience of the hasty march, his intimates Lucceius, Theophilus of Mitylene and Libo submitted

Cæsar's new
plan of
campaign.

as might also be supposed. Not only was Cæsar's situation so dangerous as to tempt any man gifted with ordinary common sense to accept an agreement; but negotiations were reopened in too many different ways and with too much ingenuity to be dismissed as insincere. In reality it was Cæsar who first lent ear to the proposals of Libo (B. C., iii. 16, 17) which were evidently designed to secure a truce. Later, during the siege of Durazzo, he endeavoured to induce Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, to interpose in favour of peace (B. C., iii. 57). Finally, during the active operations, at a date which it is impossible to determine, he endeavoured through the mediation of Cornelius and Balbus to win over Lentulus to the cause of peace (Vell., ii. 51). Balbus, who was the friend both of Pompey and Cæsar, used all his efforts during the war to arrange a peace. Moreover, if Cæsar had not been anxious for peace he would have been foolish to propose it; for by causing his opponent to believe that he was frightened he cancelled the effect produced by his rapidity and his daring, upon which he relied greatly to compensate his inferiority in numbers.

* App., B. C., ii. 54.

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to him the proposals brought by Cæsar's ambassador. Pompey cut them short at once with an objection to which there was no reply. "I cannot return to Italy by the grace of Cæsar."* On the other hand Cæsar's attempted surprise had turned out a failure. Bibulus, not to be caught a second time, had sent Libo with fifty ships to blockade the port of Brindisi, and was keeping careful watch over the sea, despite the inclemency of the season. The troops Cæsar had left behind him in Italy were thus unable to cross and Cæsar found himself isolated with 15,000 men against an enemy almost three times his number. It was hardly likely that Pompey and the Roman aristocrats in his camp would be ready to conclude peace at a moment when Cæsar, who had rashly ventured out of Italy with but a weak force at his disposal, was practically at their mercy. Cæsar was left with no alternative but to alter his plans once more—to send his soldiers into winter quarters, to wait till the rest of his troops could somehow reach him from Brindisi, to seize the country behind him, sending out skirmishing parties on all sides to fetch in supplies, and to keep a careful watch over the coast in order to prevent the fleet of Bibulus from watering and thus obliging it to undertake long and frequent journeys to Corfu, when it would be easier for his ships to slip across from Brindisi. For the fleets of antiquity water played the same part as coal plays to-day: it bound down their movements to certain points on the mainland.

[Corcyra.]

Pompey and
his camp.

But would not Pompey take advantage of his numerical superiority and force the enemy to give battle? That was the advice of the majority of officers in his camp. But Pompey had not the untiring nervous resistance of his adversary; the short-lived energy he had displayed before and after his retreat across the Adriatic had once more deserted him, and he seems to have been utterly worn out by the hardships and anxieties inseparable from a civil war in which a single defeat means the break-up of a whole party and army. During all this campaign he is no longer the powerful, if prudent, strategist of the Mithridatic war, but a changed and feebler man. His characteristic aristocratic defects of slowness and irresolution clung

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 18.

to him all through ; he seems almost like a man with a disease of doubt, unable to come to even the smallest decision, pleading continually for patience, for consideration, for delay. With a morose and brooding vanity which he thought a mark of strength, but which was really the weakness of exhaustion, he withdrew from the life of the camp and kept his own counsel. The camp as a whole was left to govern itself. It is easy to imagine to what a chaos it was soon reduced, crowded as it was with a motley assemblage of Roman Senators and financiers of all ages and temperaments, with Oriental monarchs and barbarian chieftains. The great personages from Rome, weary of the privations they had been forced to tolerate and of the difficulties to which they had been reduced after lending Pompey all the money they had been able to collect,* were impatient to return to Italy, and they emphasised their complaints with threats of vengeance and confiscation which struck the good Cicero with dismay.† They regarded one another with unconcealed distrust ; they quarrelled over petty points of personal precedence ; and they flung accusations of treachery broadcast from morning till night.‡ After all they had nothing better to do. Afranius and Cicero had been received in the camp with distrust and almost with contempt. Atticus himself, who had remained at Rome, was threatened with reprisals as though he were a deserter.§ Those who, like Brutus, took no interest in the war and stayed reading in their tents || could be treated still more lightly. In this temper they were naturally impatient to precipitate a battle. But Pompey paid no attention to their appeals. He listened only to the advice of a few intimate friends, who endeavoured to check the arrival of reinforcements, continued to keep the army under discipline, hastily recalled Scipio from Asia and, instead of attacking Cæsar on the spot, preferred to wait till famine had decimated his forces, in the hope of inflicting a more crushing defeat.

Thus week succeeded week, and nothing of importance took place. In Cæsar's camp supplies became scantier and scantier,

* See Cic., A., xi. 3, 2, who corrects Cæs., B. C., iii. 96.

† *Id.*, F., iv. 14, 2 ; A., xi. 6, 2.

‡ Plut., Pomp., 66-67.

§ Cic., A., xi. 6, 2.

|| Plut., Brut., 4.

48 B.C. and he received neither news nor reinforcements from Italy. Cæsar began to grow anxious. He had failed in his design of surprising the enemy; on the other hand peace was impossible and his commissariat was insecure. To extricate himself from this imbroglio he needed either the immediate arrival of his 10,000 soldiers from Italy or else a victory. Could Gabinius, Antonius and Calenus succeed in crossing the sea, and if so, when? Fortunately, at this juncture, Bibulus died, and Pompey, with his usual indecision, nominated no one in his place. The fleet broke up into numerous small squadrons each of which operated separately in different parts of the Adriatic. As the spring approached there were several occasions on which the wind was favourable. Nevertheless the three generals were so afraid of crossing the Adriatic in the teeth of the Pompeian fleet that they refused to embark.* Cæsar became more and more anxious; he began to fear treachery and wrote severe despatches to Calenus and Antony. It is even said that he one day attempted to cross alone on a small ship to Brindisi.†

Cæsar and the reinforcements.

Antony slips across to join him.

Under the pressure of these repeated appeals the three generals at last decided to act. They divided their forces. Gabinius with fifteen cohorts resolved to attempt the land journey and to pass through Dalmatia to join Cæsar in Albania,‡ while Calenus and Antony ventured to cross by sea. One day the two armies which were encamped opposite one another on the gulf of Durazzo saw a numerous fleet of vessels approaching with a good south wind behind them. There was a general rush to the shore, and it was soon ascertained that the fleet was Antony's. Coponius, the Pompeian admiral who commanded the fleet which lay at anchor in the port of Durazzo sallied out with his ships; and the two squadrons disappeared towards the north. Skirmishers went out from the two camps to learn the news, and the troops were kept under arms and ready to

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 23-24.

† *Id.*, 25; Dion, xli. 46; Plut., Cæs., 38; App., B. C., ii. 57.

‡ App., Ill., 12; B. C., ii. 59. The account in *De Bell. Al.*, 42-43, is rather different.

march. Cæsar must have gone through some hours of terrible anxiety. For his fate depended entirely upon the wind. But before long he learnt that, thanks to a favourable breeze, Antony had been able to land his four legions almost in their entirety in a small bay not far from Alessio. [Lissus.] Pompey and Cæsar at once made for this place with part of their armies and by different routes. Pompey was anxious to defeat Antony before he could join Cæsar, and Cæsar to join Antony and return in safety with his reinforcements. Cæsar arrived first and successfully united his forces; and Pompey was forced to retire southwards towards Durazzo, encamping his troops at Asparagium.

Antony and Calenus brought Cæsar anything but cheering news from Italy. The debt question, which Cæsar thought he had settled by ingenious manipulation, had become more acute than ever after his departure, and seemed on the point of provoking something like a miniature civil war within the ranks of his own party. Cælius, the clever but unbalanced friend of Cicero, who was the son of a banker at Pozzuoli, a Conservative by party and the rival of Catullus in the affections of Lesbia, had been induced by the pressure of his debts and the spur of ambition to propose two laws, one dispensing tenants with the payment of arrears of rent, and another simply abolishing debts altogether. The Consul and Trebonius had opposed them, and disorders had resulted. Milo, who had returned from Marseilles in agreement with Cælius, had recruited bands of gladiators and slaves in southern Italy, and attempted to provoke an insurrection. Finally both Milo and Cælius had been defeated and killed by the Gallic and Spanish cavalry whom Cæsar had left behind to protect Italy.*

Cæsar was all the more anxious to bring operations to a rapid conclusion. The war seemed to bring out, in him as in Pompey, the characteristic defects of their qualities. While Pompey was a prey to something like a mania of doubt, Cæsar, always prone to feats of daring, now allowed himself to be carried away by fantastic conceptions of

Rising of
Cælius.

Cæsar tempts
Pompey to
fight.

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 20-22.

48 B.C.

strategy which almost bordered on madness. Difficulties of commissariat impelled him, too, to try to finish the war whatever the risk. He sent Lucius Cassius to Thessaly with a newly recruited legion, Caius Calvisius Sabinus into Ætolia with five cohorts, and Cnæus Domitius Calvinus into Macedonia with two legions. Calvinus' orders were to procure corn and to face Scipio, who was moving up and down Asia raising money everywhere, even to the appropriation of considerable deposits left in the temples. Cæsar then moved close up to Pompey and several times offered him battle, but always in vain. Pompey was, of course, as anxious to temporise as Cæsar was anxious to fight. Cæsar then attempted to entice his enemy out by placing himself, after a quick and skilful march, between Pompey's camp and his base at Durazzo. But Pompey still refused to give battle and merely changed the position of his camp, placing it in a spot called Petra on the hills of the Gulf of Durazzo in such a way as to command the coast and communicate by sea with the town.

The lines of
Durazzo.

Cæsar could now no longer control his impatience. Ever since his success at Alesia he had been as confident of victory with the spade as with the sword, and he now adopted the most singular and unprecedented tactics—nothing less than to imprison the enemy between a huge earthwork and the sea, hoping thus to force him to a sortie. His troops took pick and shovel and set to the familiar task. Pompey's soldiers replied by constructing a rampart strengthened with towers on the model of Cæsar's; and soon a campaign of surprises and skirmishing began around these earthworks. Cæsar harassed the army of Pompey by cutting off its water, by preventing it from sending its horses out to pasture, and by enclosing it in a narrow and unhealthy angle of ground. But instead of marching out and giving battle Pompey embarked his cavalry for Durazzo and endeavoured to diminish Cæsar's strength by a policy of passive resistance. Last year's harvest in Epirus and Macedonia was by now exhausted: the Pompeian fleet, now divided into four squadrons commanded by Caius Cassius, Cnæus Pompeius, Marcus Octavius

48 B.C.

and Decimus Lælius, prevented all provisioning by sea; and Cæsar's soldiers were soon forced to live on roots. The whole of the Empire fixed its anxious gaze upon this corner of Epirus, where, in a campaign without battles, a desperate and obstinate conflict was at last being fought out. Which of the two armies could hold out the longer? Cæsar's troops were soon reduced to so pitiful a condition that he himself gave secret instructions to Scipio to interpose for the conclusion of peace. One day, however, one of the ordinary skirmishes round the entrenchments developed by accident into a regular battle, in which Cæsar's exhausted soldiers were severely defeated. Cæsar left 1000 dead on the field and lost thirty-two ensigns.*

If Pompey had only pressed home his success this battle might have proved Cæsar's death-blow. But he refused to run any risks. Satisfied with what he had already achieved, he led his victorious cohorts back into camp. Nevertheless it was a very serious check for Cæsar. Many people began to say that the skill which he had displayed in his campaigns against barbarians would not suffice against a general like Pompey, who had won campaign after campaign from Sulla's civil wars down to the capture of Jerusalem. To crown his misfortunes, news came at this moment that Gabinius had failed to break through to Albania after losing many soldiers on the way in skirmishes with the native Illyrians. He had succeeded in saving Salona, which was being besieged by Marcus Octavius, but there he had fallen ill, and after his death the remains of his small army had dispersed.† It would indeed have been disastrous for Cæsar if the confidence of his soldiers and their hope of future recompense had failed him at this moment. In reality, however, his defeat at Durazzo was of great use to him. It calmed the excitement in which he had of late been living and forced him to abandon his fantastic siege-

Cæsar retires into Thessaly.

[Near Spalato.]

* Schmidt has thought it justifiable to infer from Cic., A., xi. 4, that this battle took place between June 14 and 18. Cæsar's figures, quoted above, are less than those given by the other authorities.

† App., Ill., 12; Dion, xlii. 11.

48 B.C. works and to lead his army into a less desolate region to join Domitius Calvinus and Lucius Cassius, who had meanwhile been fighting against Scipio in Macedonia. Some days after his defeat, towards the end of June, after reassuring his soldiers with new promises, he set out on his retreat for Thessaly, leaving the wounded behind at Apollonia under the care of four cohorts. If Pompey had started immediately in pursuit he might still have overtaken and crushed him. But Pompey as usual preferred to temporise, and his friends and intimates were divided in counsel. Some wished immediately to follow up the enemy, others to return to Italy, others to continue the tactics hitherto pursued.* Pompey finally decided to leave Cato and Cicero at Durazzo with fifteen cohorts to protect the baggage, and himself to follow slowly on the heels of the enemy hoping to wear him down by famine, even after he had joined forces with Calvinus.

The battle of
Pharsalia.

Cæsar's fate now depended entirely on the patience of his enemy. The two armies marched into Thessaly and drew up opposite to one another in the plain of Pharsalia. Pompey had now joined forces with Scipio, and the tiresome operations which had been going on for the last six months seemed about to recommence. But the Roman nobles, elated by their victory at Durazzo and impatient to return home, were anxious to finish off the campaign. The leading Pompeians could not conceal their contempt for a war in which the sole object appeared to be to avoid giving battle. They told Pompey plainly that he had grown so old and feeble that he did not dare to attack an already conquered foe whose forces were hardly half his own.† They set every artifice at work to force their unhappy general to an engagement. Worn out and disgusted by continual criticism, he allowed himself at last to be persuaded to offer battle on the 9th of August in the plain of Pharsalia.‡ He ranged his cohorts in three lines with his right flank on the Enipeus and placed all his cavalry on

* Plut., Pomp., 66.

† *Id.*, 67.

‡ C. I. L., i. p. 324 (*Fasti Amiternini*), p. 328 (*Fasti Ant.*), August 9.

the left flank. His plan was to throw his horse upon the less numerous cavalry of Cæsar, and thus to break through his right flank. Cæsar marched out the eighty cohorts which were left to him (two others were protecting the camp) and ranged them in three lines. But when he saw the whole of the enemy's cavalry massed on the left he withdrew six cohorts from the third line, and made a fourth line, which he placed on the right flank behind the cavalry so as to help it to repulse any turning movement from Pompey's side. He put Antony on the left wing, Calvinus in the centre, Publius Sulla on the right, himself remaining on the right wing to face Pompey. Then he moved up his first two lines. But the enemy stood firm. Pompey's cavalry then endeavoured to turn Cæsar's right wing, but Cæsar's cavalry, strengthened by the six cohorts of the fourth line, at first stood its ground, then gradually moved forward to the attack, and ended by putting the enemy's cavalry to flight. The six cohorts of the fourth line, finding the road open, repulsed the left wing of Pompey's army and menaced it in the rear. Cæsar at once made use of his opportunity to withdraw the two first lines, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, and brought up his third line, which was still fresh. Pompey's troops were now forced to give way. At this point a general with ordinary presence of mind would at once have arranged for an orderly retreat, fighting his way back to camp, the great fortress which every Roman army always held in its rear. But it was Pompey, not Cæsar, who had to meet the situation. When he saw his wing attacked in the rear and the enemy also massed on his front, he lost his nerve, abandoned the command and fled almost unaccompanied into camp, crying out to the soldiers who guarded it to defend him. Thus left to themselves, the cohorts could not be expected to retire in good order, and a regular rout ensued. Cæsar then moved to the attack of the camp, which was but feebly defended. Pompey, who had retired into his tent, was roused by cries announcing the approach of the enemy, but leaping on horseback he escaped with a few friends by the

48 B.C.

back gate and galloped off on the road to Larissa. He was no longer of an age to resist what was the first real battle he had had to face since his campaign against Mithridates. On the loss of the camp Pompey's army dispersed; a certain number of cohorts retired with their officers on the road to Larissa; others fled hither and thither in the mountains. Cæsar's losses were small, while Pompey's, though greater, were probably exaggerated later.* Amongst the dead was Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus. The terrible conflict which was to decide the destiny of the world had proved to be a brief and almost bloodless engagement.

* Cæsar (B. C., iii. 99) says that he only lost 200 men, while Pompey seems to have lost 15,000. Asinius Pollio reduces this number to 6000 (Plut., Cæs., 46). Perhaps Cæsar counted the fugitives among the killed.

CHAPTER XV

CLEOPATRA, 48-47 B.C.

After Pharsalia—Pompey flees to Egypt—His death—The works of Pompey—Honours decreed to Cæsar—Cæsar at Alexandria—Cleopatra—Cicero's despondency after Pharsalia—Cæsar's party—Discord in Cæsar's party—The social revolution of Dolabella—Cæsar takes Alexandria—Cæsar's return to Italy—Cæsar returns to a democratic policy—The African War.

CÆSAR at once prepared to drive home his victory. He 48 B.C.
recalled his soldiers from the pillage of Pompey's baggage, despatched part of them to guard the camp and sent others to defend his own. Then with four legions he dashed in pursuit of the fugitives on the road to Larissa, and already at nightfall overtook the main body of Pompey's army on a hill dominating the road. He encamped at its foot to await the daylight; but next morning the enemy saved him all further trouble by a prompt capitulation. During the night the soldiers had shown so decided a disposition to come to terms that the irreconcilables among their leaders, such as Afranius and Labienus, had fled with small detachments towards Durazzo, leaving the army free to surrender. Without further loss of time Cæsar continued his journey to Larissa, where several of Pompey's officers, amongst others, Brutus, gave themselves up. Here he learned that Pompey had passed through the Vale of Tempe towards the mouth of the Peneus,* despatching slaves from his escort on the way to circulate an edict in Greece ordering all young Greeks and Romans resident in Greece to join his standard at Amphipolis.† Cæsar then ordered Calenus to reduce Greece, commanded one legion to follow him by

Pompey's flight
and Cæsar's
pursuit.

* Plut., Pomp., 73.

† Cæs., B. C., iii. 102. The fact that Pompey really went to Amphipolis seems to show that the plan was seriously intended.

48 B.C.

forced marches, and set out on the 11th of August at the head of a squadron of cavalry for Amphipolis, in the hope of finding Pompey. Meanwhile Pompey, after taking leave of his slaves at the mouth of the Peneus, had set sail in a small vessel with Lentulus Spinther, Lentulus Crus, Favonius, King Deiotarus, and a few others. Once out at sea he had fallen in with a corn-ship belonging to a Roman merchant, in which he had embarked, and was at this moment nearing Amphipolis. By dint of forced marches Cæsar with his squadron succeeded in covering the 180 Roman miles between Larissa and Amphipolis within six days,* and arrived shortly after his rival, but too late. Hearing that his opponent was already in the neighbourhood, Pompey spent only one night in the town, scraped together a little money from his friends and clients † and departed hurriedly for Mitylene, where his wife and younger son Sextus were staying, postponing all plans till he was safely at sea. His sudden departure gave Cæsar the impression that he was on his way to Syria, the province which he had conquered. ‡ He therefore gave orders to the legion which was behind him to continue the pursuit, sent another to Rhodes, and himself proceeded to Sestos on the Dardanelles.

The council of war at Corfu.

About the same time, towards the middle of August, § Labienus with his Gauls and Germans reached Durazzo, bringing the news that the great army of Pompey had suffered defeat. A terrible panic broke out; men imagined that Cæsar was already at the gates and refused to stay a day longer in the town. It was decided to retire at once with the fleet to Corfu. The soldiers rushed to the magazines and in their haste spilt the grain over all the roads leading to the port; all ships which refused to put out to sea were simply set on fire. At nightfall, in the glare of the burning vessels, the army left port, with Cicero, Varro and Cato on board. || Meanwhile the news of Pharsalia passed gradually up the coast of the

* Schmidt, B. W. C., 207.

† Cæs., B. C., iii. 102.

‡ It is clear from Cæs., B. C., iii. 102, that when he wrote his book he still believed that Pompey's original plan was to stop in Syria.

§ Schmidt, B. W. C., 179.

|| Cic., De Div., i. xxxii. 66.

48 B.C.

Adriatic; and all four of Pompey's admirals brought their fleets to Corfu—Caius Cassius from Sicily, Cnæus Pompeius from Oricus, Marcus Octavius from a cruise along the coast of Dalmatia, and Decimus Lælius from Brindisi. To Corfu too came, one after another, all those of Pompey's friends who were unwilling to surrender, amongst them Scipio.* It was thus possible to hold a sort of Grand Council of War, under the presidency of Cato. We are not told what ensued in the debate; all we know is that Cnæus Pompeius nearly murdered Cicero because he proposed to conclude peace, † and that after the meeting the majority of the chief personages dispersed in different directions. Cassius took his ships off to Pontus, with no very obvious intentions; Scipio and Labienus sailed for Africa, hoping there to meet Pompey; Marcus Octavius returned to Dalmatia to complete his conquests; and Cato proceeded with Cicero to Patras to collect the fugitives. There he succeeded in taking on board Petreius and Faustus Sulla, but on the approach of Calenus he was forced to set sail for Africa. Cicero, who had no heart to go on fighting, stayed behind at Patras.

In the meantime Pompey, who had reached Mitylene on the 12th of August, took on board Cornelia and Sextus, who had as yet only received the good news of the victory at Durazzo.‡ Taking leave of Deiotarus, who returned to Galatia, he coasted along Asia Minor and Pamphylia, touching land only to take in water and provisions, and stopping but a few hours at Phaselis§ and at Attalia,|| where some of the ships of his fleet and a few Senators were stationed. Great discussions took place on the voyage between Pompey and his friends as to the place where it would be possible to collect another army and renew the war. Some proposed Syria, others Egypt, others Africa; it was imperative to come to a

Pompey coasts
along Asia
Minor.

* Dion, xlii. 13; App., B. C., ii. 87.

† Plut., Cic., 39; Cat. U. 35.

‡ For the details and the texts of Pompey's flight see Drümman, G. R., iii. 519; Schmidt, B. W. C., 207 f. I do not believe that Pompey ever contemplated fleeing to Parthia, which would have been perilous as well as unpatriotic. See Dion, xlii. 2.

§ Lucan, viii. 251.

|| Plut., Pomp., 76.

48 B.C. decision. The fugitives stopped on Sinedra to deliberate * and it was decided to take refuge in Syria.

Cæsar follows
Pompey to
Egypt.

Meanwhile Cæsar had arrived at Sestos, where, while he waited for his ships and his legions, he received the submission of one of Pompey's admirals, Lucius Cassius, who had ten ships under his command. † It was now too that he probably made definite arrangements with regard to Italy, whither he had been unwilling to send any official announcement of his victory. Antony was to lead back his troops to Italy, secure his nomination as Dictator and act as his Master of the Horse or vice-dictator. Thus at the expiration of his consular year he would still possess all the powers necessary for the continuance of the war. When his ships and his legions were ready and he had heard of the successful reduction of Greece by Calenus, he set sail for Syria with the intention of touching at Ephesus and Rhodes on the way. ‡ He was still under the impression that Pompey would attempt to take refuge in Syria. But Pompey, who had set out for Cyprus towards the 10th of September, had just at this moment received information at Paphos that the inhabitants of Antioch refused to open their gates to him or any of his supporters. He proceeded to raise money from a big syndicate of Italian financiers established at Cyprus, collected a small fleet in the ports of the island, enrolled about 2000 soldiers from amongst the slaves whom the Italian merchants kept in depôt there for sale into Italy, and decided to make his way to Egypt. § That country was now under the rule of Ptolemy Dionysus and Cleopatra, the children of the Ptolemy Philometor whom Pompey had had re-established on his throne by Gabinius; according to the will of their father they were to marry one another and reign conjointly. Cæsar, who was at Rhodes awaiting the legion which he had ordered Calenus to send him, soon divined from Pompey's activity at Cyprus that he had changed his plans

* Lucan, viii., 259.

† Dion, xli. 6. This was not Caius Cassius, Cæsar's murderer, as Judeich (C. O., 60) has shown.

‡ App., B. C., ii. 89.

§ Schmidt, B. W. C., 208; Cæs., B. C., iii. 103.

and was making for Egypt. As soon as his soldiers arrived, about the end of September, he set sail in haste for the kingdom of the Ptolemies.* 48 B.C. The two rivals would at last be brought face to face on a narrow stage.

But when Cæsar reached Alexandria on the 2nd of October † he was met by unexpected news which formed a fitting dénouement to a story full of strange and unforeseen episodes. Pompey was dead. He had arrived to ask Egyptian hospitality at a critical moment in the affairs of that country. The young king was at war with his sister, who had been driven out by his ministers because she was older and cleverer than himself. His counsellors were unwilling to be embroiled with Cæsar; yet they feared that if they refused to receive Pompey he might be driven to take sides with Cleopatra. There was an easy way out—to plot his death. When the few ships of the fugitive arrived in view of Pelusium, where Ptolemy and his army happened to be at the time, a small boat put out to fetch him. Pompey was not without his suspicions; but he consented to step in, remarking that whoever passed the threshold of a royal dwelling became a slave. When the boat approached the bank and Pompey rose to disembark, Cornelia, who was anxiously following him with her eyes from the admiral's vessel, saw a soldier who was in the boat strike him down from behind.‡

Murder of Pompey.

We have now reached the 29th of September in the year 48.§ On this very date thirteen years before Pompey had entered Rome in the costume of Alexander the Great to celebrate his great Asiatic triumph. Pompey was not a fool, as several modern historians in their enthusiasm for Cæsar have been pleased to call him, but a typical and in some ways exceedingly capable aristocrat, with all the faults and all the virtues of the old nobility, upon whom the circumstances of his time had imposed a task which was far beyond his powers. If he lacked the consuming activity

Pompey's work.

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 106.

† Schmidt, B. W. C., 2084

‡ Plut., Pomp., 78-79; App., B. C., ii. 84-85; Dion, xlii. 3-4.

§ Dion, xlii. 5. See Zumpt, S. R., 211.

48 B.C. and the unwearied intellectual energy of his successful rival, yet it must be remembered that he owed his fall not merely to the blunders which he himself committed, but also, and in a far greater degree, to the vices and faults of the upper classes, whose champion circumstances rather than any deliberate policy had forced him to become. Nor must we forget the very considerable part which he played in the history of Rome. He annexed to the Roman Empire the country of Christ, with results of perhaps even supream importance than the occupation of Gaul. Moreover, by the building of his theatre, by the festivals he gave to the people, and by his indiscriminate liberality, he did more almost than any one to disseminate eastern culture throughout Italy, to give Rome a taste for the luxury of the imperial epoch whose remains we still continue to admire and even to imitate.

New honours
for Cæsar.

Of all the lucky chances in Cæsar's life the sudden death of Pompey was certainly the luckiest. The rival who would never have laid down his arms disappeared at one blow, cut down by a miserable conspiracy of oriental eunuchs; and Cæsar was saved from the guilt of having shed his blood. When the news of his death reached Italy towards the middle of November* through Diochares, one of Cæsar's fastest couriers, every one regarded Cæsar as definitely victorious; and as in politics success is the chief criterion of popularity, the impression produced was far greater than Cæsar himself could have expected. The statues of Sulla and Pompey were removed, and the public relapsed into a condition of ecstatic admiration for the man whom they had despised six months before as a criminal.† On the proposition of his friends and without any suggestions of opposition, extraordinary and unprecedented honours were voted to him, honours such as Sulla himself had never known. Not only was he given the Dictatorship for the whole of 47

* See, with regard to the length of the journey between Rome and Alexandria, Schmidt's (B. W. C., 205) successful refutation of the statements of Judeich.

† Dion, xlii. 19.

as he desired,* but the right of presiding alone over the elections of the magistrates ordinarily presided over by the Consul—that is, of all the magistrates, with the exception of the Tribunes and the Ædiles of the people—the right of himself distributing the provinces amongst the Prætors, instead of drawing lots, and finally that of ranking as a Tribune of the people for life.† In short, Cæsar had now regularly taken Pompey's place in public consideration and had become master of the Republic.

This rapid change in opinion is but another example of the great social and moral crisis through which Italy was passing. It is true that the ardent desire for peace, the vacillation and nervousness of public opinion, the marked inclination for moderate measures that Cæsar had hitherto displayed, all helped to produce an outburst of enthusiasm that was in part sincere, in part fictitious. But if we look below the surface there are deeper reasons to be found for this strange revulsion. It was the normal and necessary outcome of the new conditions of Italian society. There no longer existed in Italy classes and parties sufficiently powerful, either politically or economically, to resist the political cliques which centred

Causes of
Cæsar's
popularity.

* *Fasti capit*: year 706, C. I. L., 1², p. 40. There is by no means agreement upon the time at which Cæsar was made Dictator. Judeich (C. O., 182) and Sternkoff (*Programm.*, Dortmund, 1891, p. 27) say that it was at the beginning of November. Mommsen (C. I. L., 1², p. 41) during the last months of the year; Schmidt (B. W. C., 211) in the middle of September; Groebe (App. to Drümann, 1², p. 404) at the end of September or beginning of October. None of the arguments seem to me conclusive; but I am inclined to agree with Schmidt in thinking that Cæsar conceived the idea of securing the Dictatorship soon after Pharsalia, when he saw that he would have to continue the war even after the expiration of his consular year. Nevertheless I do not think that we must believe Cicero when he says (Phil., ii. xxv. 62) that Antony nominated himself Master of the Horse. It would have been too great an abuse, and Cæsar, who was still disposed to moderation, would never have tolerated it. It seems to me more likely that when, about the 25th of October according to Schmidt (B. W. C., 211), Cæsar ascertained at Alexandria that he had been nominated Dictator, he sent back his nomination of the Master of the Horse, which would thus arrive in the first days of December. Another alternative is to accept the textual correction of Dion (xlii. 21) made by Zumpt (R. S., 211-12).

† Dion, xlii. 20.

48 B.C. round the most powerful figure in the State. So long as there had been two rival cliques, many men had been able to preserve a certain measure of independence by skilfully passing from one to the other; but now that Pompey's clique had been broken up at Pharsalia and Cæsar seemed sole master of the Republic and the administration, interest alone compelled a great majority to submit. A large part of the political world lived upon office, and for them to display obstinacy in opposing the victorious clique would have been simply suicidal.

Cicero's em-
barrassments.

Cicero's experiences at this juncture are a good commentary upon this text. Next to Pompey and Cæsar he was the best known figure in the Roman world. Yet he was just now in a position of the very greatest embarrassment because every one considered his political foothold precarious. No one was prepared to advance him money, and many of his creditors were insisting on payment. His family affairs had thus become highly involved. He had had to suspend the payment of Tullia's dowry and was exceedingly alarmed lest Dolabella should demand a divorce. Terentia had been reduced to the most desperate intrigues; his creditors had even threatened to drive him into bankruptcy to force him to sell his goods; perhaps he would really have gone bankrupt if Atticus had not come to his help, and if a fortunate legacy had not arrived just in time.* If even Cicero's finances depended entirely on the political situation, it can be imagined what was the predicament of a great number of the obscurer Senators under similar circumstances. Vigorous opposition to the victorious clique, dictated either by sentiment or principle, was simply out of the question; every one felt his interests so bound up with the State that the small party which controlled the government had for the moment the whole of society on its side.

Cæsar misses
his chance.

Never in his life had Cæsar been so happily placed. Fortune had put the whole game in his hands. He had only to make use of the unanimous enthusiasm of Italy, all the more overwhelming because it was inevitably short-lived, to return to Rome and attack the great problems of the age—to adjust

* See Cic., A., xi. 1, 1; xi. 2; xi. 3, 2; xi. 4, 20.

the old republican institutions to a mercantile society, to conciliate liberty with imperialism, Latin traditions with the new demands of eastern luxury and culture. But Cæsar was a man of genius, and not a demigod; he could not discern all that is so clear to us in the perspective of twenty centuries. At this critical moment in his career he allowed himself to be diverted, like any ordinary man, by passing incidents and the immediate necessities of the situation. He needed money. Egypt was a rich country, and Ptolemy had not paid him the whole sum agreed upon in return for the help given him by Gabinius. He decided therefore to go to Alexandria, to claim as Consul the right of settling the difference between brother and sister and interpreting the will of Ptolemy, and thus secure the payment of the father's debt and of his own services as arbitrator before returning to Rome.* It is true that he had only some few thousands of soldiers with him, but after his previous successes he could not doubt that the matter would be finished off quickly and without serious difficulty.† He therefore sent orders to Cleopatra and Ptolemy to dismiss their armies and submit themselves to his judgment, installed himself in the royal palace and imposed a tribute upon the inhabitants of Alexandria.

But while the king's ministers were haggling with Cæsar and trying to persuade him to leave the city, and while the restless metropolitan populace, excited by the exactions and the orgies of the Roman soldiers,‡ was beginning to break out into rioting, a woman, single-handed, carried the day against them all. The young queen slipped secretly into the town and the palace§ and penetrated suddenly one evening into Cæsar's apartments. Herself utterly cold and callous, insensitive by nature to the flame of true devotion, Cleopatra

* That Cæsar was led to stop in Egypt and intervene in the civil war by his need of money is clear from Dion, xlii. 9 and 34; Oros., vi. 15, 29; and Plut., Cæs., 48.

† Cæs., B. C., iii. 106.

‡ This results from comparing Dion, xlii. 34, and Plut., Cæs., 48, with Cæs., B. C., iii. 106. The *εσπράξεις τῶν χρημάτων* mentioned by Dion are the contributions alluded to in Plut., Cæs., 48.

§ Dion, xlii. 34. The *Commentaries*, of course, are discreetly silent.

48 B.C.

was one of those women gifted with an unerring instinct for all the various roads to men's affections. She could be the shrinking modest girl, too shy to reveal her half-unconscious emotions of jealousy and depression and self-abandonment; or a woman carried away by the sweep of a fiery and uncontrollable passion. She could tickle the æsthetic sensibilities of her victims by rich and gorgeous festivals, by the fantastic adornment of her own person and her palace, or by brilliant discussions on literature and art; she could conjure up all their grossest instincts with the vilest obscenities of conversation, with the free and easy jocularly of a woman of the camps. Cæsar had just emerged from one of the most tempestuous periods of his life; his faculties of enjoyment were heightened by his recent successes and the high promise of his future, by a long period of continence and the severe hardships of his campaigning. It was easy for Cleopatra to persuade him in a single interview, between night and morning, that her cause was the just one. Her interference put a new complexion upon the whole situation. When on the following morning Ptolemy and his ministers learned that Cleopatra had spent the night in Cæsar's company, they knew that their cause was lost. Pothinus, the Minister of Finance who saw in Cæsar a new Rabirius, incited the people to revolt and urged Ptolemy's general to go to Alexandria, to fight the Romans. The Egyptian army was a kind of Foreign Legion composed of ex-soldiers of Gabinius, of adventurers, of fugitive slaves and deserters from every Mediterranean country.* This small force soon compelled Cæsar to retire with his soldiers within the high walls of the palace and submit to a siege, while he awaited the reinforcements hastily summoned from Cnæus Domitius Calvinus, who had stayed behind in Asia as governor of the province.

The waiting
Senators.

Thus up to the 13th of December Cæsar continued to govern Italy and the Empire; he had still time to nominate Antony Master of the Horse, and to promulgate a law forbidding all Pompey's partisans, with the sole exception of Cicero and

* CÆS., B. C., iii. 110.

Decimus Lælius,* from returning to Italy. Then winter and the new war cut him off, in the royal palace at Alexandria, from all contact with the outer world. During the first six months of the year Italy and the Empire received no news of his doings.† It is to this long absence that Cicero justly attributes much of the trouble which subsequently occurred.‡ The Senators who had left Pompey after Pharsalia and were in hiding in different cities on the Mediterranean coasts, awaiting Cæsar's return before venturing to Italy, were condemned to a long period of delay which allowed them time to meditate upon the moral and material damages they had sustained through the civil war. To form a picture of the suffering and suspense which many distinguished personages went through during these months, we have only to turn to what is told us by Cicero. Cicero spent the whole winter and spring at Brindisi brooding over the friends he had lost in the war, over his quarrel with his brother Quintus, who complained of having been coerced on to Pompey's side, over the Ephesian money he had lent to Pompey, which had disappeared for good, over the penury to which he and his family were now reduced, over the troubles of Tullia, who was being disgracefully treated by Dolabella, over the insolent contempt of the less educated wing of Cæsar's party, and, last but not least, over his loss of popularity with the public, who regarded him with unconcealed suspicion because he had fought on the wrong, or rather, the beaten, side.§ Pharsalia had brought divisions into his family and ruin into his affairs, destroyed his political prestige and veiled the glories of the *De Republica*. Who was there now who could possibly look up to him as the great political thinker of the day? The meanest of Cæsar's centurions who had fought at Lerida and Pharsalia had better claims than he.

Cicero had at least definitely made up his mind not to take

* Cic., A., xi. 7, 2. With regard to this edict see Judeich, C. O., p. 185; Schmidt, B. W. C., 214 f.; Groebe, App. to Drümman, G. R., 1², 402. But the history of the decree is still very obscure.

† Cic., A., xi. 17, 13.

‡ *Id.*, F., xv. 15, 2.

§ See Cic., A., xi. 23; xi. 24.

47 B.C.

up arms. But there were others in less submissive mood than himself who were beginning to grow impatient, to lend an ear to the rumours which circulated along the Mediterranean coasts and brought hope to exiles longing for vengeance. Though Illyria, now in the hands of Cæsar's quæstor Quintus Cornificius and of Vatinius, who had sailed from Brindisi to his help, had been definitely abandoned, the Pompeian ex-governor Marcus Octavius had been able to take his fleet with him to Africa; here he was said to be re-creating an army out of the surviving members of Pompey's force, and to have plans for the invasion of Italy. Cæsar himself was declared to be in danger of his life at Alexandria, and the war might break out afresh at any moment.

New rumours
of war.

Antony's
Italian
administration.

Far greater were the troubles in Italy itself. According to the law passed after Pharsalia Cæsar alone was to preside over all the elections ordinarily presided over by a Consul: this meant that no magistrates except Tribunes and Ædiles of the people could be elected during his absence. The State was thus left almost entirely in the power of the Vice-dictator Antony, who was young, frivolous and debauched, a capable soldier perhaps, but a quite inexperienced administrator, who regarded his position rather as a privilege than as a responsibility and gave himself up to amusement and self-indulgence in the congenial company of singers, dancers, and the notorious Cithæris.* Before long something like a social revolution had broken out almost under his eyes.

The two wings
of Cæsar's
party.

In Cæsar's party, as in all democratic parties which represent the most numerous and the poorest section of the community but draw their leaders from the upper classes, there was a latent contradiction which was bound eventually to cause trouble. One part of it, what may be called the educated or aristocratic wing, included representatives of the upper classes such as Caius Trebonius, Marcus and Decimus Brutus, Sulpicius Rufus, Sulpicius Galba and Asinius Pollio, men of means, of good education and decent morality, according to the standard of the age. Some of them had come over to him after Pharsalia, because they wanted peace, and saw no alter-

* Plut., Ant., 9.

native course. Some had been with him from the first, out of personal sympathy or from an over-hasty ambition, or because they were disgusted at the crying misgovernment, the callousness and arrogance of the last genuine survivors of the Roman aristocracy. These men had been brought up in aristocratic and cultivated surroundings, and shared the sentiments and ideas, the prejudices and interests of the upper classes. If they desired a democratic government which was generous towards the poor, they desired neither the rule of demagogues nor such a revolution as would disturb the upper classes in the enjoyment of luxury and culture. But there was a second and far more numerous section, composed of adventurers, malcontents, criminals, agitators and bankrupts, men drawn from all classes, the highest and the lowest, often bold and energetic but generally ignorant, almost always devoid of principle and of all political ideas, actuated solely by the desire to satisfy their ambition: such men as Dolabella, Vatinius, Fufius Calenus and Ventidius Bassus, Oppius, Cornelius Balbus, and Faberius, the skilful but unscrupulous secretary of Cæsar. These men cared little for public order or tradition, or the tranquillity of the upper classes, so long as they increased their own power; and to obtain that power they were ready to gratify the malice, the madness or the greed of the poor.

So long as they were fighting their way together into office the divergence between the two sections of the party remained latent, and Cæsar did his best to conceal it by alternately playing to the proletariat and coquetting with the Conservatives. But the moment that they felt power at last within their grasp, at the beginning of 47, trouble was inevitable. By this time the distress had reached appalling dimensions; everywhere tenants and debtors were sinking deeper into the slough, and crying out for a rescuer. Dolabella, who was the nearest to bankruptcy among the Tribunes, an unbalanced young politician of twenty-two, refused to take warning by the fate of Cælius. Encouraged by the utter demoralisation of the Conservatives and by the chaos to which the Republic had been reduced for lack of magistrates, he attempted to gratify the desires not only of the left wing of Cæsar's party

Dolabella and
the abolition
of debt.

47 B.C.

but of the whole of Italy, and to win lasting popularity for himself, by reintroducing, in January, the old proposals of Cælius for the cancelling of rents and the abolition of debt. This caused a panic amongst all owners of house property, such as Atticus, and amongst the wealthy capitalists. The social revolution which had been looming in the distance since the beginning of the civil war, but which they had just begun to hope they might escape after all, was now suddenly and unexpectedly at their doors. Cæsar had several times declared his respect for private property; but he was far away; the Conservative party was crushed, and there remained no authority in the State capable of maintaining public order. Thus even to those who feared it most, the present seemed a most favourable moment for the outbreak of a social revolution.

But to their great surprise the upper classes soon perceived that safety was to come from a quarter whence they had least expected it. Partly under the influence of personal friendships and in obedience to moral and legal scruples, partly because they felt ashamed to be associated by their social equals with the politicians of the gutter, the educated right wing of Cæsar's party treated Dolabella's proposals as the Conservatives would have treated them under similar conditions. The Tribunes Trebellius and Asinius Pollio, supported by the Senate, opposed the law. Dolabella insisted, and Antony, at heart thoroughly indifferent, but pleased to be courted by the rich, for some time refused to take sides. Finally the multitude of artisans, small shopkeepers and freedmen, whose profits and corn-doles had been diminished during the last two years and who were threatened with eviction by landlords to whom they paid no rent, broke into an open agitation, and riots ensued.* The Senate suspended the constitution and charged Antony with the duty of maintaining order, employing soldiers if necessary.† But this gave rise to a new danger. The legions in Campania, which had just returned from Greece elated after their victories and missed the controlling hand of Cæsar, threatened to mutiny if they did not receive their discharge and the money grant

* Dion, xlii. 29.

† *Id.*; Plut., Ant., 9.

Antony
represses
the rioters
at Rome.

so frequently promised them.* Antony had immediately to repair to Campania, where he had great difficulty in restoring discipline. Unfortunately the excitement of the populace was encouraged by the revolt of the soldiers. On his return to Rome Antony found the situation far worse than when he left. Dolabella was continuing his agitation, not only delivering panegyrics in memory of Clodius but organising armed bands as at the time of the Revolution. Cicero, who had hoped to ennoble his family by marrying him to Tullia, had the supreme chagrin of seeing a son-in-law of his own emulating Catiline. Thereupon Antony, impelled it appears by personal motives (for he suspected Dolabella of being the lover of his wife), decided to take sides with the partisans of order and set himself vigorously to repress the revolt. Dolabella was not easily to be intimidated. On the day on which his law was discussed in the Assembly he had the Forum barricaded by his partisans in order not to be driven out. Excited by this manœuvre, Antony, always violent and hot-headed, saw Revolution in the air: he hurled his soldiers upon the Forum and dispersed Dolabella's bands, with a loss of 800 killed.† It was years since Rome had seen such a slaughter.

This drastic remedy allayed the agitation among the poor for a time; but it greatly discredited Cæsar and his party among the Italian upper classes. Their restlessness was soon augmented by the arrival of more definite news from Africa and Asia. Two of Pompey's sons, together with Cato, Scipio and Labienus, had collected the remains of Pompey's army in Africa and formed an alliance with Juba King of Numidia. They were recruiting archers, slingers and Gallic cavalry, accumulating arms, raiding Sicily and Sardinia with their fleet, and attempting to win over the Spanish natives who were dissatisfied with the government of Quintus Cassius. Meanwhile at the very moment when a new army was preparing to attack Cæsar in Africa under the supreme command of Scipio, Pharnaces son of Mithridates suddenly emerged with an army in Asia from the small principality of the Chersonese, bent on

Restlessness
of the upper
classes.

* (Cæs.) B. Alex., 65; Dion, xlii. 30.

† Dion, xlii. 31; Liv., Per., 113. Cf. Ziehen in Rh. Mus., 1896, 593 f.

47 B.C. the reconquest of his father's kingdoms, and inflicted a defeat upon Domitius Calvinus. All the hopes that Italy, weary of political discord and civil war, had so joyfully cherished in the autumn of 48 gave place in the spring of 47 to a great and growing uneasiness. The social revolution seemed on the point of breaking out in Italy, the civil war was being revived in Africa, while in the East the Empire of Rome was being disputed by the son of the indomitable Mithridates. And all this time Cæsar gave no sign of life.

Cæsar leaves
Egypt.

It was only towards the end of April* that Rome learnt through private sources that, after the arrival of his reinforcements, Cæsar had succeeded on the 27th of March in taking Alexandria.† Every one supposed that he would then return immediately to Italy; and the rioting, which had already calmed down, stopped as though by magic.‡ But days and weeks passed without any official news of his victory,§ without even news of his departure from Alexandria.|| Soon fresh troubles broke out in Rome.¶ The most various rumours were current as to the cause of the delay. Cæsar's friends grew anxious and wrote him pressing letters urging immediate return; many even set out to look for him and hasten his journey.** But Cæsar, after having reconquered Alexandria and given the throne of Egypt to Cleopatra (for Ptolemy had died during the war), had committed the additional blunder of taking a trip up the Nile †† and prolonging for another enjoyable two months his gallant but disastrous adventure with the queen, who was expecting a child. The situation soon became so dangerous at Rome that Cæsar's friends caused the people to vote a series of laws designed to dash the rising hopes of Pompey's partisans. Cæsar was to have the right of making war and peace with all nations and to treat Pompey's supporters as he pleased.†† At last, in the

* Schmidt, B. W. C., p. 222.

† C. I. L., i. p. 304, *Fasti Maffeiani*, March 27.

‡ Dion, xlii. 30. § Cic., A., ii. 15, 1. || *Id.*, xi. 17, 3.

¶ Dion, xlii. 30. ** (Cas.) B. A., 65. †† App., B. C., ii. 90.

‡‡ Dion (xlii. 20) enumerates together all the honours voted to Cæsar both immediately after Pharsalia and later on during the year 47, with the sole exception of the power of making war and peace, which

first days of June,* Cæsar set out for Syria, after having wasted nine precious months † at a time when days were worth years, and years centuries.

47 B.C.

On his arrival at Antioch he found a batch of letters and a great number of persons who urged him to come at once to Italy; yet he allowed a new delay to intervene. He was unwilling to return to Rome until he had done something to re-establish order in the East. A few days sufficed him to reorganise affairs in Syria. He left Antioch in the first days of July, and encountered the Pompeian squadron at the mouth of the Cydnus under the command of Caius Cassius, who had spent a large part of his time studying eloquence at Rhodes with Brutus. ‡ Cassius immediately surrendered. Cæsar sailed on to Ephesus, marched up country with a small army against Pharnaces, using every expedient to extort money on the way, and on the 2nd of August defeated Pharnaces at Zela.§ He then held a Diet at Nicæa, made a distribution of kingdoms and lands, receiving rich presents in exchange from the kings of the East, but without making reprisals against those who had opposed him at Pharsalia, gave a free pardon to Deiotarus King of Galatia, whose cause was pleaded by Brutus; then, passing by Greece and Athens, he sailed for Italy, disembarked at Taranto on the 26th of September,|| giving a cordial welcome to Cicero who had come down to meet him, and made his way to Rome.

At last he was back in the capital. But he had let his great opportunity slip by. His long absence and his connection with Cleopatra had damaged his reputation in many he says was accorded to him afterwards when the danger of a war in Africa appeared very urgent. It seems to me probable that the right of treating the Pompeians as he wished was given him at the same time, as a threat on the part of the Cæsarians. Immediately after Pharsalia this measure would have been inconsistent with the spirit of conciliation then prevailing.

Cæsar's cold
welcome in
Italy.

* Date fixed by Judeich. See Schmidt, B. W. C., 224.

† App., B. C., ii. 90.

‡ Bynum, B., 25.

§ C. I. L., i. p. 306 (*Fasti Maffeiani*), p. 324 (*Fasti Amiternini*), August 2.

|| Schmidt (B. W. C., 226) fixes this date by Cic., F., xiv. 20 (written on October 1).

47. B.C.

quarters ; and the revolt of the legions, the discord in his own party and the appearance of a new Pompeian army in Africa had revived the old uncertainty as to the issue of the war. This was particularly the case in the upper classes, where distrust and hatred for Cæsar had been allayed for a time, but were not extinct. Many persons began to ask if the future had not as great surprises in store as the past. The party of Cæsar, which appeared so homogeneous, was distracted by internal dissensions, and the last few years had shown striking and unexpected vicissitudes of fortune. Thus Cæsar was not received with the enthusiasm he might have had a year before. He soon perceived that an attitude of cold respect, and the prospect of a new campaign in Africa, indirectly supported from Rome, were all he had gained by his moderation towards the upper classes and the care with which he had avoided confiscation and plunder even at the risk of goading his legions to revolt. The impression of his striking victory at Pharsalia was in large part effaced, and the situation had again become dangerous and obscure. His reconciliation with the upper classes was only skin-deep, the fidelity of the legions precarious : his party was in danger of breaking up : and he had lost the sympathy of the masses, who had seen their hopes of relief through Dolabella frustrated by the action of a whole group of the Cæsarian party.

Cæsar sides
with the left
wing.

Cæsar immediately discerned that the best way to crush the rising hopes of the Conservatives was to strike a blow at once at the new Pompeian army in Africa. But he saw also that he could not again leave Italy without some attempt to improve the internal situation, which his previous vacillation had rendered so confused and even dangerous. If he continued this uncertain policy he ran great risk of losing his popularity among the lower classes without winning the confidence of the upper. Preoccupied by this danger and exasperated by the new campaign with which the Pompeians had replied to his advances, Cæsar decided before his departure to return to his old democratic policy, and give some clear indication of his intention to benefit the poorer classes, who after all supplied him with legionaries, electors and the in-

dispensable momentum of popularity. At a moment when every one was expecting him to reward Antony and crush Dolabella, he gave a public proof of his sympathy with Dolabella and his indignation with the man responsible for the murder of 800 plebeians. He even went so far as to adopt one part of Dolabella's proposals, not the universal abolition of debt but the cancelling for a year of all rents below 2000 sesterces at Rome and 500 sesterces in the other towns of Italy.* He refused to accept the nomination of Consul for five years,† but passed laws forbidding the mortgage of more than a certain proportion of an estate, forcing capitalists to invest part of their money in land,‡ imposing obligatory loans upon rich individuals and towns,§ and confiscating for sale the patrimony of many citizens who had fallen in the civil war, amongst others that of Pompey.¶ This was at once an act of reprisal against the irreconcilables, a hint to those who still wavered, and a financial expedient to procure money. Antony purchased Pompey's palace, intending not to pay for it, and laid hands on his works of art, his luxurious furniture and well-stocked cellars. Finally Cæsar presided in place of the Consul over the elections of magistrates for the years 47 and 46, or rather he secured the election of his own nominees and distributed the proprætorships among his faithful followers. Vatinius and Calenus were to be Consuls in 47, Cæsar himself and Lepidus in 46, Hirtius was to be one of the Prætors, while Decimus Brutus, for whom he had a marked predilection, was to be left in Transalpine Gaul; Marcus Brutus, to whom he showed favour for Servilia's sake, was despatched to Cisalpine Gaul, Trebonius to Farther Spain, his nephew Quintus Pedius and Quintus Fabius Maximus to Nearer Spain, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the lawyer who had drawn up the electoral bill against Catiline, to Achæa, Publius Sulpicius Rufus to Illyria, Pansa to Bithynia, Publius Servilius Isauricus to Asia.¶¶ But

* Plut., Ant., 10; Dion, xlii. 51; Suet., Cæs., 38.

† This is a conjecture of Zumpt, S. R., 221, which appears to me likely.

‡ Tac., Ann., vi. 16.

§ Dion, xlii. 50; Corn. Nep., Att., 7.

¶ Dion, xlii. 50; Plut., Ant., 10

¶¶ Lange, R. A., iii. 433.

47 B.C.

Cæsar was to have an encounter with the legions before he left. When he gave orders to Sallust to lead back the Campanian troops to Sicily with the promise of large sums of money the soldiers mutinied once more, nearly put Sallust to death, and marched in serried bands on Rome, murdering two Senators and spreading pillage and devastation wherever they went. Cæsar was forced to allow them to enter the city and had great difficulty in calming them down.* But he was in no mood to delay his departure for Africa. Towards the middle of December † he set out for Sicily, arrived at Marsala on the 19th, ‡ embarked with six legions on the 25th, landed at Hadrumetum on the 28th § and at once commenced operations.

[Lilybæum.]

* Dion, xlii. 52-55.

† Schmidt, B. W. C., 233.

‡ (Cæs.) Bell. Afr., 1.

§ *Id.*, 2.

CHAPTER XVI

CÆSAR'S TRIUMPHS, 46 B.C.

Cicero's *Brutus*—New honours heaped on Cæsar after Thapsus—The domestic troubles of Cicero—The death of Cato—The rewards given to the veterans of the Civil War—Cæsar's triumphs—His reforms—Caius Octavius—Decline of Cæsar's intellectual powers—Cleopatra at Rome.

CÆSAR's sudden reversion to a democratic policy could not fail to set serious issues in motion. Its first result was abruptly to cut short all hopes of a reconciliation with the Conservative classes. No doubt these classes ought really once more to have been grateful to Cæsar for staying his hand after selling the goods of his fallen enemies. But their feelings were so inflamed at the time that the confiscation of Pompey's goods was indignantly resented as a monstrous act of tyranny and revenge. The right wing of Cæsar's own party was equally dissatisfied; it chafed at the unexpected treatment Cæsar had meted out to Antony on the one hand and Dolabella on the other. So the months during which Cæsar was fighting in Africa were a time of anxious suspense for the upper classes in Italy. Great was the speculation and uncertainty as to Cæsar's intentions. What course would he adopt when he had finally crushed the resistance of the Pompeians? The sale of the goods of Pompey's partisans, the law about rents and the indulgence accorded to Dolabella were ominous of trouble. It is true that since the beginning of 46 Cæsar was no longer Dictator.* But would he not

46 B.C.

Cicero's
"Brutus"
and its political
setting.

* Zumpt (S. R., 211) is, I think, right in following Dion, xlii. 20. According to Dion the second Dictatorship was not conferred on Cæsar for an indefinite term but for the whole of 47. He was therefore no longer Dictator on January 1, 46. Why should he have been given the Dictatorship for ten years in April 46 if he was already Dictator

46 B.C. force them to give him new honours after his victory, a victory which seemed only too well assured? As in the first fitful days of early spring the sky and the earth are darkened by passing storm-clouds, brightening again after a moment only to be darkened once more, so cloud on cloud of foreboding swept over the mind of Italy during these long-drawn months. We can see their shadow still, after the lapse of all these centuries, over the books written that same spring by the most delicate interpreter of the thoughts and feelings of the upper classes. Under the encouragement of Brutus, with whom, oblivious of their quarrel in Cilicia, he was becoming increasingly intimate, Cicero had once more taken up his pen, and, early in 46, had begun to compose a history of Latin eloquence, in the form of a Platonic dialogue, with Brutus, Atticus and himself as the speakers; it is the work known as *Brutus seu de claris oratoribus*. But these literary relaxations could not distract his mind from political anxieties: although at the beginning of the dialogue Atticus declares that there will be no politics discussed,* there are covert allusions on almost every page. Cicero's heartfelt distress at the renewal of the civil war makes him envy the lot of Hortensius, who had died shortly before, not living to behold the Forum deserted and dumb.† A little later Brutus delivers a fine eulogy on the first Consul of the Republic, the destroyer of the monarchy, from whom Atticus, who was something of an antiquarian, had shown that Marcus Brutus was directly descended.‡ Then the dialogue goes on to praise Marcellus, the Consul of 51 and a personal enemy of Cæsar, who had retired to Mitylene, far removed from "the common and destined miseries of mankind."§

But only half the book was written when news arrived from Africa of the sudden conclusion of the war, on the

for an indefinite term? Moreover, we have coins of the year 46 in which Cæsar is simply called Cons. III. (Cohen, *n.* 2, 3), and in the *Fasti Capitolini* (C. I. L., 1², p. 21) there is no mention of a Dictatorship in 46.

* Cic., Brut., iii. 11.

† *Id.*, i. 4; ii. 6.

‡ *Id.*, xiv. 53.

§ *Id.*, lxxi. 250.

46 B.C.

6th of April, by Cæsar's signal victory at Thapsus. For once he had given no quarter. Faustus Sulla, Lucius Afranius and Lucius Julius Cæsar, who fell into his hands, had been summarily put to death. Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Marcus Petreius and Scipio had died by their own hand; only Labienus and Cnæus Pompeius had succeeded in escaping to Spain, and Cato to Utica. The gloomy forecasts of the Dialogue had thus been justified by events. The proscriptions were beginning once more! All that remained of the Conservative party withdrew into silence to mourn for its fallen friends and the death-agony of the Republic. For the more ambitious of Cæsar's supporters made use of the victory, as far-seeing men had predicted, to decree him the most extraordinary honours—the Dictatorship for ten years, the Censorial power under the name of *Præfectura Morum*,* and the right of proposing candidates for the Tribuneship and the Ædileship.† The impression that these measures caused was most disastrous. Not the most pessimistic of observers had predicted such inroads on the constitution. The decennial Dictatorship above all seemed almost the same as a revival of monarchy to a public which had been brought up in a traditional hatred for undivided, long-continued and irresponsible office.‡ It was clear what was going to happen. Cæsar's Dictatorship would be followed by the arbitrary government of a greedy and exclusive cabal. Yet no resistance seemed possible. The left wing of Cæsar's party gained ground daily, and was increasing the power of its chief in order at the same time to increase its own. It was this small clique which, together with a few fanatical admirers and a crowd of parasites, surrounded the new Sulla, who commanded the loyalty of all the soldiers in the Empire. Through him it had supreme control over the Senate and the electorate, and even over the more moderate section of their own party, which, though

The decennial Dictatorship.

* Dion, xliii. 14. See Mommsen, C. I. L., 1², p. 41.

† Dion, xliii. 14. Dion's language is not very clear; but Stobbe (*die Candidati Cæsaris* in Phil., xxvii. p. 94), seems rightly to draw this inference from a comparison with xliii. 45 (giving the new honours after Munda).

‡ Dion, xliii. 15.

46 B.C. secretly disapproving of the turn affairs had taken, was not strong enough to offer any open resistance.

Cicero's
domestic
troubles

So the tone of the *Brutus* becomes more and more despondent. When Brutus mentions Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Cicero begs him to be silent. "The memory of past sorrows is unhappy, and more unhappy still the expectation of sorrows to come." * Once more Cicero dwells on the happy lot of Hortensius; he regrets that his earthly journey is ending in this "night of the Republic," and he is almost led to pity Brutus, who is young and will see an infinite succession of still greater troubles. † As the book nears its close the tone becomes darker and darker, and the letters written by Cicero to Varro during these months are full of the same melancholy. ‡ Private griefs came to reinforce public disasters. His beloved Tullia could no longer live with the discredited Dolabella; while, for reasons which it is difficult to unravel, there had arisen between himself and his wife Terentia one of those strange difficulties between elderly married couples in which an irritable old age sometimes indulges: so serious a quarrel, indeed, that Rome very nearly witnessed father and daughter simultaneously divorced. § Now that the excitement of his conflict in the Forum and the Senate-house, his cherished ambitions and the pleasures of notoriety, no longer occupied his thoughts, the comparative penury to which he had been reduced and the hopeless entanglement of his affairs began to weigh heavily on his mind. His only consolation was to immerse himself in his favourite studies, in finding answers, for instance, to the numerous questions on Roman history put to him by Atticus, who spent the leisure hours of his business in collecting material for a history of Rome. He found some

* Cic., *Brut.*, lxxvi. 266.

† *Id.*, xcvi. 330 f.

‡ Cic., *F.*, ix. 1-7.

§ The first allusion to trouble with Terentia occurs in *A.*, xi. 16, 5, dated June 5, 47. By *Cic.*, *F.*, iv. 14, 3, the breach has become irreparable. The divorce must have taken place at the end of 47 or the beginning of 46. See Schmidt, *B. W. C.*, 239. The reasons for the divorce are not very clear. The freedman Philotimus seems to have been mixed up in it.

satisfaction, too, in the esteem with which he was regarded by the most prominent and cultivated members of Cæsar's party, who invited him almost daily to dinner.* Hirtius even asked him to give him lessons in oratory and entertained him royally in return.† Here too he met Dolabella who had managed somehow, despite his behaviour to Tullia, to keep in the good graces of his father-in-law. With his unfailing charm of manner he had induced the old orator to overlook his behaviour, as he had extorted a similar indulgence from Cæsar and from all the men and even from all the women of his acquaintance.‡ Worn out by the burden of his years and misfortunes, Cicero accepted these invitations just for the pleasures of society, though from time to time he felt a sting of remorse when something happened to recall the miserable catastrophe which had cost him so many of his friends.

To these the name of Cato had by now to be added. The old aristocrat had ended his life with the same inflexible obstinacy with which he had lived it. Despatched after the battle of Thapsus to the defence of Utica, he soon realised that all resistance was useless; unwilling to accept a pardon from Cæsar, he had quietly set his affairs in order, then one evening, after bidding his son farewell, he retired to his room, spent some hours over the *Phædo* and then fell upon his sword. When his friends found him he was already dying.§

Meanwhile Cæsar, after annexing the kingdom of Juba to the Roman Empire and raising considerable contributions, left Utica on the 13th of June, disembarked on the 16th at Cagliari, where he stayed till the 27th, despatching Caius Didius and his soldiers to Spain to hunt down the last remnants of the enemy. The winds were contrary and he did not reach Rome till the 25th of July. || Immediately on landing he made a speech to the people and another to the Senate celebrating the vast extent of the lands conquered in Africa, their fertility and

* Cic., F., ix. 7, 1; ix. 16, 2.

† *Id.*, ix. 16, 7.

‡ See Cic., A., vi. 6, 1.

§ Plut., Cat. U. 66 f.; Dion, xliii. 10 f.; App., B. C., ii. 98 f.

|| (Cæs.) Bell. Afr., 98; Dion, xliii. 14.

Death of Cato.

Cæsar's moderation on his return.

46 B.C.

the abundance of corn they would furnish to Rome, and giving assurances that his government would not be tyrannical and that he intended simply to act as head of the people.* He did not at once accept decennial Dictatorship,† contenting himself with the position of Consul, and the electoral powers of the *præfectura morum*.

Cæsar's
ambitions.

But if his speeches were reassuring the upper classes awaited his actions with ill-concealed anxiety; their ancient hostility was reinforced by the helplessness of their position and a sullen jealousy at the honours that were being heaped upon him. While a few sanguine spirits dared to hope that the end of the civil war meant a restoration of republican institutions, the majority dreaded an open, violent and rapacious tyranny. It was not long before both parties discovered that they were mistaken. True, Cæsar had no intention of retiring into private life. Though he had originally entered upon the war not out of lust for the supreme power but to win a secure and honourable position in the aristocratic republic, yet his overwhelming successes, his intimacy with Cleopatra, and the revolutionary movement which was affecting the whole of Italy, appearing now in the new literary fashions of the younger generation, now in the prevalent affectation of oriental customs, had left their mark upon his ambitions.

* Dion, xliii. 15; Plut., Cæs., 55.

† It seems to me that the only way to settle the numerous difficulties about Cæsar's third Dictatorship is to suppose that Cæsar only accepted the Dictatorship which was decreed him after Thapsus towards the end of 46, certainly before January 1, 45, although Mommsen (C. I. L., 1², p. 42) supposes the contrary. Dion, xliii. 1, says that in 46 he was Dictator and Consul for the third time; but this is refuted by the *Fasti Capitolini* (C. I. L., 1², p. 28), which say nothing of a Dictatorship in 46, while they indicate, as do the coins of 46 (Cohen, n. 34-36; n. 15, 17), that Cæsar's third Dictatorship was in 45 and his fourth in 44. Thus the third Dictatorship must be that of 45. On the other hand there are coins of 46 (Cohen, n. 4) on which Cæsar is styled Dictator, and even if we accept the ingenious arguments by which Zumpt attempts to assign them to 47 (S. R., 215), it is clear from (Cæs.) Bell. Hisp., ii. (*dictator tertio, consul designatus quarto*) that Cæsar assumed the Dictatorship a little before the close of the year, on his departure for Spain. This would explain why the compilers of the *Fasti Capitolini* say nothing of the Dictatorship of 46.

Cæsar was no sceptical voluptuary like Sulla, no easy-going dilettante like Pompey, but a restless and ardent spirit for whom feverish activity, engrossing labour, and intense and continuous excitement had become almost a second nature. At last, after years and years of painful effort to win scope for the exercise of these transcendent abilities, he had it within his power to control an army, to put trusted supporters in the chief offices of State and to dispose of huge sums of money. To return to private life, to renounce the execution of the great designs which he was maturing in his brain, was too much to ask of him. Moreover, he was beginning to find pleasure in some, though not in all, the temptations of omnipotence. Supposing he retired into private life, was it likely that Cleopatra would keep her promise to visit him in Rome?

But even had he wished it, to renounce the supremacy was no longer in his power. His hands were tied by the very completeness of his success. He was the prisoner of his own victory. He had won his triumph by exciting in the multitude, as Sulla had done before him, the most dangerous passion of his age, cupidity, by promising his soldiers lands and privileges and money, heaping promise on promise, each greater than the last, the promises of Spain on those of Rimini, and the promises of Brindisi on those of Spain, and on those of Brindisi the recent and still more extravagant promises made after the defeat at Durazzo. And his soldiers had trusted him. They had worked themselves to death in their trust, relying on his untarnished reputation for generosity. Now had come the time for keeping his word. All his other engagements he could disavow, as idle tales for the dupes who had helped him to victory—but not these pledges given to 30,000 or 40,000 men who had either followed him from Gaul or come over to him from the enemy, and who had now for three years been dreaming of settling down at their ease in the country on Cæsar's money. The recent mutinies of the legions, impatient for their rewards and their discharge, had shown him that they were not to be hoodwinked. The civil war and his promises together had raised them to a pitch of dangerous excitement; they would not shrink from taking

Cæsar the
prisoner of
his success

46 B.C. the law into their own hands and precipitating a military revolution in which their general would be the first victim. Like Sulla, he was personally responsible for all the promises made, all the wild hopes conceived in his name; like Sulla he could not abandon his post at the helm, which was his sole means of fulfilling his multitudinous pledges.

The weakness
of Cæsar's
position.

But if the few who expected Cæsar forthwith to lay down his powers had utterly mistaken his position, those who looked for the recurrence of a Sullan régime of violence were perhaps even further from the truth. Cæsar had indeed every reason to be indignant with the survivors of the Pompeian party and with the upper classes at Rome for the insincerity of their attitude since Pharsalia, and he made no attempt to conceal his ill-humour on the occasion of his triumphs. He had four triumphs each lasting a whole day, the first over the Gauls, the second over the Egyptians, the third over Pharnaces, and the fourth over Juba. In the last of these Cæsar exhibited the arms taken from his Roman opponents and circulated caricatures of his chief enemies, including Cato. If Cæsar took no pains to conceal his hostility to the aristocrats at Rome and his intention of relying upon the popular classes, if he returned resolved to govern the Republic without considering the prejudices and pretensions of the Conservatives, he knew very well that it was impossible for him to do a tenth part of the work that Sulla had achieved. One of the greatest mistakes made by all historians of Cæsar is the assertion that after Pharsalia and Thapsus he was practically omnipotent, sole master of the Republic and of the Roman world. In truth he was nothing of the kind. Sulla had saved the whole Empire from imminent destruction and rescued an entire class of citizen from political extinction. Cæsar had not emerged triumphant from a revolution; he had merely happened to win in a civil war brought about in a peaceful and peace-loving country through the rivalry of two political cliques. He had neither the prestige to inspire one tenth of the terror or admiration of Sulla, nor an army on whose fidelity he could rely, nor a body of supporters united in their aims and ideals. On the contrary discord was making

way among all classes of his adherents and the solid block of his party showed new fissures every day. Antony himself had refused to obey him in paying for Pompey's goods, which he had bought by auction, and was spreading threats and invectives against his leader broadcast through Rome. It was even whispered that he had made attempts to hire an assassin.*

46 B.C.

The weakness of Cæsar's position is thus easily explained. The conquest of Gaul had not provided him with prestige adequate to the extraordinary responsibility which he had assumed, while, as for his successive victories since he left his province, they had been gained in a civil war and had better be forgotten than proclaimed. Cæsar saw very clearly that if he was to be truly master of the Republic he must win some greater and purer title to glory by his services to Italy; that all the pains that he had spent hitherto were only a prelude to the great work which he was now to undertake. At last he was in a position, not to enjoy but to win a real supremacy in the Republic through the performance of some immortal achievement. Now that the civil war was over he dreamt of forming a government which should be stable, beneficent and memorable to posterity, a government with three essential features in its programme, a large and generous policy towards the poor, a complete reorganisation, such as the nation rightly demanded, of the whole disordered machinery of administration, and lastly, in the domain of foreign policy, some great and striking military achievement. He was returning in fact to the old ideas, or the old dreams, of 56.

Cæsar's programme for winning the supreme power.

No sooner was he back in Rome than he set resolutely to work in his usual spirit with the help of several friends and freedmen. With the six hundred million sesterces and vast quantities of precious metals he had brought back from Africa,† he paid each citizen the 300 sesterces promised in 49, the 80,000 promised to each soldier, the 160,000 promised to the centurions and the 320,000 promised to the military

A series of Conservative reforms.

* Cic., Phil., ii. xxix. 72.

† Vell., ii. 56; App., B. C., ii. 102.

46 B.C.

Tribunes; * he also gave a great public banquet and made a free distribution of corn and oil.† By using his authority as a censor or by proposing bills to the electors he carried through a series of reforms all thoroughly Conservative in spirit. He reorganised the tribunals, giving them a more aristocratic character; ‡ he modified the penal laws by strengthening the penalties against crimes of violence; § he dissolved all illegal associations, including the *collegia* of workmen organised by Clodius, which had proved so useful to himself in his struggle with the Conservatives; || he reduced the number of the poor who had been admitted by the law of Clodius to take part in the distributions of corn; ¶ he published a sumptuary law putting a check on the use of pearls and purple and litters; ** he attempted to check the emigration of young Italians, which had seriously affected the recruiting for the army; †† he made arrangements for the better administration of his Land Law, which had languished hitherto, by the formation of colonies in Campania in the neighbourhood of Calatia and Casilinum; ‡‡ he made arrangements for the issue of a new gold coin, the *aureus*; he brought Egyptian astronomers to Rome to rectify the calendar; §§ he attempted to regulate the neglected finances of the Republic by re-establishing customs dues and by taking over for the State and leasing out the emery quarries in Crete, which had been largely worked without authorisation by private enterprise; ||| and he devoted himself to the working out of the famous *lex Julia municipalis*, of which there will be frequent

* Suet., Cæs., 38; App., B. C., ii. 102; Dion, xliii. 21. (The figures vary slightly.)

† Dion (xliii. 21) distinguishes the celebrations at the Triumphs from those held a little later to inaugurate the Temple of Venus Genetrix. The other authorities confuse the two occasions.

‡ Dion, xliii. 25; Suet., Cæs., 41. § Suet., Cæs., 42. || *Id.*

¶ Dion, xliii. 21. ** Suet., Cæs., 43; Dion, xliii. 25.

†† Suet., Cæs., 42.

‡‡ Zumpt (C. E., i. 300) supposes, rightly, as I think, that the grants of Italian land in 45 and 44 were made in accordance with the Land Law of 59.

§§ Dion, xliii. 26; Plut., Cæs., 59.

||| Suet., Cæs., 43; Dig., xxxix. 4, 15.

mention as our story continues and which was to reorganise the government and administration of all the towns of Italy.* 46 B.C.

But he was nursing still greater projects than these. He intended to revive the old idea of Caius Gracchus, to re-establish the ancient centres of civilisation which had been crushed or undermined by the expansion of the Roman dominion, to rebuild Carthage and Corinth, to send out colonies to Provence, to Lampsacus, to Albania, to Sinope, to Heraclea and the coasts of the Black Sea, still smarting from the brutality of the soldiers and officers of Lucullus; last of all he dreamt of returning to the adventure which had cost Crassus his life, the conquest and annexation of Parthia. Hitherto the unkind chances of politics had banished him, sorely against his will, to the cold grey skies of northern Europe. Now that he was free to go his own way he turned towards the East, the land of his early ambitions, which cast its spell over him as over all his contemporaries, and beckoned him to repeat the fabulous exploits of Alexander. Gaul after all was but a poor and barbarous country; the road to the civilisation of the future lay through Asia, through the wealthy and highly civilised lands on which the Macedonian and his successors had left immortal marks of their achievement.

Several of these reforms were highly pleasing to the Conservatives, and consoled them somewhat for their mortification at seeing a caricature of Cato carried in the Fourth Triumph. For there was now something like a hero-worship of Cato growing up among the Italian upper classes. Cicero, who, still at Brutus' suggestion, had written a panegyric on him and had now set himself to compose the *Orator*,† was constantly wondering whether Cæsar was not going to restore the republican government; he kept watch over all his actions, and waylaid his intimates with questions, in a con-

* There is no agreement as to the promulgation of the *Lex Julia Municipalis*. Savigny assigns it to 45; Mommsen (C. I. L., p. 123) to the close of 45; Lange (R. A., iii. 440) to 46; Nissen (Rh. Mus., xlv. p. 100) to May to September 46. I am inclined to agree with Mommsen.

† Schmidt, B. W. C., 255.

46 B.C.

tinual alternation of confidence and despair. He had been very sanguine up to the end of September, so much so that he had even consented to break through what he had regarded as his mourning for the Republic, and to make a speech in the Senate, full of complimentary references to Cæsar, on behalf of the exiled Marcellus, alluding confidently to the reconstruction of a normal civil government.*

The "Pro Marcellus."

The temple of Venus, the mother of the Julii.

But his hopes were soon rudely shattered. Towards the end of September Cæsar consecrated a temple to Venus Genetrix and scandalised Cicero and the public by displaying in it a statue of Cleopatra by Arcesilaus, one of the best-known Roman sculptors.† The general disgust was increased by the festivals which were celebrated at the inauguration. These were on a far larger scale than those which had been given at the Triumphs; there were wild-beast hunts and gladiatorial fights, and performances given in every quarter and in all languages for the amusement of the cosmopolitan proletariat; there was even a sea-fight on an artificial lake. Cæsar then was bent on corrupting the people, just as he was bent on degrading the Senate by electing members from amongst the obscurer ranks of society, including even the professional *haruspices*.‡ Both these new additions to the Senate and Cæsar's inexplicable delay in convening the electors were highly unpopular; and they were soon followed by a series of disagreeable incidents. Cæsar's activity was degenerating into a wild impatience. It was in this spirit that he forced Arcesilaus to exhibit his unfinished statue in the Temple of Venus Genetrix in order that he might proceed with the inauguration;§ and he frequently hurried on preparations with an arbitrary procedure which caused widespread annoyance. Thus one day Cicero received the thanks of certain oriental princes for a decree which he had caused to be approved by the Senate, though he had never even heard of the existence of the potentates in question.|| His nominations of governors for the year 45

* Cic., F., iv. 4, 4; Cic., Pro Marcellus, ix. 27.

† App., B. C., ii. 102.

§ Overbeck, G. G. P., ii. 482.

‡ Cic., F., vi. 18, 1.

|| Cic., F., ix. 15, 4.

proved equally unpopular ; with a few exceptions they were all old friends of his own,* some of them were peculiarly odious to the Conservatives, the notorious Vatinius, for instance, and Sallust, who had been made proprætor of Numidia after Thapsus and was allowed to remain there an extra year to recover the fortune which he had wasted on dissipation at Rome.

Thus the situation was becoming more and more difficult. This constant state of inward excitement, the extraordinary nervous tension of the last years, his natural exaltation after his victories, the feeling of strength springing in his case partly out of the very strain at which he lived, all combined to tempt Cæsar to assume responsibilities such as no man, not even he, could carry with impunity. Here again historians are wrong. They are fond of asserting that, because Cæsar had been able to construct so wonderful an instrument of rule as his army, he was thereby placed in a position where he could govern and reorganise the Empire as he wished. He had indeed used his army as an incomparable weapon of destruction ; it had helped him to crush the Conservative party and destroy the legitimate government ; but it could not help him, except in a wholly insufficient manner, to form a new government on the ruins of the old. The breach was widening on all sides of him. He stood alone, and well-nigh helpless, in the place of power. The nobility, even those of them who had rallied to his side after Pharsalia, had forgiven him nothing ; they held suspiciously aloof, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that they could be prevailed upon to accept office. Even in his own party the whole of the right wing was lukewarm and gradually withdrawing from all active support. Only the small and vigorous *coterie* of his partisans from amongst the lower orders remained actively loyal ; and they courted the Dictator merely to monopolise his favours and keep off all dangerous intruders. The faithful Oppius, the skilful Balbus, the intriguing Faberius, the gay Dolabella, Vatinius, Calenus, Decimus Brutus, his favourite amongst them all, who had saved him from disaster in Spain and who had, for the last two years, been Governor

Cæsar "contra mundum.

* Lange, R. A., iii. 448.

46 B.C.

of Transalpine Gaul where he had repressed a new revolt amongst the Bellovaci—these were now his chief collaborators in the gigantic task of reorganising the Empire, a work that called for all the talent and energy in the Roman State. And there were gaps even in that inner circle. Antony had now fallen quite into disgrace and was living in obscurity with his newly married wife, Fulvia the widow of Clodius and Curio. Cæsar had now neither the time nor the wish to search the crowd, as he had so successfully done hitherto, for the unknown man whom he could use for his purposes; and within the close gathering of his intimates there were few new admissions, only the sons of his two nephews Quintus Pedius and Caius Octavius, and the family of Servilia; these last, Servilia's son Brutus and her two sons-in-law, Caius Cassius and Lepidus, formed a small aristocratic group in Cæsar's party, and were treated by Cæsar with great consideration, though Lepidus was the only one with whom he was really intimate.* Caius Octavius was a young man of seventeen who showed promise of great ability; after the death of his father and his mother's second marriage with Lucius Marcius Philippus he had been brought up in the house of his grandmother, Cæsar's sister. Cæsar himself had for some time past taken him under his protection; he supervised his education, introduced him to the public by several special marks of distinction, and was probably instrumental in finding him two new teachers, Athenodorus of Tarsus and Didymus Areus, in addition to the masters under whom he was learning already. Didymus belonged to that small Neopythagorean school which we have already seen attempting to spread a new and ascetic morality † in the Roman world. But Octavius was a young man of delicate health and was

* The affection and intimacy between Cæsar and Brutus have been much exaggerated. It must be remembered that from Pharsalia down to Cæsar's return from Spain they can only have been together for quite a short time, during 47 in the East; afterwards Cæsar went to Africa and Brutus spent the whole of 46 as Governor of Cisalpine Gaul. When Brutus returned to Rome Cæsar had already left for Spain. See Bynum, B., 29 and 39.

† Suet., Aug., 89. See Weichert, *Commentatio de imp. Cæs. scriptis eorumque reliquis* (Grimæ, 1835), p. 27 f.; Gardthausen, A. Z., i. p. 47 f.

actually at this moment suffering from a serious illness which caused great anxiety to Cæsar. 46 B.C.

Thus the loyal and vigorous co-operation which might have enabled him to carry his great projects into execution was not to be found; and the idea that a single man, however remarkable his energy and ability, together with a few friends and freedmen picked up at random at various times in his career during twelve years of war and adventure, could arrest the growing disorder of a long process of social decomposition and change throughout a vast Empire, was the idlest of dreams. It had been easy to use his army to triumph over the Conservative party and the degenerate upper classes of Italy; but it was impossible for one man by mere legislation to reconcile the terrible antagonisms that were raging in a violent overbearing and money-loving society. One difficulty after another confronted him, often created by his very impatience to overcome them, and the worry, the weariness, the disappointments of his never-ending labours dulled that keen and exquisite sense of what was real and practicable which had stood him in such stead in past years. Sometimes he himself would say, like a man worn out, that he had lived long enough.* His intimates, Balbus and Oppius, had noticed for some time how he was daily becoming more irritable, headstrong and strange in his manner; how every suggestion, however guarded, of the wisdom of laying down at least a part of his power caused him increasing annoyance; they had seen him so out of temper at Cicero's panegyric of Cato that he meditated writing a refutation and had encouraged Hirtius to do the same. Yet he refused to have it said that he was violating the constitution, or breaking with Roman tradition, or acting against the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of the laws which had granted him his powers. He was just now engaged in composing his *Memoirs of the Civil War*, doing his utmost to prove that he had scrupulously observed the constitution, and that it was his opponents and not he who had laid hands on the property and the rights of the citizens. But as the months slowly went by in this endless year, in

Cæsar's intellectual decline.

"De Bello Civili."

* Cic., Pro Marcello, viii. 25.

46 B.C.

which there was room for so much to happen because it was increased to fifteen months and 445 days by the astronomers who were reforming the calendar, the situation corresponded less and less with his words and his intentions.

Cleopatra
at Rome.

Towards the end of the year Cæsar committed a grave blunder by entertaining Cleopatra who had come to Rome with a large suite of slaves and ministers. This caused a huge scandal at Rome and in Italy.* It had been an open secret for some time past that Cæsar had been giving rein to his passions, particularly in his relations with royal personages, and that during the African war he had a connection with Eunoe, wife of Bogud, King of Mauretania, and had made her enormous presents.† But this new scandal shamelessly flaunted before the eyes of Rome shocked and excited a public that was only too ready to find a mark for its criticism. The old Latin family had exercised many judicial and disciplinary functions now reserved for the State, and its dissolution tended to aggravate social disorder in a way quite out of proportion to the relaxation of family ties under modern conditions. Perhaps no other of the many problems of the day was more lamented by contemporaries or seemed more hopeless of remedy. Cleopatra's open appearance in Rome gave fresh emphasis to these complaints. Every one felt pity for the unhappy Calpurnia, married in 59 for a political intrigue, then left alone for years by a travel-loving husband, and now compelled to receive a rival into her own household. Yet Calpurnia was but a melancholy instance of the lot reserved for all the women in Roman high society who were not either dissolute or criminal. It was the same fate that befell Tullia, in spite of her father's devotion, or Cornelia, the widow of Publius Crassus and of Pompey, and hundreds of others whose names have not come down to us. They were married, abandoned, and remarried from one year to the next, without regard to the age or the character of their husbands; they moved from one home and household and

* For the harm done to Cæsar by his relations with Cleopatra see Dion, xliii. 27; Suet., Cæs., 52.

† Suet., Cæs., 52.

46 B.C.

society to another, according to the accidents and vicissitudes of politics; often they had not even the consolation of motherhood and found stepsons older than themselves at their husband's table; at the worst they had to endure the shame of being openly superseded by freedwomen and slaves. This was one of the evils of the age—one of those numberless symptoms of disorder, lamentable, yet inevitable, that marked the great change that was taking place in Roman civilisation, to which women had to contribute their share, and more than their share, of suffering. But for once an envious public reserved for Cæsar their resentment against an evil that was common to his class. It was intolerable that the Dictator should make public ostentation of his private vices.

CHAPTER XVII

CÆSAR'S LAST AMBITION—THE CONQUEST OF PARTHIA

Cæsar's last ambition—Cæsar and the ideas of Caius Gracchus—The popular monarchy of Cæsar—The eight *præfecti urbi*—Discontent of the upper classes—The writings of Cicero—Brutus—New honours decreed to Cæsar after Munda—Cæsar and Brutus—Grandiose and chimerical projects of Cæsar—Laws and reforms of Cæsar—Antony changes sides—Supreme powers given to Cæsar—The illusions of a Dictatorship—Cæsar's colonies—Atticus and the settlement at Buthrotum—The Lupercalia.

46 B.C.

Growing
unpopularity
of Cæsar
among the
upper classes.

AMONG the upper classes discontent was thus gathering to a climax. Hereditary pride and dislike of discipline set them naturally against any ordered system of government; and they were still smarting under the effects of the civil war, mourning the loss of parents and friends and damage to their property or interests. The confiscation of the goods of the vanquished had robbed many of windfalls on which they had reckoned: others had lost sums deposited in the temples of Italy and the East, while more still were hard hit by the scarcity of money and the difficulty of raising credit. It was in vain that Cæsar attempted to show in his *Memoirs on the Civil War* that it was Pompey and not he who had laid hands on the deposits of individuals, while they had him to thank for the safety of the great Temple of Diana at Ephesus and the treasure there stored.* Pompey was dead and his rival, who was still alive, had to bear the brunt of the blame.

It needed a man of unwearied skill and patience, of unruffled calm and unflinching discretion to steer his way through these difficulties. Deliberate malice and ill-tempered criticism, petty

* Cæs., B. C., iii. 31-33.

personal quarrels and far-seeing ambitions all joined to block his path. But Cæsar was no longer equal to the work. The strain was at last beginning to tell on his character. The excitement of power and success, the constant adulation, the very weariness that his position entailed, pricked him into the desire to achieve something great and decisive. His dreams of rivalling the romantic exploits of Alexander bore down the habitual restraints of vigilance and good sense. These tendencies were only encouraged by the inevitable pressure of circumstances. In face of the appeals that poured in upon him from all sides he was practically compelled to throw off all semblance of legality. All around him were problems crying out for courageous handling. He can be excused for believing that it was not personal ambition but the imperious necessities of his age that drove him into absolutism. Throughout Italy the distress had grown to appalling dimensions; a large part of the middle class and the proletariat had been driven almost to desperation by the continuance of the depression. A large number of skilled eastern slaves had been set free in different parts of the country by masters who had been unable to find them employment and could not afford to keep them idle till the arrival of better times. The distress was increased by the reduction that had been found necessary in the number of the recipients of the corn-dole; there were thousands at Rome living in enforced idleness on the verge of starvation. An awful catastrophe seemed inevitable unless some new source of revenue could be discovered. In what direction were these riches to be sought?

There was only one possible answer to the question, and Cæsar had long ago divined it. In Parthia alone lay his hopes of reconstruction; in the fabulous treasures of the East lay the capital that was to relieve the necessities of Italy. It was a great and daring programme. But how could he carry it to a successful conclusion if he had all the while to be considering the absurd prejudices and the petty personal interests of a knot of grumbling Roman Senators? Besides, he owed them no more consideration than they in turn paid him. They had no eyes for the difficulties of his task or the troubles of their

46 B.C.

The financial depression.

Parthia and the need for Cæsarism.

46 B.C. fellow-countrymen. At this moment all they cared about was the latest news of some little victory of young Pompey in Spain and the composition of silly and malicious eulogies of Cato. Even Brutus had followed the prevailing fashion and was writing up the suicide at Utica. In his present mood of impatience to be at work the clanking and creaking of the old constitutional machinery was altogether intolerable. He was growing old. He had never yet known failure. He must act, and act quickly, to secure his popularity and win an undying title to renown. He had no old scores to wipe off like Sulla; he did not wish to despoil the rich in order to relieve the poor. But just because his ends were so moderate he felt justified in assuming wide powers, regardless of constitutional propriety, to enable him to achieve them.

Cleopatra and
her child.

It is not improbable that the visit of Cleopatra contributed to produce this change in his attitude. The Queen of Egypt, herself one of the tragic figures of the time, plays a strange and significant part in the tragedy of the Roman Republic. Placed on the throne of Egypt at a moment when the government of Rome had fallen into the hands of a sole military Dictator, she had conceived a new diplomacy for the preservation of her kingdom. Her object it is not difficult to guess, though we are not told it in any well-authenticated document. She desired to become Cæsar's wife; and that by her example and the fascination of her presence and pleading she hoped to awaken in him the passion for kingship is an equally justifiable assumption. How indeed could she think or act otherwise? She was young, ambitious, greedy of pleasure, and still greedier of power; and she was born an Egyptian princess. The conclusion is irresistible. What is certain at least is this—that Cleopatra came to Rome with her infant son to win Cæsar's permission to call him after his father; and that when she left Rome she had, amongst other gifts and privileges, obtained this precious concession.* But whatever Cæsar's ultimate ambitions their realisation depended at this moment upon the success of his Parthian campaign.

* Suet., Cæs., 52.

This therefore was henceforward his dominant idea, and towards it all his energies were now directed. 46 B.C.

Unfortunately in the second half of 46 serious incidents intervened to interrupt his preparations. In Spain Cnæus Pompeius and Labienus made play with the popularity of Pompey's name; and through the widespread disgust at Cæsar's governors, assisted by the discontent of some of the legions, they had succeeded in recruiting an army and in conquering a large part of the Peninsula. Cæsar had at first made light of the danger and entrusted the conduct of the war to subordinates; but when all their efforts proved futile they had finally appealed to their chief to come in person. The news from Spain of course only intensified the prevailing excitement and uncertainty, and Cæsar was forced reluctantly to admit that he could not set out for the East leaving a victorious enemy behind him in the West. Truly the civil war seemed to be becoming almost chronic. That a new campaign should be required just at this moment was the most disconcerting thing that could have happened. It obliged him to break off in the very midst of his work of reform and to postpone the great war against Parthia, while it increased his difficulties with Italian public opinion by showing that he had not yet succeeded in granting his promised boon of peace.

Impatient at the prospect of his Spanish campaign, and in the hope of overwhelming his enemies by one bold and unexpected stroke, Cæsar, towards the end of the year, threw off all pretence of constitutional rule and assumed to himself all the supreme powers of government. He took the Dictatorship, choosing this time as his Master of the Horse not Antony, who was still in disgrace, but the faithful Lepidus, who had been nominated Governor of Nearer Spain and Narbonese Gaul, and who, to the general astonishment, was authorised to administer these provinces through legates.* He also desired to be nominated Consul without a colleague for the year 45;† and he postponed till later the election of the other magistrates. As Dictator and at the same time Consul with-

* App., B. C., ii, 107.

† Dion, xliiii. 33; C. I. L., 1², p. 28.

46 B.C.

out a colleague he was for all practical purposes an autocratic ruler.

The Land
Law of 59
enforced.

These measures produced a most disastrous impression. They widened the breach of distrust—already wide enough—which separated him from the upper classes, and encouraged the current apprehension that absolute power in Cæsar's hands was synonymous with a social revolution. A report was suddenly circulated that Cæsar had undertaken a measurement of lands in different parts of Italy with a view to a wholesale confiscation on the Sullan pattern, for the benefit of his troops.* For a moment there was a regular panic. But it was soon ascertained that Cæsar was merely putting in a new commission, in accordance with the Land Law of 59, to find land in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul for distribution among his soldiers.† On several occasions large portions of the public domain had passed into private hands; but the arrangements had been carried out in such haste and disorder that a few remnants were still left over, either in the possession of the State or leased out to private persons, especially in Etruria and Campania and in the neighbourhood of Leontini. It was this remnant that Cæsar was anxious to divide among his veterans, supplementing it with estates bought from private owners. The lands were to be given on the condition originally laid down by the Gracchi, that they were to be inalienable for twenty years.‡ It was an attempt, somewhat late in the day, to revive the central idea of the Gracchan policy.

Cæsar
establishes
Cabinet
Government
in his absence.

No sooner had this excitement abated when new incidents occurred to alarm the public. Cæsar had set out for Spain without convoking the electors,§ and every one at Rome expected that in the course of his journey he would provide for the offices in the usual fashion. But towards the end of the year there was a new surprise. Cæsar nominated eight

* See Cic., F., ix. 17.

† See Dion, xlii. 54; App., B. C., ii. 94; Cic., F., xiii. 3; xiii. 5; xiii. 7; xiii. 8. (All these are pleas for estates which were or might be considered State Land.)

‡ Cf. App., B. C., iii. 2 and 7.

§ Cic., A., xii. 8.

præfecti urbi who were to be entrusted with all the powers of the Prætors and certain powers, such as the administration of the Treasury, that belonged properly to the Quæstors,* nominally under the direction of Lepidus, but really also controlled by Cornelius Balbus and Oppius. Thus by a stroke of the pen, to the dismay of the public, he created what was practically a system of Cabinet Government, in which the people and the Senate were of no account at all. Meanwhile he occupied his spare hours on the journey in writing a book against Cato to combat the recrudescence of Republican sentiment.

46 B.C.

This sudden change in Cæsar's policy caused consternation among the upper classes in Italy and even among the right wing of his own supporters,† who regarded it as a prelude to the definite victory of the revolutionary section of the party. A whole flood of recriminations broke out. The grant of his own name to the child of Cleopatra was bitterly criticised;‡ while the creation of the *præfecti urbi* was regarded as one of the most arbitrary measures Rome had ever known. Men began to whisper—and the whisper had proved fatal to many an illustrious Roman in the past—that he was stretching out his hands towards the monarchy. It was at this moment that news came that Marcellus the Consul of 51, to whom Cæsar had lately given a free pardon, had been mysteriously assassinated at Athens on his homeward journey; and evil tongues suggested that Cæsar had secretly plotted his death, to gratify a personal hatred whilst pretending in public to grant him a free pardon. The publication of the book against Cato added fuel to the flames. Written in a sour and venomous spirit, it was universally resented as an unworthy calumny on the memory of a great man. All the more striking were the warm references in it to Cicero, which succeeded, as usual, in hitting that tender mark. The old orator sent a hearty note

Uneasiness
and suspicions
in Italy.

* Suet., Cæs., 76; Dion, xliii. 28 and 48; Cic., F., vi. 8, 1; Schmidt, B. W. C., 263.

† We have a proof of this in what we are told about Trebonius in Plut., Ant., 13. See Cic., Phil., ii. xiv. 34. Also, the allusion to the unfavourable prognostications of Antony in Cic., F., vi. 2, 2.

‡ Suet., Cæs., 52.

45 B.C.

of congratulation through Balbus and Dolabella to the Dictator. But he was alone in his opinion, and even he had not the courage to submit his letter to Atticus for approval.* The labours of the Land Commission too were causing widespread anxiety. The common people were being encouraged to indulge in hopes and illusions which might some day prove dangerous to the State. Moreover the inquiries made to identify the public lands were highly disconcerting in many quarters, for if rigorously pressed home they might lead to some unpleasant revelations. Naturally the commissioners were overwhelmed with special appeals from landlords and their friends and relations.† Every one was anxious to own land in Italy, where the soil was under special privileges by law, paid no tax except the *tributum* levied in war time, and could be held as absolute freehold; whereas in the provinces the soil belonged to Rome and the occupiers might be turned out of their holdings at any moment.

The death
of Tullia.

Thus, while Cæsar was fighting in Spain the situation at Rome was far from reassuring. Balbus and Oppius wrote letter after letter to Cæsar and did their best meanwhile to soothe the ruffled feelings of the leaders of opinion. They were particularly attentive to Cicero, now passing into life's evening with the shadow of many troubles upon him. At the end of 46 he had contracted a second marriage with Publilia, a rich young girl of 14; ‡ but at the beginning of 45 a great blow had been struck at his happiness. Tullia died in childbirth, shortly after her divorce.§ Her father could hardly bear up against his grief. To distract his mind he turned resolutely to the execution of a design he had perhaps been contemplating for some time but from which the vicissitudes of politics had always diverted him—to gather up the leading ideas of Greek philosophy in a series of dialogues after the model of Plato, in which all the great Romans of the last generation from Cato to Lucullus and Varro were to appear as interlocutors. It was a project that

* Cic., A., xiii. 50, 1; xiii. 51, 1.

† *Id.*, xiii. 4; xiii. 5; xiii. 7; xiii. 8.

‡ Schmidt, B. W. C., 263.

§ *Id.*, 271.

gave ample scope to the peculiarly dramatic powers of his style. The working out of this idea might have produced one of the masterpieces of literature, creating and reanimating for all posterity, in the calm and intimate atmosphere of philosophic dialogue, the great figures that history only shows us in the strife of war and politics.

45 B.C.

But such a task needed the leisure for quiet and continuous workmanship; and Cicero's life at this moment was crowded with petty worries and distractions. He had continually to requisition Dolabella for the recovery by instalments of the dowry of Tullia; and he was trying to find the money for a sumptuous mausoleum to his daughter's memory. Moreover he was tormented by the question of Cæsar's intentions, which formed the subject of constant letters to Brutus, now one of his closest friends, who had only lately returned from the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul. He was also deep in the study of the great Greek books on political philosophy. He had been specially attracted by the letters written by Aristotle and other Greek thinkers to Alexander urging him to reserve autocratic rule for the Asiatics and to remain first citizen, *primus inter pares*, among the Greeks, the noble race which had always lived and could only live under free institutions.* Aristotle's letter suggested the idea of writing one in similar terms to Cæsar; and Cicero actually composed an eloquent little treatise which he submitted to Atticus.† But the cautious banker advised his friend to submit it first to Oppius and Balbus, who persuaded him not to send it on to the Dictator.‡ The incident was a great disillusion to Cicero and caused renewed suspicions among the educated classes. One touch of brightness came to light up his troubles. A certain Cluvius, who had been one of his most ardent admirers, left him a large bequest which tided him over his pecuniary difficulties. Yet Cicero, like the rest of Rome, was in a continuous state of nervous suspense.

Cicero as
Cæsar's
Aristotle.

* Cic., A., xiii. 28.

† *Id.*, xii. 51; A., xiii. 2; A., xiii. 26, 2; A., xiii. 27, 1.

‡ *Id.*, xiii. 27, 1. *Isti* means Oppius and Balbus, as is clear from A., xiii. 2, 1.

45 B.C.

The news which arrived from Spain at the beginning of 45 only increased the general uneasiness. Cæsar had been so busy thinking out his Parthian plans that he had omitted to prepare the details of this preliminary campaign. From the very first the supplies were insufficient and the soldiers suffered severely from famine.* It was the same difficulty that had befallen him in the war against Vercingetorix, in his first campaign in Spain, and during the operations in Albania; but with this difference, that it could now only be set down to the carelessness of the master of the great Mediterranean granaries.

Cæsar's
negligence
in Spain.

Brutus and
his marriage.

Meanwhile a strange and unexpected event intervened to distract the attention of Roman society from the Spanish War. The virtuous Brutus divorced the daughter of Appius Claudius and married Portia, daughter of Cato and widow of Marcus Bibulus,† Cæsar's old colleague in the Consulship, the admiral who had died during the war in Albania. A noble of ancient lineage, an enthusiastic student of art, literature and philosophy, Brutus was one of those spoilt children of fortune who succeed in winning general admiration for achievements they have not yet performed. Endowed with certain virtues rare in high society, with sobriety and continence, an unusual austerity in his private habits and a high disdain for vulgar ambitions, he had gained a great reputation among his contemporaries. They overlooked small peccadilloes like his trouble with the Cilician debtors, and regarded him universally, Cæsar included, as a prodigy of will and energy,‡ who had great and enduring achievements to his credit, and could rightfully expect to be offered privileges which others laboured painfully to earn. He could take what liberties he liked: there was none to gainsay him. He had sided with Pompey out of regard for Servilia; yet Cæsar had loaded him with honours and responsibilities. He had become a leading member of the aristocratic Cæsarian party; yet without sacrificing the

* Dion, xliii. 32.

† Mommsen's objections to Portia's parentage (Hermes, xv. p. 99 f.) are well refuted by Bynum, B., 33.

‡ Plut., Brut., 6; Cic., A., xiv. 1, 2.

friendship of Cicero and other distinguished Pompeians. Now he suddenly announced his marriage with the daughter and widow of two of the Dictator's bitterest enemies. All Rome was agog with excitement. What did this new development portend? Hostility on Brutus' part to Cæsar's recent change of policy, or an open reconciliation between Cæsar and his old enemies? Servilia, who feared that the marriage might cost her son the friendship of the Dictator, did her best to dissuade him, and Cicero maintained a judicious reserve. But all in vain. Brutus had set his heart on the marriage, and it had to take place. We may suspect that politics had really very little to do with it; it was an old intimacy between cousins which had been renewed after long years of separation. In any case it is clear that Brutus had no intention of breaking with Cæsar; indeed, perhaps by way of compensation, he wrote a pamphlet in his defence against the current accusation that he had caused the death of Marcellus.

Meanwhile the Spanish War had come to a victorious conclusion, but only after perils and vicissitudes that no one had expected. Cæsar himself had fallen ill on several occasions, and he had conducted operations with so little vigour that in the final battle at Munda, on the 17th of March 45, he was within an ace of being defeated and taken prisoner. Moreover the victory lacked the finality of its predecessors. He had left some notable enemies still in the field. Cnæus Pompeius and Labienus had fallen in battle, but the young Sextus Pompeius had successfully made his escape to the north. But Cæsar was impatient to be in Italy. Leaving his subordinates to deal with Sextus, he hastily set out on the homeward journey.

His arrival was anxiously awaited in Italy. The battle of Munda seemed to close the era of the civil war. There was no longer either pretext or reason, so the upper classes held, for the prolongation of the Dictatorship. The decisive moment, then, was approaching; at last the world would know whether Cæsar cared more for liberty or for the temptations of tyranny and revolution. The omens were far from favourable. His party had made immediate use of the victory to

45 B.C.

The battle
of Munda.End of the
civil war.

45 B.C.

propose new honours, which had of course been approved. Cæsar was to bear the title of Imperator as hereditary *prænomen*; he was to be Consul for ten years, and he was also to have the right of nominating the candidates for the Ædileship and the Tribuneship.* At the same time Balbus and Oppius, partly to gratify Cæsar, partly to impress the public, sent invitations to all the chief personages in Rome to come out to meet Cæsar on his return and escort him back in state to the city. It seemed clear therefore, unless his partisans were going farther than he wished, that Cæsar was aiming at supreme and absolute power. Amid a welter of hopes and doubts, and endless discussion of his possible intentions, Rome feverishly awaited the conqueror's return.

Brutus goes
out to meet
Cæsar.

Yet still he delayed his appearance. He spent some time making several Spanish cities into Roman colonies, including Hispalis,† Carthagena,‡ and Tarragona,§ confiscating a part of their territory and settling a number of discharged soldiers on their lands. He was further detained in Narbonese Gaul, where he entrusted Caius Claudius Nero, a friend who had done him useful service at Alexandria, with the duty of distributing lands to the veterans of the sixth and tenth legions in the neighbourhood of Arles and Narbonne.|| Two more legions were thus disbanded. Yet even before he crossed the Alps Cæsar was swept into the whirlpool of Roman controversy. Representatives of all the different sections of opinion, Conservatives as well as moderate and extreme members of his own party, had jumped at the invitation of Oppius and Balbus and arrived daily to swell the numbers of his escort. They must have formed a singular company. Amongst them was Antony, who had grown tired of the pleasures of obscurity and had come determined to make his peace with his old master: ¶ and Trebonius, who was so indignant at Cæsar's

* Dion, xliii. 44, 45.

† Isidorus, xv. 1, 71; Strabo, iii. 2, 1. On the text of this last passage see C. I. L., ii. p. 152.

‡ C. I. L., ii. 462.

§ *Id.*, ii. 538.

|| Suet., Tib., 4. Kromayer (Hermes, xxxi. p. 10 f.) has, I think, proved that only these two colonies, which were styled *Julia paterna*, were founded by Cæsar for the veterans of the second Spanish War.

¶ Plut., Ant., 13.

new policy that he was already dreaming of a dagger to cut the knot ; * and finally Brutus, who had gone out to Cisalpine Gaul, on Cicero's encouragement, to sound Cæsar's intentions and find out what the Dictator thought of his wedding. He had no reason, as it turned out, to be nervous. To Brutus all things were lawful. He found a hearty welcome, and was warmly congratulated on the zeal he had displayed during his provincial administration. Of course he was delighted with his reception, which put all his old apprehensions to sleep. He wrote a most reassuring letter to Cicero, declaring that Cæsar aimed at the re-establishment of an aristocratic government on the Conservative pattern. †

And indeed Cæsar had been genuinely impressed by the unanimity of the public and the dissensions within his own party, and was for a moment inclined to make concessions to the right wing of his supporters and the Conservative school of opinion. He was publicly reconciled with Antony, and to show that he had forgiven him his conduct to the rioters in 47 allowed him to make part of the journey in his own litter. Arrived in Rome he deposed the *præfecti urbi*, refused some suggested distinctions, and resigned his sole Consulship ; then he convened the electors, and nominated the ordinary magistrates, selecting for the Consulship Quintus Fabius Maximus, one of his Spanish generals, and Trebonius, who was one of the most prominent and disaffected of the moderate Cæsarians.

In an impressionable society this was sufficient to revive the wildest hopes. Many believed that the end of the exceptional régime was actually imminent. But Cicero, always far-sighted, could not bring himself to believe it ; and he was right. Cæsar was, in fact, not in the least interested in the constitutional question that was absorbing so the leisured classes at Rome ; his sole and all-engrossing thought was still the Eastern War and the annexation of Parthia. Moreover his health was growing steadily worse ; the attacks of epilepsy from which he had never been entirely free were increasing in

* Plut., Ant., 13 ; Cic., Phil., ii. xiv. 34.

† Cic., A., xiii. 40, 1.

45 B.C. frequency and violence; * body and soul were almost worn out. The striking bust of him in the Louvre, the work of a great unknown master, gives a wonderful representation of the last expiring effort of his prodigious vitality. The brow is furrowed with huge wrinkles, the lean and shapeless face bears marks of intense physical suffering, and the expression is that of a man utterly exhausted. In truth he was tired out.

Cæsar's projects for his supremacy.

Yet, as so often with tired men, he could not take the rest he needed. The vision of Parthia lured him on to fresh exertions. His short spell of moderation did not last for long. No sooner had he arrived at Rome than he set to work on the military and political preparations for the expedition. One of his first objects was to influence public opinion in favour of the war. Sumptuous festivals were given to celebrate his Spanish triumph, and in the huge popular banquets that accompanied them Cæsar for the first time substituted in place of the usual Greek wines some of the new Italian vintages which, thanks to the skilful cultivation of the eastern slaves, were now beginning to be widely known. It was a good way of advertising a new home product, and of encouraging the Italian vine-grower, whose prosperity was rapidly increasing, in spite of the prevailing depression.† The law on the oversea colonies was at once proposed and approved and settlers were recruited from amongst soldiers, citizens and freedmen. Then followed surprise on surprise. Every day Rome was stupefied to hear of some new and daring project. The Dictator intended to divert the course of the Tiber in order to drain the Pontine marshes; to cut up the Campus Martius into building sites, using the land at the foot of the Vatican Hill in its place; to raise a huge theatre, afterwards completed by Augustus, and familiar to the modern traveller as the great Theatre of Marcellus; to commission Varro to establish large libraries in all parts of Rome; to pierce the Isthmus of Corinth; to lay out a road over the Apennines; to create a huge port at Ostia; to assign great public works to contractors and labourers; to collect and codify all the existing laws:‡ all schemes to be

* App., B. C., ii. 110; Nicolas of Damascus, 23.

† Pliny, N. H., xiv. 15, 97.

‡ Plut., Cæs., 58.

executed, of course, after the completion of the great Parthian campaign, for which they were to serve as an overwhelming justification. 45 B.C.

But Cæsar was for once mistaken in thinking that he could dazzle Italy with this profusion of grandiose ideas. The cosmopolitan proletariat of the metropolis might still be deluded into chimerical hopes at the promise of colonies and employment; but the middle class remained sullenly hostile, vainly waiting for a break in the prevailing depression, while the upper ranks of society, touched in their tenderest prejudices by Cæsar's calm assumption of autocratic authority, and always afraid of a social revolution which would despoil them of their riches at the bidding of a dictator, amused themselves by pretending that Cæsar was becoming insane and by heaping derision even on serious projects, such as the reform of the calendar.* They took a childish pleasure in working up indignation against the noisy clique of men and women who surrounded the Dictator. To raise the money necessary for his Parthian campaign Cæsar was obliged to make an indiscriminate sale of the property confiscated from his enemies and the public land which was not suitable for settlements, as well as the treasures in the temples; † and these hurried auctions were made full use of by his friends, many of whom bought huge lands at purely nominal prices. Servilia, for instance, secured a large confiscated estate in this way, ‡ and many centurions, military tribunes and generals in Cæsar's army as well as a few astute freedmen amassed huge fortunes. Amongst these latter was the young German slave named Licinus whom Cæsar had once caught playing the usurer against his companions in servitude and had raised to an important post in the administration, where he had become one of his most skilful coadjutors.

Unscrupulousness of Cæsar's friends.

Cæsar could not risk losing the support of his intimates, and he was obliged to let these abuses go on; but his enemies found in them a most useful leverage. In their indiscriminate condemnation of all his acts and intentions they were parti-

Conservative criticism.

* Plut., Cæs., 59.

† Dion, xliii. 47.

‡ Suet., Cæs., 50.

45 B.C.

cularly emphatic against the Parthian War, now the keystone of Cæsar's whole policy. His premature annexation of Gaul had been sufficiently disastrous to the Republic; yet he was still thirsting for fresh conquests.* Surely it was inexcusable for him to assume these unprecedented powers only to leave the Republic in the throes of a great crisis in order to go off buccaneering in the East.†

Cæsar's
impatience.

Disaffection then was spreading through all classes of the community; yet Cæsar was daily growing less amenable to criticism. Relaxing the self-mastery that had served him so well hitherto, he would let fall violent and indiscreet remarks, such as that Sulla was a fool to lay down his office; that the Republic now only existed in name; that his wish was as good as law.‡ His municipal proposals had been approved by the people, but they bore signs of haste in every line. We may search vainly in the confused and contradictory fragment that has come down to us for the lucidity and distinction of Latin official writing.§ His other arrangements reveal the same exacting impatience. He entrusted the coining of money and the whole of his financial arrangements to oriental slaves, most probably Egyptians;|| he introduced slaves and freedmen into all the public services; he administered a severe rebuke to Pontius Aquila, one of the Tribunes, for not rising when he passed in front of the Tribunician seats;¶ he allowed himself to break out into unworthy and indecent invective; he was furious when he discovered that any of his laws, even the pettiest provisions against luxury, were not being scrupulously carried out, and attempted to secure their better observance by organising a number of vexatious persecutions on matters of detail. But he refused to listen to the suggestion that he

* Cic., *A.*, xiii. 31, 3, reveals to us this discontent among the upper classes. It was in order to allay this that Cæsar wrote to Oppius and Balbus that he would not start for Persia till he had reorganised the State.

† Suet., *Cæs.*, 77.

‡ *Id.*, 76.

§ For the singular style of the extant fragment (*C. I. L.*, i. p. 206) and the hasty compilation which was probably the cause of it see Nissen in *Rh. Mus.*, xlv. p. 104 f.

|| Suet., *Cæs.*, 76.

¶ *Id.*, 78.

was aiming at monarchy or tyranny, and took elaborate pains on several occasions to show his disapproval at any attempt to proclaim him king. Yet he was so tortured by the secret longing for an heir that in the will made on his return from Spain, in view of his approaching departure from Parthia, he named tutors for the child who might be born to him, and actually adopted Octavius, the nephew of his sister, as his son.* When two Tribunes removed a diadem that an unknown hand had placed on one of his statues he broke out in fury against what he declared to be a deliberate insult.† It is hard to say if Cæsar really intended to found a dynasty analogous to that of the Hellenistic monarchs of Asia, or if he merely toyed with the idea in passing, at the suggestion of Cleopatra, without making up his mind either boldly to accept it or to cast it from him as an unworthy temptation. In any case his enemies had every excuse for circulating the report that he was aiming at the "Kingship." So the rumour went the round of the capital, unsettling all minds, awaking hopes and fears, suspicion and bitterness, and complicating a situation already sufficiently difficult.

Yet amid all this inward and outward confusion there was but one object really on which Cæsar's mind was set. All his serious thoughts, all his remaining energies were directed upon Parthia. It was the one clear path through the maze of his difficulties. Once back in Italy with his legions from Parthia, loaded with eastern treasure, with the halo of victory round his standard, he would see Rome and Italy at his feet. Already his preparations were well advanced. He was accumulating supplies of money, making a great depôt of arms at Demetrias, working out a plan of campaign and sending on the young Octavius to Apollonia with his tutors and sixteen legions composed partly of new recruits. A number of young Italians had been driven by poverty to enlist, in the hope of returning rich on Parthian gold.

Thus in the second half of 45 the right and the left wing of Cæsar's party, the moderates and the extremists, were fighting hard for predominance in the counsels of the Dictator; but the

* Suet., Cæs., 83.

† *Id.*, 79.

Parthian
preparations.

[Near
Pagasæ,
or Volo.]

45 B.C.

Cæsar and
the extremists.

extremists were steadily gaining ground. They had been quick to realise, what their rivals still failed to see, that the Parthian expedition was the inevitable outcome of the situation. Without it their party must inevitably succumb, sooner or later, to difficulties which it was not in a position to surmount. If so, there must be no haggling about constitutional legalities. The Dictator must be given all the powers that he needed, even all the ordinary magistracies united in one hand, to secure his success in the indispensable campaign. It was a difficult and hazardous enterprise that would tax all the energies of their general; and it was imperative that he should enter on it unfettered by constitutional restrictions. These arguments were irresistible, and the men that wielded them had the ear of the Dictator. Amongst them was Dolabella, the bankrupt adventurer, now constantly at Cæsar's side, and Antony, who after two painful years of expiation for his services in the cause of order, had now finally thrown in his lot with the winning side.

Antony
restored
to favour.

Antony's defection was a serious blow to the moderate group, for his distinguished services in the Gallic and Civil Wars gave him a commanding position in Cæsar's party. Soon afterwards, towards the close of 45, the moderates received a still more serious, almost an irreparable check. Cæsar decided to use the right which had been conferred on him after Munda of nominating magistrates to the electors, allowing the people only the power of confirming his nomination. This was a cruel disillusion for all those, and they were very numerous, who had persisted in hoping to the last that Cæsar would refuse to exercise this unprecedented prerogative. What indeed was left of the Republic if a single man had it in his power to distribute all the offices? And how did Cæsar differ from a purely autocratic ruler, if all aspirants to a magistracy were henceforth dependent upon his will and pleasure? Moreover his first set of nominees did not serve to allay the prevailing dissatisfaction. Cæsar attempted, it is true, to give some compensation to the Conservative wing of his party, by nominating two of its four most eminent members, Brutus and Cassius, to the Prætorship; but he

effaced this concession by his generosity to their enemy the turncoat. Antony was selected as Cæsar's colleague in the Consulship, and his two brothers Caius and Lucius were made Prætor and Tribune respectively. Rome seemed threatened with a government of the House of Antony. The disgust of the public was intensified by an open scandal. Cæsar was anxious to name a *Consul Suffectus* for the time during which he would be absent in Parthia. His choice fell upon his favourite Dolabella, who had not even held the Prætorship. Thus the leader of the revolutionary party would be one of the chief officers of the Republic during Cæsar's absence. But for once his calculations were curiously falsified. Feeling that he had the whole strength of public opinion at his back, Antony who had an old grudge to pay off against Dolabella, and was perhaps seeking to regain the favour of his old friends on the right wing, declared in the sitting of the 1st of January 44 that in his capacity as Augur he would forbid the electors to meet for Dolabella's nomination. Cæsar bowed to the clamour and refused to intervene.

44 B.C.

Rome was in a state of extraordinary confusion. The upper classes, now utterly disgusted, had withdrawn entirely from politics. Cæsar stood practically alone, with a small knot of greedy adventurers. His parasites used their power to induce the Senate and the people, in the first days of 44, to vote him still more extravagant honours borrowed from the disgusting eastern practice of deification. A temple was decreed in honour of Jupiter Julius; the name of the month Quintilis was changed into Julius, and Cæsar was given the right of being buried inside the City boundary and of maintaining a bodyguard of senators and knights.* These were all the trappings, if not yet the name, of kingship. It was still more ominous that when the Senate went to communicate to him the conferment of these honours, he received the deputation without rising from his seat: † that he nominated all sorts and conditions of new members to the Senate, including a number of Gauls: and lastly that, for the Vice-dictatorship in 44, when Lepidus had left Rome for his province, he proposed to appoint

Cæsar king in all but name.

* Dion, xliv. 5.

† Suet., Cæs., 78.

44 B.C. his nephew Caius Octavius who was not yet eighteen years of age. This was openly to violate some of the oldest and most venerated of Roman traditions: a daring application in the sphere of politics of the radical and revolutionary ideas that were widespread among the rising generation of writers and thinkers.

Cæsar's efforts
to win back
the public.

Meanwhile this steady accumulation of honours was accompanied by a progressive weakening of authority. With every fresh access of power Cæsar seemed less able to wield it. He was constantly finding it necessary to make concessions, particularly to his enemies in the Conservative camp. His situation was indeed almost ludicrously contradictory, inconsistent at once with the supreme position which he occupied and with the idea which most historians have formed of his Dictatorship. The root of all his trouble lay in the Parthian campaign. This forced him at once to assume the fullest possible powers, yet to set out without leaving too many enemies behind his back. He needed, if he could, to have a favourable public. Unfortunately the prolongation of his exceptional authority exposed him to widespread and irreconcilable hostility. Unable as he was to renounce any of these powers, he endeavoured to allay irritation by yielding on minor points, sometimes even to the detriment of the prestige of the State. Alarmed at the excitement caused by his nomination of all the magistrates he went back upon his decision and tried to find a way out by proposing through Lucius Antonius, apparently at the beginning of 44, a very curious *lex de partitione comitorum* which doubled the number of the Quæstors, enacting that one-half should be elected by the people and one-half nominated by himself and automatically accepted by the electors. The same law perhaps also provided that half the Tribunes and plebeian Ædiles should be nominated by Cæsar, and half elected by the people, and that both the Consuls should be nominated by Cæsar, but the curule Ædiles by the people.* By these ingenious arrangements he showed a proper respect for the rights of the people whilst maintaining

* Dion, xliii. 51; Cic., *Phil.*, vii. vi. 16. See Stobbe in *Phil.*, xxvii. p. 95.

in office a due proportion of his own adherents. It was no doubt also to gratify the Conservatives that he proposed the *lex Cassia*, an attempt to fill up the number of the old patrician families many of which had become extinct.

The same spirit is displayed in his concessions to the Pompeians. Not only did he reverse his previous policy and proclaim a complete amnesty, but he welcomed them back to Italy with open arms, restored the widows and children of the dead a part of the confiscated property,* and heaped favours upon the returning exiles, somewhat to the neglect of his old associates in the dark days of his career.† Hirtius and Pansa warned him repeatedly against being too open-hearted.‡ But Cæsar refused to listen. He dismissed his whole bodyguard, including his Spanish slaves, and desired to be accompanied only by lictors on his walks.§ When told that nocturnal meetings were being held against him in different parts of Rome, and a conspiracy very possibly being set on foot, he did no more than publish an edict declaring his full knowledge of all that was going on, and make a speech to the people in which he warned all would-be evildoers to be careful of their ways.|| Better to die than to live as a tyrant,¶ as he said one day to Hirtius and Pansa.

Cæsar and the Pompeians.

Meanwhile he made promises of all sorts, possible and impossible, to every one who came near him,** and no longer even attempted to stop the wholesale pillage of public money which his friends were conducting under his very eyes.†† The Dictatorship was degenerating into a senile and purposelless opportunism that recalled the feeblest expedients of the old republican government. Many of his veterans had been settled at Volterra and Arezzo, on lands which, originally [Volaterræ.] confiscated but restored by Sulla to their old proprietors, had once more been reclaimed for the State by Cæsar. Many more had been given holdings in various places up and down Italy and had been made members of the order of Decurions, the municipal aristocracy reorganised by the

Cæsar and land settlement in Italy.

* Suet., Cæs., 75.

† Nic. Dam., 19.

‡ Vell., ii. 57.

§ App., B. C., ii. 107. See Suet., Cæs., 86.

|| Suet., Cæs., 76.

¶ Vell., ii. 57.

** Dion, xliii. 47.

†† *Id., id.*

44 B.C.

[Larinum.]
[Casilinum.]

lex Julia in many of the smaller Italian towns as at Ravenna and Larino, at Capua and Suessa, at Calatia, Casilino and Sipontum.* But the search for what remained of the old State domain proceeded but very slowly, the Commissioners being overwhelmed with appeals for delay from persons of influence. The majority of the veterans had therefore to rest content for the present with the old promises of their general.†

Cæsar bows
before Atticus.

Nor were the oversea colonies more successful. It appears that a certain number of settlers actually started for Lamp-sacus ‡ and the Black Sea,§ but the preparations for Carthage and Corinth were not pushed forward so rapidly,|| and the idea of founding a colony in Albania had to be abandoned altogether. This had led indeed to a very curious situation. Making use of his rights over provincial land, Cæsar had confiscated part of the municipal domain of Buthrotum which had refused to pay him a fine fixed during the war, intending to distribute it among Italian settlers. But one of the proprietors thus despoiled of their estates happened to be Atticus, who was responsible, it must be remembered, for the investments of a large number of prominent Romans. Atticus brought so much pressure to bear upon Cæsar through his friends at court that the decree was eventually revoked on condition that Atticus be responsible for the original fine. Thus a financier who had never held even the lowest office in the State had got the better of the almighty Dictator. But the sequel is more curious still. Cæsar continued his preparations for the colony as though nothing had happened, till Atticus and Cicero, who had worked hard for his friend in the matter, again became uneasy and asked for an explanation. Cæsar soon reassured them, but begged them to keep the matter quiet. He was unwilling that the public should

* See Zumpt, C. E., i. 304-307.

† This is clear from App., B. C., ii. 125, 133, 139.

‡ App., B. C., ii. 137.

§ Sinope: Strabo, xii. 3, 11. See the coins in Head, *Historia Nummorum* (Oxford, 1887), p. 435. Perhaps Heraclea should be added; cf. Strabo, xii. 3, 6. See Zumpt, C. E., i. 317.

|| See App., Pun., 136; Zumpt, C. E., i. 318.

discover that he had given up his colony to satisfy a Roman plutocrat. He must carry the matter through. He prepared to embark his settlers, and land them in Albania, and then find them some other destination than Buthrotum, though where that should be he had not yet decided.* Such were the shifts to which the master of the world was reduced. He was not even successful in allaying the open hostility between Antony and Dolabella; and Antony had actually carried through his threat of preventing the nomination of Dolabella as *Consul Suffectus*. Thus even the apparently omnipotent Dictator was himself entangled in the network of robbery and corruption which encircled Rome as it encircles all mercantile societies where money has become the supreme object of desire. He could no more break through them than the meanest of his dependants.

Yet all these concessions failed utterly in their object; **After Parthia.** Cæsar's unpopularity increased from day to day.† In the whole situation there was a latent contradiction that no human force or ingenuity could resolve, and which was destined indeed to drive Cæsar to his doom. Cæsar endeavoured to justify the prolongation of his exceptional powers on the plea of his Parthian expedition. But it was precisely his Parthian ambitions which set so many, particularly in the upper classes, against his Dictatorship. Everywhere men were asking what more he would do when he returned victorious. Surely then he would be, in fact as well as in name, the absolute master of the Republic? While Cicero was trying to persuade himself that Cæsar was foredoomed to the fate of Crassus, others looked forward with genuine dismay to the exploits of a general who had never known defeat, and did their best to sow suspicion and distrust of his intentions. The strangest rumours were set in circulation. According to one version Cæsar proposed to marry Cleopatra, to transfer the Metropolis of the Roman Empire to Ilion or Alexandria,‡ and then after the conquest

* Cic., A., xvi. 16, A-F.

† See Cic., F., vii. 30.

‡ Suet., Cæs., 79; Nic. Dam., 20.

44 B.C. of Parthia to conduct a great expedition against the Getæ and Scythians and return to Italy by way of Gaul.* Cleopatra seems to have returned to Rome towards the end of the year 45, in time to play her part in the composition of these fairy tales. On the top of all this came a serious scandal. On the 26th of January 44, as Cæsar was passing through the streets, some of the common people saluted him as king; the two Tribunes of the people with whom he had already come into conflict about the diadem promptly clapped them into prison. Cæsar was furious. He declared that the Tribunes had excited these poor people to make a demonstration in order to cast suspicion upon him for monarchical ambitions. When the two Tribunes objected to his interference, he passed a law to depose them and had them expelled from the Senate, thereby scandalising the common people who still regarded the Tribune as the most sacred of magistrates.†

The
Lupercalia.

Meanwhile Cæsar and the extreme party among his associates were breaking down the last barriers of constitutional legality. In the first fortnight of February ‡ the Senate of the people nominated Cæsar perpetual Dictator.§ This was the last and the most important of the measures taken in view of the Parthian War on which Cæsar was almost immediately to set out. Its object was to provide him with the full and unfettered powers which he needed on his campaign without fear of being distracted by the vicissitudes of politics in the Metropolis. A perpetual Dictator was, of course, only good Latin for Monarch. In order to weaken the impression of what was really a *coup d'état* and to reassure a public that felt a traditional and almost superstitious horror of monarchy, Cæsar appears to have arranged with Antony for a public pantomime to take place on the Feast of the Lupercals on the 15th of February. Cæsar presided over the festival in person. Antony advanced, diadem in hand, and pretended to be about to place it on his head. Cæsar declined it,

* Plut., Cæs., 58.

† App., B. C., ii. 108; Suet., Cæs., 79.

‡ Lange, R. A., iii. 470.

§ Dion, xliv. 8; App., B. C., ii. 106.

but Antony insisted and Cæsar again declined with added emphasis. He was of course long and loudly applauded, after which he had a note inscribed in the Calendar, stating that on this day the people had offered him the royal crown and he had refused it. But this palpable falsehood only increased the public indignation.*

44 B.C.

All this while Italy was as distracted as ever with the problem of debt, and the middle class was still feeling the pinch of the prevailing crisis, while among the poor population of Italy and Rome there was a strange recrudescence of vague revolutionary propaganda which was becoming daily more alarming to the property-owning classes. The wildest dreams were bandied about in the streets of Rome and over the Italian country side. Cæsar, with his colonies and his Parthian War, would bring back the age of gold; the tyranny of the rich and powerful was drawing to its close, and a newer and better government was at hand. The memories of the great popular revolution became so lively in men's minds that a certain Erophilos, a native of Magna Græcia, a veterinary surgeon by profession and no doubt more or less weak in the head, passed himself off as the grandson of Marius and immediately became the hero of the hour. Associations of workmen, colonies of veterans and even municipalities chose him as their patron, and he actually formed a sort of court around him and dared to treat Cæsar and the aristocracy on terms of equality. Afraid to embroil himself with the people, Cæsar did not dare to remove him; and the utmost he would do was to turn him out of the metropolis.†

Revolutionary
dreams among
the poor.

* Dion, xliv. 11; App., B. C., ii. 109; Plut., Cæs., 61; Ant., 12; Suet., Cæs., 79; Vell., ii. 56. The scene was so long remembered that it is frequently mentioned in Cicero's *Philippics*. See esp. Phil., ii. xxxiv. 85-87, and Columba, *Il Marzo del 44 a Roma* (Palermo, 1896), p. 9.

† Nic. Dam., 14; Val., Max., ix. 15, 2; Cic., A., xii. 49, 1.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE IDES OF MARCH

The originator of the conspiracy—Cassius and Brutus—The motives of the conspiracy—Cæsar's political ideas—Cæsar the Archdestroyer—A conspiracy of eighty—The scheme of the plotters—The hesitations of Brutus—The Ides of March—The death of Cæsar.

44 B.C. THEN it was that a man took up the idea foreshadowed by Trebonius a few months before—the idea of assassination.

Cassius and the nucleus of the conspiracy.

It was Cassius* who revived it, the Quæstor of Crassus in his Parthian campaign who had married the daughter of Servilia. He was a young man of ability and ambition, but bitter, violent and overbearing, too clever to delude himself that he had more to gain by Cæsar's removal than he might safely expect from his favour. His first step was to discuss the notion cautiously with a few close friends, whom he knew to be opposed to the Dictator. A small group of conspirators was formed, and the possibility of the attempt seriously examined. It was soon agreed that it was indispensable to secure the co-operation of Brutus, the brother-in-law of Cassius,† who had great influence amongst all parties as son of Servilia and an intimate of Cæsar's. If it became known that Brutus was actually one of the conspirators many a possible ally would find courage to join.

The career of Brutus.

Like so many another who has been dragged to the front by the caprices of revolutionary history Brutus was the very opposite of a strong man. His was one of those temperaments so common among the hereditary nobility in a civilised age,

* The statement of Dion (xliv. 13) that Brutus was the originator of the conspiracy, which is contrary to all psychological probability, is contradicted by the statements of all other historians, especially Plut., Brut., 8.

† Plut., Brut., 10.

reasonably intelligent but devoid either of energy or passion, conceited but entirely wrapped up in himself, with few outside ambitions, without a touch of cruelty or vindictiveness, and given to a rather overt display of self-denial and benevolence. Fond of modelling himself on others, like all men of weak character, he had taken for a time to the fashionable pastime of usury; he had joined Pompey in 49, when, in the great panic after the capture of Rimini, the upper classes went blindly after the leader who represented property and order. Later he had made his peace with Cæsar and enjoyed his friendship. Yet by nature he was neither a piler up of millions nor a political aspirant, but a quiet and simple-minded student who in any ordinary age would have developed into nothing more than an aristocratic dilettante, somewhat strange in his ideas and chilling in his manner, finding as much satisfaction in his books as other men in love or fame or riches. But in these troublous times the fervent admiration conceived by the people for his unusual gifts of character had stirred that in him which was stronger even than his taste for study—the insidious passion of vanity. He loved to pose as a hero of iron will and unshrinking resolution, a model of those difficult virtues which can only be exercised by dint of painful self-mastery. This vanity, which a study of the Stoic philosophy had still further excited, together with the underlying feebleness of character which it only partially concealed, are the real keys to a nature which has puzzled generations of historians and moralists.

Cassius was a clever man. He had seen through his brother-in-law, and knew the right bait to use. He began by causing Brutus to find mysterious notes left during the night on his prætor's seat, or at the foot of the statue of the first Brutus in the Forum; they contained strange and suggestive admonitions, such as "Oh Brutus, if thou wert still living," or "Thou art asleep, oh Brutus."* Sometimes

Brutus: the student in politics.

* Plut., Brut., 9; Cæs., 62; App., B. C., ii. 112. I think it probable, in spite of what Plutarch says, that Cassius and his accomplices were responsible for these missives. See App., B. C., ii. 113.

44 B.C.

too in the street Brutus heard men cry behind him, "We have need of a Brutus."* Not guessing whence these missives proceeded the ingenuous student imagined that a whole people was crying out to him as the inflexible hero who was alone capable of the deed of blood. His vanity was touched: he began to reflect on Cæsar's actions, to ask himself if it was not his painful duty to cut them short. No doubt his gentle soul shrank back at first in dismay when he pictured the dangers and the ingratitude of the murder, when he thought of Cæsar's kindness to himself and his old and unbroken friendship with his mother. But once entrenched in that stiffly logical mind the idea of assassination was not to be exorcised. It cast a spell over his narrow and bookish imagination. He called to mind the glory of the tyrant-slayers in Greek literature and Roman tradition; he read and re-read the subtle reasoning by which the old philosophers justified regicide on grounds of the highest morality. Argument against argument, emotion against emotion. Cæsar had been his benefactor. That was no reason for forgiveness. All the more necessary to strike him down without flinching, to sacrifice a personal affection to the public good, as his ancestor, the first Consul of the Republic, had put his own children to death for the sake of Rome. It was at this point in the struggle that Cassius intervened. Marcus Brutus must prove no ordinary prætor; Rome looked to him with confidence for guidance and inspiration. None so fitted as he to lead her back to freedom!† Cæsar, then deep in his Parthian preparations, saw little of Brutus during these critical weeks. So Cassius conquered; and the conspiracy spread, as it had sprung up, among the small group of aristocratic Cæsarians who centred round Servilia, as a natural reaction against the open victory of the radical and revolutionary faction. Lepidus was the only one of the group who knew nothing and remained loyal to his leader.

Brutus and Cassius found many accomplices among the

* Dion, xliv. 12.

† App., B. C., ii. 113.

surviving Pompeians and the right wing of Cæsar's party : 44 B.C.
 even some of his best known generals, such as Caius Trebonius and Servius Sulpicius Galba, were ready to join. Modern historians almost all express surprise at the ease with which the conspiracy was arranged ; in their very justifiable admiration for the man who was seeking to reorganise the Roman world they have been unsparing in their judgments upon the treachery, the obstinacy, the short-sightedness of his murderers. Had they tried to form an estimate of the actual situation, as it must have appeared to men at the time, they might have found reason to modify both their surprise and their condemnation. Great man as Cæsar was, it was impossible that his contemporaries should anticipate the child-like hero-worship of posterity or see in him a demigod whose very blunders and self-deceptions were material for adoration ! Many of the conspirators may indeed have been actuated by paltry and personal considerations. But these after all were not the real dynamic forces at work. Neither the conspiracy itself nor Cæsar's work as a whole can be judged good or bad by a simple inquiry into the private motives of the actors concerned. We must realise, in all its dramatic intensity, the unique situation which impelled them to action.

Rapid spread
of the con-
spiracy.

Cæsar was a genius—a man whose powers have seldom or never been equalled in history. He was at once student, artist and man of action ; and in every sphere of his activity he left the imprint of greatness. His soaring yet intensely practical imagination, his wonderfully clear-cut and well-balanced intelligence, his untiring energy and lightning quickness of decision, his marvellous elasticity of temper and iron power of self-control, his indifference even at moments of the greatest strain to anything of the nature of sentiment or mysticism, would have made him, at any time in the world's history, one of the giants of his age. Under twentieth-century conditions he might have become a captain of industry in the United States or a great pioneer or mine-owner or empire-builder in South Africa, or a scientist or man of letters in Europe with a world-wide influence over his contemporaries.

The versatility
of genius.

44 B.C.

In the Rome of his day both family tradition and personal inclination forced him into politics. Political life is always perilous to a man of genius. There is no sphere of activity which is so much at the mercy of unforeseen accidents or where the effort put out is so incommensurable with the result obtained. In the field of Roman politics Cæsar succeeded in becoming a great general, a great writer, a great character. He failed to become a great statesman.*

Cæsar's career
of blunders.

There were three great political objects for which he fought during his career: the reconstruction of the Constitutional Democratic party in 59, a bold adoption and extension of the Imperialism of Lucullus in 56, and the regeneration of the Roman world by the conquest of Parthia after the death of Pompey. The first and second of these ideas were taken up too late: the third was inherently impossible. The first ended in the revolutionary Radicalism of his Consulship, the second in the field of Carrhæ and the horrors of the death-struggle with Vercingetorix, the third in the Ides of March. It would be unjust to lay the blame for these failures at Cæsar's door. If he was not a statesman, it was because the times forbade him to become one. In a democracy bitten with the mad passion for power, riches and self-indulgence, a man who stands aloof from these temptations may live very happily in retirement and write books upon philosophy; but he must not stray into the hazardous paths of politics. An inexorable destiny seems to dog Cæsar all his days. It was events which drove him to the revolutionary measures of his Consulship. Again it was the necessity under which he lay to save himself, his party and his work from the results of that revolution which drove him to the boldest step in his

* This opinion is directly contrary to that of Mommsen (R. G., iii. 464). "No doubt," he says, "Cæsar was a great orator, a great writer, and a great general, but he became all these because he was an incomparable statesman." Paolo Orano, in his essay, *Il problema del Cristianesimo* (Rome, 1901), in which there are some suggestive observations, couched in a somewhat involved style, on the Roman world, remarks with justice (p. 84) that "the personal causes which contributed to Cæsar's greatness were *necessary* causes." But he is mistaken, in my opinion, in speaking of him as "a magnificent statesman and incomparable opportunist."

life, the annexation of Gaul. Annexation once proclaimed, it was no longer in his power to turn back; he was pushed on to those sanguinary acts of repression which form the darkest page in his history. The civil war arose so inevitably out of the policy which he adopted in Gaul that all his efforts to avert it were doomed to failure. His success in the civil war proved even greater than he had hoped—so great, in fact, as to defeat his own object. Victory left him in an unexpected and painfully difficult position. Ostensibly master of the Roman world, he was in reality suspended between two equally impossible alternatives—either to abandon the position he had just triumphantly captured, or, almost single-handed, with the help of a few personal adherents, to administer a huge and disorganised Empire. He dreamt of escaping from this dilemma by the conquest of Parthia, an enterprise which was to be the beginning of a new era in Roman history. With the experience of twenty centuries to guide us, it is easy to understand how he entertained such an idea: but easy also to understand that it was a fantastic illusion.

Cæsar was not a great statesman; but he was a great destroyer. In him were personified all the revolutionary forces, the magnificent but devastating forces, of a mercantile age in conflict with the traditions of an old-world society—its religious scepticism, its indifference to morality, its insensibility to family affection, its opportunist and undisciplined politics, its contempt for precedent and tradition, its Eastern luxury, its grasping militarism, its passion for the baser forms of commerce and speculation, its first tentative efforts towards intellectual refinement, its naïve enthusiasm for art and science. There is hardly a stranger irony in history than that the rulers of Germany and Russia should have assumed the title of this prince of revolutionaries. For we fail to grasp the true significance of Cæsar's career till we discern that, like Pompey and Crassus and the other great figures of his day, his mission was primarily destructive—to complete the disorganisation and dissolution of the old world, both in Italy and the provinces, and thus make way for a stabler and

Cæsar the
Archdestroyer.

44 B.C.

juster system. But when he imagined that he could apply his unrivalled powers of mind and will to all the intellectual and social influences of the time, and direct them to his own purposes, he displeased all parties and was removed from the scene. It matters little that in the later part of his life he displayed more wisdom and moderation than in the earlier; that he attempted in part, though with many inconsistencies, to repair as a reformer the mistakes he had committed as a demagogue; that he had at last come to see that a discontented society, blind and breathless in the race for riches and self-indulgence, has set its selfish course, beyond all turning, for the Abyss. To avert this collapse was beyond any single man's powers. Too many foes were struggling for mastery in the Roman society of his day—from the truceless conflict between riches and poverty or capital and debt, to the antagonism between the spirit of revolution and the spirit of authority, Asiatic profusion and Latin frugality, the new Hellenistic culture and the traditions of Roman life. No doubt Cæsar had displayed a marvellous vigour and elasticity, far beyond that of any contemporary, in his prolonged resistance against the rolling and tossing of the Roman democracy, adrift as it was, like a derelict in a stormy ocean, amid the blasts of a perverse and excitable public opinion. But how could he compose or control these far-reaching conflicts in the whole of society when he could not even dominate those within the ranks of his own party? Until the struggle had reached its climax in the great crisis which began at Cæsar's death and raged without intermission through the whole of the next decade, it was impossible for a new generation to build a sounder and more sheltered society out of the *debris* left by its predecessors—a busy, fortunate, Titanic breed of builders, but too worn and weary, too arrogant, too much embittered by war and hatred, too prone to licence in morals and politics and in their general philosophy of life, to be dowered with lasting happiness. The times called for a quieter, a more cautious, a more patient race of workers. Cæsar's hour had come and gone. He must pass, as Crassus, Pompey, Cato, had passed before

Empire
builders and
organisers.

him, as Cicero was to follow after a few more months, together with the flower of the aristocracy that had lived through the greatest and most stirring age of Roman history. 44 B.C.

It is in this rôle of Titanic destroyer therefore that we must admire him, a rôle which demanded almost superhuman qualities of conception and achievement. We find him, it is true, at the close of his career, busy with the reorganisation of a world whose disorder he had done so much to promote, attempting to build on the field which he and his contemporaries had piled with wreckage. But for the success of this work two conditions were necessary. First, Cæsar must retain sufficient vigour and elasticity to adapt himself to the needs of an altered policy; second, the great solvents that had been at work for the last century, loosening the fabric of Italian society, must have finished their work with the civil war. To the former condition fate forbids us the reply. Perhaps the Archdestroyer had still strength enough left him to turn that Protean genius to the work of reconstruction. As to the second, we have the evidence of the next twenty-five years. The forces of dissolution were indeed very far from exhausted. So far were they from being arrested at the time of Cæsar's death, that they went on to provoke what was perhaps one of the most tremendous crises in the whole course of world-history.

Cæsar and
the might
have been.

Moreover the fact that Cæsar did not succeed in healing or even allaying the dissensions within his own party is in itself significant. It does not suggest that he would have been more successful in controlling the similar but far more violent antagonisms in the wider field of society. We need not be surprised that Cæsar, who could not see into the future, had little sense of the realities of the situation: that he naïvely looked forward to the conquest of Parthia as the prelude to an easy reorganisation of the Republic. But the modern observer, viewing the centuries behind him in their right perspective, has a clearer vision of his dilemma. He has no excuse for regarding the plot to which Cæsar fell a victim as an unlucky misadventure, due to the weakness or the wickedness of a few isolated individuals. The very opposite is the truth. The

The object of
the conspiracy.

44 B.C.

conspiracy was the first outcome of an important movement, inevitable both for practical and sentimental reasons. It marks a genuine alliance between the surviving Conservatives and the right wing of Cæsar's party. Its object was to hinder the Parthian expedition. The conspirators were in fact less concerned with the actual situation than with that which would face them when Cæsar returned victorious from the East. Not all his most emphatic denials could convince them that he was not intending to establish an open kingship. As the representatives of the old Latin and Conservative Republic, the defenders of property and class interest, they banded themselves together against the Asiatic and revolutionary monarchy which they saw looming in the East, between the folds of Cæsar's conquering banners.

Eighty to
keep a secret.

The plot was so well taken up that by the 1st of March it comprised according to one account sixty, according to another, no less than eighty Senators.* One of the last to join was Decimus Brutus, Cæsar's favourite friend, who had returned to Rome from Gaul towards the end of February. Cicero on the other hand was not admitted into the secret; they were unwilling to expose the veteran writer and speaker to the dangers of conspiracy. The large number of plotters is astonishing in view of the fact that the risk of indiscretions is always necessarily increased with the number of accomplices. But there was probably good reason for their action. The loyalty of the army to their general was regarded as unassailable; while the proletariat, among whom the excitement was rising daily higher, seemed, rightly or wrongly, to be wholly on Cæsar's side. It was therefore absolutely necessary that Cæsar should be struck down not by a few personal enemies but by a practically unanimous Senate. It was the only way in which the coalition of Pompeians and moderate Cæsarians could hope, after his death, to maintain control over the legions, the populace and the Provinces. This is no doubt also the reason why, after lengthy discussion, it was decided that Antony should not meet the same fate as his leader. It was not Brutus, with his scruples against the shedding of Roman

* Nic. Dam., 19, says eighty, the other authorities sixty.

blood, that saved him, but more probably the reflection that the simultaneous disappearance of the two Consuls would have prevented the immediate restoration of the old constitution.* No doubt they also hoped that so recent a convert to the party of tyranny would return to his old allies on the death of the Dictator.

The place and the method of the assassination are clear evidence of the real intentions of its authors. These details opened up a very difficult question, and a number of alternative plans were discussed † during the visits which the conspirators paid to one another in their houses; for to avoid suspicion no common meeting was held.‡ But the days were passing and immediate action was imperative. Cæsar would shortly be starting for Parthia. His veterans, who were to escort him out of the city, were already streaming in from all parts of Italy, finding quarters as best they could in the temples.§ Several different proposals were made, but no one seemed satisfactory. The conspirators began to lose heart; several already repented of having joined. There was one moment of awful suspense when the weaker section threatened to break off the whole enterprise.|| But the force of events and the danger in which they were already involved came to strengthen their sinking resolution. Cæsar was moving on from illegality to illegality. He had now gone so far as to pass through the Senate a law providing that before his departure magistrates should be chosen to cover the whole of the next three years, the probable duration of his campaign. Early in March Hirtius and Pansa were nominated Consuls for 43, together with a new batch of Tribunes. According to one report, a Sibylline oracle had declared that only a king could conquer the Parthians, and Lucius Aurelius Cotta, the Consul of 65, against whom Cæsar had conspired in 66, was about to propose his proclamation as king of the whole Roman Empire outside Italy.¶ When at last it was known that

The details arranged.

* On the constitutional difficulties opened up by vacancies in the consulship see Cic., Fam., xi. 10, 2.

† Nic. Dam., 23; Suet., Cæs., 80.

§ App., B. C., ii. 120.

|| Dion, xlv. 15.

‡ Nic. Dam., 24.

¶ Suet., Cæs., 79.

44 B.C.

Cæsar intended to convoke the Senate on the 15th in the Curia of Pompey to settle the question of Dolabella's consulship and other outstanding business, and that he was to leave Rome on the 17th, all agreed that this last opportunity must not be allowed to go by. Cut down in the Senate-house by a band of eighty influential Senators Cæsar would seem to fall like Romulus at the hands of his country.*

The second
week of
March.

There was no more drawing back. On the Ides of March the blow must be struck, cost what it might. The last days before the sitting began slowly to run their course. Every evening in eighty of the richest houses of Rome men who had often and often faced death on the battlefield went trembling to their beds, not knowing whether Cæsar would let them live till morning. At dawn they would recommence the wearisome round of visits to friends' houses, avoiding the curious eyes of passers-by in the streets, baffling the listening ears of the slaves in the houses, with the pretended indifference of a ceremonious visitor. Brutus suffered especially from these torments of doubt and anxiety. If he bore himself in the streets with all the outward marks of serenity, within doors he would plunge into long and melancholy reveries; he would toss and sigh in his sleep, with a trouble that Portia was unable to divine. Fear, gratitude and affection were fighting a hard battle within him against his obstinate ambition to play the hero's part.† Meanwhile the days were passing; nothing stirred in Rome; the secret was well kept.‡ Neither Cæsar nor his intimates seemed to dream of danger. Only Portia, by constant questioning, had wrung the truth from her hus-

* App., B. C., ii. 114.

† Plut., Brut., 13.

‡ I believe that there is a great deal of exaggeration in the ancient stories of warnings given to Cæsar. If the conspiracy had been so well known it would have come to the ears of Antony, Lepidus and other faithful friends, which would have been enough to stop it. It was not necessary that Cæsar himself should be warned. It is probable that during these days he received imaginary revelations of a conspiracy such as he had often received before, like all heads of a government. The only real piece of evidence for a betrayal of the secret seems to me to be that of Popilius Læna in Plut., Brut., 15. The conspirators, after all, were Senators and aristocrats, and it is not surprising that they could keep their own counsel.

band. Bit by bit at private meetings all the details of the assassination were arranged. The conspirators were to conceal daggers under their togas; Trebonius was to detain Antony in conversation. In the theatre of Pompey, just outside the Curia, Decimus Brutus was to station a troop of gladiators that he had hired for the Games, who would defend the conspirators in case of need. Immediately after the murder Brutus was to deliver a speech to the Senate explaining the reasons of their action and proposing the reconstitution of the Republic. The 14th of March came and passed without a hint of trouble. Cæsar had arranged to spend that evening with Lepidus, and would return home late—a clear sign that he had no suspicions. How many eyes must have been turned that night towards the sky, to watch for the setting of the stars and the rising of the sun that was to see Cæsar dead and the Republic restored! Only Cæsar, home late from his friend, slept innocent of his doom—the broken sleep of a sick and weary man.

On the morning of the 15th the conspirators were early at their rendezvous, at the colonnade of Pompey, near the present Campo dei Fiori. Brutus, who was Prætor, mounted the judgment-seat and began quietly to attend to his day's litigation, controlling his inward excitement. The rest of the conspirators awaited the opening of the sitting, walking up and down the colonnade talking to their friends and trying to conceal their agitation.* In the neighbouring theatre of Pompey a performance was going on. There was the usual bustle and traffic in the streets. Cæsar might arrive at any moment.

The morning
of the Ides.

But Cæsar delayed to come, detained, it seems, by a slight indisposition, which had almost induced him for a moment to postpone the sitting. The conspirators, already excited, began to grow anxious, to start up at every passing noise. A friend approached Casca, one of the conspirators, and said to him, laughing, "You know how to keep a secret, but Brutus has told me everything." Casca, dumbfounded, was about to reveal the whole plot, when his friend's next words showed

Cæsar tarries.

* Plut., Brut., 14.

44 B.C.

that he was alluding to Casca's intention of standing for the Ædileship. One of the Senators, Popilius Læna, came up to Brutus and Cassius and whispered into their ear, "Success is possible, but whatever you do do quickly."* Still Cæsar did not come. It was perhaps about ten in the morning † and the sun was already high in the heavens. The conspirators were exhausted by their long wait. They spoke of treachery and their nerve began to fail. At last Cassius resolved to send Decimus Brutus to Cæsar's house, to see what was detaining him and to bring him to the Curia. Decimus hurriedly threaded the back streets by the Campus Martius, descended into the Forum, and found his way into the *domus publica*, where Cæsar had his official dwelling as Pontifex Maximus. He found him just on the point of postponing the sitting. It was the crucial moment. But Decimus had the nerve, or the ferocity, to drag to the slaughter-house the friend who trusted blindly to his guidance. He engaged him in pleasant conversation, amiably overruled his objections, and persuaded him to come. ‡

The murder.

At last Cæsar's litter hove in sight. Just outside the Curia the Dictator descended, and the conspirators, who were already collected in the hall, observed Popilius Læna go up to him and address him in low tones. It was a cruel instant of suspense for Brutus and Cassius. Cassius very nearly lost his self-control; but Brutus, calmer than his colleague, had the courage to look Cæsar for an instant in the face. That stern, emaciated, careworn countenance, with the marks of his work lined upon it, was listening unmoved. Brutus beckoned Cassius that all was well. § But there was another delay. Cæsar stopped outside the Senate-house to make the sacrifices ordained by the State ritual. At last he entered and took his seat, while Trebonius detained Antony in conversation outside. Tullius Cimber approached the Dictator to demand pardon for an exiled brother. The others gathered round him, as though to join their prayers to Cimber's, till Cæsar, feeling that they

* Plut., Brut., 15; App., B. C., ii. 115.

† Columba, p. 40.

‡ Plut., Cæs., 64; Dion, xliv. 18.

§ Plut., Brut., 16.

were pressing him too close, stood up and bade them move farther away. Then Tullius seized him by the toga, which slipped down to his feet, leaving the body covered only with a light tunic. It was the appointed signal. Casca aimed the first blow, but missed in his fright, hitting him in the shoulder. Cæsar turned sharply on him with a cry, seizing his *stilus* in self-defence. Casca called for help to his brother, who plunged his dagger in Cæsar's side. Cassius struck him in the face, Decimus in the groin. In an instant the whole band was upon him, so excited that they hit one another, while Cæsar fought like a wild beast at bay, and the rest of the Senators, after a moment's stupor, fled panic-stricken from the hall, shouting and pushing and stumbling over one another in their haste, Cæsar's own supporters, even Antony, amongst them. Only two rushed forward to rescue Cæsar. Their loyalty was in vain. Still madly beating off his enemies Cæsar had fought his way to the foot of Pompey's statue, where he had fallen at last in a sea of blood.*

The murder over, Brutus turned to deliver his speech to the Senate. But the Curia was empty. The conspirators had not reflected that a childish panic might upset their elaborate plan for at once decreeing the restoration of the Republic. What was to be done? In the excitement of the moment they held a brief consultation. Fearing trouble from the veterans and the people they resolved to summon the gladiators of Decimus and take them up to a fortified position on the Capitol, where they could deliberate in greater calm. Then they emerged from the Curia, with their togas twisted round their left arms for shields, brandishing their bloody daggers in their right hands, bearing aloft on a stick the cap, the symbol

The panic and
the silence.

* Plut., Cæs., 66-67; Brut., 17-18; Dion, xliv. 19-20; App., B. C., ii. 17; Nic. Dam., 24-25. I have only given the details of the beginning of the assassination, as they alone are probable. It is natural enough that the conspirators should have remembered the first acts in the *mêlée* and retained no clear memory of the rest. Cæsar's words to Brutus as he wrapped himself in his toga are certainly a myth. How could he wrap himself in his toga with his assassins striking at him from all sides? As for the invocation to Brutus (*tu quoque, Brute fili mi*) it is merely a piece of sentiment tacked on to the fantastic legend which makes Brutus the child of Cæsar.

44 B.C.

of liberty, and shouting to Liberty, to the Republic, and to Cicero, the philosopher of Republicanism. But outside they found all was noise and confusion.* In the colonnade and the neighbouring streets people had taken fright at the sudden emergence of the panic-stricken Senators and the appearance of the armed gladiators. The alarm was raised in an instant and the public took to their heels. The noise of the shouting reached the spectators in the theatre of Pompey, who rushed out to join the fugitives, while pickpockets laid hands on the baskets and carts of the strolling costers round the theatre.† There was a general rush for refuge into houses and shops, which their owners as promptly closed. The sudden appearance of a crowd of armed men, reeking with blood, increased the disorder in the streets they traversed. It was in vain that, led by Brutus, they shouted and gesticulated to quiet the crowd.‡ Men were far too frightened to listen. Meanwhile the news was spreading rapidly to the farthest corners of Rome, and everywhere people were flying panic-stricken for shelter. Before long Antony was safely shut up in his house, the conspirators were entrenched in the Capitol, the frightened public had retired expectant to their homes, and Rome was wrapped in funereal silence, like a city of the dead. All parties were afraid of one another.

The salvation
of Parthia.

Parthia was saved. The Archdestroyer had himself been cut down at the moment when he was setting out to conquer the Empire of Parthia and set Rome on the road trodden by Alexander. For this was the dream which had absorbed all his energies during the last months of his life, while the rumours as to his monarchical ambitions were probably nothing more than inventions or at least exaggerations on the part of his enemies. How he would have acted on his return,

* App., B. C., ii. 119; Nic. Dam., 25.

† *Id.*, 118; *id.*

‡ Dion, xlv. 20; Nic. Dam., 25. I do not agree with Groebe's conjecture (App. to Drümman, G. R., i.², 407 f.) that Brutus chose this moment to make a first speech to the people in the Forum. The authorities, especially Nicolas of Damascus and Dion Cassius, who describe the whole episode with admirable clearness, speak only of exhortations to keep order, made by Brutus and the others with gestures and a few shouted words, amid the general din and confusion.

supposing he returned victorious, no one can say. Perhaps he did not know himself. After all, he had been an opportunist all his life. Thrown into politics in an age of unexampled confusion, he had learnt, by thirty years' experience, to adapt himself to the most widely divergent conditions. Always entirely engrossed in the question of the hour, he was at this moment only considering how he could use the Dictatorship that he had won in the civil war to become a second Alexander and bring home from Parthia the secret of social reorganisation. 44 B.C.

But for once the incomparable opportunist had mistaken his reckoning. Cæsar had already, without knowing it, contributed more than all his contemporaries to the future of the world. His greatest work for posterity was the conquest of Gaul, to which he himself attributed so little importance. But to the men of his own day he had no remedy to offer. Before the great regeneration of her society could come about Rome needed, not feats of arms on her distant frontiers, but a great crisis at home in which the forces of dissolution, now at work for a century, could at last run their course. Twenty more long years of storm and tragedy. Then, when all the foremost figures of the age had gone to their deaths by violence and their bones lay scattered through the lands of the Empire they had done so much to extend, an ordered and peaceful world would reap the tardy fruits of their labours. Then at last it would be plain how the conspirators had in part been right; that the hour of military autocracy was still far off; that as yet no citizen could raise an eastern palace in the capital of the old Latin Republic; that death, the far-seeing liberator, had rescued Cæsar from an entanglement which not even he could have unravelled; that not through absolutism, however inspired, but by the free, patient and often halting development of infinite small social forces, the stormy morning of the Roman Empire would broaden into a clear and tranquil noon. The last of the giants.

1/22/10.
1. Sept. 1. 46.

APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

ON THE CORN TRADE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

(Vol. i. pp. 40 and 354)

It is a common opinion among historians that the competition of foreign (*i.e.*, Sicilian and African) wheat was the cause of the agricultural depression from which Italy began to suffer in 150 B.C. Weber (R. A. G. 225) and Salvioli (D. F. F. 62 ff.) have been almost alone in refusing to accept this explanation, which I regard as entirely mistaken. In antiquity each district consumed its own wheat; and there never was any trade in cereals, whether private or international, comparable to that of modern times.

I append proofs:

In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the population of Attica, which had become an industrial district and a centre of political power, became so dense that the harvests of the country were insufficient to feed it. Attica was thus obliged to import, even in good seasons, a supply of wheat amounting, according to Demosthenes (*in Lept.* 31) to 800,000 medimni, or about 12,000,000 bushels; but which Boeck (E. P. A. p. 154) estimates at a million medimni, *i.e.*, about 15,000,000 bushels.

Whichever figure be accepted, the amount in question remains a very small one, compared with the figures of modern commerce. And yet private enterprise would have been unable to supply Attica with these millions of bushels without the aid or sometimes even the compulsion of the State. It appears from Demosthenes (*in Lacrit.* 50-51) that all vessels owned by Athenians or subsidised by Athenian owners or metics were compelled *under severe penalties* to return partly laden with wheat. The speech against Phormio (36-37) shows further that any skipper trading between Athens and the Greek colonies of the Crimea who sold a cargo of grain at any port except Athens *could be punished with death*. Chapter 38 of the same speech shows that a rich capitalist earned distinct merit as a citizen by the

scrupulous observance of these laws (on which see also in *Theoc.* 10). All this goes to prove that the import of cereals, even at a great centre like Athens, within five miles of the sea, tended to be regarded as a burdensome duty imposed on merchants by the State, in exchange for its protection and other definite privileges.

But this is not all. Not only was the import of corn in part compulsory, but even after its arrival in the country the corn on the market was kept under strict supervision. Two-thirds of the corn arriving at the Piræus went by law to Athens, according to Aristotle (*Resp. Ath.* 51); from the speech of Lysias against the corn dealers we learn that speculation in wheat was punishable with death. And while the retailing of other provisions was superintended by the ἀγοράνομοι, the corn market was under the care of special officers known as σιτοφύλακες (*Lys.* 22, 16), who had to record the amount of wheat imported from different countries (*Dem.* 20, 32). Yet even then the supply was not sufficient to avert the possibilities of famine, and it became necessary from time to time for the State or private donors to provide for distributions of corn at a reduced price, such as afterwards became customary at Rome. (*Ar. Vesp.* 718 *et schol. ad loc.*, *schol. Equit.* 103; *Dem. in Phorm.* 37 ff.; C. I. A. ii. 108, 143, 170, 194, 195. The scholiast on Aristophanes *Ach.* 348 seems to imply that Pericles built a great public granary.) There were even special magistrates for the purchase of corn (σιτῶναι) not appointed by lot but elected by the people, who often contributed towards the purchase out of their own fortunes (*Dem. de Cor.* 248; C. I. A. ii. 335, 353).

Moreover, while the industrial countries of to-day seek so far as possible to check the import of cereals by protective duties, Athens used every expedient of war and diplomacy to render the supply of imported corn both regular and abundant. Demosthenes (*in Lept.* 29 ff.) praises the great magnanimity of Leucon, tyrant of the Crimea, who had granted to Athenian merchants the privilege of exporting any quantity of grain they pleased without payment of any tax; this exemption was equivalent to a yearly gift of 13,000 medimni, or less than 2000 bushels; yet to Demosthenes it seemed most munificent. The dearest ambition of the Athenians, when at the zenith of their power, was to obtain the mastery of the Black Sea and especially of the Bosphorus, in order to capture the corn trade for themselves, or to entrust it, on their own conditions, to whom they pleased (Boeckh, E. P. A. 124; *Dem. de Cor.* 87; C. I. A. i. 40). Numerous decrees are

also extant in honour of Kings of Egypt who conceded the privilege of exporting corn.

The foregoing facts can only be explained by supposing that corn was not easily transported for sale beyond the local market. Except in certain countries in which the population was sparse and the land very fertile, as in the Crimea, and in certain others in which the population was dense but thrifty and the land extraordinarily fertile, as in Egypt, the crops were hardly sufficient for the local demand. Consequently there was a disinclination to export, and export was in fact often actually forbidden. The small amount available for export, even under ordinary conditions, was alone almost sufficient to prevent it.

Moreover, in ancient times the expenses and risks of transporting merchandise even by sea were very great. This was accounted for by the scarcity of capital and very high rate of interest, the smallness and slowness of the boats, and the risks of weather, war, piracy, bad faith, and general insecurity. These expenses and dangers were still greater in land transport. Under such conditions merchants did not attempt numerous or ambitious enterprises; their object was rather to make a large profit on each undertaking. They preferred to carry small quantities of goods from a cheap market to a dear one and thus to make large profits on quite a light cargo. This is the reason why ancient nations tended principally to exchange luxuries, &c., that is, commodities with a limited and wealthy circle of consumers and an elastic price. There was a second class of goods, too, which it paid them to carry. The coasts of the Mediterranean were inhabited by a few civilised and many barbarous or semi-barbarous nations; and the value of commodities tends to vary in direct proportion to civilisation. Now, there are many commodities, not exactly luxuries (for instance, dried fruits, wool, honey and perfumes), which were very abundant in poor and uncivilised countries and highly valued in countries that were both rich and civilised; and which it was therefore profitable to convey from one to another. In a word, trade was carried on so that the freight of a vessel or a caravan brought in enough profit to cover the expenses of the journey, the interest on the capital, and the heavy risks involved.

Apply these considerations to the corn trade. Cereals are both bulky and expensive to transport, and consequently there was no inducement for private individuals to carry wheat from one country to another, whatever the buying price, except at times of great scarcity; and

even then they would tend to carry small quantities to allay, rather than completely to relieve, the famine; for if they imported an amount sufficient perceptibly to diminish the price, they would not realise profits large enough to compensate them for the enormous expense and risk of carrying such bulky and damageable merchandise. In other words, the private corn trade became a *speculation on partial and local famines*, rather than what it is now, a sure and regular means of provisioning countries and equalising international prices. This is confirmed by Xenophon (*Econ.* 20, 27, 28), who expressly tells us that corn-merchants speculated on famines by selling in foreign markets; and by Demosthenes (*in Dionys.* 7-11), who describes a very curious sort of Trust made by a group of merchants; they speculated on all the famines which might occur in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean by carrying small cargoes of wheat from one to another and profiting by the great difference in the prices. If the corn trade had been international, speculations on a rise would have depended not on the market but on the season, as they do now. No one now speculates by buying in a country where corn is plentiful, but by buying at a time when prices are low in order to sell again when they rise. And it was because these local and limited markets were so very uncertain that ancient speculation was so risky as it was declared to be by Demosthenes (*in Zenothemidem*, 25).

I have dwelt at some length on the Athenian corn trade, because of the abundance of our evidence. But since the conditions of ancient civilisation remained constant, these considerations apply equally well to Rome and Italy. If in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the corn of Pontus and Egypt could not be transported to a wealthy maritime centre like Athens without a subsidy from the State or the help of rich merchants who either voluntarily or compulsorily assumed a part of the expense, how could Egyptian corn have been sold two centuries later in the interior of Italy, in Cispadane Gaul, and in the townships in the Apennine highlands? Long before it reached its destination it would have risen to a price far outside the competition of home-grown wheat, which was thus far better protected by the expense of transport than by any protective duty. The import of foreign corn was indeed so difficult that it became necessary, at least at Rome, to have recourse to artificial incentives analogous to those which had been employed at Athens—state purchases of corn and free distributions at the expense of

private individuals. When Rome had acquired a position of some importance and newcomers flocked in from the countryside the food-supply began to be drawn from a wider range, and prices rose in proportion to the increased cost of transport. Modern Europeans and Americans are so accustomed to see cities with populations of many millions regularly fed by private enterprise that they regard this as the normal and natural state of things. In reality it is one of the most recent and marvellous signs of the progress of civilisation, and has only been rendered possible by the invention of railways and steamboats, by the powerful and complex organisation of modern industry and commerce, by the increase and the fluidity of labour and by the unprecedented accumulation of wealth. In antiquity it was an almost insoluble problem adequately to provision a town of 100,000 inhabitants.

This explains why ancient cities were almost always very small, and should make us cautious in accepting the high figures which are sometimes given for the population of the ancient capitals. It explains also how in a country enriched by commerce and industry such as Attica, or by usury and plunder, such as Italy, both of which witnessed the familiar phenomenon of the rural exodus, the food-supply became a political problem of the first importance. It was vital for the State to be able to obtain food from countries in which there was every year a surplus of corn; and it was therefore necessary either to preserve diplomatic relations with such countries, or else to conquer them. Finally it explains how the military expansion of ancient states depended partly on the possession of good corn-growing territories. When once she had conquered Sicily, Sardinia and Spain, and established regular relations with Egypt, Rome could land troops in any part of the Mediterranean. She had immense granaries at her disposal whenever she required them. So, too, Mithridates was able to undertake his long struggle against Rome when he had conquered the fertile plains of the Crimea. A large army, as Thucydides remarked long ago, is simply a movable city, an accumulation of hungry mouths. A country which hardly raised sufficient corn for its own needs would have been reduced to perpetual famine if it had been obliged to send away part of its yearly harvest of corn to supply its armies. It was, I believe, with these considerations in mind that Cæsar and Crassus clamoured in 65 for the conquest of Egypt as the richest granary of the Mediterranean. They expected the idea to be welcomed by the populace, which is always in fear of famine,

with the same enthusiasm as it had shown over Pompey's defeat of the pirates.

It is impossible, therefore, to admit that Italian agriculture, from the year 150 B.C. onwards, was ruined by the competition of foreign corn. What, then, was the cause of the agricultural depression of which we hear so much? I believe it is to be found simply in the increased cost of living. It is, of course, merely a conjecture, for we have not the facts to prove it, but it is a conjecture which seems to me inherently probable. The historians of antiquity gave us countless reminders of the increase of luxury in Italy after the end of the second Punic War, and Pliny has preserved for us significant instances which I have quoted in the course of this work. This increase of luxury, which was in reality only a growing intensity of life due to the influence of a more refined civilisation, is sufficient to account for a grave crisis in a country devoid of any great natural resources. History is full of analogous instances. The economic crisis from which Italy has been suffering during the last twenty years is due to the increased cost of living occasioned by the introduction, from 1848 onwards, of the industrial civilisation of England and France into an old agricultural society. The same thing happened in Russia after 1863. A phenomenon of the same nature, although confined within narrower limits, must have taken place in Italy at the time of which we are speaking. When the costly and pleasure-loving civilisation of Greece and the Orient penetrated to the simple rural population of ancient Italy it produced effects not merely in the moral but in the economic order. It destroyed the old basis of wealth. But that is a vast and important question which I intend to examine in detail in a separate study.

APPENDIX B

ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF LUCULLUS (Vol. i. p. 153)

PREVIOUS to Reinach it had always been assumed that the war for the conquest of Bithynia began in the spring of 74. This is the opinion of Mommsen, R. G. iii. 55 ff. Reinach, on the other hand, while admitting that Nicomedes died at the end of 74, makes the war begin in 73 (M. E. 321, note 1); and his opinion has been followed by Jürgens (*De Sallustii Historiarum reliquiis*, Göttingen, 1892). More recently, Maurenbrecher (*Sallustii historiarum reliquiæ*, Leipzig, 1893) and Bernhardt (*Chronologie der Mithridatischen Kriege*, Marburg, 1896) have returned to the old chronology. I have studied the matter at length, and find it impossible to accept the emendation of Reinach. Cicero (*pro Mur.* xv. 33); Livy (p. 93); Eutropius (vi. 6) and Appian (*Mithr.* 72) say, in speaking of Lucullus and Cotta, or of Lucullus alone, that the Consuls were sent to take command of the war. It seems to me very rash to suppose that all these authorities wrote Consuls when they meant Proconsuls. It is true that Cicero says (*Acad. prior* ii., i. 1): *Consulatum ita (Lucullus) gessit ut . . . admirarentur omnes; post ad Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu . . .*). But Lucullus spent at least four or five months as Consul at Rome, and Cicero is evidently alluding to this brief period. Similarly the words of Velleius (ii. 23, *L. Lucullus . . . ex consulatu sortitus Asiam*) cannot be quoted in support of this view. In an incidental clause attached to the name of Lucullus by a *qui*, Velleius gives a brief outline of the war, and in this rapid and confused *résumé* he makes various errors. He attributes to Lucullus the province of Asia instead of Cilicia: he mentions the victory of Cyzicus, the first gained by Lucullus, after the defeats inflicted on Mithridates, which belonged to the following campaign. This proves that Velleius was ill-acquainted with the history of the complicated wars which he is summarising; and if he is at fault

as to the name of the province and the enumeration of the most important events, he may well have been equally wrong as to the authority with which Lucullus was invested when he went to Asia. His testimony cannot therefore prevail against that of Eutropius, Appian, Livy, and especially Cicero.

But without going through the arguments drawn from the text, which may be found in the work of Bernhardt, I believe that a definite conclusion may be reached by simply studying the somewhat confused history of the war. Our knowledge of it is drawn from two principle sources, Plutarch, who in the life of Lucullus has almost certainly drawn from Sallust, and Appian, who in the wars of Mithridates is following some less reliable writer than Sallust, possibly Nicolas of Damascus. Both these authorities give a very obscure account owing to the fact that, in an attempt to summarise a rather complicated series of events, they have either abridged or completely neglected one essential factor in the operations—that Mithridates' invasion of Bithynia and Asia took place quite unexpectedly. We need not discuss the question whether it occurred in 74 or in 73. The essential point is that it took place when both Cotta and Lucullus were still in Italy, when there was a vacancy, owing to the death of Octavius, in the government of Cilicia, and there were no troops in Asia beyond the two legions of Fimbria under the command of a Proprætor. I believe that the obscurity of the two ancient accounts and of many modern historians, including Reinach himself, arises from the fact that they have none of them noticed that the history of the first year of the war presents many insoluble difficulties. If Cotta had already occupied Bithynia with an army before the invasion of Mithridates, why did no town in Bithynia (with the exception of Chalcedon) offer any resistance? Cotta could not have avoided placing a garrison at least at Nicomedia, the capital, which contained the royal treasuries. If Lucullus had been in Asia with five legions at the time of the invasion of Mithridates, the enlistments made by Cæsar, who was at the time studying at Rhodes (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 4), would have been an uncalled-for piece of bravado, for which Lucullus might have called him to account. But they become a reasonable if useless measure of precaution once it is admitted that the invasion occurred unexpectedly, when Asia was left with only the two legions of Fimbria under a Proprætor, that the rich classes were in dread of a new revolution, and that most probably all the cities prepared to defend themselves as best they

might. Moreover, we know that as soon as the question of war arose at Rome Lucullus desired the governorship of Cilicia in order to attempt an invasion of Pontus through Cappadocia (Plutarch, *Luc.* 6); but that when he had obtained it, instead of going to Cilicia, he disembarked in Asia, where he had as yet no authority. (This is wrongly disputed by Reinach, *M. E.* 321, n. 1; see Lange, *R. A.* iii. 201.)

Lucullus therefore changed his plan of campaign. Why did he do so? The reason must be that at this juncture Mithridates invaded Asia, thus forcing Lucullus back upon defensive instead of aggressive measures. In my opinion the decisive proof of all this is to be found in the fact that the command was divided between Cotta and Lucullus, and in the decree setting forth this division, which has happily been preserved for us by Cicero (*pro Mur.* 15, 33; *ut alter Mithridatem persequeretur, alter Bithyniam tueretur*). It is absurd to suppose that the Senate issued this decree while Mithridates was still in Pontus, when no one yet knew how he intended to act and every one at Rome still looked forward to offensive operations. Why send Cotta to defend Bithynia and the Sea of Marmora, which were threatened by no danger? Why charge Lucullus to *follow up* Mithridates, an expression which clearly indicates an enemy who had already taken the offensive? On the other hand, this decision becomes reasonable if it be admitted that it was arrived at when the Senate knew that Bithynia and Asia had been invaded by two armies. The Senate sent Cotta to try and reconquer Bithynia, and Lucullus to cope with the army which was in Asia. This also explains the disembarkation of Lucullus in Asia. Moreover, there is the behaviour of Lucullus himself when he had landed in Asia. How could he, when invested with no authority in the province, venture to decree measures of financial relief for the Asiatics, unless Mithridates was already in the country, making it imperative for him to allay the discontent before advancing north against the Pontic army?

Finally, our hypothesis permits us to unravel the history of the intrigues preceding the nomination of Lucullus, which in the pages of Plutarch remain a complete enigma. Lucullus must have begun the intrigue and made advances to Pretia and to Lucius Quintius in order to obtain the proconsulate of Cilicia. But when it became known that Mithridates had invaded Bithynia and Asia and that a repetition of the massacre of 88 was to be feared, it was recognised that the responsibility of such a war could not be left to a Proprætor

with only two legions, not undertaken while Cilicia remained without a governor; and it became desirable at any cost, even by an extraordinary measure such as that by which Pompey had been sent to Spain, to send out a man capable of holding his own against the enemy. This pointed at once to Lucullus. He was Consul; he had a great military reputation; and he knew the east, where he had already fought with distinction against Mithridates. In the moment of danger the other candidates were disregarded and put off with subordinate commands.

Mithridates then invaded Asia and Bithynia in the spring which followed the death of Nicomedes, at a time when Rome had made no preparation for war. Was this the spring of 74 or of 73? Clearly in my opinion the spring of 74. Lucius Octavius was Proconsul in Cilicia in 74. If the war had broken out in 73 the government of Cilicia would have been held by his ordinary successor, and would not have become vacant, as it did, in a manner which caused alarm to the home government. Besides, Lucullus would already have been in his allotted province of Gaul, and not at Rome. It is evident, from a close study of Plutarch's account, that the intrigues for the command of the east took place when Lucullus and Cotta were Consuls at Rome, and such a supposition is probable in itself. If Lucullus, who should have been Proconsul in Gaul, had remained at Rome in order to obtain the Proconsulship of Bithynia, and not to replace a dead Proconsul, but to supersede a governor already appointed, we should have been informed of so unusual and unconstitutional a proceeding. It is simpler to believe Cicero, who says in so many words that the Consuls Lucullus and Cotta were sent to the front. For the Consuls to go to the front was not common, but it was not so rare as Reinach supposes.

As to the date of the death of Nicomedes, the argument drawn from the Bithynian Tetradrachmæ struck in the year 224 of the Bithynian era, which began in the month of October of the year 74 B.C., which Reinach uses (*M. E.* 318, n. 2) in order to prove that Nicomedes was dead at the end of 74, has already been refuted by Maurenbrecher. It is by no means far-fetched to suppose that even after the death of Nicomedes, in the political disorder that followed the annexation, the old coinage was continued, especially if, as Maurenbrecher says, these coins bore not the effigy of the deceased King, but that of his father Nicomedes II. (*S. H. R.* p. 228).

I have accepted the theory that, in the first invasion, Mithridates

accompanied the division of the army which entered Asia and not that which invaded Bithynia, relying chiefly on Plutarch (*Sert.* 24). This text certainly refers to the first invasion, and it gives too many details to admit of doubt as to its authority. Nor is it surprising that Mithridates, who placed great hopes upon a rising in Asia, should have desired to accompany Marcus Marius in order to emphasise to the waverers that the insurrection did not necessarily involve a rupture with Rome. This supposition suggests another, perhaps less justifiable, conjecture—that the two generals Taxilas and Hermocrates, of whom Appian speaks (*Mithr.* 71), were sent to Bithynia. But Eutropius (vi. 6) and Appian (*Mithr.* 70) say that Cotta was defeated at Chalcedon by Mithridates. This leads me to suppose that when Mithridates knew that Cotta was going to Chalcedon with a fleet, he abandoned the army of Asia and went personally to lead the Bithynian troops to the siege of Chalcedon. The Roman fleet at Chalcedon might inflict great damage upon the whole Pontic army, and Mithridates was the more anxious to defeat Cotta because the revolutionary movement in Asia was making slow progress; he therefore went in person to direct the operations against him. Thus he committed the same error as the Romans; he divided his forces in order to attain two separate objects; but the imprudence of Cotta turned his blunder into a success. He was able to defeat Cotta and to return, probably with a part of the besieging army, in time to march against Lucullus, who was now advancing after having reorganised his legions.

It might be objected that if Mithridates invaded Asia when Cotta and Lucullus were still in Italy he had three months in Asia with very insignificant forces against him. Why then did he not seize the occasion to overrun a great part of the province of Asia instead of remaining all the time in the North? His action was no doubt dictated by the attitude of the Asiatic towns. Only a small number of them, and those the less important, sided with the invader. The others, terrified by their recollection of the miserable *dénouement* of the previous revolution, and influenced by the Roman emigrants and the wealthy classes, who were not likely to let themselves be surprised a second time, refused to stir. Owing to the scarcity of provisions, it would have been very unwise for Mithridates to venture into the heart of a hostile country and tire out in difficult siege operations the forces which he wished to preserve unimpaired for the impending struggle with the main Roman army.

APPENDIX C

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CRASSUS, POMPEY AND CÆSAR BETWEEN 70 AND 60 B.C. (Vol i. p. 241)

THE relations between Crassus and Pompey during the ten years which elapsed between their joint consulship and that of Cæsar are of great importance for the interpretation of the events of this period; but the accounts of the ancient historians are so confused and defective that it seems necessary to add a few notes to explain the conjectures upon which my version is based.

It is generally admitted, as I have stated and explained in the text, that Pompey and Crassus had quarrelled before the end of their consulship. My conjecture is that this quarrel was due to Crassus' successful attempt to prevent Pompey from succeeding Lucullus. It is so natural, and so necessary for the understanding of the sequel, to suppose that Pompey was already entertaining this ambition, that it has been assumed even by Mommsen (R. G. iii. 106), who explains its abandonment by the fact that in 70 the war against Mithridates seemed to have come to an end. It seems to me however more probable that Pompey renounced the idea because Crassus forced him into doing so. It was not difficult to foresee even in 70 that the war against Mithridates would lead to troubles in Armenia. Moreover if this quarrel between the two rivals, which was renewed after the reconciliation of January 70 for reasons connected with the consulship, was so fierce and long-continued and so dangerous to the popular party, it must have been due to some cause that went deeper than a mere personal difference. A cause of this nature is ready to hand in the competition to obtain an extraordinary proconsular command. Finally, my conjecture makes it easy to explain a passage of Velleius Paterculus (ii. 31), who states that Pompey as Consul took an oath *se in nullam provinciam ex eo magistratu iturum*, a solemn public declaration which cannot have been made without due reason. It is surely not fantastic to suppose that Crassus and his Conservative allies had

circulated distorted accounts of Pompey's ambitions, such, for instance, as that he wished to go to the east in order to follow in the steps of Sulla and make himself master of the whole empire (an ambition which was in fact generally attributed to him until his return from the east), and that Pompey, weary of these calumnies, and irritated by the incessant difficulties, had been driven into making this contemptuous declaration. I can imagine no other occasion and no other motive for such a proceeding. Besides, it seems to me impossible that Pompey should have remained at Rome after his consulship except under compulsion; and his reserved and scornful attitude and the bitterness which he displayed towards Crassus seem to indicate that it was Crassus who forced him to remain in private life.

This hypothesis is confirmed by the subsequent behaviour of Crassus. During the years 69 and 68, while Pompey was secretly intriguing against Lucullus and pretending to find satisfaction in the recreations of a private citizen, Crassus abstained from politics and quietly attended to his own affairs: he did not even stir when in 67 Pompey was commissioned to suppress the pirates. But when in 66 Pompey was appointed to succeed Lucullus, Crassus again unexpectedly intervened, displaying a restless and imprudent ambition that was strangely out of keeping in the cautious banker of the preceding years. To the indignation of the Conservatives he suddenly attempted to persuade the Senate to decree the conquest of Egypt, a country which had for many years been on terms of friendship and alliance with the Republic (*Plut. Crass.* 13). It is true that Suetonius (*Cæs.* 11) says that it was Cæsar who desired this command; but I prefer to accept the version of Plutarch, for it is not likely that Cæsar, who at that time had only just been elected *Ædile* and whose debts far exceeded his influence, could have entertained such ambitions. Since we know that Cæsar was at this time in the service of Crassus and his most active lieutenant, it is probable that Suetonius mistook the propaganda carried out by Cæsar on behalf of his patron for a display of personal ambition. Crassus then is suddenly seized with the desire to win extraordinary military honours. The careful financier, so much attached both by temperament and by interest to Conservative ideas, and hitherto the model of prudence and reserve, suddenly turns demagogue and throws himself into the struggle between popular party and the Conservatives, simply in order to obtain the command in the Egyptian war. To attain this object he proposes to grant the citizenship to the Trans-

padani, he takes part in the conspiracy of 65, and pours out his money to raise Catiline to the Consulship in 63.

Unless we bring in the hypothesis of mental aberration, this change must have been due to some exterior cause; and this cause is to be found, I believe, in the fact that the despatch of Pompey to the east was a serious personal rebuff to Crassus. He had probably flattered himself that he had finally thwarted Pompey's hopes of succeeding Lucullus; and his first success in doing so must have added largely to his influence. But now Pompey was having his revenge; the old rivalry was renewed; and Crassus demanded satisfaction in the shape of some extraordinary commission which would place him again over Pompey's head. Unless we suppose that Pompey had been compelled by Crassus in 70 against his own will to renounce his province all this later development appears almost inexplicable.

What part did Crassus take in the conspiracy of 66? In the absence of direct or even tangible evidence all hypotheses are admissible. In spite of the fact that Dion (xxxvi. 42) and Sallust (*Cat.* 18) do not name Crassus amongst the conspirators, while Suetonius (*Cæs.* 9) and Asconius in *toga candida* treat the question of the participation of Crassus as a doubtful rumour, I am inclined to believe that Crassus and Cæsar were both privy to the conspiracy. It is the only possible explanation, as John insists, of the indulgent attitude of the Senate. If the Senate and the Consuls had had to deal only with Autronius, Sulla and Piso, they certainly would have put them to death, especially as the proceedings taken against Sulla three years later show that the intended victims were not wanting in animosity. Yet the Senate spared and even rewarded them. Surely this was because they had behind them a man far more powerful than themselves: and this must have been the man who seems at this time to have been moved by such various ambitions, and who appears in Sallust's account as the proposer of the honours decreed to Piso in reward for his conspiracy. Now why should Crassus interest himself in obtaining this mission for Piso? This question depends on another; what induced Crassus to take a share in the conspiracy? I say "a share" because, unlike John, I think it probable that Crassus did not originate it himself, but only encouraged the promoters, who must have been the two Consuls. The rumour recorded by Suetonius to the effect that Crassus desired to be elected Dictator with Cæsar as his *magister equitum*, seems to me unlikely. Even if Crassus had been Dictator in 65, how would that have helped him to gratify his hatred for Pompey or to attain his

further ambitions, if he had no army to back him up? Sulla had been master of Italy for several years, not in virtue of the Dictatorship which was conferred upon him, but thanks to the army which he had brought back from Asia. Even if it be admitted that Crassus, in order to defend himself against Pompey on his return, or to take the offensive and crush him, was at this time looking forward to a Sullan Dictatorship, it was still indispensable for him to procure an army, and that could not be done through a war. It therefore seems to me more probable that his object in helping Sulla and Autronius to regain the Consulship was to have the Consuls on his side, and by their aid to obtain the command in the Egyptian war. On the failure of this attempt he tries in 65 to grant the franchise to the Transpadanes, and to foment a popular agitation through the instrumentality of Cæsar, whose ædilician games were certainly undertaken at Crassus' expense. After a second failure he recurs obstinately to his original plan of getting two of his friends elected Consuls, and comes to an understanding with Catiline and Antonius. The collapse of this scheme, followed by the detection of the conspiracy, makes havoc of his projects, and he now definitely renounces his ambitious designs. In short, I agree with Mommsen (R. G. iii. 172 ff.) that it was the conquest of Egypt at which Crassus was aiming during the whole course of his agitation to be equal with Pompey, and that it was therefore also the cause of his participation in the first conspiracy. It follows that the despatch of Piso to Spain cannot have been connected with the plans of the revolutionaries, for the government of Spain could not in any way contribute to the conquest of Egypt; but it was at the same time an insult to Pompey, to whom Piso was hostile, and a personal gratification to Crassus; it displayed his power, and gave a death-blow to the rumours which were current concerning his share in the conspiracy.

The part played by Sitius still remains inexplicable, and I have looked in vain for a hypothesis which would satisfactorily account for it.

I have still to justify my account of the relations between Crassus and Cæsar during Pompey's absence. Mommsen, followed by John, supposes that Cæsar and Crassus jointly planned the conquest of Egypt and the despatch of Piso to Spain in order to procure themselves an army to oppose Pompey. But this theory is open to one objection that seems insuperable. Unlike Crassus, Cæsar had no reason to fear or to hate Pompey, with whom, on the contrary, he was on friendly

terms. Cæsar had helped to pass the Manilian Law at the beginning of the year 66: why then at the end of 66, when Pompey had not yet finally subdued Mithridates, should he have endeavoured to defend himself against the effects of the law which he had supported ten months previously? Moreover, the growth of Pompey's power, by weakening the Conservatives and giving confidence to the popular party, was of great service to Cæsar, who was then only just elected Ædile, and could not hope to compete with Pompey for the leading position at Rome. Pompey on his side had no reason to fear Cæsar; Cæsar was far less influential than himself; he was poor, and probably in his debt; he had already done him good service and might do so again. If Cæsar intervened to help Crassus at the risk of quarrelling with Pompey, whose friend it was to his interest to remain, he must have had some serious reason, which must be looked for, I think, in the state of his finances. Cæsar was in debt, and in considerable difficulties; this is rendered probable by the offer of Catulus during the pontifical election, and by the confiscation of his baggage before his departure for Spain; and it is confirmed by a consideration of the crisis from which the whole of Italy was suffering—the scarcity of money, which was at the root of all the political troubles of the times and which made the renewal of credit more and more difficult. Cæsar was obliged to continue spending money with his ordinary profusion, besides incurring the great expenses of the Ædileship. Moreover we know for certain that Crassus did supply Cæsar with money. The conclusion drawn from these facts seems to be probable, and is confirmed by the fact that Cæsar evidently took pains that his zeal for Crassus should not imply hostility to Pompey, with whom he successfully endeavoured to remain on good terms. For instance, in 63 Cæsar supported a proposal moved by one of his most devoted followers, Labienus, for granting extraordinary honours to Pompey on the termination of the war against Mithridates, and in 62 he personally proposed further honours, and joined with Q. Metellus Nepos, a partisan of Pompey and originator of the proposal for his recall to Italy, in attacking the Conservatives. Even if this renewal of friendship for Pompey was stimulated by the failure of Crassus' intrigues, Cæsar could not possibly have made these proposals and allied himself with Metellus if in the two preceding years he had openly taken sides with Pompey's enemies. Nor could he two years later have intervened as peacemaker between Crassus and Pompey, after their long-continued quarrel, unless he had previously been the friend of

both. Cæsar was clearly determined to stand well with both sides, and as he had helped Pompey to the command in Asia so he now wished to help Crassus to the command in Egypt, to which after all he had a substantial claim. That Crassus desired this command partly through jealousy of Pompey might annoy but was not sufficient to deter him. Pompey could not fail to recognise the perfect justice and loyalty of his conduct.

Hero-worshippers will no doubt think it almost blasphemous to assign so petty and personal a motive to a series of acts which had an immense influence on Cæsar's life, and which are therefore among the leading events of history, but this consideration will not weigh with those who have learnt by experience how often the most important actions are performed just for the very reason that their ultimate consequences are not realised at the time.

APPENDIX. D

THE WAR AGAINST THE HELVETII AND THE SUEVI

I

THE account given in the text (vol. ii. chap. 1) of Cæsar's first war in Gaul differs so greatly from that which has become traditional, that it seems necessary to justify it by a critical and detailed examination of the sources. The inquiry concerns one of the most important and difficult problems in Roman history : why Cæsar conquered Gaul.

We know for certain that it was only in the course of the year 61, that is to say, barely three years before Cæsar's Proconsulate, that the Roman Senate began to take an interest in Gaul. Its attention was awakened by events which can fortunately be determined with precision by a comparison. Putting together certain isolated notices that have hitherto escaped the attention of historians, Cæsar tells us (B.G. i. 31) that an Æduan chief, Divitiacus, had been sent as ambassador to Rome ; and Cicero (*De Div.* i. 41, 90) informs us that Divitiacus was a Druid and had been his guest in the capital. It is therefore highly probable that it was when Divitiacus came to Rome, on the embassy of which Cæsar speaks, that he enjoyed the hospitality of Cicero. But when and why was Divitiacus sent to Rome as ambassador by the Æduan Senate ? Although neither Cæsar nor Cicero mention the date, Cæsar indirectly provides a clue by his statement (B. G. i. 35) that in the year 61 (*M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus*) the Senate made a decree which confirmed the Ædui in their right to call themselves friends and allies of the Roman people, and entrusted the governor of the Narbonese province with the responsibilities of defending them. It is surely a very probable supposition that Divitiacus had come to Rome in 62 or 61 to solicit this decree. We know from the *Commentaries* that Divitiacus was the chief of the Romanising party among the Ædui : it was therefore natural that the Æduan Government should employ him to negotiate with Rome. As to the reasons which led the Ædui to demand help from Rome,

Cæsar (B. G. i. 31) gives us an indirect but sufficiently explicit indication. The Ædui needed assistance in their war against Ariovistus, King of the Suevi.

It is therefore exceedingly likely that in 62 or 61 Divitiacus came to Rome to set before the Senators the unhappy situation of Gaul, and to denounce the "German peril" with which they were threatened owing to the growing power of Ariovistus; and that he returned to Gaul after having obtained from the Senate the decree which Cæsar mentions. This decree authorised the Ædui to apply to the Governor of Narbonese and Cisalpine Gaul for the support of his legions against Ariovistus.

But only a year afterwards, in 60, a curious thing happens: Ariovistus in his turn opens negotiations to be declared friend and ally of the Roman people. It is Pliny (H. N. ii. 67, 170) who indirectly informs us of this in a statement that Ariovistus made large presents to Metellus, one of the Consuls of the year 60. Since we know that in the following year, 59, Cæsar, as Consul, granted the request of Ariovistus, we may suppose that the presents made to Metellus were intended to pave the way for these negotiations. There is no doubt that under the direction of the incompetent senatorial cliques, at the mercy of party jealousies and intrigues and the random votes of the Assembly, Roman foreign policy was at this time hopelessly inconsistent. But even this cannot justify us in believing that two enemies at open war could both be declared allies and friends of the Republic. The double alliance with the Ædui and the Suevi remains entirely inexplicable, and, indeed, almost criminally foolish, unless we imagine that something had occurred to change the situation in Gaul and convince the Romans that a reconciliation between Ariovistus and the Ædui was both possible and expedient. We may therefore confidently affirm that some event of great importance had taken place in Gaul during the year 61.

Now, Cæsar tells us in the first chapters of the *Commentaries*, that in the year 61 the Helvetii, one of the most barbarous and bellicose of the Gallic tribes, were persuaded by one of their chiefs, Orgetorix, to attempt the invasion and conquest of Gaul; while Cicero, in a letter written to Atticus on March 15, 60, mentions that at the beginning of this year there was already considerable apprehension at Rome concerning the projects of the Helvetii, and adds these further details regarding the movement. "People are afraid of a war in Gaul. It is certain that the Helvetii have armed and are

raiding the province. The Senate has decided that the Consuls are to draw lots for the two Gauls: levies are to be raised and exemptions suspended, and ambassadors are to be sent to the different nations of Gaul to detach them from the Helvetii" (*ad Att.* i. 19, 1). Cicero is apparently afraid of a federation of the Gallic peoples centring round the Helvetii, and his slightly different version of the story rather completes than contradicts that of Cæsar. Before invading Gaul the Helvetii desired to gain allies and supporters throughout the country in the hope of founding a great Gallic empire under their military hegemony. Surely here, in the migration of the Helvetii, we have the cause of the important change in the situation for which we have been looking. The proposed invasion of the Helvetii must have been quite as alarming to the Ædui and Ariovistus as to the Romans. While the Ædui, weakened by internal dissensions, were in danger of being crushed by the Helvetian federation, the Romans themselves still remembered only too vividly the terrible invasion of Cimbri and Teutones, in which the Helvetii had taken part, and which, once at the head of a Gallic confederation, they would be certain to renew. It was therefore to the interests of Romans, Suevi and Ædui alike to unite against the common enemy.

Up to this point all seems clear. However little they might be disposed to occupy themselves with the affairs of Gaul, Roman politicians must at last have perceived that the threatened invasion of the Helvetii necessitated measures of defence. The Senate had hoped to provide for emergencies by the decree to which Cicero refers in his letter, while another section of opinion, represented by Metellus and Cæsar, undertook to supplement these precautions by the alliance with Ariovistus, by which Rome became the peacemaker between the Suevi and the Ædui. In short, the Helvetian peril took the sting out of a Roman alliance with the Ædui against Ariovistus.

The early developments of this policy during the year 60 now become quite clear. Once public interest had been awakened in the affairs of Gaul, the prevalent spirit of Imperialism intervened to give a new direction to the purely defensive policy which the Senate had in view. A coterie of politicians proposed to use this policy to kindle a war which was to be as lucrative and as glorious as the campaigns of Lucullus and Pompey in the east. No doubt, too, the political troubles which broke out at Rome on Pompey's return helped to divert men's minds to the west. So long as Pompey's arrangements were unratified everything in the east continued in suspense.

The kings created by Pompey did not know if they were really kings ; the new province of Syria did not know what was to be its fate ; and while these questions remained undecided the east was closed to all further enterprise. It was idle, for instance, to dream of conquests in Parthia before the Syrian annexations were finally ratified. The Imperialists of the time were therefore obliged to look further afield, even to so uncertain and uncivilised a sphere of action as Gaul. In another letter to Atticus (i. 20, 5) Cicero tells us who it was who first hit upon the idea of using the migration of the Helvetii to stir up a war in Gaul. Curiously enough it was not Cæsar, who was indeed at this moment Proprætor in Spain, but the Consul, Quintus Metellus Celer, husband of the famous Clodia, and great-grandson of Metellus Macedonicus. Cicero writes to Atticus : "*Your friend Metellus is an excellent consul. I only regret that he seems so dissatisfied now that the news from Gaul allows us to hope that war may be averted. Really he is far too anxious for a triumph.*" These few lines reveal that already in the year 60 there was a party which hoped to make the migration of the Helvetii an excuse to applying to Gaul the aggressive policy which had been so successful in the east ; and that the more prudent school of observers disapproved of their projects. The Consul Metellus, who had already obtained Cisalpine Gaul as his province, was at the head of the war party ; Cicero was among the friends of peace.

Everything therefore leads us to suppose that the new governor looked forward to attacking the Helvetii in the spring of 59. But an unforeseen incident upset the Imperialist calculations. Early in the year 59 Metellus died, so suddenly that his wife was accused of having poisoned him. Cæsar, now in his Consulship and on the look-out for a favourite province, hastened to take over the plans and prospects of Metellus, and passed a law through the Assembly, on the proposition of Vatinius, giving him Cisalpine Gaul for five years from the day of the vote, which was apparently March 1. All his acts up to the moment when he set out for Gaul, in March 58, seem easily explicable on the supposition that his views on Gaul were those current in political circles at Rome, and his plans identical with those of his predecessor. If, like every one else, he regarded the Helvetian invasion of Gaul or the Roman Province as imminent, it is easy to understand why he obtained leave from the Assembly to take command of the legions at once, even before his Consulship had expired. If he was even more anxious than Metellus to make use of this

impending war for his own Imperialist purposes, it is natural that he should have favoured the conferment of the title of friend and ally of the Roman people upon Ariovistus, in order to prevent an alliance between Suevi and the already formidable Helvetii. The Helvetii did not leave their mountains at all during the year 59; and Cæsar was too deeply engaged in party controversies to attend to them. But when, early in the spring of 58, he learned that the Helvetii were ready to march, he hastened his departure. This is exactly what we might expect. If the long-apprehended invasion of Gaul was at last in progress it was his bounden duty to take every precaution necessary for the defence of the province, and, if necessary, in accordance with the Senate's decree, for the protection of the Ædui.

II

We have now reached the moment at which the story of the *Commentaries* opens. So far it has been fairly easy to explain the course of events. It seems quite clear that it was the Helvetian design of founding a great Gallic empire which had obliged the Senate to take defensive measures, and that these defensive measures were transformed into a policy of aggression by the prevalent influence of Imperialism and kindred financial interests. So far we have had only a few stray notices to rely on. Now that we can call the history of the war, written by the man who waged it, to our service, we might reasonably expect to find the task far easier. Exactly the opposite is the case. The first book of the *Commentaries* once more opens up all the questions to which satisfactory answers had apparently been given, for it destroys the very foundation of our whole interpretation. It proves in a word that the Helvetii had not the slightest ambition to found a great Gallic empire, and that the "Helvetian peril" was a bogey of the imagination.

Immediately after his celebrated geographical and ethnological sketch of Gaul, Cæsar devotes four chapters (ch. iii.-vi.) to the movement of the Helvetii. But a close study of these chapters reveals that they are vague, obscure, and almost embarrassed in expression, and that they exhibit the most singular contradictions. Cæsar begins by stating that one of the great chiefs of the Helvetii, Orgetorix, had persuaded the nobility and people to invade and conquer Gaul; and that the Helvetii had allowed themselves to be persuaded because they did not wish to live any longer in a country shut in on all sides by the

mountains, whence it was difficult to make those incursions on neighbouring tribes which were necessary as a relief to their martial instincts. Yet Cæsar tells us in the preceding chapter that the Helvetii were always engaged in wars offensive or defensive with their neighbours, especially with the Germans. The contradiction is, perhaps, not a serious one; and even if we hesitate to admit that the Helvetii were infected with this mania for fighting of which Cæsar speaks, we need not on this account question that their chiefs had conceived the idea of an invasion of Gaul and decided, as Cæsar tells us a few lines earlier, to conclude treaties of alliance with the neighbouring tribes through the instrumentality of Orgetorix. Cæsar thus confirms what Cicero had led us to suppose: that the Helvetii hoped to carry out their designs by placing themselves at the head of a Gallic coalition. But we should naturally expect from Cæsar, in an account of the conquest of Gaul, a more detailed explanation of this coalition than that given by Cicero in a private letter to his friend Atticus. The historian, however, does not linger over a question which is, of course, one of vital importance for his narrative, but hurries on to inform us (chap. iii.) that in the course of the negotiations Orgetorix betrayed the cause of nobility and people. Instead of concluding an alliance between the three peoples, he persuaded a chief of the Sequani, Castic, and a chief of the Ædui, Dumnorix, to seize the supreme power in their respective tribes, promising to lead the Helvetii to their assistance; by which means the three conspirators controlling the three most powerful tribes in Gaul would have become masters of the entire country. But this account, too, is far from clear. The part played by Orgetorix is especially mysterious; he is said to have proposed to help Castic and Dumnorix to overthrow the legitimate government of their people *suis copiis suoque exercitu*. But how could he expect to put the Helvetian forces at the disposal of his friends? Did he simultaneously intend to attempt a *coup d'état* to seize the supreme power among his own countrymen? Cæsar, indeed, tells us that Orgetorix "was about to obtain supreme control of the State," *suae civitatis imperium optenturus esset*, a vague phrase which seems to refer to a projected revolution. He goes on to say that when the intrigues of Orgetorix were discovered judicial proceedings were instituted against him; but that he died mysteriously before the trial could take place. But is it not surprising, if Orgetorix was preparing to attempt a *coup d'état* in his own country, that he should have simultaneously undertaken to

support two other *coups d'état*, one among the Ædui, the other among the Sequani ?

His conduct would be intelligible if he had sought the support of a foreign power ; but why any sane man should thus have increased his risks for no corresponding advantages must remain a mystery. There is, indeed, only one conclusion to be drawn from an examination of this obscure chapter. It is that Castic and Dumnorix played a part in the invasion of the Helvetii which Cæsar either did not fully understand himself or was unwilling to make intelligible to his readers.

After recording (in chap. iv.) the death of Orgetorix, Cæsar takes up the story in the fifth chapter with these words: *Post eius mortem nihilominus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur.* ("In spite of the death of Orgetorix the Helvetii did not abandon their enterprise.") Cæsar affects to be surprised that the death of Orgetorix and the discovery of his intrigues did not put a stop to the migration. Yet his surprise is wholly unjustified by the facts he has himself recorded. According to his own narrative the plot of Orgetorix with Castic and Dumnorix was not an essential part of the original plan, but involved a deviation from it, and Cæsar tells us himself that the Helvetii had made great preparations for the movement. What then more natural than that, having once discovered and punished the traitor, the nobles and the peoples should revert to their original plan for the invasion of Gaul ? It seems, therefore, highly probable that Cæsar has not told us the whole truth concerning this mysterious plot, which must have been of great importance, since Cæsar seems to have expected that its discovery would have led to the abandonment of the whole scheme sketched out by Orgetorix and the other chiefs of the Helvetii.

Thus, in striking contrast to the geographical and ethnological sketch of Gaul at the beginning of the book, the succeeding chapters, which profess to explain the movement of the Helvetii, are exceedingly obscure. To what is this obscurity to be attributed ? Is it due to Cæsar's inability to discover all the details of events which had occurred in Gaul before his arrival, many of which were in the nature of diplomatic secrets ? Unfortunately the narrative does not become less obscure when Cæsar is recording his own action in Gaul, his negotiations and struggles with the mysterious Helvetii.

In the early spring of 58 the Helvetii, unwilling to enter Gaul by the difficult gorges of the southern Jura, send ambassadors to Cæsar

for permission to pass through the province, and undertaking to do no damage. Cæsar cuts the bridge at Geneva, collects his troops, brings up the legion in the province to fortify all the points on the left bank of the Rhone at which a landing was possible, from the Jura to the end of the lake, and refuses the permission demanded by the Helvetii. The latter, after a few attempts to cross the river in his despite, of which Cæsar probably gives an exaggerated account, abandon the idea of passing through the province, address themselves to the Sequani, secure permission to traverse their country, and turn back to the passes of the Jura. Thereupon Cæsar leaves his legion in charge of Labienus, crosses the Alps, calls out three legions which were wintering at Aquileia, recruits two new legions, returns to Gaul with five legions by way of the Col de Genève and Grenoble, and hastens to the Rhone at the northern frontier of the province. Clearly he is here executing a vigorous offensive movement against the Helvetii, who had meanwhile arrived at the Saône and were invading the Æduan territory. This offensive movement had, I believe, been planned long before; he had conceived it at Rome, so soon as he had fully recognised the urgent necessity of repulsing the dangerous invaders. What is our surprise, then, to find that Cæsar gives quite a different reason for his activity? He says (chap. x.) that he hastened to concentrate six legions in Narbonese Gaul because he had learned that the Helvetii desired to settle down on the coast, in Saintonge, that is to say, in a fertile piece of country bordering on the province and not far from Toulouse. How are we to reconcile this very singular explanation with what Cæsar has told us a few chapters back, that the Helvetii were bent upon the conquest of Gaul? A trek into Saintonge was an enterprise very different from an invasion of Gaul; yet Cæsar makes no attempt to reconcile the two statements. Which are we to believe? Furthermore, if Cæsar desired to protect the province from an attack by the Helvetii from the side of Saintonge, why did he not march towards Toulouse and the Garonne? Why, after Labienus had joined him, did he continue his march to the north, passing the Rhone at its confluence with the Saône and crossing the frontier of the Roman province? This rapid and resolute march can only be explained on the supposition that Cæsar intended to carry out the plan of Metellus, and attack the Helvetii at the earliest possible moment, which turned out to be while they were preparing to cross the Saône, probably at Mâcon. Cæsar was aware of the inconsistency, and endeavoured to

excuse it by stating that as soon as he had crossed the frontier, ambassadors of the Ædui, Ambarri and Allobroges came to his camp to ask for help against the Helvetii, and that it was only then that he decided to attack the Helvetii before their arrival in Saintonge. In other words, he wishes us to believe that the idea of an offensive movement against the Helvetii occurred to him after he had passed the frontier and had received the Æduan envoys. But this is obviously a very far-fetched explanation. Cæsar has still to explain to us why, in his anxiety to defend Toulouse in the west, he should have marched due north and crossed the northern boundary of the province.

What lies at the root of these manifest inconsistencies? It would be absurd to attribute them to careless writing or to the speed with which the *Commentaries* were composed. *Quam facile et celeriter eos (i.e., the Commentaries) perfecerit scimus*, writes Hirtius. But Cæsar is far too clever for us to acquiesce in such an explanation. He can write with the most admirable lucidity and accuracy, even when he is most hurried. Moreover, these contradictions are too serious to be regarded as involuntary blunders. It is far more probable that we are face to face with inconsistencies imposed by some necessity of concealment.

Is it possible to discover what it is that Cæsar desired to conceal? He did not write the *Commentaries* to perpetuate the memory of his victories; but because, accused of having pursued during his governorship a policy of violence and aggression, he desired to prove that he had always fought reluctantly, and that all his campaigns, from the first year onwards, so far from being aggressive, had been necessary measures of precaution and self-defence. Now, on these very lines, Cæsar had an excellent opportunity of interpreting his great offensive movement against the Helvetii: he had only to base his explanation on what he himself had said in his opening chapters—on what Cicero wrote to Atticus—namely, that the Helvetii desired to found a great Gallic empire. No justification would have carried greater weight in the eyes of his countrymen; no one would have ventured to refuse Cæsar the credit of having saved the empire from a second invasion of Cimbri and Teutones by a war which, in spite of its apparently offensive character, was, in reality, only a prudent measure of defence. Why, then, when on the point of adopting a simple and lucid explanation, based, moreover, upon facts recorded by himself, does Cæsar abandon it and have recourse to the confused and incoherent explanations which we have reviewed: first, the necessity of defend-

ing the Province ; then the necessity of defending Toulouse ; finally, the necessity of defending the Ædui and other Gallic allies of Rome ? There is only one way of explaining what is, on the face of it, an absurdity ; we must believe that the fears expressed by Cicero concerning the migration of the Helvetii were much exaggerated ; that the Helvetii had no plan so ambitious as that of conquering the whole of Gaul ; and that between the year 58 and the year 52 this fact had become so notorious that, when Cæsar was writing the *Commentaries* at the end of 52, he had no longer the courage to justify his offensive strategy by pleading the necessity of breaking up the nucleus of a future Celto-Helvetian empire. This explanation being now inadmissible, Cæsar found himself obliged to confess, either that he had wholly misjudged the purpose and character of the Helvetian migration, or that he had attacked them without due cause. He avoided the dilemma by attempting to prove provocation on the part of the Helvetii, and by modifying his account by ingenious alterations which, for all his cleverness, he could not succeed in making wholly consistent.

We are thus in a position to draw the important conclusion that the Helvetii had no desire to conquer Gaul or to establish a great Gallic federation. But this immediately gives rise to several other questions. What was the real object of the Helvetian migration ? Did they really desire to migrate to Saintonge, as Cæsar says ? And if the Helvetii did not desire to invade Gaul, how are we to explain the conduct of the Senate and of Metellus and Cæsar ? We have seen that the formidable character attributed to the Helvetian movement would explain all our difficulties. If this be denied, in what direction are we to modify our whole account ? Let us continue our examination of Cæsar's narrative, which will supply us with many of the answers required.

After the conclusion of his negotiations with the Ædui, Cæsar executed the last part of his offensive movement with characteristic quickness and energy. He attempted to surprise and crush the Helvetii at the passage of the Saône, but, succeeding only in destroying a small rearguard which had remained on the eastern bank, he threw all his army across the river in one day and began to follow the enemy at a short distance, waiting for an opportunity to attack. Cæsar describes this march with great detail in chapters xiii-xxiii., but without ever indicating its direction, and narrates one incident of exceptional importance. At one moment he discovered treachery

among some of the Ædui. The Ædui had given him a body of cavalry and had promised to supply him with corn, but the Æduan cavalry was defeated with suspicious regularity in all the skirmishes and engagements during the march, while the promised corn never arrived, though provisions were running short and the Æduan leaders found it more and more difficult to explain the delay. Cæsar decided to clear up the mystery, and held an inquiry. At this point a character whose acquaintance we made at the beginning of the narrative again makes his appearance—Dumnorix, the Æduan chief who was said to have taken part in the conspiracy of Orgetorix. Cæsar discovered that the Roman alliance had been demanded by one party, with Divitiacus at its head, while Dumnorix, on the other hand, favoured the Helvetii, because his wife was a Helvetian, and he hoped through them to obtain the supremacy in his nation. Unfortunately for Cæsar, Dumnorix was immensely rich and had widespread influence, and it was he who, as commander of the cavalry, had given his men secret orders to let themselves be defeated by the Helvetii, and was preventing the arrival of supplies.

This incident is of the greatest importance. It shows us, first of all, that Dumnorix's mysterious connection with the Helvetian expedition had not been severed by the death of Orgetorix. It shows us also that the movement of the Helvetii, though it had not the ambitious purpose which had been attributed to it at Rome, must have aimed at something less modest than the migration to Saintonge, which would have concerned only the Helvetii themselves. For in that case why should the powerful party of which Dumnorix was leader have been interested in the success of the movement? But Cæsar does little to satisfy our curiosity. After briefly informing us that he generously pardoned Dumnorix he hurries on with the narrative.

He states that he hoped on one occasion to crush the Helvetii by a night surprise, but that the attempt failed, and that he was about to abandon the pursuit through lack of provisions when he was suddenly attacked by the enemy. It is now that he gives us the first indication of the locality. The attack took place on the heights of Bibracte (Mont Beauvrai) near Autun. The Helvetii had therefore marched northwards and made a long detour in order to reach Saintonge. But our surprise increases after reading the account of the battle, which Cæsar describes as a glorious victory for his legions. Rauchenstein, who has subjected the history of this war to an

ingenious if sometimes almost over-subtle criticism, has used Cæsar's own narrative to testify to the doubtful result of the battle. It is certain, for instance, that Cæsar was obliged to remain on the field for three days in order to bury his dead and attend to his wounded, while the Helvetii were quietly continuing their march in the direction of Langres. Here is a second piece of topographical information, and it is no less significant than the first. The Helvetii, who according to Cæsar desired to move towards the coast, were now marching north-east, that is to say, in the opposite direction. Cæsar succeeded at last in making peace, and the majority of the Helvetii decided to return to their old home, while an obstinate minority proceeded *ad Rhenum finesque Germanorum*. This detail throws much light on the obscure question which we are attempting to solve and supplements the two first indications of the Helvetian line of march. Why did this minority march towards the Rhine? It is clear that when they separated from their compatriots they were not in a position to take any road at random; they must have continued in the direction which they had been following with the rest of the tribe. We have seen that the Helvetii had already turned eastwards. The Helvetii therefore were migrating towards the Rhine.

Have we now arrived at sufficient data to determine the purpose of this mysterious migration? Let us first of all notice certain rather curious coincidences. In 62 or 61 the Ædui asked help from the Roman Senate; in 61 the Helvetii are persuaded to migrate. The negotiations at Rome are entrusted to Divitiacus; Dumnorix is somehow involved from the beginning in the intrigues which precede the movement of the Helvetii. What was it that Divitiacus was to demand at Rome? The support of the Roman legions against Ariovistus. In what direction were the Helvetians marching? Towards the Rhine, that is to say, towards the country in which the army of Ariovistus was probably encamped. Throughout the war Divitiacus acts as Cæsar's friend, Dumnorix as protector of the Helvetii. One is therefore strongly tempted to ask whether the migration of the Helvetii was not intended to serve the same end as the negotiations of Divitiacus at Rome; that is to say, to drive back Ariovistus beyond the Rhine. Let us take this hypothesis as a basis for the reconstruction of the Gallic situation on Cæsar's arrival, and we shall see how its probability is enhanced. The great problem which had for some years past occupied every nation in Gaul was the

“German peril,” the growing power of Ariovistus. The Ædui, who had been deprived by Ariovistus of the supremacy of Gaul, were so discouraged by repeated failures that they despaired of succeeding with their own unaided forces, and had decided to have recourse to Rome. This was the mission with which Divitiacus had been entrusted. But Rome was evidently not the only foreign power from whom the Ædui might expect assistance ; the warlike Helvetii who had already waged long campaigns against the Suevi might prove very valuable allies. Now Divitiacus was the leader of the Conservative party which represented the old nobility of Gaul, and his party was opposed by a faction, led by Dumnorix and supported by the lower classes, which may be described as the popular party. The issue between these parties must have involved some serious matter of policy. Thus we arrive at the following fairly obvious conclusion. Both parties were equally convinced that the Ædui could not by themselves overthrow the German supremacy, but they were not in agreement as to the foreign power to which they should appeal. The party of Divitiacus relied on Rome ; the Nationalists under Dumnorix looked to the Helvetii. It was probably Dumnorix, and not Orgetorix, who made the proposal to the Helvetii, with the promise of lands in some fertile part of Gaul, while Orgetorix was merely the chief agent of the Nationalist party among the Helvetii.

Rash as these hypotheses may appear, it is remarkable how they clear up all the facts which remain obscure or unexplained : the alliance of Rome with Ariovistus, the alarming rumours concerning the movements of the Helvetii, the death of Orgetorix, and, finally, the offensive movement undertaken by Cæsar. We can now understand why in 60 and 59 Ariovistus was so anxious to be declared friend and ally of the Roman people. It was not, as we naturally supposed, the vague fear of a Helvetian invasion, but a far more serious danger that induced him to seek the friendship of Rome. As soon as he knew that Divitiacus and Dumnorix were both intriguing against him, one at Rome and the other among the Helvetii, he took alarm lest the two brothers should succeed in forming against him a coalition of Ædui, Helvetii and Romans. He was forced to take prompt measures to anticipate this coalition before it was formed. It is very probable that he attempted to counteract the intrigues of Dumnorix among the Helvetii, though we possess no information on this point. It is evident, on the other hand, that his request to the

Romans for the title of friend and ally was intended to cancel Rome's alliance with the Ædui.

This being so we are able to give a very probable explanation of the alarming rumours current in Rome concerning the Helvetian migration. The Ædui had asked for the support of Rome against Ariovistus, and Rome had granted it by the senatorial decree of 61. Now, although Ariovistus was ready to pay any price for the Roman alliance, he and his friends at Rome were obliged to find some means to conceal from the public the inconsistency between this alliance and that already concluded with the Ædui. The best means of doing this was evidently to demonstrate that Romans, Ædui and Suevi were all menaced by a great common danger, which made it advisable for them to forgive and forget their petty quarrels. It therefore seems to me very probable that Ariovistus took advantage of the Helvetian migration and the ignorance of Roman politicians in order to exaggerate the peril and persuade influential Romans that the Helvetii intended to place themselves at the head of a Gallic federation which might one day attack Italy itself. Ariovistus achieved his object the more easily, because he was probably assisted by one party among his enemies. We have already noticed that Cicero, in his letter written to Atticus on March 16 of the year 60, is the first to acquaint us with the Helvetian peril. Whence did he obtain his information? We have seen that he was on intimate terms with Divitiacus, who had been his guest. It is therefore very probable that this piece of information, as well as others on Gallic affairs, had its source in Divitiacus. It is not difficult to see why those Ædui who favoured the alliance with Rome joined in attempting to alarm the Romans on the subject of the Helvetii. It was to their interest to anticipate the Nationalists in promoting the overthrow of Ariovistus. Since Dumnorix was doing his best to stir up the Helvetii, they were obliged to try to force the inert Senate into action by the application of some powerful stimulant. The Helvetian peril could be made to serve their ends by being used to precipitate the Roman intervention. Gaul was in a critical position; if Rome did not intervene to deliver it from Ariovistus the Helvetii would undoubtedly do so, and once masters of Gaul the Helvetii would be a grave danger to Italy. This must have been the essence of the communications which the Roman party among the Ædui sent to Italy. It is very probable that the friends of Divitiacus were intriguing among the Helvetii to checkmate the negotiations, for it

seems likely that Orgetorix fell a victim to the intrigues of Ariovistus or of the Ædui, or of both. We are thus enabled to account for Cæsar's surprise when he discovered that the death of Orgetorix made no difference to the preparations of the Helvetii. Orgetorix was the representative and leader of the Nationalist party among the Helvetii, the most active and intelligent of Dumnorix's agents, and the chief organiser of the expedition. If the cabal which brought about his death aimed at making the Helvetii oppose all the undertakings of the Nationalist party, it is easy to understand how Cæsar, who by the time he wrote his book in 52 was aware of the whole truth, should in a moment of forgetfulness express his surprise that the fall of Orgetorix in no way affected the preparations for the expedition.

Gallic affairs were thus during the course of the year 60 becoming more and more complicated. The Nationalists were working hard to bring up the Helvetii; the Romanising party and Ariovistus were both, but for different reasons, denouncing the Helvetii. Roman politicians found themselves in a very difficult position. Were they to yield to the solicitations of the Ædui, send an army to fight Ariovistus, and put a stop to Helvetian intervention by themselves undertaking to overthrow the Germans? Or were they to attend first of all to the "Helvetian peril," accept the alliance of Ariovistus, and move at once against the Helvetii in order to secure Italy from all danger in the future? They had to choose between two alternative policies, the anti-Helvetian and the anti-German. The little that we know of the plans of the Consul Metellus leads us to believe that he already inclined to the anti-Helvetian policy. Cæsar decided definitely in its favour in the course of 59, as is proved by the alliance which he concluded with the King of the Suevi. This alliance meant the triumph of the intrigues of Ariovistus over those of Divitiacus. It would no doubt be very interesting to know the reasons which led him to make so unfortunate a choice, but in the absence of evidence we must content ourselves with conjecture. Most probably the cause of his mistake lay in the general ignorance which prevailed at Rome about Gaul. The alarming rumours spread by Ariovistus and Divitiacus concerning the movement of the Helvetii must have produced a great impression, for the invasion of Cimbri and Teutones was still fresh in the public memory. As soon as these rumours began to circulate, the politicians and the public, with that tendency to rash generalisation so characteristic of democracies, concluded that

the entire Gallic problem centred round the Helvetii ; everything else, the struggle between Ædui and Suevi, the " German peril," the Rhine frontier, was of secondary importance. Cæsar was infected by the infatuation of the majority, and as soon as he found himself at the head of his army made the necessary arrangements for attacking the Helvetii.

The choice was in reality a very serious mistake. The Helvetian expedition must have been exceedingly popular throughout Gaul, because men hoped that it would contribute to the disappearance of the Germans ; and the intervention of the Proconsul as the cat's-paw of Ariovistus wounded the pride and the interests of the Nationalists, and placed the Romanising party and Cæsar himself in a very difficult position. The partisans of the Roman alliance were naturally held responsible for the action of Rome's representative in Gaul. They had predicted that the Roman intervention would confer the greatest benefits on Gaul ; whereas the Proconsul now made his appearance as the zealous ally of Ariovistus, who had been rescued by Cæsar from a formidable enemy without the trouble of moving a single soldier. Here again is what looks like a somewhat rash hypothesis ; but it can be supported by an argument which is, I think, decisive, for it permits us to explain the violent change in Cæsar's policy as soon as peace was concluded with the Helvetii.

Great as are the difficulties which we have examined in the first book of the *Commentaries*, there remains one much greater. Cæsar nowhere explains why, after the war against the Helvetii, he immediately proceeded to attack Ariovistus. He states that on the termination of the Helvetian war the representatives of the tribes of Gaul asked permission to convene an assembly, and gives a pathetic description of its session. The representatives sat plunged in gloomy silence, and he himself, alarmed and affected by the sight, was obliged almost to drag the truth from lips which were closed by superstitious fear. When at last they were persuaded to speak, they gave Cæsar an account of the burdensome oppression of Ariovistus. Whereupon Cæsar, regarding it as intolerable that friends of the Roman people should be so cruelly maltreated, in a noble outburst of generosity decided for war—a chivalrous war of liberation undertaken in the name of justice.

No one with any experience of politics can take this heroic story very seriously. Roman policy in general and Cæsar in particular knew nothing of sentimental considerations. The war against

Ariovistus was a very serious war, for it meant marching six legions into a distant country with no certain base of operations against a very powerful enemy in the flush of success. Moreover, there was a political as well as the military difficulties. Ariovistus was the ally of Rome, and he had kept his engagements with perfect loyalty; his quarrel with the Ædui could not be taken as a pretext for a rupture, because they were anterior to the alliance. In declaring the Ædui and Suevi her friends and allies, Rome had evidently undertaken to interfere no further in their differences. There was, therefore, no decent pretext for the war. Now, although an unjust war would in no way have troubled the conscience of a Roman Proconsul, an illegal war was on a very different footing. In case of failure, the general who had undertaken such a war would have incurred very serious responsibilities; nor must we forget the possible effect of such an unlawful aggression on a superstitious and ignorant soldiery. At Besançon Cæsar actually had to face an incident very rare in the military history of Rome: the troops mutinied and refused to proceed further, protesting among other things that the war was unlawful.

It is clear, therefore, that, if Cæsar embarked on so highly dangerous an enterprise at a few weeks' notice, willingly encountering every danger and staking his whole prestige, he must have been driven by some very pressing political interest which would not permit delay. Otherwise he would have attempted to gain time, in order to increase his army (as in the following year, for the war against the Belgæ), and in order to find a more serious *casus belli*. What was this pressing political necessity? If we follow the *Commentaries* or the traditional narrative it cannot be discovered; but we can give a very satisfactory answer to the question if we accept the explanations which we have suggested. Cæsar made war against Ariovistus in order to remove the disastrous impression produced in Gaul by his campaign against the Helvetii. That war had destroyed the whole basis of his policy, and had only served to increase the power of his rival, Ariovistus. During the Helvetian war, or on its conclusion, Cæsar must have perceived his blunder; and in order to lose no time in retrieving it he boldly broke the alliance which he had himself concluded, and declared war on Ariovistus. On this hypothesis everything becomes explicable.

There is, of course, an alternative line of argument. It may be urged that Cæsar was aware all the time of the real purpose of the

Helvetian migration, that he knew when he left Rome that he would have to overcome, not the Helvetian, but the German peril, and that he had made up his mind to make war on Ariovistus, but desired first of all to get rid of the Helvetii, who were his rivals in the same undertaking. In this case the German alliance becomes a mere trick to gratify Ariovistus and induce him to leave Cæsar's hands free during the war against the Helvetii. This is the theory of Duruy, but in my opinion it is open to two insuperable objections. First of all, if Cæsar had been thoroughly acquainted with the situation in Gaul and with the true character of the Helvetian migration, he would have refused to accept Dumnorix as commander of his cavalry. The *Commentaries* show that the discovery of Dumnorix's treachery was a great surprise to Cæsar, and this proves that he was unaware of the true bearing of the expedition upon the state of political parties in Gaul, that is to say, that he had only a superficial and imperfect idea of the real nature of the movement. The other capital objection is the alliance with Ariovistus. If he had foreseen the inevitability of a war with Ariovistus he would surely never have consented to see him granted the title of friend and ally. No one acquainted with Roman history will believe that Cæsar can have deliberately adopted a daring expedient so likely to involve him in serious embarrassment.

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
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
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